The Dissertation Committee for Raymond Joseph Parrott Certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation:

Struggle for Solidarity:
The New Left, Portuguese African Decolonization, and the End of the Cold War Consensus

Committee:

Mark Atwood Lawrence, Supervisor

Oloruntoyin Falola

Barbara Harlow

Minkah Makalani

Jeremi Suri

Struggle for Solidarity:
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by

Raymond Joseph Parrott, M.Pub.Pol.; M.A.; B.A.

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Dedication

To Julie and my parents. Thank You.

Acknowledgements

When I began this project, I could not have imagined the directions it would take or the dissertation it would become. It began as a fairly straightforward international history of how the Western world managed the decolonization of Portuguese Africa – the last European empire. It has since morphed into something much more complex, seeking to integrate the diplomacy of stateless peoples, Western popular movements, and Euro-American politicians into a single narrative. I believe the resulting project is far more interesting and important than I initially envisioned, and I owe a debt of gratitude to a number of individuals and institutions that challenged me to expand my scholarship and allowed me to pursue an ambitious research agenda.

First and foremost, I must thank the faculty and staff of the History Department at the University of Texas. When I drove halfway across the country to enroll as a graduate student, I could not have imagined how fortunate I would be to become part of such a community. I have grown as a scholar, educator, and writer due to the guidance I received in the department. Though far from an exhaustive list, I am especially grateful to H.W. Brands, Wm. Roger Louis, Tiffany Gill, Tony Hopkins, Michael Anderson, and Matthew Tribbe. I would also be remiss if I did not thank Marilyn Lehman, who has been irreplaceably helpful during the many times I dropped into her office unannounced over many years.

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The exploration and evaluation of grassroots social organizing and its political influence is difficult due to the decentralized, often ephemeral nature of these movements. This project would have been impossible without the assistance of numerous individuals and institutions that guided and funded the expansive research involved. I am especially grateful to all the scholars, activists, policymakers, and archivists who took time from their busy schedules to submit to extended interviews and discussions. While a list of the oral histories I conducted is available in the bibliography, I must also recognize John P. Cann, Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo, Tor Sellström, Coletta Youngers, Robert Van Lierop. Kier Schuringa, and Lincoln Cushing. I would not have been able to begin this project without the work done by the African Activist Archive to collect and contextualize movement records, and I owe a special debt to those involved: Richard Knight, Chris Root, David Wiley, and Peter Limb. I am also grateful to William Minter, who has offered consistent advice, insight, and documents as I completed this project.

The ambitious research agenda that resulted from these many conversations would not have been possible without the generous support of a number of grants and fellowships,

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Throughout these years of research, travel, and writing I have been privileged to be part of a History Department community that produces not just good scholars, but also wonderful people. I am especially appreciative of those friends who have consistently acted as sounding boards, mental health professionals, and partners in (sometimes absurd) adventures. I completed coursework with a group of intelligent and consistently entertaining people, and I am happy to be part of the extended African history family that was proactively welcoming when I was first began searching for a project – notably Jason

Morgan, Charlie Thomas, and Jessica Achberger. I am also particularly lucky to have been a member of both “The League” (Danielle, Jacob, Matt, Helen, Val, Ava, etc.) and the weekly Crown & Anchor crew (Jason, Sean, Amy, Sundar, Shari, Ryan, David and Karen sometimes, Trevor rarely, Martha and Nick by extension).

Finally, I owe by far the greatest debt to my family. My parents have shown no limit in their enthusiasm for my chosen profession despite limited trips home and occasional overseas radio silences. From the editing of literally hundreds of pages to simple advice on demand, they have provided a steady flow of support available at almost any time of day. They have remained consistently excited for my scholarly future since I first began toying with the idea of graduate study in college, and I am incredibly appreciative for their bottomless confidence. Most of all, I owe great thanks to my wife, Julie. She has been intimately involved in this project since it first began shortly after we married. She usually entertains my academic foibles and provides assistance whenever she can. She has kept me grounded as a scholar and helped me grow as an educator. Most importantly, she provides me with a welcome respite each night from living in my own head (or a Word document). The sometimes challenging process of graduate school has been rendered enjoyable by her encouragement, patience, positivity, and friendship. I am truly fortunate to be undertaking this journey with her by my side.

Struggle for Solidarity:
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Raymond Joseph Parrott, Ph.D.

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Supervisor: Mark Atwood Lawrence

"Struggle for Solidarity: The New Left, African Decolonization, and the End of the Cold War Consensus" explores how Third World criticism of the Cold War changed Western foreign policy and activist ideologies. Between 1961 and 1975, the decolonization of Portuguese Africa inspired a diverse, decentralized transnational support movement. In the midst of the Vietnam War, Americans and Europeans disillusioned with the Cold War found models for transnational political, economic, and racial justice in the socialist freedom struggles of Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and Angola. A broad New Left coalition of youth, ethnic minorities, and religious activists rejected the anti-communist and Eurocentric diplomatic alliance with imperial Portugal. They embraced in its stead a new internationalism that championed self-determination and greater equality between global North and South. Drawing on over forty oral histories and extensive archival research on three continents in English, Portuguese, French, and Afrikaans, the dissertation reconstructs the transnational networks that animated this movement and its successful lobbying of Congress. The grassroots-legislative alliance increased pressure on Portugal and ended Gerald Ford's anti-communist intervention in newly independent Angola in

1975, institutionalizing Vietnam era political and ideological cleavages in ways that defined the final decades of the global Cold War.

The dissertation argues that decolonization and a new domestic internationalism merged to fundamentally alter Western attitudes toward the Cold War in three ways. First, it concretely illustrates how grassroots organizations gained access to American policymaking by providing information and framing options for Congressional legislators. Second, Portuguese African nationalists helped unify ideological and racial communities behind a New Left internationalism. Shared hostility to formal colonialism legitimized radical critiques of foreign policy, structural racism, and exploitative international business practices in ways the divisive Vietnam War could not, influencing social movements from anti-apartheid to the Seattle protests of 1999. Finally, this revived and expanded anti-imperial coalition ended the Cold War anti-communist consensus. Success against Ford in Angola became a political and legislative model for constraining U.S. interventions in Africa, Latin America, and beyond.

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Introduction: *A Luta Continua*

A heavy drizzle was the only thing suppressing the excitement of the 50,000 people packed into Machava Stadium on the outskirts of Laurenço Marques. It was midnight on June 25th, 1975, the day that Portugal would formally dissolve its colony in Mozambique and hand power to a new, independent nation. The red and green of the Portuguese flag had been flying over the capital city – soon to be rechristened Maputo – on and off since its namesake explorer had first arrived in Delagao (Maputo) Bay in the 16th century. At 12:20 AM, the symbol of 470 years of European rule over this corner of Africa descended, replaced by a new standard that featured a bayonetted gun and hoe crossed over a book. The khaki-clad Samora Moises Machel, a 41-year old nurse turned revolutionary, presided over the festivities. The second president of the *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (Mozambique Liberation Front, FRELIMO) had led the fight against the Portuguese since his party had begun an armed liberation struggle in 1964. This revolution had been the last to join the campaigns in Portugal's other African colonies of Angola and the small enclave of Guinea-Bissau. Like his comrades, Machel had spent ten years fighting in the bush in anticipation for this day. Now he stood ready to accept the presidency of the nation, amidst drum rolls and booming cannons of a different variety to which he had long been accustomed. The mostly black African crowd roared its approval. "We have won our independence by dint of our struggle," Machel proclaimed in his characteristically

animated way, “We shall make revolution triumph! Long Live FRELIMO! Long Live the People Republic of Mozambique! The struggle continues [A luta continua] . . .”[1]

As Machel thundered through his lengthy speech that revisited the revolution and set the stage for his new government, he was surrounded by visiting dignitaries that had aided FRELIMO over the prior decade. Nearby was Portugal’s revolutionary Prime Minister Vasco Gonçalves, who had come to power after a coup toppled the fascist government in Lisbon the year before. Representatives of many African nations were present, notably Tanzania that had sheltered FRELIMO during much of its time in exile and Algeria that had armed it. India had sent its ambassador, ready to present his credentials to the government on its first day. The Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China had sizeable delegations on hand, and a smattering of eastern Europeans were present as well. Largely absent, however, were the major nations of the Western alliance. The United States, Canada, France, and West Germany had no officials at the ceremonies. Britain alone among the great powers had received an invitation, as had the Netherlands and the Nordic countries. Machel praised those present, singling out his African and socialist allies along with the Dutch and Scandinavians for aiding the revolution in its early stages. Amidst the fanfare, the century old American consulate located across the city lowered its own flag at midnight, since the independent government of Mozambique had not requested it reopen as an embassy.

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[1] Africa Fund, “Voices of Liberation #1: Message to the Nation on his Investiture as President of the People's Republic of Mozambique,” nd [c. fall 1975], African Activist Archive. For descriptions of the independence ceremony, see Gloria Negri, “Flag Raising Ceremony Heralds Free Mozambique,” *Boston Globe*, 26 June 1975.

This is not to say that there were no Americans in the audience. FRELIMO had a number of friends in the country. Black Congressional Caucus members Charles Diggs and Cardiss Collins were in the stadium as private citizens, and Senator Ted Kennedy had regretfully declined an invitation. A few others represented organizations that had aided FRELIMO, including two members of the American Committee on Africa.[2] These politicians and activists had supported the liberations struggles, even as their government maintained the alliance with imperial Portugal. In the midst of the Cold War, papers across the world commented on the absence of American and European delegates, worrying that it might represent a sign of Mozambique's embrace of a communism hostile to the West. But those in attendance understood that the snubs had less to do with Machel's ideological plans for the country than his memory of the past. Diggs acidly assured a reporter that the United States would have been invited had it "followed a policy of more than lip service to the independence movements in Africa."[3] Those Westerners in attendance had championed the cause of African liberation in their own nations, thereby earning their positions in the football stadium that rainy winter evening.

The mix of foreign dignitaries, legislators, and non-governmental representatives may have confused the international media but it was a reflection of an internationalism that was central to FRELIMO and the liberation of its fellow socialist parties in Angola and Guinea-Bissau. These African nationalists had sought independence through decade-

[2] Gloria Negri, "Flag-Raising ceremony heralds a free Mozambique," Boston Globe, 26 June 1975; letter, Janet Hooper to Joaquim Chissano, 17 August 1975, Box 79, American Committee on Africa Papers, Amistad Research Center (New Orleans, LA).
[3] Dial Torgerson, "500 Years of Portuguese Rule Ends in Mozambique," *Los Angeles Times*, 25 June 1975.

long military struggles, but their fortunes depended as much on battles as who supported them at the international level. This kind of "diplomatic revolution," as Matt Connelly describes the Algerian War against France, relied on international pressure to magnify local military defeats into crushing blows against traditions of racial and economic exploitation in Africa and elsewhere.[4] It was as much a war of ideas and ideology as weapons. Press releases, personal networks, and media joined guns as essential elements in achieving independence. Globalization – whereby states and their citizens became more closely intertwined through new transportation, economic, and communication networks – had blurred borders. For the first time, marginalized and disempowered peoples had ready access to pathways for informational and material exchange that allowed them to challenge imperial rule. In this new diplomatic revolution, liberation was not won by force alone, but rather changing relative inequalities of power in all their aspects. Emerging standards of equality and self-determination helped strengthen the liberation movements, while promoting the political isolation of metropolitan states.

An international struggle was particularly attractive to Portuguese African nationalists. Lisbon's dictatorial politics and self-imposed economic isolation constrained the growth of anti-colonialism in both the metropolis and the colonies. As a result, the formative influences for Portuguese Africans were primarily foreign, slowing the development of cohesive resistance movements but exposing emerging leaders to a multiplicity of sympathetic constituencies in Europe, Africa, and the Americas. FRELIMO,

[4] Matthew Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 4-5.

the *Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde* (African Independence Party for Guinea and Cabo Verde, PAIGC), and competing Angolan nationalist groups all appealed to foreign governments for assistance in pursuing their independence. When they were rebuffed by Western officials in the midst of the Cold War, they shifted their efforts to courting religious humanitarians, radical leftists, and ethnic minorities unsympathetic to colonialism. This decision reflected a commitment by FRELIMO and PAIGC to a policy of non-alignment, which sought to unite a variety of global constituencies behind a search for self-determination, independent economic development, and representative governance in Africa. Indeed, the parties viewed themselves as part of a global revolution rebelling against antagonistic ideologies that divided nations. Their diplomacy sought to overcome not just the formal boundaries of colonialism, but the more elusive lines of thought that separated East and West, North and South.

While the transnational aspects of the Lusophone struggles for independence are fascinating in their own right, this dissertation is not a global history of Portuguese decolonization. Rather, it takes as its subject the relationships that simultaneously baffled and frightened the foreign press covering Mozambican independence. The mixture of official and non-governmental Western organizations that aided and impeded PAIGC and FRELIMO's long struggle for freedom reflected an era of globalization that saw the centrality of state sovereignty diminished and the number of influential international actors multiply. Convincing Western governments to isolate a North Atlantic ally in the midst of the Cold War would prove difficult, but there existed in Euro-American polities populations sympathetic to the concept of decolonization. Nationalist parties like

FRELIMO worked around state borders by forging contacts with civil society groups that prioritized a set of international values beyond the preservation of capitalistic democracy that usually informed Cold War strategy. These values included self-determination of political and social norms, global racial equality, and real economic sovereignty.

Importantly, the formation of a transnational movement advocating for African liberation had a greater impact on its host societies than the Lusophone colonies. For while Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau would likely have gained independence at some point with the arms provided by Eastern European and African governments, the growth of a popular Western commitment to these liberation struggles contributed to the transformation of Euro-American society. Decolonization occurred at the same time the West experienced a veritable revolution in the way it understood the civil and economic rights of its own citizens. But the dominant Cold War liberal consensus that promoted anti-communism and narrow national identities prevented the integration of these processes until the cathartic years of the Vietnam War. The conflict inspired a deep soul searching in the United States and the wider North Atlantic alliance, pushing many Westerners to reevaluate international policies in light of new domestic emphases on equality, democracy, and justice. This applied particularly to the Third World, where Western governments had long emphasized stability and access over the best interests of local peoples. Radical Portuguese African criticisms of the Western alliance, advanced most vociferously by socialist parties such as FRELIMO and PAIGC, helped expand this soul-searching beyond the narrow question of Vietnam to a wider anti-colonial/anti-imperial critique of the Cold War. A growing sense of solidarity with Portuguese African liberation

thus became a central element in the fundamental alteration of how Western peoples understood their national engagements with the Third World: Africa, Asia, and Latin America – which this dissertation will also refer to as the global South.

The socio-political impact in Western societies of the transnational solidarity movement with the socialist nationalist parties of Portuguese Africa illustrates an underappreciated historical reality: Third World peoples and ideologies affected the local politics and policies of the superpowers. Beyond governments reacting to trends in the global South, the lowering of state barriers opened Euro-American societies to criticism most clearly articulated by colonial peoples. Radical concepts once depreciated by Cold War liberalism found new lives in more flexible ideological spaces defined by activists working with nationalist movements. New visions of the future, values, and rhetoric were imported and created in these exchanges, which continued to inform Euro-American political movements – particularly on the left. Building on a recent literature that has privileged such transnational elements in ethnic studies, this dissertation contends that broad popular embrace of socialist-egalitarian ideologies defined in dialogue with anti-colonial movements empowered Westerners to challenge inherited understandings of Euro-American hegemony from within. This approach demands a reconsideration of the dialectic present in the global Cold War. For while Odd Arne Westad rightfully points out the tendency for competing parties in the global South to couch local conflicts in terms defined by the competing superpowers, his and other scholarly depictions of rigid Soviet-American ideologies underappreciate how Third World internationalism transformed the

societies of the global North.[5] Westerners frustrated by ideological conformity and seeking to reshape their own nations adapted universally attractive elements embedded within struggles for self-determination to inspire, reinforce, and legitimize their own movements.

Beyond influencing social and political relationships, the creation of a transnational movement advocating for foreign nationalist interests helped transform Western approaches to the Third World. And it is in this key intersection that the Portuguese African example is so pivotal. While it is difficult to gauge the impact of the West's gradual and incomplete isolation of imperial Portugal, the impact of a newly critical Euro-American internationalism is clear in the case of Angola's contested independence in 1975. The decision by the United States government to intervene on behalf of an anti-communist nationalist party against the socialist *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, MPLA) provided the first test of recently empowered American constituencies critical of the Cold War. The network of activists assembled during the earlier struggle for liberation successfully mobilized against a reactionary American internationalism, realizing the potential of this transnational movement. That it did so through popular organizing and congressional constraints offered a replicable path for future attempts to limit presidential adventurism. For while similar restrictions on the Vietnam War had illustrated the ability of civil society to influence Cold War policy, Angola implied this was not an isolated incident. The activism and congressional action in effective defense of the MPLA drew on tactics pioneered during

[5] Odd Arne Westad, The *Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

the anti-war and anti-colonial periods, but deployed them in a different context. This would provide a model for challenging reactionary American and Western policies in the global South for the remainder of the Cold War.

At its core, then, this study asks a pair of interrelated questions: how did the development of transnational social movements affect Western societies, and how did these changes concretely affect Cold War foreign policy– particularly in the most powerful country the United States? It uses the case of Lusophone African liberation due to its pivotal timing at this moment of transition between 1961 and 1975, but also because the resolution of the independence question offered the first test for what might best be termed a New Left internationalism. This admittedly fluid ideology took as its common unifying elements a new respect for the nations of the global South and their priorities, as well as a deep cynicism of the Cold War and the longer history of Euro-American hegemony of which it was the latest manifestation.

Portuguese African Decolonization in an International Context

Portugal has been the outlier in the historiography of decolonization. The country's retreat in 1975 after the high tide of independence has made linking it to familiar narratives complicated. Scholars have tended to focus on the more populous (and better funded studies of) Francophone and Anglophone worlds, reinforcing the historic marginalization of Lusophone states like Angola and Mozambique.[6] Portuguese scholars contributed to this

[6] The list of major studies on Portuguese decolonization includes Norrie MacQueen, *The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa: Metropolitan Revolution and the Dissolution of Empire* (New York: Longman, 1997); Stewart Lloyd-Jones and António Costa Pinto, eds., *The Last Empire: Thirty Years of Portuguese*

trend with a tendency to focus less on recent history than the country's overseas expansion, not its declension. Such emphasis has bred a remarkably international outlook in the academe of the small country, but it has retarded the growth of the historiography of decolonization at a time when scholars of the Britain, France, and most other European states have devoted ever greater attention to near contemporary events.[7] The result is a narrative of decolonization that generally ends around 1968, with an asterisk marking Portuguese Africa and the equally problematic cases of Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) and South Africa.[8]

This oversight is unfortunate for international histories of decolonization, because Portugal was perhaps the most interconnected imperial nation and elicited noteworthy reactions from other empires and minority governments. Small and relatively undeveloped, it was intimately tied into colonial, economic, and alliance networks with the United States, Britain, France, and South Africa. This outward looking nature of Portuguese imperialism implicitly tied other American and European states to its colonial plans, calling into question the Western commitment to full decolonization in the 1960s. A recent generation of scholars has embraced this global perspective, engaging with the question of Portuguese decolonization primarily through bilateral diplomatic histories and biographies of key

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Decolonisation (Chicago: Intellect, 2003); António Costa Pinto, *O Fim do Império Português. A Cena Internacional, a Guerra Colonial, e a Descolonização, 1961-1975* (Lisbon: Livros Horizonte, 2001). There is a larger but still relatively small literature on the decolonization of individual Lusophone state, most notably Mozambique and Angola.

[7] Jean-Frédéric Schaub, "The Internationalization of Portuguese Historiography," *E-Journal of Portuguese History* 1:1 (Summer 2003): http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Portuguese_Brazilian_Studies/ejph/html/issue1/pdf/schaub.pdf.

[8] See for example, Martin Shipway, *Decolonization and Its Impact: A Comparative Approach to the End of the Colonial Empires* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008); Frederick Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

leaders.[9] A common argument contends that the Cold War alliance system helped the poor Iberian nation retain its territories far longer than it otherwise would have.[10] Through skillful use of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and new economic links with European and southern African countries, Portugal funded three overseas wars for well over a decade. Unfortunately, focus on bilateral relations between Lisbon and various European capitals, Pretoria, and Washington explain how Portugal could delay decolonization, but they have greater difficulty addressing the seemingly inevitable collapse of the empire.[11] The ahistorical tendency to accept decolonization as a fait accompli is simply too tempting. By falling into this ahistorical trap, scholars have failed to truly interrogate Lusophone Africa's relationship to wider global trends.

Integrating Portugal's experience into the tripartite formula first proposed by John Darwin clarifies the Iberian state's position in the process of decolonization, while recovering the role of transnational actors largely excluded from narrowly defined diplomatic histories. According to Darwin, the interaction of metropolitan politics, African

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[9] See Filipe de Ribeiro de Meneses, *Salazar: A Political Biography* (New York: Enigma Books, 2009); Tiago Moreira de Sá, *Os Estados Unidos e a Descolonização de Angola* (Lisbon: Dom Quixote, 2011); José Freire Antunes, *Kennedy e Salazar: O Leão e a Raposa* (Lisbon: Dom Quixote, 2013); Emídio Fernando, *Jonas Savimbi: No Lado Errado da História* (Lisbon: Dom Quixote, 2012); Luís Barroso, *Salazar, Caetano, e o Reduto Branco* (Lisbon: Gradiva, 2012).

[10] Witney Schniedman, *Engaging Africa: Washington and the Fall of Portugal's Colonial* Empire (Lanham: University Press of America, 2004);José Manuel Duarte de Jesus, *Eduardo Mondlane: Um Homem A Abater* (Coimbra: Almedina, 2010; Thomas J. Noer, *Cold War and Black Liberation: The United States and White Rule in Africa, 1948-1968* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1985); Julião Soares Sousa, *Amílcar Cabral: Vida e Morte de um Revolucionário Africano* (Lisbon: Nova Vega, 2011).

[11] See for example, Daniel da Silva Costa Marcos, *Salazar e de Gaulle: a França e a Questão Colonial Portuguesa, 1958-1968* (Lisbon: Ministério does Negócios Estrangeiros, 2007); Luís Nuno Rodrigues, *Kennedy-Salazar: A Crise de uma Aliança. As Relações Luso-Americanas entre 1961 e 1963* (Editorial Notícias, 2002); Pedro Aires Oliveira, *Os Despojos da Aliança. A Grã-Bretanha e a Questão Colonial Portuguesa*, (Tinta da China, 2007).

resistance, and international legitimization of self-determination all contributed to the pace, style, and results of European contraction.[12] Yet Darwin's British narrative provides a case study of one of the more exceptional examples of flag independence, which has nonetheless become the primary theoretical foundation for decolonization. According to Darwin and others, Africa's most politically sophisticated colonies negotiated with a metropolitan power willing to give up governmental control for continued economic influence. The need to legitimate claims to democratic and open markets, both of which were key elements of Western ideology during the Cold War, made decolonization politically and economically expedient for Britain, especially as colonial resistance increased.[13] French historiography has followed a similar line, albeit one in which armed revolution in Algeria plays a prominent role in compelling an adoption of this logic.[14] What this popular Anglo-French narrative cannot explain is why metropolitan governments would resist decolonization after the rise of serious colonial resistance, and what happens when allied diplomatic pressure is not enough to force European withdrawal. These are the two questions that define the supposedly unique Portuguese case. However, looking closely at the African

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[12] John Darwin, *Britain and Decolonization: The Retreat from Empire in the Postwar World* (New York: Macmillan, 1988), 25.

[13] For example, Jason Parker, "Cold War II: The Eisenhower Administration, the Bandung Conference, and the Reperiodization of the Cold War," *Diplomatic History*, 30:5 (November, 2006); Ronald Hyam, *Britain's Declining Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 243. Hyam's approach to decolonization lacks a universal component, as his claim that the East-West dynamics of the Cold War sped North-South decolonization is only partly true. Though it certainly helped motivate African pressure from the colonial angle and persuaded any British officials, both France, Portugal, and South Africa used anti-communism to legitimize their recalcitrance with some success. See Ebere Nwaubani, *The United States and Decolonization in West Africa, 1950-1960*. (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2001). John Darwin, *Britain and Decolonization: The Retreat from Empire in the Postwar World* (New York: Macmillan, 1988), 25.

[14] Tony Chafer, *The End of Empire in French West Africa: France's Successful Decolonization?* (Oxford: Berg, 2002); Charles Robert Ageron, *La D'ecolonisation Française*. 2nd ed. (Paris: A. Colin, 1994).

colonial component and the way it related to the international context reveals additional nuances to this tripartite relationship that operated under the surface of earlier phases of the decolonization struggle but came to the forefront as time progressed.

Specifically, the ability of liberation parties to mobilize support in supranational institutions like the United Nations, independent African capitals, Eastern bloc countries, and Western populations constrained determined metropolitan responses. Martin Shipway has offered a framework for understanding this process in his comparative analysis of decolonization (which characteristically excludes Portugal), arguing transfers of power to nationalists emerged from a "sense of diminishing options" available to the colonial powers.[15] In the case of Portugal, an especially determined and cohesive dictatorial regime clung tenaciously to its traditions of imperial rule. It only capitulated as worsening social and economic conditions compelled it to accept its own demise and the liquidation of its empire. Nationalist parties – often developing in exile due to the repressive conditions of Portuguese colonialism – forced metropolitan reconsideration by waging military battles in Africa and propaganda battles internationally. Arms obtained from African and Eastern European sources sustained the war, but the increasing isolation of Portugal within the North Atlantic alliance prevented the state from responding with the full might of a modern arsenal due to embargoes and economic limitations.

The history of this Lusophone African internationalism has received increased attention in recent years, but there has remained only passing attention to this transnational

[15] Shipway, 202.

campaign for Western support.[16] Scholars have focused on the aid provided by socialist countries, notably Piero Gleijeses impressively researched volume on Cuban foreign policy in Africa and Vladimir Shubin's more anecdotal work on the Soviet Union.[17] This dominant focus on military aid has simplified the nuanced strategy of the Lusophone freedom fighters who maintained their appeals to Western peoples despite official indifference. The omission also hides another important element explaining the character of decolonization; that the Portuguese African solidarity movement was similar in structure, style, and indeed chronology to the better known anti-apartheid movement. Many historians have yet to make this connection, but the activism on behalf southern Africa that begins earnestly with parties like FRELIMO and concludes with the collapse of apartheid is a feature of many narratives penned by activist scholars on individual national movements.[18] This dissertation builds on this continuity showing that while Portuguese

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[16] Both Garcia and Guimarães discuss the role of Western aid in their valuable but somewhat shallow international studies, as does de Jesus' biography of Eduardo Mondlne. Francisco Proença Garcia, *Análise Global de Uma Guerra: Moçambique 1964-1974* (Prefácio, 2003); Fernando Andresen Guimarães, *The Origins of the Angolan Civil War: Foreign Intervention and Domestic Political Conflict* (London: MacMillan Press, 1998).

[17] Vladimir Shubin, *The Hot "Cold War:" The USSR in Southern Africa* (London: Pluto Press, 2008); Piero Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002). For individual sections on other socialist aid to various movements, see Jeremy Friedman, "Reviving Revolution: The Sino-Soviet Split, the 'Third World,' and the Fate of the Left, dissertation, Princeton University (2011) and Philip Muehlenbeck, *Czechoslovakia in Africa, 1945-1968* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). There is little serious scholarship on African aid to the liberation movements, which was arguably the most important and deserves attention.

[18] Most of the scholars mentioned Portuguese Africa tangentially. Francis Njubi Nesbitt, *Race for Sanctions: African Americans Against Apartheid, 1946-1994* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), see also Roger Fieldhouse, *Anti-apartheid: A history of the movement in Britain, 1959-1994 – A study in pressure group politics* (London: Merlin Press, 2004); David Hostetter, *Movement Matters: American Antiapartheid Activism and the Rise of Multicultural Politics* (New York: Routledge, 2009). Works that give clear credit to the role of Portuguese Africa in rejuevenating and expanding anti-apartheid activism include See for example Tor Sellström, *A Suécia e as Lutas de Libertação em Angola, Moçambique, e Guiné-Bissau*. (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2008); Sellström, *Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa*, 2 vols. (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1999; 2002); Sietse Bosgra, "From Jan van Riebeek to Solidarity with the Struggle," in SADET, Ed, *The Road to Democracy in South*

African parties did not pioneer the use of popular global networks, they created the first truly cohesive and effective transnational solidarity movements. This stateless diplomacy directly informed the rejuvenation of the anti-apartheid movement, creating an unbroken deepening and expansion of anti-colonial internationalism from Algeria to South Africa. In so doing, it pushes for a greater examination of how globalization and the softening of state sovereignty contributed to the timing and form of decolonization.

The Anti-Colonialism and New Left Internationalism

The international isolation of Portugal relied on the creation of popular solidarity that tapped into an existing anti-imperial sentiment, which became increasingly central to leftist politics in the postwar period. The dissertation uses solidarity in terms defined by geographer David Featherstone as a relation forged by political struggle against perceived repression. The process through which individuals define this common bond is transnational and inventive, drawing on existing identities to forge empathies across borders in terms of racial, ideological, class, or political similarities.[19] There have been many studies on the creation of solidarities within the Western world during this period, but few have connected political activism with decolonization proper.[20] This is surprising considering the centrality of anti-imperial – and by extension anti-colonial – rhetoric to

Africa Volume 3: International Solidarity, 2 Parts (Pretoria: UNISA Press, 2008); Arquivo Historic Moçambique, Brothers from the West (Amsterdam: Netherlands Institute for Southern Africa, 2005).

[19] David Featherstone, *Solidarity: Hidden Histories and Geographies of Internationalism* (New York: Zed, 2012), 5-6.

[20] Popular topics include a large literature on the anti-apartheid movement, solidarity with Cuba, Chile, and parts of Latin America, Vietnam, and Poland. The only literature that deals seriously with Western anti-colonialism is that on Pan-African activism, discussed at greater length below.

leftist organizing in the last third of the twentieth century. This scholarly indifference is the result of a national silo effect. Historians and even political scientists studying social movements often view domestic politics as wholly discrete, concentrating primarily on issues affecting the nation or narrowly defined interests abroad. Rarely do such interests include the freedom of foreign peoples. The result is a surprisingly small literature on European popular resistance to their own empires, which shrinks to almost nothing in the case of dictatorial Portugal.[21] This dissertation argues that while Portuguese anti-colonialism struggled to cohere, nationalists developed a global solidarity that encompassed the exiled resistance movement and placed pressure both internal and external on the Lisbon regime. The African parties did not create this sentiment from scratch but expanded and deepened an existing anti-imperialist sentiment within the leftist tradition of Western states. Recovering this interaction complicates the idea of a liberal consensus that seemed especially strong in the United States, but it also demonstrates how the socialist anti-colonial politics revived and expanded existing anxiety over the Cold War and anti-communist internationalism.

Generally, scholars have failed to appreciate the extent to which radical ideas had extended lives in mainstream movements, particularly the New Left and the global generation of 1968. This is surprising, because Third World actors and ideas proved

[21] Only a handful of books have studies the topic including Stephen Howe, *Anticolonialism in British politics: the Left and the End of Empire, 1918-1964* (New York: Oxford, 1993); Fenner Brockway, *Toward Tomorrow: the Autobiography of Fenner Brockway* (London: Hart-Davis, MacGibbon, 1973); Claude Liauzu, *Histoire de l'Anticolonialisme en France : du XVIe Siècle à Nos Jours* (Paris: Armand Colin, 2007). Only in the United States is there major attention to popular anti-colonialism, though serious scholarly attention becomes thinner after the embrace of imperialism and the subsidence of political debates on the topic in the early twentieth century.

important influences on how activists and socialist politicians understood everything from aid to domestic racial relations. Scholars agree on the pivotal role played by such ideologies during high tide of the anti-war movement, wherein the most radical elements articulated a solidarity with the North Vietnamese (or an idealization of them). Nonetheless, the historiography has defined this activism within a narrative of the rapid rise and decline of popular organizing.[22] Broader histories of the New Left by scholars of domestic politics such as Doug Rossinow have better contextualized the trajectory of youth criticism of the Cold War, but here too they are thematically and chronologically limited by a tendency toward declension.[23] For New Left scholars, Vietnam distracted youth and their allies from organizing a new society, with anti-war activism itself divided by the splintering of groups who moved beyond Vietnam to adopt sectarian ideologies of anti-imperialism.[24] There is little attention to the anti-colonial/anti-imperial activism in the 1970s, nor even much appreciation for how specific tactics for championing foreign causes perfected during the anti-war years found new life as the lifeblood of later movement such as that against apartheid.

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[22] Charles DeBenedetti with Charles Chatfield, *An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1990); Terry H. Anderson, *The Movement and the Sixties* (New York: Oxford, 1995); Melvin Small, *Antiwarriors* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002); Eley, Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe, 1850-2000 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); David Farber, *The Age of Great Dreams* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1994).

[23] Douglas Rossinow, *Visions of Progress* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2008), chapter 6; Michael Kazin, *American Dreamers: How the Left Changed a Nation* (New York: Vintage, 2011), 248-264 This owes much to the "good 1960s, bad 1960s" paradigm established by activist/historian Todd Gitlin, who too narrowly understands the New Left and popular internationalism through the lens of Students for a Democratic Society. Todd Gitlin, *The Sixties: Year of Hope, Days of Rage* (New York: Bantam, 1993), chapter 17,

[24] Max Elbaum, *Revolution in the Air: Sixties Radicals Turn to Lenin, Mao, and Che* (London: Verso: 2002).

The primary exception to the dearth of scholarship on anti-colonial solidarity is that on African American internationalism and Pan-African organizing. African Americans became the leading critics of American acquiescence to colonialism beginning in the 1930s, articulating a critique of race and racism by linking capitalism, imperialism, and unrepresentative democracy. These commonalities became central components in defining a transnational critique of Western and particularly American society in the way it treated people of the global South and their descendants. In so doing, they ran afoul of the government deeply concerned about anything smacking of radicalism or communism.[25] Simultaneously, the apparent death blow to colonialism that was the Year of Africa in 1960 combined with the disillusionment of radicals with heretofore model states like Ghana seemingly shifted the emphasis toward the growing success of the domestic Civil Rights Movement.[26] The commitment to integration under the weight of Cold War internationalism undermined the calls for systemic socio-economic reform that had been central to the transnational anti-imperialism of earlier decades.[27] These facts led scholars such as Penny Von Eschen to lament the collapse of a Third World Solidarity movement, but recent scholarship of Black Power has demonstrated this was far from the case.[28]

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[25] Penny Von Eschen, *Race Against Empire: Black Americans and Anti-Colonialism, 1937-1957* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997); Gerald Horne, *Black and Red: W.E.B. DuBois and the Afro American Response to the Cold War* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986); Carol Anderson, *Eyes Off the Prize: The United Nations and the African American Struggle for Human Rights, 1944-1955*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

[26] James Meriwether, *Proudly We Can be Africans: Black Americans and Africa, 1935-1961* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Kevin Gaines, *American Africans in Ghana: Black Expatriates and the Civil Rights Era* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006).

[27] Von Eschen, 187.

[28] Peniel Joseph has illustrated the international influence on the growth of Black Power, but there is relatively little discussion of internationalism. *Waiting 'Til the Midnight Hour: A Narrative History of Black Power in America* (New York: Henry Holt, 2006). The international aspects of notable groups like

Indeed, though perhaps having somewhat tenuous ties to the anti-colonialism of earlier decades, black populations actually expanded their definitions of solidarity to include "darker" peoples as part of what Cynthia Young as termed a "U.S. Third World Left."[29] It was just such an inventive process of self-identification that Lusophone nationalists required to promote foreign activism, using the rediscovery and redefinition of minority identity in the United States to help build a movement.

Nonetheless, the narrow focus on African American and ethnic politics has limited the reach of these important works, failing to draw sufficient connections with contemporaneous politics – New Left and mainstream. The insularity of these historiographies has hidden the interconnectedness of Western anti-imperial movements in Europe and the Americas and their institutionalization in the 1970s.[30] The dissertation argues that popular critiques of Cold War foreign and domestic policy based on issues of racial equality, economic egalitarianism, and resistance to undemocratic power were a constant if sometimes underrepresented presence in the United States and Europe from the 1960s onwards. Through ebbs and flows, the discrete elements of a transnational resistance remained at the grassroots level and actually expanded in the 1960s and 1970s, during a

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the Black Panthers have only begun to be explored, see Kathleen Neal Cleaver, "Back to Africa: The Evolution of the International Section of the Black Panther Party (1969-1972)," in Charles E. Jones, ed., *The Black Panther Party Reconsidered* (Baltimore: Black Classics Press, 2005).

[29] Cynthia Young, *Soul Power: Culture, Radicalism, and the Making of the U.S. Third World Left* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006). See also the discussion of the darker nations present in Vijay Prashad, The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World (New York: New Press, 2007); Brenda Gayle Plummer, *Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935-1960* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 327.

[30] Quinn Slobodian offers a valuable corrective to these tendencies to canalize scholarship, demonstrating how Third World peoples played active roles in the creation of the German 1968 generation. Quinn Slobodian, *Foreign Front: Third World Politics in Sixties West Germany* (Raleigh: Duke University Press, 2012).

time when a similar reassertion of radicalism arose in Europe. The Vietnam War punctuated the Cold War equilibrium in both Europe and the Americas, allowing subterranean currents of dissent to gain additional adherents through racial, ideological, and humanitarian appeals. As Vietnam deescalated, the Portuguese African movements and their inclusive transnational socialism became prominent, providing an avenue for uniting disparate constituencies into coalitions and networks. The result was what might best be termed a New Left Internationalism, which viewed the world not through a lens of communism versus capitalist but rather in terms of a search for global social justice. While the specifics of this vague concept were fluid, they generally included economic and political self-determination, racial equality, and a respect for the still vaguely defined rights of peoples in the global South and their descendants. New Left internationalism therefore embraced a more cooperative foreign policy that rejected the reactionary associations with unrepresentative anti-communist governments and interventions in favor of the status quo that had typified past policy in the Third World.

The New Left internationalism, refined in many during its embrace of the African nationalist cause, created a rhetorical and ideological space to articulate criticisms of Western foreign and domestic policy. In the process of forging this dialogue, North-South exchanges created a sense of solidarity that flowed both ways and encouraged activists to continue the struggle despite repeated setbacks. While never achieving a consensus to replace liberal anti-communism, constituencies challenging the Cold War actually broadened as they incorporated additional causes in the 1970s and achieved greater success. As Van Gosse has argued, “an a amorphous bloc that spanned the distance

between polite liberalism and unalloyed radical came together in opposition to U.S. policies in the Third World . . . an rather than falling apart, this broad foreign policy opposition consolidated and advanced in the seventies."[31] While there were a number of causes that filled the void after Vietnam, Lusophone liberation and the subsequent protection of the socialist government of Angola first demonstrated the real political power of the movement. In so doing, it helped legitimize and mainstream Third World criticisms of undemocratic governance, unrestrained capitalism, and Western intervention in the developing world entered into the mainstream of politics in the mid-1970s.

Civil Society and the Final Phase of the Cold War

Though this study takes seriously the need to recover the cultural and identity politics of social movements, it nonetheless emphasizes the importance of how New Left internationalism and popular advocacy worked to influence policy. In this sense it follows the recent trend in international history to seriously consider the agency and effectiveness of groups and institutions below the state. Until recently, diplomatic history had, in the words of Brenda Gayle Plummer, the "tendency to ground itself in the world view of policymakers . . . and to see as both normative and neutral the clearly ethnocentric commitments of elite national leadership."[32] A flood of excellent monographs since the late 1990s has challenged this preconception, replacing straightforward diplomatic history

[31] Van Gosse, "Unpacking the Vietnam Syndrome: The Coupe in Chile and the Rise of Popular Anti-Interventionism," in *The World the Sixties Made: Politics and Culture in Recent America* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2008), 111.
[32] Plummer, Rising Wind, 5.

with a transnational perspective that now recognizes the formative roles played by everything from global corporations to local coffee klatches. Yet in doing so, many of these works have replicated the tendency to conflate authorial voices with their subjects, no longer Washington elites but marginalized internationalists with limited access to the levers of economic or political power. This has been especially true concerning historical studies of ethnic internationalism mentioned above.[33] The tradeoff here has been a better understanding of ethnic identity and social politics at both the local and international levels, but a still sketchy understanding of whether and how transnational movements affect policy.

The goal of this dissertation is to bridge this gap between activist and policymaker. The emergence of this new grassroots leftism and the end of decolonization had deep effects on the trajectory of the Cold War and the foreign affairs that defined it. Demonstrations, education campaigns, lobbying, and cooperation with legislative politics all aimed to use this belief in real self-determination to constrain a tradition of Western intervention in the developing world. States confronted by foreign intervention responded military and diplomatically, but they also relied on transnational allies to represent their interest abroad through the democratic mechanisms of voting and agenda setting. Studies of this overlapping space that Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall call the "intermestic"

[33] Notable exceptions to this generalization include Akira Iriye, *The Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the making of the Contemporary World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004); Paul Thomas Chamberlin, *The Global Offensive: The United State, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the Making of the Post-Cold War Order* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).

are in their infancy.[34] Jeremi Suri's important *Power and Protest,* for example, has demonstrated the importance of such an approach, but structural explanations for precisely how civil society affects policy are only beginning to be clarified by scholars, notably those in the field of human rights.[35] Indeed, most histories that do allow for the role of civil society concentrate heavily on presidential calculations of popular opinion, which are difficult to gauge and prone to the vicissitudes of individual personalities in the White House.[36]

These studies are not wrong, but resistance to Cold War adventurism after Vietnam demonstrated much more straightforward if complex trend. The more developed social science literature on transnational network building and grassroots advocacy provides some guidance on how movements accessed levers of power. In their groundbreaking work *Activists Beyond Borders*, Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink identify the central operating component of transnational advocacy as information exchange: "nontraditional international actors . . . mobilize information strategically to help create new issues and categories and to persuade, pressure, and gain leverage over much more powerful organizations and governments." Foreign actors provide otherwise inaccessible perspectives, allowing domestic activists to wield power based on a monopoly on

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[34] Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall, *America's Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012).

[35] Jeremi Suri, *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003). For an example of the promising scholarship on human rights that addresses these structural issues, see Sarah B. Snyder, *Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War: A Transnational History of the Helsinki Network* (New York: Cambridge, 2013).

[36] Lyndon Johnson's extended handwringing over Vietnam is arguably the most important example, but there are others. Fredrik Logevall, *Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of the Vietnam War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Richard D. Mahoney, *JFK: Ordeal in Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983).

information. Activists use this unique material to influence levers of power through both the ability to generate politically useful reports and symbolic politics, which expands movements through dramatic publicity and media coverage.[37] Jeffrey W. Knopf argues that activists then access policymaking through one of three avenues (specifically referencing the United States) – "electoral pressure, changing coalitions in Congress, and feeding ideas into the bureaucracy" – with the Congressional route being the most likely to succeed.[38]

This owes much to two facts. First, transnational social movements wield information in ways that can establish policy agendas in legislative bodies, especially in terms of regions of the world where there is little extant knowledge and weak commitments such as Africa. Members of Congress, and more broadly parliaments, lack the vast informational structures offered by the American executive branch or ministerial appointees and are therefore dependent on outside experts. Especially where limited information is available, advocates have the power to frame international issues and shape political responses. Second, policy advocates can more easily organize electoral pressure in the small regions that elect legislators than on a national scale. Especially in terms of the American system, this allows campaigns that appeal to specific racial or ideological constituencies to more easily claim electoral power with individual members of Congress, who can than provide advocates with access to the larger political body. While Vietnam

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[37] Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 2.

[38] Jeffrey W. Knopf*, Domestic Society and International Cooperation: The Impact of Protest on US Arms Control Policy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 50, 251. On the role of media, see William A. Gamson, "Bystanders, Public Opinion, and Media," in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, David A. Snow et. al. , eds (Hoboken: Wiley, 2008).

was a national issue that logically attracted the attention of many congressman, issues of African solidarity had greater weight in areas with sizeable minority populations and where liberal international causes were especially popular.

Though there remain relatively few Congressional histories of the Cold War, there is evidence to support this grassroots-congressional coalition as an important element of foreign policy after the 1960s.[39] In addition to the obvious Vietnam example that is surprisingly understudied, historians writing on the popular opposition to Ronald Reagan's approach to Latin American in the 1980s have touched on this topic. They argue that organizations such as the Washington Office on Latin America filled this advocacy role, linking foreign nationals and popular protests with the growth of Congressional opposition.[40] A few others have explored similar relationships concerning anti-apartheid activism during its high tide in the 1980s.[41] In concentrating on this latter era, however,

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[39] Two of the few broad overviews of the Congressional role in the Cold War are Robert David Johnson, *Congress and the Cold War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) and Julian Zelizer, *Arsenal of Democracy: The Politics of National Security – From World War II to the War on Terrorism* (New York: Basic Books, 2012). Most histories attuned to Congress's role in foreign policy have looked at individuals. Notable examples include Randall B. Woods, Fulbright: A Biography (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995) and Robert G. Kaufman, Henry M. Jackson: A Life in Politics (United States: University of Washington Press, 2000). None spend serious time on exploring the connections between congressmen and popular activists, though some autobiographies have done so. See for instance Ronald Dellums' discussion of his early work with anti-apartheid activists in Boston. Ronald Dellums, *Lying Down with Lions* (Boston: Beacon, 2000), 121-124.

[40] Cynthia J. Arnson, *Crossroads: Congress, the President, and Central America, 1976-1993* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993); Christian Smith, The U.S. Central America Peace Movement (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); Coletta A. Youngers, *Thirty Years of Advocacy for Human Rights, Democracy and Social Justice* (Washington: Washington Office on Africa, 2006); Roger Peace, *A Call to Consciousness: The Anti-Contra War Campaign* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2012).

[41] See Håkan Thörn, *Anti-Apartheid and the Emergence of a Global Civil Society* (London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2009); J.E. Davies, Constructive Engagement? Chester Crocker and American foreign Policy in South Africa, Namibia, and Angola (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007); Janice Love, The U.S. Anti-Apartheid Movement: Local Activism in Global Politics (New York: Praeger, 1985). European authors have shown a greater interest in researching how anti-apartheid shaped U.S policy, notably Fieldhouse, Sellström, and Bosgra cited above.

scholars have failed to seriously explore the common elements linking the Reagan years to the political reorganization of the 1960s or the evolution and institutionalization of New Left organizational strategies. As a result, scholars have failed to appreciate the role that socialist revolutionaries such as FRELIMO and PAIGC played in legitimizing and extending criticisms of the Cold War and global North hegemony, as well as active solidarity with socialist parties. Many activists first mobilized in support of Lusophone liberation became key components of the anti-apartheid movement, while the legislative constraints placed on Angola became models for similar action in Latin America. By the 1980s, both leftists and centrist humanists rallied behind socialist, militant parties like the Sandinistas and the African National Congress (ANC) in large numbers – a reality almost impossible to imagine in the early 1960s.

The longer and better integrated history of grassroots Western policy advocacy therefore hints at something approaching what some scholars have called a "global civil society."[42] While this dissertation does not champion this lofty idea, the networks that linked nationalists to Western activists argue for the creation in the globalized postwar era a transnational civil society, or perhaps overlapping civil societies. Formal political and informal economic divisions continue to create what Jackie Smith and Dawn Wiest have called an "uneven geography" that has prevented the formation of anything approaching a singular global forum for interactions of individuals, groups, supranational institutions, and

[42] This term is used regularly in social scientific literature, though one key example for the purpose of this dissertation is Håkan Thörn's contention that the modern anti-apartheid movement demonstrated the emergence of a global civil society.

state actors.[43] Rather there exist a multitude of fragmented and contested networks of individuals and institutions that operate across state borders around contested internationalist ideologies. For while the term civil society does not imply agreement, it does involve a shared sense of association. In this case, the association formed around discussions of social justice-based issues of race, economics, and politics, cutting across the political boundaries defined by the Cold War in order to create new linkages between global North and South.

While this dissertation takes as its focus the chronologically bounded struggle for Lusophone independence, the selection of this important transitional case demonstrates that this transnational society also cut across regional boundaries. The formation of a transnational network and the affirmation and expansion of an inclusive New Left internationalism depended directly on the political opening in Western society created by the Vietnam War. Socialist movements that had struggled to build alliances found after the mid-1960s new allies willing to look beyond the Cold War. Their success both in organizing and in proactively blocking interventions such as the one in Angola legitimized activist networks and ideologies, while establishing models of action that would inform future movements that involved African, Latin American, and Asian nations.[44] After 1975, domestic debates revolved less around the tactics used to fight the Cold War, and more on the legitimacy of the superpower conflict – especially as it pertained to the global South.

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[43] Jackie Smith and Dawn Wiest, "The Uneven Geography of Global Civil Society: National and Global Influences on Transnational Association," *Social Forces* 84: 2 (December 2005), 637-639.

[44] This parallels and in some ways builds on Barbara Key's recent arguments concerning human rights. Barbara J. Keys, *Reclaiming American Virtue: The Human Rights Revolution of the 1970s* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014).

In the United States in particular, transnational coalitions of mostly left-leaning activists would rely on Congress to constrain the anti-communist interventionism of a previously unchecked executive branch. The Portuguese African experience acted as a pivot point in Western international history, helping to extend the exceptional case of Vietnam so that it became a defining element of the domestic politics of the final phase of the Cold War.

Chapter Outline

This dissertation draws on Thomas Bender's definition of transnational history as a "weaving together of coexisting histories." Instead of promoting a single overarching narrative, the following chapters explore in detail the concrete linkages between Africa, Europe, and North America that helped create a politically effective transnational network.[45] In weaving together this complex intercontinental tapestry, choices of emphasis are necessary. As a result this dissertation is a mix of histories. It is primarily a transnational history operating across national boundaries and below the governmental level. Secondarily, it is an American history examining the way Third World ideologies came to shape domestic politics and set the model for foreign policy debates after the Vietnam War. Thirdly, an African history recovers the international strategy and diplomacy of Luosphone African nationalists. Lastly, it touches upon a European history that demonstrates changing American perceptions of the Cold War and the global South were part of a larger shift in a transnational civil society.

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[45] Thomas Bender, "Historians, the Nation, and the Plenitude of Narratives," in *Rethinking American History in a Global Age*, ed. Thomas Bender (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 6-9.

The first two chapters provide the political context for the creation of this transnational network. Chapter One explores the origins of Portuguese decolonization in the wider Western context. It introduces the primary nationalist parties and demonstrates how Angola forced the Portuguese colonial question onto the global agenda. Despite some success in gaining a fleeting level of official support from the world powers, the dual concerns of African stability and European unity led Portugal's most critical allies in the United Kingdom and the United States to gradually retreat from initial pressure for decolonization. Chapter two explores the effective embrace of Portugal by these same governments, which fueled nationalist frustrations and provided additional justification for the turn to arms. With limited popular solidarity advocating for the nationalists during the 1960s, Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence reinforced official Western calculations of Portugal as a valuable ally. Events effectively denied nationalists access to foreign governments, leading them to redouble their efforts to work with civil society groups.

The next three chapters explore the expansion of this grassroots organizing on behalf of the liberation parties. Chapter three focuses on early successes in Europe, where case studies of Sweden, the Netherlands, and Britain demonstrate Lusophone attempts to encourage and utilize independent but interrelated transnational networks. Coalitions of youthful leftists, humanitarian moderates, and government officials provided material assistance to the liberation movements while advocating for policies to isolate Portugal. Chapter four follows the parallel construction of this movement among the New Left in the United States. Leftists and religious youth radicalized by Vietnam gravitated toward

Portuguese Africa, helping to introduce the cause into wider anti-imperial discussions in the United States. As these young people promoted solidarity with African socialists, they helped pull centrist organizations further leftward. United around a New Left internationalism, these coalitions used boycotts, divestment, and public demonstrations as a way of publicizing American complicity with the Portuguese regime and drawing the attention of sympathetic legislators. Chapter five completes the survey by focusing on the African American community, long prized as a necessary component of effective American solidarity with Africa. Better able to mobilize large numbers than among radical whites, this segment of the network dramatized the potential electoral power of the advocacy network during the Black Power era. With the encouragement of the nationalists, this Pan-African solidarity eventually became a component of a multiracial coalition trying to isolate Portugal.

Chapter six recovers the afterlife of the transnational liberation network, which reached its peak shortly before the Carnation Revolution of 1974 that would eventually lead to decolonization. While the solidarity movement had an indeterminate effect on the downfall of the Portuguese regime itself, it had lasting effects on Euro-American views of the Cold War. Continued organizing in the United States promoted a new interest in the cause of southern African liberation and helped legitimize the idea of socialist self-determination. When Gerald Ford intervened in Angola against the MPLA, the solidarity movement mobilized against the president. Allies in Congress successfully blocked the executive action with legislation, which itself was encouraged by public demonstrations against the intervention. In both Europe and the Americas, this decentralized movement

pushed the issue of southern Africa to the forefront of national consciousness months before the Soweto uprisings. The result was a sustained left-leaning challenge to Cold War hawkishness that would grow as the years passed. After Portuguese Africa gained independence, the Western struggle for a more justice foreign policy in the global South would continue.

Chapter 1: The Last Empire

Portuguese Africa and the Crisis of 1961

It had been 500 years since the death of the Infante Dom Henrique, the spiritual father of Portugal's overseas empire known worldwide as Prince Henry the Navigator. In 1960, his homeland was celebrating this event with the pomp and circumstance that would remind the world of the country's once and future greatness. The small Iberian state had declined precipitously since its Golden Age in the 1500s, but it retained a far flung empire centered on the large African colonies of Mozambique and Angola, complemented by coastal and island holdings including Guinea-Bissau in West Africa, Macao in China, Goa in India, and the mid-Atlantic Azores archipelago. Portugal used these colonial artifacts of a rapidly disappearing era to claim equality with its far more powerful European neighbors, which had long ago surpassed the agrarian dictatorship in economic and political power.

The sheer geographical extent of Portugal's overseas possessions made the celebration of the long-dead provincial prince a global event, despite the fact that nationalists in Asia and Africa had spent much of the last fifteen years reversing the European expansion Henry helped instigate. The quincentenary coincided with the "Year of Africa," when over a dozen countries declared independence from foreign rule, but such contradictions did not stop allies new and old from celebrating the world's oldest surviving empire. In August, ten thousand people watched alongside the presidents of Brazil and Portugal as ten square-rigged vessels from eight European nations rounded the country's southernmost point of Sagres, trailed by 33 flag-bedecked warships representing North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies like Italy, France, and Canada as well as a dozen other countries. The United States, Britain, and the friendly dictatorship of Spain provided an air guard that saluted the old seaside fortress from which Henry had organized his voyages of discovery and colonization.[46] Portugal designed these commemorations as a tribute to its past glory and continued dedication to the imperial mission. It alone among the European powers remained determined to preserve its international empire. While most of its neighbors sending delegations to the celebrations had come to terms with the rising tide of Third World nationalism and were making moves to accommodate Asian and African demands for political self-determination (if not yet economic autonomy), Portugal hoped, in the words of one British newspaper, to "stop the clock" before the colonial era completely expired.[47]

Centuries after Prince Henry bid farewell to his intrepid explorers, Portugal seemed the least likely of empires, certainly not one that would have challenged the global forces that were cowing mightier powers like Britain and France. The small nation failed to meet the criteria that bound the majority of Western Europe together in the postwar period; it was economically weak, dictatorial in its politics, and perpetually backward-looking in its colonial policies. The country had little to its credit except an oversized empire inherited from past centuries and the canny if unimaginative mind of its long-serving premier, Antonio de Oliveira Salazar. The diminutive, sickly looking former economist had quietly

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[46] "Honouring Henry the Navigator," *The Guardian*, 8 August 1960; "16 Nations Honor Henry, Navigator," *Washington Post*, 8 August 1960.
[47] "Standing Fast in Angola," *The Guardian*, 19 August 1960.

moved from isolation to membership in NATO by leveraging overseas possessions like the strategically located Azores islands and its massive African colonies. Decolonization threatened to strip Portugal of its last vestiges of international influence. A new generation of leaders was arising the world over, committed to a vision of global politics that sought to upend traditional relations between the global North and South, a scenario in which Portugal would likely suffer. How Salazar would deal with this generational shift – amongst his allies and colonial subjects – might have remained a matter of great importance only to the Lusophone world, but both the wily dictator and those who sought to challenge his power understood decolonization in larger terms. Salazar's challenge to the prevailing trends, tacking like Henry's caravels into the "wind of change," would affect not just the ongoing North-South debate but also the East-West competition becoming increasingly global in scope.

When rebellions in its largest colony of Angola finally forced Portugal to put words into action in 1961, Portuguese Africa became a litmus test for decolonization and the Euro-American support for this project. This owed much to the fact that Portugal had maintained strict control of its colonies, forcing anti-colonial leaders to journey abroad to find support for their movements. As the Cold War stabilized in Europe, the superpowers shifted their competition to regions like Africa, forcing both East and West to engage with the ongoing North-South reorganization. Competing Cold War globalizations offered by U.S. democratic capitalism and the Soviet Union's universalistic communism opened new avenues for nationalists to operate outside the traditional confines of the metropolitan-colony relationship. But the centrality of the industrialized north to the U.S.-Soviet

competition reaffirmed the traditional importance of Europe, even as both sides sought to rhetorically legitimize the emerging political power of Asia, Latin American, and Africa. As a result, the decolonization and the Cold War became inextricably intertwined, simultaneously reinforcing and challenging the other though actors in both the global North and South worked in vain to separate them.

In the midst of this ongoing dialectic, the decisions by France and Belgium to grant their last African colonies political independence in 1960 had seemingly created momentum for the idea of political self-determination that tiny, impoverished Portugal could not resist. Among the proponents of this view was John Kennedy, the young American president who seemed to represent a new era in American and wider Western engagement with the global South. For the administration, Lusophone decolonization represented an opportunity to demonstrate to the wider world a new American resolve that would support the aspirations of Afro-Asian peoples and win them to the side of democratic capitalism. Yet Kennedy, like much of the rest of the world, underestimated the resolve and skills of the Salazar dictatorship. The resulting clash between the small Iberian nation and the global forces backing self-determination would be a test for the Western commitment to decolonization, revealing the extent to which Cold War strategy continued to define the global South as subservient to European interests.

Transnational Revolutions

As unlikely an empire as Portugal may have been in the 1960s, its colonies were even less likely candidates for organized revolutions. Salazar had institutionalized the idea

of empire into the very fabric of the nation more than any other postwar European leader. Losing the colonies would undermine popular morale and almost certainly topple his regime. He guarded the borders of his country and its colonies jealously, carefully controlling the influx of goods, people, and ideas. This situation made the development and organization of nationalist movements difficult, forcing many potential anti-colonial leaders into exile. In an empire ruled meticulously from the center, it was by looking outside of its borders that anti-colonialists were able to find ideologies, allies, and assistance as they quietly prepared to challenge the Portuguese imperial state.

Though a ruthlessly effective dictator, Salazar stands in a class apart from the megalomaniacs and generals with whom he often shared the fascist label. He looked more like a patent clerk than a strongman, having begun his career as an economics professor before being invited to serve in the government after a conservative military coup in 1926. Beginning as finance minister, the abstemious Salazar - who often worked wrapped in a blanket to save on heating costs – restored order to a country wracked by revolutionary upheavals. He balanced budgets and prioritized conservative economic and social practices, parleying the public confidence into a virtual dictatorship as president of the Council of Ministers beginning in 1932. The *Estado Novo* (New State) centrally managed the country through an extensive system of syndicalist organizations, isolationist regulations, and an effective if not overly violent secret police known as the PIDE (*Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado* – International and State Defense Police). Portugal remained a bastion of stability through the Great Depression and World War II under the firm tutelage of a man committed to preserving social cohesion and traditional values at all

costs.[48] Unfortunately for most Portuguese, economic modernization and political freedom were sacrificed at the altar of stability, meaning the country did not participate in the postwar European recovery common under socialist governments.[49] For Salazar, domestic peace came not from material gain or creature comforts but from the preservation of order and tradition. "I do not believe in equality," Salazar once remarked, "but in hierarchy."[50]

Hierarchy is also the best way to understand the *Estado Novo's* relationship to its African colonies, which Salazar used to provide an economic and ideological foundation for his regime. Overshadowed by the former colony of Brazil and the richer Asian enclaves of Goa and Macao, Portuguese settlement in Africa long remained confined to the coast and small pockets in the interior of Angola and Mozambique that concentrated on coffee and cotton, respectively. The smallest mainland possession, Guinea-Bissau, was little more than a moderately sized trading center as late as the 1920s.[51] Though initially indifferent, Salazar came to see Portugal's remaining colonies as the salvation of the nation. The professor promoted imperial investment and trade to decrease foreign imbalances, prop up metropolitan industries, and strengthen the Portuguese currency, the *escudo*. New laws

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[48] Filipe de Ribeiro de Meneses, *Salazar: A Political Biography* (New York: Enigma Books, 2009). Chapter 1 provides a good overview of Salazar's rise to power; chapter 2 focuses on the creation of the *Estado Novo*.

[49] As late as 1950, nearly half the population worked in fields while three quarters of industrial firms employed four people or less. See Werner Baer and António P.N. Leite, "The Peripheral Economy, Its Performance in Isolation and with Integration: The Case of Portugal," *Luso-Brazilian Review* 29:2 (Winter, 1992), 2 and 23.

[50] Basil Davidson, *In the Eye of the Storm* (New York: Doubleday, 1972), 121.

[51] In Guinea-Bissau there were less than 1,000 settlers, 18,000 in Mozambique, and barely over 20,000 in the largest colony of Angola. In no colony did settlers approach one percent of the total population. See Patrick Chabal, *Amilcar Cabral: Revolutionary Leader and People's War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 20; Malyn Newitt, *A History of Mozambique* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 1995), 442; and Gerald J. Bender, *Angola Under the Portuguese: The Myth and the Reality* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 20.

raised barriers to foreign investment and formalized African labor conscription to expand cultivation.[52] In the postwar period, growing coffee yields provided important revenue for Portugal – whose primary domestic exports remained wine, cork, and people – while ports such as Mozambique's Beira, Laurenço Marques (modern Maputo), and Angola's Lobito became profitable railway heads for goods from the British colonies, South Africa, and the Belgian Congo. While other European nations flirted with liberalization as a way of maintaining their empires, the *Estado Novo* established a neo-mercantilist strategy that sought to control its remaining colonies through isolation and increased oversight from Lisbon.

Salazar also understood the imperial hierarchy as a popular rallying point for his otherwise uninspiring regime. The *Estado Novo* drew on traditional narratives of national destiny and imperial success to unite the country and claim continued international relevance. Salazar became especially dependent on such narratives as limitations of free speech, economic isolationism, and slow industrialization further marginalized Portugal among its European neighbors. Facing foreign critics who dismissed the state as backward and unimportant, the government relied on a rhetorical use of the empire to celebrate Portugal as the vital center of a Lusophone world.[53] This exaggeration helped tie the national identity together and invested citizens with enough pride in their state that they accepted the frustrating experience of living under the regime. Unfortunately, the grafting

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[52] See Malyn Newitt, "Angola in Historical Context," in *Angola: The Weight of History*, Patrick Chabal and Nuno Vidal, eds. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 58; Bender, 147.

[53] David Corkill and José Carlos Pina Almeida, "Commemoration and Propaganda in Salazar's Portugal: The 'Mundo Português' Exposition of 1940," *Journal of Contemporary History*, 44:3 (July 2009), 397

of the *Estado Novo* to the empire also made the retention of colonial relationships essential for the maintenance of the state. The regime became, in the words of historian Margarida Calafate Ribeiro, a "unique singularity fulfilled only in that empire."[54] Given its dependence on the empire, Salazar's *Estado Novo* jealously guarded its borders from the rising tide of African nationalism with seeming success.

Constant vigilance was needed as the extractive mindset of Portuguese colonists produced difficult conditions in the African empire. In both Mozambique and Angola, large European-owned plantations took much of the best land, leaving many Africans to scrape out subsistence existence or submit to brutal conditions as laborers. Practices of forced labor in Angola produced conditions nearing slavery, while Portuguese authorities profited from the sale of Mozambican workers to South African mines.[55] Guinea-Bissau faced less exploitative conditions due to the small European population, but it – like most of the African colonies – received minimal investment in terms of infrastructure and education. With most Portuguese services confined to the coastal cities, until the 1950s, schools in the interiors of Angola and Mozambique were largely left to protestant missionaries, who the Catholic Portuguese barely tolerated.[56] Only predominantly mixed-race population of Cabo Verde approached in any way the Portuguese ideal of an assimilated society, receiving special privileges reserved mainly for Europeans. Yet beyond this special status Lisbon

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[54] Margarida Calafate Ribeiro, "Empire, Colonial Wars and Post-Colonialism in the Portuguese Contemporary Imagination," *Portuguese Studies* 18 (2002), 134.
[55] Newitt, in Chabal and Vidal, 60-65.
[56] Malyn Newitt, *A History of Mozambique* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 1995), 478-481; David Birmingham, *Frontline Nationalism in Angola and Mozambique* (Trenton: Africa World Press, 1992), 20-24.

paid minimal attention to drought prone islands, doing little to assuage the occasional famines that seemed to mark each generation. Given these conditions, the potential for unrest was high, and the Estado Novo repeatedly used its secret police and rapid, violent reprisals to prevent the irregular protests from escalating to serious revolts.

As late as 1960, Portugal faced little visible colonial discontent, while other Europeans struggled to respond to calls for greater black participation in government in such places as Kenya, the Congo, and South Africa. In fact, Salazar's greatest challenge had come not from the colonies but from India, which consistently criticized Portugal at the United Nations (UN) for its ongoing presence in the enclaves of Goa, Daman, and Diu.[57] With Jawaharlal Nehru inconsistent in his attention to Africa, threats to Portugal's monopoly on power there seemed scarce, despite the growth of economic ties with the outside world. "Angola's period of isolation is ending," one British official noted in the late 1957, though he concluded that "there are no native troubles and no hint that any are brewing for the foreseeable future."[58] The powerful PIDE and Salazar's careful management of colonial relationships quieted any outward signs of African nationalism. Given the hostile colonial climate, black nationalists were obliged to look abroad as they prepared to challenge the regime. It is in part this reality that gave the Lusophone revolutions a peculiarly transnational character, but it also hid the slow process of organization from the view of many outside observers.

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[57] The American non-response to Indian saber rattling over Goa had strained bilateral relations since the mid-1950s, though Allen Dulles' private assurances that Washington considered it a "Portuguese province" had lessened tensions. Luís Nuno Rodrigues, *Salazar-Kennedy: A Crise de uma Aliança* (Lisbon: Notícias, 2002), 27-29.

[58] Telegram, Purves to Selwyn Lloyd, 16 August 1957, FO 403/480, UKNA [Archives Direct].

Portugal's control of its colonies seemed a welcome respite to Western governments that viewed the Third World in the 1950s as a series of crises. Decolonization in Asia and parts of Africa had given rise to a new sense of independence in the Third World, led by fiery nationalist leaders like Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah and Egypt's Gamel Abdel Nasser, which threatened to shift whole continents away from the NATO camp during the most dangerous stages of the Cold War. The United States recognized the signs of the times and hoped that its European allies would accept the need for self-determination, but it also worried that postcolonial nations might drift into the Soviet bloc as nationalist preferences for centralized development plans and semi-authoritarian cults of personality provided common ground for alliances with the USSR.[59] Events like the independence of the Congo in 1960 only fueled such Cold War fears. When Belgium hastily dismantled its colonial apparatus in the sprawling state, it handed power to the incautious Patrice Lumumba, who unsuccessfully tried to use the Cold War to obtain much needed aid for his country. Fearful that the mineral rich state could defect to the communists, Western interests and their local allies murdered Lumumba, backed the secession of Katanga, and plunged the country into years of chaos that made it the first real casualty of the Cold War in Africa.[60]

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[59] See H.W. Brands, *The Specter of Neutralism: The United States and the Emergence of the Third World, 1947-1960* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989); Robert B. Rakove*, Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Jason Parker, "Cold War II: The Eisenhower Administration, the Bandung Conference, and the Reperiodization of the Cold War," *Diplomatic History*, 30:5 (November, 2006).

[60] For an overview of events in the Congo around 1960, see Lise Namikas, Battleground Africa: Cold War in the Congo, 1960-1965 (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2013), chapters 2-6.

Most importantly, the Congo gave Western officials pause as to the desirability of universal independence. Americans may have hoped that managed decolonization could, as Dwight Eisenhower explained to Salazar in 1960, "swing this nationalist feeling to the side of the West," but the Congo illustrated that it could also open the door for Soviet intervention if mishandled.[61] Salazar's refusal to consider self-determination for its colonies was inopportune, but at least Portugal seemed in control. The United States was unwilling to force the matter and potentially destabilize another major African state bordering the already problematic Congo. Other major European powers agreed with Washington, preferring to focus on their own territories so long as no crisis was apparent. Therefore, when U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower visited Lisbon in May 1960, he praised Portugal publicly as a "tremendous friend" and expressed his concerns about growing African nationalism privately and discretely.[62] When Salazar argued that "giving" independence to Africans before they were ready would be "a crime," Eisenhower assented, revealing the central concern of American officials remained pro-Western stability.[63] With little sense that the nationalist "wave" would sweep over Portuguese Africa anytime soon and appreciating the relative predictability the *Estado Novo* provided

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[61] Memorandum of Conversation, 19 May 1960, FRUS 1958-1960.

[62] Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Remarks to the Staff of the U.S. Embassy and the American Community in Lisbon," 19 May 1960, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, available: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11793. See also, Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Remarks Upon Arrival at Portela Airport, Lisbon," 19 May 1960, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, available: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11792; Memorandum of Conversation, 19 May 1960, Document 288 in Ronald D. Landa, et. Al., eds. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Volume 7, Part 2: Western Europe* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1993), 640.

[63] Ike did fear that delaying decolonization indefinitely could turn nationalism into communism. Apontamento de Conversa, entre Eisenhower e Salazar, Palacio de Queluz, 19 May 1960, Pasta 2, AOS/COE-2, TT-PT.

in Africa, the Western alliance was happy to attend to more urgent regional matters, returning to Lisbon when events demanded much later down the road.[64] This poor prognostication would exaggerate Euro-American shock at the Angolan rebellion, feeding fears that the chaos would likely replace Portugal's steady hand.

But there were Westerners who had long warned that rebellion was imminent, and the most prominent among them was the American Committee on Africa (ACOA). Barely a year before the outbreak of violence in Angola, members of the New York-based committee had publicly warned the U.S. government of brewing unrest.[65] It had a right to claim a unique knowledge of events on the continent. ACOA had been founded in 1952 as a way to connect domestic civil rights activists with an emerging anti-apartheid movement in South Africa, but it had quickly shifted to support continent-wide self-determination. Under the leadership of George Houser, a Methodist minister involved with the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR) and the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), ACOA had developed strong relationships with many of Africa's leading nationalists including Kwame Nkrumah, Tom Mboya, Kenneth Kaunda, and Julius Nyerere. The committee sponsored speaking tours for these men, aided African petitions to the UN, and promulgated anti-colonial perspectives through publications like the monthly *Africa Today*. It also gained insight into the realities of evolving nationalist struggles as members

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[64] The American ambassador was confident no "trouble will develop spontaneously" in Portugal's colonies, and suspected that UN criticism was waning. Memo of conversation, Elbrick and Hare, 27 October 1960, 1; Memo of Conversation, Elbrick and Nunley, 11 January 1960, 2, Box 1813, Central Decimal File, 1960-63, RG 59 Records of the State Department, NARA (hereafter CDM 1960-63, RG 59, NARA).

[65] See "Revolt in Angola is Reported Here," *New York Times,* 8 March 1960.

provided assistance and the occasional overnight couch to Sub-Saharan Africa's future leadership.[66] ACOA's professed goal was to "keep the conscience of Americans alive to the issues at stake in Africa – to gain sympathetic support for the aims of self-government and equality."[67] It had succeeded well to that point, counting among its backers such prominent figures as Eleanor Roosevelt, A. Phillip Randolph, Martin Luther King, Jr., Jackie Robinson, Oscar Hammerstein II, Senator Hubert Humphrey (D-MN), Congressman Adam Clayton Powell (D-NY), and socialist Norman Thomas.[68]

The relative prominence of ACOA and its advocacy work at the UN made it an attractive ally for African nationalists excluded from discussions with Washington officials. Among the committee's early contacts and the one who would become most important for informing its reaction to Angola was Holden Roberto. Born in the northern Bakongo region in the early 1920s to a family with Baptist missionary ties, Roberto spent much of his early life in the Congo after tensions between the Portuguese and Protestants forced his family over the border. An uncle loyal to the former Kongo Kingdom schooled Roberto in Angolan politics and launched an ethnic nationalist organization in Leopoldville with ambitions to restore the splintered polity, installing his nephew as the international face of the movement.[69] It was in this context that Roberto first came in contact with ACOA

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[66] David Hostetter, *Movement Matters: American Anti-Apartheid Activism and the Rise of Multicultural Politics* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 17-23.

[67] "Annual Report: American Committee on Africa June 1, 1960-May 31, 1961," *Africa Today* 8:6 (June 1961).

[68] Form Letter, "The worst thing about Portuguese Africa . . ." ND [1958], Internal Memos, Reel I, Records of the American Committee on Africa, Part I: ACOA Executive Committee minutes and National Office memoranda, 1952-1975 (Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, 1992).

[69] Marcum, The Angolan Revolution I, 60-65. Roberto's un-Portuguese given name came from his baptism by the British missionary Robert Holden Carson Graham. See also, Holden Roberto, "Biographical

after his uncle utilized missionary linkages to request Houser help champion the Kongo cause at the UN in 1956.[70] Long exiled from Angola with limited contacts over the border, Roberto's international appeal nonetheless seemed the best option for the nationalist cause in the late 1950s. Houser was skeptical of such ethnocentrism, but there were few organizations openly agitating against Portuguese colonialism.

ACOA became a key ally for Roberto as he became the preeminent Angolan nationalist leader of the late 1950s. He used the committee's New York office "virtually as his headquarters" during his time at the UN, while Houser helped facilitate interactions with various African nationalists after Roberto attended the Accra Conference in 1958.[71] Interactions with Pan-Africanists such as Nkrumah and Frantz Fanon convinced Roberto of the limitations in the ethnic movement his uncle had started, launching a process that would result in the creation of the Union of Angolan Peoples (*União dos Povos de Angola*, UPA) with Roberto as the sole leader.[72] The UPA opened itself to all Angolan nationalists, claiming an anti-colonial position that sought to replace Portugal with a vaguely redistributive black state, which Roberto made sure did not hint of communism. The UPA began quietly preparing an armed revolution with aid from sympathetic African states and nationalist parties such as the Algerian National Liberation Front (*Front de Libération Nationale*, FLN), while continuing to petition the UN. This careful political positioning

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Statement," in Ronald H. Chilcote, *Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese Africa* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1972).

[70] Letter, Houser to Necaca, 14 May 1956, Box 79, American Committee on Africa Papers, Amistad Research Center, Tulane University, (New Orleans, LA). Also see Houser, Rain, 42.

[71] Houser, Rain, 79.

[72] David Macey, *Frantz Fanon* (New York: Picador, 2000), 370; Marcum, Angolan Revolution I, 65; Antunes, Kennedy-Salazar, 92.

allowed the revolutionary to make overtures to American politicians with support from ACOA – which arranged among other meetings a forty minute discussion with John Kennedy in January of 1960 – in hopes of mobilizing pressure on Portugal in advance of a domestic revolt.[73] ACOA and religious connections also encouraged Roberto's ties to sympathetic officials in the State Department.[74] The UPA struck upon a formula for advancing the revolution in exile: ACOA became the primary organ for communicating with the West, while it prepared for an extended armed revolution with aid from African states. Vaguely aware of Roberto's plans if not necessarily their timing, ACOA understood by 1960 that Lisbon's supposed peace was tenuous at best.

But Roberto was only part of the equation, and ACOA maintained an equally important relationship with another Lusophone African who also used church ties to build a network in the Western world. Eduardo Mondlane came to the United States for training to become a religious leader in his native Mozambique, but there was little doubt of his strong nationalist tendencies. Born in 1920, the son of a Tsonga chief, he attended a Swiss Missionary School that sponsored his education in social work in South Africa. [75] Forced to leave after the implementation of apartheid, Mondlane became an activist and operated a political education campaign in Mozambique under the cover of social and cultural

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[73] Letter, Homer Jack to Winifred Armstrong (Office of John Kennedy), 6 January 1960, Box 1, Winifred Armstrong Papers, JFK Library; Letter, Lloyd Garrison to Emanuel R. Freedman, 5 January 1962, Box 37, New York Times Foreign Desk Records, New York Public Library (New York, NY) [hereafter, NYPL].
[74] Theodore Tucker of the NCC commended Roberto to one diplomat as moderate anti-communist nationalist. Memcon, Theodore Tucker, 8 January 1961, Box 1821, CDF 60-63, RG 59, NARA.
[75] "Memorandum of Scholarship Aid to Eduardo Mondlane Since 1948," 28 March 1957, Box 15, RG 8, Presbyterian Historical Society (Philadelphia, PA) [hereafter PHS]; Helen Kitchen, "Conversation with Eduardo Mondlane," *Africa Report* 12:8 (November 1967), 31.

activities.[76] Concerned about growing official interest in his activities, Swiss missionaries worked with the U.S. National Council of Churches (NCC) to arrange for Mondlane to spend a year studying in Lisbon before finishing his undergraduate education at Oberlin University in Ohio. Mondlane married a young American woman he met at a religious retreat before earning a doctorate from Northwestern under pioneering anthropologist Melville Herskovits. After rejecting an offer to teach in Lisbon that wreaked of imperial cooptation, he accepted a position researching trust territories for the United Nations, where he could more freely travel while working on anti-colonial issues – including a return to Mozambique.[77]

Even more so than the itinerant Roberto, Mondlane spent his time in the United States cultivating an American anti-colonial solidarity that would come to include ACOA. He used Protestant networks to champion continental independence, addressing conferences, congregations, and spiritual retreats during the early years of the Civil Rights Movement. Speeches often connected domestic struggles for equality with international ones for self-determination.[78] Mondlane believed that personal testament and careful framing would provide the foundations for meaningful popular support, remarking "American public opinion tends to be predominantly sympathetic to almost any desires for political freedom manifested by the colonial peoples of empire other than their own."

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[76] Eduardo Mondlane, *The Struggle for Mozambique* (New York: Penguin, 1969), 113.
[77] José Manuel Duarte de Jesus, *Eduardo Mondlane: Um Homem A Abater* (Coimbra: Almedina, 2010), 79-83; Kitchen, 31.
[78] In one example from 1951, Mondlane spoke at a gathering of over 2,500 students on "such problems as colonialism, communism and nationalism abroad, and racial problems and social injustices at home." "2,500 Students to Attend Volunteer Movement Confab," *Atlanta Daily World*, 9 December 1951.

While he understood that there were limitations on the U.S. commitment to international justice, Mondlane believed that the country's anti-colonial heritage, democratic traditions, and reverence for a sometimes secularized Christian ethic would provide the foundations for transnational cooperation. As such, he argued that the domestic movement for equal rights should adopt a more global perspective and integrate support for the Portuguese African self-determination.[79] For nearly a decade, Mondlane promoted this view to become one of the most consistent voices in the country championing decolonization, building strong relationships with ACOA, the churches, and civil rights leaders.[80] This unique political maturation isolated Mondlane from certain radical nationalist theories, but it provided him with a uniquely Western outlook that would shape the way he approached African politics.[81] Instead of the ethnic identifications first used by Roberto or the leftist ideologies favored by other nationalist parties discussed below, the Mozambican relied in these early years on a universal understanding of Christian ethics – which came to inform contemporary human rights discourse – to build a solidarity that could pressure Portugal into liberalization.

These African connections provided ACOA with direct knowledge of the Portuguese colonies, but they also revealed the limitations of American solidarity in this

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[79] Eduardo Mondlane, "Anti-Colonialism in the United States," in Centro de Estudos Políticos e Sociais, ed., *Enquêre sur L'anticolonialism*e (Lisbon: 1957), 188-189; George Houser, phone interview with author, 10 March 2014.

[80] Mondlane presented alongside Dr. Albert Schweitzer, the head of the NCC, and UN official Ralph Bunche.

[81] Duarte de Jesus, Mondlane, 78. Mondlane nonetheless retained what he described as an African preference for communalism that clashed with capitalism. Eduardo Mondlane, "African Religious Beliefs and the Christian Faith," 19 September 1956, Box 15, RG 8, PHS.

period. African nationalists appreciated ACOA's staunch anti-colonialism, but it was by no means a revolutionary organization. An extension of the Civil Rights Movement, it encouraged peaceful transfers of power brought about by diplomacy and, if pushed, non-violent demonstrations. It was also a product of its times, hewing closely to a Cold War liberal view of the world that championed self-determination along democratic lines as the best chance for peace and development. As an early document explained, ACOA aimed

> to help in every way the emergence of democratic self-governing states . . . and to free the people on the African Continent from the exploitation, poverty and racial discrimination under which they suffer. Our Committee opposes the fanaticism and totalitarianism of the doctrines of Communism, Mau Mau, White Supremacy and Imperialism and seeks to help the African people to find a democratic peaceful pathway into the new day of the 20th century world.[82]

This attitude allowed ACOA to appeal broadly to centrist institutions like the Protestant churches that paid many of its bills, while also providing a foundation for building constructive relationships with government officials interested in fighting the Cold War.[83] Still, ACOA understood colonial repression and slowly accepted the idea of armed revolution as an unpleasant necessity, eventually supporting the Algerian revolution without providing overt aid to the fighting itself. Therefore, Mondlane and Roberto – who had few leftist connections and continued to publicly urge UN action until the 1961 revolt

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[82] "Aims and Purposes of the American Committee on Africa," no date [c. 1953], Folder: ACOA – Statement of Purpose (Drafts), Box 29, American Committee on Africa Papers.

[83] ACOA built relationships with many government officials, especially those in the Kennedy administration. See Memo, Houser to Executive Committee, "Trip to Washington," 2 February 1959, Internal Memos, Reel I, Microfilm Records of the American Committee on Africa, Part I: ACOA Executive Committee minutes and National Office memoranda, 1952-1975. Gerald Horne has criticized ACOA's liberalism in the 1950s and 1960s, comparing it negatively with the leftist and shorter-lived Council on African Affairs led by the outspoken duo of W.E.B. Dubois and Paul Robeson. See Gerald Horne, *Mau Mau in Harlem?* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 164, 171-172; Gerald Horne, "Review of Minter, William; Hovey, Gail; Jr., Charles Cobb, eds., *No Easy Victories: African Liberation and American Activists over a Half Century, 1950-2000*," H-SAfrica, H-Net Reviews (January, 2008).

– were ideal allies. ACOA's goal in the 1950s was to gain early acceptance for these brands of African self-determination in order to avoid the violence of armed revolution and the drift toward communism that was a logical outgrowth of continued Western support for the outdated imperial model.

But this Cold War liberalism prevented ACOA from tapping into a second, more radical form of anti-colonial nationalism originating, of all places, in the universities of Lisbon. Educational advancement was a remote possibility for the vast majority of colonial peoples (and most citizens of Portugal for that matter), but there were some opportunities for the gifted and well-connected. A handful of mostly *mestiço* (mixed race) youth gained access to Portuguese schools as part of the *assimilado* (assimilated) class from which some advanced to metropolitan universities.[84] Colonials gravitated together as they confronted life in Portugal, where few citizens had seen Africans from their supposedly integrated empire. Many African university youth were involved with the *Casa dos Estudantes do Império* (House for Colonial Students), which served as the social, cultural, and political incubator of revolutionary leadership.[85] Their experiences of both racism and comradery in Lisbon reinforced a sense of shared continental identity, which fueled what the Angolan nationalist Mário Pinto de Andrade termed "a re-Africanization" as the first step in the development of an anti-colonial ideology.[86] Study in Portugal also introduced them to the

[84] In 1961, the Portuguese admitted there were only two thousand university students (both black and white) from the African colonies at metropolitan universities from a total population of thirteen million. Memcon, Rusk with Luis Esteves Fernandes, 10 March 1961, Box 1821, CDF 60-63, RG59, NARA.
[85] Dalila Cabrita Mateus, *A Luta Pela Independência: A Formação das Elites Fundadoras da FREIMO, MPLA, e PAIGC* (Portugal: Inquérito, 1999), 66-75.
[86] Andrade later argued that this process represented the first step in creating the anti-colonial movement, stating "The first manifestation of revolt is the affirmation of blackness." Mario de Andrade, "Amilcar

revolutionary politics of Marx, French African nationalists, African Americans, and the underground Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) – with medical student and future Angolan president Agostinho Neto acting as a bridge between the two groups. In Lisbon, bright young colonials found a furtive ground for articulating increasingly leftist critiques of the fascist empire.

Amílcar Cabral, the founder of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (*Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde,* or PAIGC), provides a window into this culture. Born in Portuguese Guinea in 1924 to Cabo Verdean parents, Cabral spent a decade on the mainland before attending school in the more assimilated if marginalized islands first colonized by Portugal in the 1460s.[87] Taking advantage of the special status that the creolized Cabo Verdeans held in the empire, he studied agriculture at the Technical University of Lisbon, living with a number of other African students in the western *Ajuda* district and becoming active in the *Casa dos Estudantes do Império*. Cabral became a leader of a veritable who's-who of the revolutionary generation from Lusophone Africa, notably de Andrade and Neto from Angola and the Mozambican Marcelino Dos Santos.[88] The cadre formed a seminar to explore Marxism, African nationalist ideas like those of Leophold Senghor, the poetry of

Cabral e a re-africanização dos espíritos," Nô Pintcha, II 225 (12 September 1976), Arquivo de Mario de Andrade, Casa Comum.

[87] Chabal, Cabral, 29-35. Portugal long used the more culturally Portuguese population of Cabo Verde (sometimes written Cape Verde) as colonial middlemen in Guinea.

[88] Gérard Chaliand and Michel Vale, "Amilcar Cabral," *International Journal of Politics* 7:4 (Winter, 1977-1978), 5; Chabal, 40-44. Cabral and his cadre also had contact with future Portuguese premier Mario Soares, who was a leader of a radical youth league Movimento de Unidade Democrática of which Neto was also a member.

Pablo Neruda, the literary soul-searching of the Harlem Renaissance, and a great deal else forbidden by the government. It was these readings and exchanges that, in Andrade's words, "opened [Cabral's] mind to the understanding of the world."[89] This communal exploration helped revitalize their identities as African peoples, providing an important mental challenge to their status as colonial subjects. The fact that they had come to this conclusion together also forged lasting bonds between the African revolutionaries. Cabral later explained that this time in Lisbon had been the genesis of "the long march towards the liberation of our people."[90]

Over the next decade, this community of Portuguese African leftists evolved into a network of closely associated revolutionary movements. They drew on each other to help define their objections to Portuguese colonialism and develop methods for attracting new recruits. After their studies, most students returned home, though a few like De Andrade and Dos Santos settled in France where they developed unfettered contacts with the European left.[91] Cabral was in many ways the unofficial leader of this movement. He became intimately familiar with Guinea as a census taker, before taking a position within the colonial state that sponsored his travel between Portugal, Guinea, and Angola. During one such trip to his birthplace in September of 1956, he founded PAIGC on vaguely Marxist principles. Three months later he was in Angola with Andrade and Neto when they formed the leftist Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (People's Movement for

[89] Mario de Andrade, *Amílcar Cabral* (Paris: Francois Maspero, 1980), 32.
[90] Cabral, Revolution in Guinea, 77.
[91] Davidson, Eye of the Storm, 154.

the Liberation of Angola, or MPLA).[92] The final movement to emerge from this network was the *União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique* (National Democratic Union of Mozambique, or UDENAMO), founded by nationalist exiles in Southern Rhodesia and led internationally by Dos Santos.[93] Together, Cabral and his Lisbon associates began to lay the groundwork for leftist anti-colonial revolutions that would repudiate the Salazar regime. They coordinated their activities after 1958 through a series of international organizations, culminating in the creation of the Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas (Conference of Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies, or CONCP) in 1961.[94]

The CONCP illustrated the inherent internationalism of the socialist nationalist parties that had emerged from 1950s Lisbon independent from the church-ACOA network. Yet the goals were similar, in that the parties hoped to pressure Portugal into liberalizing its relationship with its colonies – even as they sought monetary and military aid for potential revolutions. The CONCP parties worked cooperatively to "develop propaganda in order to obtain the effective support of world public opinion."[95] Given the political inclinations of the constituent members, it would have been logical for the international organization to focus its efforts on the communist East and Third World. This it certainly

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[92] Marcum, 27-31; Chabal, 52.

[93] Allen Isaacman and Barbara Isaacman, *Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution, 1900-1982* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), 79-80.

[94] The CONCP was preceded by the *Frente* Revolucionária Africana para a Independência Nacional das colónias portuguesa (FRAIN), which evolved from the Movimento AntiColonialista (MAC) first launched by Amílcar Cabral in 1958. De Andrade, Neto, and Dos Santos were also involved in these earlier groups. Mateus, 88-92.

[95] CONCP, Statuts, 1961, Pasta 04604.023.015, CONCP, Movimentos Anti-Coloniais, Documentos Amílcar Cabral, Projecto Casa Comum, Fundaçao Mario Soares [hereafter, DAC, CC].

did through participation in forums like the All-Africa's People Conference of 1960, which helped launch the CONCP's immediate predecessor. Yet from the late 1950s onward, the Lusophone nationalists sought to create a broad coalition that also included leftists in European countries. It believed the support of Portugal's European allies could force Salazar to liberalize policy in the colonies. It created a number of valuable contacts with French communists and the British anti-colonial movement, even revisiting ties first pioneered by Neto in Lisbon by working with Portuguese exiles in London.[96]

The CONCP alliance was also the vehicle through which the socialist nationalists sought international attention for their cause. In 1960, the MPLA tapped into the momentum of the Year of Africa to make the first serious appeal for independence of Portugal's colonies. The party explained that it and its allies had been preparing for revolution, which would enter the armed stage soon. It requested that Lisbon recognize the tide of history and promise eventual self-determination, allow the establishment of political parties, and prepare negotiations with colonial nationalists by the end of the year. Only these measures, the MPLA claimed, could prevent the looming specter of bloodshed and "find a peaceful solution to the colonial problem." When Salazar refused to respond to the declaration, the CONCP countries held a press conference in London where they decried "Portuguese obstinacy" and urged international action to sway the Salazar regime.[97] Unfortunately for the Portuguese African leftists, their calls fell on deaf ears – receiving

[96] Fenner Brockway, *The Colonial Revolution* (London: Hart-Davis, MacGibbon, 1973), 400
[97] Mario de Andrade, "Angolan Nationalism," reprinted in Ronald Chilcote, ed. *Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese Africa* (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1972), 190-191

limited media coverage and never reaching the desks of Western decision makers. There is not even evidence that ACOA took notice. The CONCP emphasis on socialism and its connections to the European left offered little opportunity for early cooperation with Houser's respectably liberal organization in New York. But the unity shown at this supranational level by Lusophone nationalists would come to play an important role in creating a single vision of "Portuguese African liberation" and a commitment to a kind of transcendent, universal iteration of a specifically Third World socialism that would appeal to a broad array of peoples worldwide.

By 1960, both primary currents of Lusophone African nationalism were preparing for self-determination. The first was an ill-defined and politically varied assortment of individuals and groups whose primary unifying element was a relationship with the international Protestant network, limited ties to the trans-imperial intelligentsia, and a commitment to a centrist nationalism. The second included the better organized groups associated with the CONCP, more radically oriented in their leanings, that often traced their lineages to the *Casa dos Estudantes do Império*. While the first built strong relationships in the United States, the latter found greater support in Europe, where the integration of socialism into nationalist politics proved less controversial. Bridging the gap between these two groups was difficult, as evidenced by an abortive attempt to merge the UPA and MPLA in the late 1950s. Holden Roberto had scuttled the talks, fearing that his Bakongo dominated UPA would become a secondary partner in a socialist front. He consolidated control of his party and portrayed his rejection of the MPLA union as proof

of his commitment to the anti-communist West.[98] While there remained deep divisions between the nationalists, they did agree on the need to make appeals to Portugal's allies in the West, even as they prepared for armed revolution with African and Eastern weapons. At the same time, these tenuous transnational manifestations of anti-imperialism stood in place of the local nationalist organizing familiar to Anglo-French decolonization but difficult under the repressive conditions of Portuguese rule. This new formulation of revolution from the outside-in – and in some ways from the top-down – meant that official observers were slow to recognize the true power of these revolutions. How Western policymakers would respond to either form of anti-colonialism when the myth of Portuguese stability had been called into question remained to be seen.

Salazar, Kennedy, and the International Response to the Angolan Rebellions

Official ignorance of the emerging Lusophone revolutions ended with a jolt in 1961. In the first three months of the year, a series of popular protests and rebellions shook the tranquility of Salazar's tightly controlled empire. After two months of low level unrest in the north of Angola over poor wages, a coordinated attack against political prisons occurred in Luanda in February, killing fourteen Europeans and eliciting harsh reprisals from colonial officials and vigilantes. The MPLA claimed credit for the Luanda uprising, though it inspired no sustained revolt.[99] Then in mid-March, the UPA launched a rebellion

[98] Houser, Rain, 152.

[99] See Marcum, Angolan Revolution vol I, 123-130; Guimarães, 42-45; Jean-Michel Mabeko Tali, *Dissidências e Poder de Estado: O MPLA perante si próprio (1962-1977),* Vol I (Luanda: Nzila, 2001), 68-76. Mabeko Tali notes that some at the time and since have sought to place blame on American agents – including ACOA – though no evidence exists to tie any U.S. nationals to the events. At the time, even

in the north, crossing over the Congolese border and taking advantage of the earlier disruptions to begin the first Lusophone independence struggle. During these first months of 1961, Portugal attempted to restore order through brutal reprisals that left hundreds – perhaps thousands – of Africans dead, but struggled in the face of multiple revolts. The façade of peace had finally been shattered, and governments across the globe took notice as Portuguese Angola seemed on the precipice of collapse just across the border from the already chaotic Congo.[100]

African nationalists were especially interested in the reaction of the United States, Portugal's most powerful ally. When reports of anticolonial unrest first began filtering through Lisbon's censors in January, John F. Kennedy had just entered the White House. The youthful president, though still new to the office, had clear ideas on decolonization. He believed that the developing world had the potential to become the future battleground of the Cold War and had expressed an early interest in Africa. While chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa, Kennedy had criticized the French handling of Algeria and built personal (if not necessarily close) relationships with nationalists including Kenya's Tom Mboya and Roberto. He had also backed colonial independence on the campaign trail, scoring points with liberals and African American voters who were understandably less enthusiastic about the Democrat's carefully moderated statements on domestic civil rights. [101]

Roberto attributed the February uprising to the MPLA. Telegram, McIlvaine to SecState, 11 February 1961, Box 1821, CDF 60-63, RG 59, NARA.

[100] See Associated Press, "Whites Slain in Angola; Airlift of Refugees is On," *New York Times*, 18 March 1961.

[101] Mahoney, 14-33; Muehlenbeck, 34-41.

Importantly, Kennedy's position had less to do with a specific ideology than his insightful observation of international affairs. He recognized the geostrategic implications of peripheral independence movements and believed decolonization in some form to be inevitable. As early as 1957, he had expressed concern that Asian and African states would "look with suspicion on the Western nations who impeded their steps to independence" – and likely ally with communist states.[102] Kennedy sincerely believed the United States had an opportunity to encourage the transition to majority rule in a way that would win friends and avoid the traditional quiescence to European interests that had alienated Third World nationalists in previous decades.[103] The Congo crisis validated this concern even as it warned of the chaos possible with poorly managed transfers of power. Halting the spread of unrest further south was especially important, as South Africa's continued resistance to majority self-determination had the potential to transform localized struggles into a wider regional race war that could invite foreign intervention. It was, according to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, this potential "alliance between Communism and racialism" that most concerned the administration.[104] Angola offered an opportunity to undermine the alliance if the United States could help manage Portugal's transfer of power. Facing a relatively weak ally, Kennedy felt confident he could facilitate a gradual self-determination, which would ideally stabilize a region on the verge of becoming a Cold War flashpoint.

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[102]Senator John F. Kennedy (MA), "Imperialism – The Enemy of Freedom," Congressional Record 102:8 (2 July 1957), S10784 and S10787.
[103] Mahoney, 14-33.
[104] Memcon, Rusk with Luis Esteves Fernandes, 10 March 1961, Box 1821, CDF 60-63, RG59, NARA.

Most Americans believed Salazar faced a serious crisis. Washington had little confidence that Portugal, given its limited economic and military resources, could long hold out against an organized revolt. U.S. leaders were concerned that a full-scale revolution in Angola could force the Lisbon regime from the continent, making the earlier Belgian exit seem smooth in comparison. Kennedy sought to place gentle pressure on Portugal but quickly adopted a harder line as Salazar seemed to be losing control in Angola. Even before the March 15 invasion by the UPA, Secretary of State Rusk had contacted Salazar about Washington's "[deep concern] over [the] deteriorating position [of] Portugal" in Africa. Rusk, a southern liberal and Rhodes Scholar, shared his president's view of colonialism but remained sympathetic to Europe. He was nonetheless blunt in his warning to Salazar: continued inaction would only worsen the situation. American officials were concerned not only about Portugal's military situation but also about the criticism of Afro-Asian states – some directly allied with Roberto's UPA – who had used the outbreak of violence to draft a UN resolution on Portuguese colonialism that threatened to force the issue onto the international agenda.[105] Discussing the issue with C. Burke Elbrick, the career Foreign Service officer who had been the U.S. ambassador in Lisbon since January 1959, the secretary commented that "if [the] Portuguese did not bring [the] overseas provinces to self-determination, they would be creating worse Congos." The communication softened the blow by proposing economic assistance to offset the economic consequences of decolonization if only the *Estado Novo* would show some sign of moving

[105] Telegram, Rusk to Elbrick, 4 March 1961, Box 1813, CDM 1960-63, RG 59, NARA.

toward greater African participation in colonial affairs.[106] Salazar accepted the warnings courteously without official response, presuming that the message was the posturing of a new administration and that NATO allegiances would prevent any further action.[107]

The aged dictator sorely underestimated deep American concern about instability in Portugal's colonies. Rusk's Congo comment encapsulated the fears of the Kennedy administration. Still settling into the Oval Office, Kennedy had little knowledge of Salazar but believed he understood events in Angola. Failing to realize the deep divisions between the nationalists, Kennedy presumed the weakening of central power would expand popular support for the cause of independence and military liberation as had happened in Algeria. Prolonged fighting would empower anti-Western radicals, while a forced Portuguese retreat would create a power vacuum in Africa and potentially topple the empire-dependent *Estado Novo* with unpredictable consequences. To Kennedy and his staff, the only way to avert this chain of events was for Portugal to embrace self-determination as a way of undermining support for armed conflict, thereby allowing a more gradual transition. Reports from Lisbon indicated that some high-ranking Portuguese officials – notably Defense Minister Júlio Botelho Moniz – recognized the need for flexibility and were willing to listen to American initiatives.[108] Washington officials felt that placing greater

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[106]Telegram, SecState to AmEmbassy Paris, 7 March 1961, Box 1821, CDM 1960-63, RG 59, NARA; see ibid.

[107] Untitled document (Ministério dos Negócios Estraingeiros), Visita do Snr. Harrman ao Conselho, 3 March 1961, PAA 287, Pasta 922, AHD; Memo, George C. McGhee to McGeorge Bundy, 25 May 1961, Box 154, NSF, JFKL.

[108] Telegram, Elbrick to SecState, 4 March 1961, Box 154, NSF, JFKL.

political pressure on Portugal would embolden these dissenting voices and convince Salazar to reverse course in order to preserve power in Angola and within his own cabinet.

It was in this context that Kennedy made his most aggressive move. On March 15, the U.S. delegation to the UN voted in favor of a Security Council (SC) resolution calling for Portugal to move toward self-determination in order to avoid "another Congo . . . [and] disastrous consequences." The Liberian sponsored resolution did not pass due to a high number of European abstentions, but it represented the first time the United States had voted against a NATO ally (and with the Soviet Union) on a colonial issue.[109] The vote raised the stakes on Portugal but less than many historians have assumed. The administration believed that the relatively moderate Liberian proposal in the Security Council – which was assured to fail due to French and British hostility – would soothe calls for more assertive measures in the General Assembly. This second route held the potential for the "creation of UN machinery on Angola," which Rusk and the State Department wanted to avoid at all costs given the difficult situation the international body had caused in the Congo as well as Salazar's assuredly irate reaction.[110] Rusk saw the vote as making the best of an exceedingly difficult situation, simultaneously protecting a NATO ally while encouraging Portugal to reevaluate existing policies. That the United States would gain some traction with African states was important, but it also bought time for Lisbon.

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[109] Schneidman, 15-16. Schniedman notes that Kennedy refused to give Stevenson advance permission to vote for an Afro-Asian resolution in the GA, likely fearing a demand for immediate independence.
[110] Telegram, Rusk to USUN New York, 6 March 1961, Box 1821, CDF 60-63, RG 59, NARA.

Despite its intent, the vote infuriated Salazar and launched a summer of diplomatic maneuvering and confrontation. Rather than empower critics within the regime, American action had the opposite effect. Preparing for a long political and military struggle, the cagey Salazar consolidated his rule by installing a number of new ministers and ambassadors who shared his view of the colonies.[111] He also rallied the nation, using the colonies' keystone position within the *Estado Novo* to tap into a well of popular support. The state-controlled media portrayed the vote as a direct attack on Portugal, fueling violent anti-American protests in the metropolis and Angola that were tolerated and likely encouraged by the regime. In one such incident in late March, a large crowd damaged the Lisbon embassy when the local police were slow to arrive – a rare incident in a country that prided itself on maintaining order.[112] The country was further incensed that the United States had voted alongside the Soviet Union, since Salazar asserted that the nationalists were armed, funded, and led by outside communist agitators. "It's impossible to maintain a situation in which the United States has an alliance with European countries to defend the West against

[111] The able young diplomat Franco Nogueira became foreign minister, the reform-minded Adriano Moreira overseas minister, and Salazar confidant Theotonio Pereira ambassador to Washington. Salazar assumed the defense portfolio after an unsuccessful coup by Botelho Moniz, which some historians have attributed to U.S. involvement. De Meneses, 472-482. American officials knew of the Botelho Moniz's complaints and may have considered supporting a coup, but there is little evidence of direct participation. Ambassador Elbrick, who met with Botelho Moniz often, advocated for Salazar and generally sided with the status quo. See Antunes, 239-266 – most of Antunes evidence comes from interviews with individuals close to Salazar, who believed the coup a U.S. plot. Rodrigues believes the U.S. distanced itself at the last minute. Rodrigues, 65-66.

[112] Telegram, Elbrick to SecState, 29 March 1961, Box 154, NSF, JFKL; "Conversa teloficina com Overseas minister 25/3/61," Pasta 9, AOS/CO/UL-30D, TT.

Russian action," one Portuguese official fumed, "and on the other hand, in relation to Africa, aid communist bloc positions against European interests."[113]

While the Portuguese smoldered, nationalists looked at the vote as an early victory. Roberto had been at the UN when the UPA invasion occurred, taking advantage of the sudden importance of Angola to gain media attention. He praised the Security Council vote as an important "reversal in American politics regarding Africa and colonial empires," but he reminded listeners it was just a first step. The UPA leader demanded that the world follow the example of the UN and "exert pressure on Portugal to bring an immediate end to the atrocities in Angola."[114] He also privately urged the State Department to continue its activity, warning inaction could result in the growth of communist sympathies.[115] This last point was important, because Roberto spent the first months of the revolt reinforcing his image as a moderate nationalist and potential ally for the United States, even as his party took up arms. "If the Portuguese have been accusing us of being communist – it's because it's the only argument they have now," Roberto assured an NBC documentary crew, "We are not communist but are fighting for freedom."[116]

Roberto would soon discover that serious aid to the nationalist cause was not yet on the administration's agenda. Rusk heard enough good things to order the embassy in Leopoldville to maintain discreet contact with Roberto "for [the] time being" and explore

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[113] Conversa com Sr. John H. Ferguson, 15 May 1961, PAA 287, Pasta 922, AHD. See also Rodrigues, 93-94.
[114] "U.S. Praised by Angolan," *The Sun* (Baltimore), 25 March 1961.
[115] Telegram, Plimpton to SecState, 16 March 1961, box 1821, CDF 60-63, RG 59, NARA.
[116] The NBC documentary aired domestically and on the BBC. Quoted Len Addicott, *Cry Angola!* (Amsterdam: SCM Press, 1962), 28. See also"Angolan Leader a Moderate Man," *The Guardian*, 27 June 1961.

American involvement in the struggle short of support for a government in exile. As Rusk's carefully chosen words communicated, the administration remained wary and was still in the process of assessing "Holden's integrity, character as leader [of the] UPA."[117] Roberto had been on the CIA payroll since the Eisenhower years, and Kennedy continued to provide assistance. But the State Department purposely limited these funds to prevent Roberto from purchasing weapons and sought ways to insulate government agencies from direct contact with the UPA leader. What many historians have identified as proof of Kennedy's commitment to self-determination was in Rusk's own words barely more than a bribe, designed to maintain contact with Roberto as the government pondered its future strategy.[118]

The UN vote represented a shift in the rhetoric of American policy, but it did not necessarily connote the policy change that either the Portuguese or Roberto assumed. A close reading of documents reveals that the Kennedy administration's view of African independence in Angola was limited in scope, advocating for increased political autonomy while simultaneously seeking to reinforce Lisbon's economic, cultural, and diplomatic control of the colonies. Discussions repeatedly highlighted the American desire for Portugal to retain a substantial presence in Africa, albeit in a form that assuaged the nationalist demands of apparent moderates like Roberto. State's European Bureau highlighted the objectives of a new policy towards Lusophone Africa, which included

[117] Telegram, Rusk to Leopoldville, 21 March 1961, box 1821, CDF 60-63, RG 59, NARA.
[118] Memos, Hilsman to Bundy, 23 May 1961; Rusk to Johnson, 18 June 1961; and Johnson to Hilsman, 17 July 1961, FRUS Africa, 543-547.

protecting metropolitan economic interests and "laying foundations for a new political status for the Portuguese territories and a new relationship with Portugal."[119] Though articulated in the section of the State Department most friendly to Lisbon's interests, the comment reflected a common logic. Speaking with Salazar in March, Rusk "noted relative success [of] British in retaining close ties with former colonies after their independence and deplored cases where former profitable relationship broken (Dutch-Indonesia, Belgium-Congo)."[120] Even UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, identified by historians as a key pro-African liberal in Kennedy's foreign policy team, offered a nuanced reading of American anti-colonialism. "The official attitude of Washington," Stevenson explained to his Portuguese counterpart after the vote, "was not to provoke 'hasty movements to self government' but to develop gradually," requiring only a vague pledge to independence at some future date.[121] The administration believed that it was important for Portugal to retain political and economic relationships with its dependencies, but it believed that Portuguese commitment to direct rule threatened this very goal.

But this measured approach meant little to Salazar. Already feeling isolated as European empires capitulated around his colonies, the dictator perceived American intentions as a mortal threat to the *Estado Novo*. To Salazar, Kennedy's calls for gradual self-determination could mean nothing more than the complete independence of the

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[119] Memo, Nunley to Kohler, January 17, 1961, 5, Box 1815, CDF 60-63, RG 59, NARA.

[120] Telegram, State to Lisbon, 10 March 1961, Box 1813, CDM 1960-63, RG 59, NARA.

[121] Untitled document from Ministério dos Negócios Estraingeiros, Section: Reaccão do Representante Permanente dos Estados Unidos . . . , 20 April 1961, PAA 287, Pasta 922, AHD. See Muehlenberg, 42; Schneidman, 20.

colonies and the division of multi-continental Portugal.[122] The small Iberian state lacked the economic might to tie its colonies to the metropolis after a transfer of power, meaning comparisons with Britain and France were at best shortsighted and perhaps disingenuous. The regime believed that, rhetoric aside, the United States was colluding with African countries to seek the ouster of Portugal from the continent in search of political and economic advantages.[123] Salazar's newly appointed foreign minister, Franco Nogueira, summarized the attitude of Lisbon when he wrote privately that there "is some plan of the United States, and it has the objective of placing Portugal outside of Africa."[124] On the defensive after nationalist victories elsewhere on the continent, the *Estado Novo* invested American rhetoric with far greater ambition and resolve than most Washington officials could have ever imagined.

Even when Salazar set aside his fears of an American power play, he considered the initial demarche shortsighted, because it sought to undermine the long history of European authority on the continent that he believed was key to a lasting peace. The dictator retained strong views on the inherent inferiority of Africans and warned American officials that local peoples would "soon revert to tribalism" without European guidance.[125]

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[122]The Constitution of the Portuguese Republic incorporated a section of the Colonial Act of 1930 that proclaimed "It is intrinsic in the Portuguese Nation to fulfill its historic mission of colonization in the lands of the Discoveries . . . The Overseas Provinces, as an integral part of the Portuguese State, are united among themselves and with Metropolitan Portugal." "The Fundamental Principles of Overseas Portugal," in Chilcote, 18.

[123] See PIDE Informational." 242/61-GU, 2 March 1961, Pasta 20, AOS/UL-32C, TT-PT; PIDE Informational, 242/61-GU, 2 March 1961, Pasta 20, AOS/UL-32C, TT-PT.

[124] Franco Nogueira, *Um Político Confessa-se (Diário: 1960-1968),* 3rd ed, (Porto: Livraria Civilização, 1987), 12.This attitude was fairly widespread. See letter, Overseas Minister to Governor General of Angola, 28 April 1961, Pasta 18, AOS/CO/UL-30D, TT-PT.

[125] Telegram, Lisbon to SecState, 7 March 1961, 2, Box 1813, CDF 60-63, RG 59, NARA.

Borrowing from the Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre, officials argued Portugal was especially well-positioned to play this civilizing role. The warm Iberian climate supposedly prepared colonists for settlement in tropical regions, while a lack of formal segregation had produced a history of cultural mixing evidenced in multiracial Lusophone nations like Brazil.[126] This theory of *lusotropicalism* became the *Estado Novo's* leading defense of Portugal's imperial role in Africa, though proponents demurred it would take decades or even centuries before Africans were fully prepared for self-rule. Forced separation of Angola and Mozambique would not only deprive Portugal of its historic mission but also threaten Western desires for regional stability.[127] Armed with this defense of empire, Salazar responded to American overtures that he was "deeply concerned over what he considers a self-defeating policy of [the] US with regard to Africa," and Portugal would play no part in the dissolution of its own territories.[128] As long as Portugal retained its colonies, the *Estado Novo* considered itself a bulwark against anti-Western intrigue and a world power that could resist external pressure for internal reform.

If the United States had any hope of changing Salazar's mind, additional support would be necessary. The Kennedy administration believed a joint NATO approach was the best option for cajoling the Salazar regime, illustrating the administration's continued deference to Europe. Rusk had discussed options with Britain and France in early March,

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[126] See Gilberto Freyre, *The Portuguese and the Tropics*, Trans Helen M. D'O Matthew and F. De Mello Moser (Lisbon: 1961), 5-27. It is interesting to note that Portuguese proponents of this theory were notably less excited about the idea of racial miscegenation, which they believed unnecessary for cultural synthesis.
[127] Bender, 3-12. See also Antonio Julio de Castro Fernandes, "Unity in Nation," in Chilcote, 8.
[128] Telegram, Lisbon to SecState, 7 March 1961, Box 1813, CDM 1960-63, RG 59, NARA.

but neither had committed to supporting the U.S. approach and abstained from voting in New York.[129] The French foreign minister had been particularly hostile to requests that NATO criticize Portugal. Not so subtly alluding to the rising number of Franco-American disagreements that ranged from Algeria to a nuclear Germany, he lamented that the situation represented "one more crisis for the west."[130] France had always been a somewhat unpredictable Cold War partner, and relations with Washington had frayed after Eisenhower had humiliated its ally by opposing the Euro-Israeli invasion of the Suez Canal. The advent of Charles de Gaulle's Fifth Republic had only amplified this split, as the proud general chafed under American leadership and pushed for greater independence.[131] Though de Gaulle accepted the necessity of decolonization, the how and when of the event in Africa remained a point of contention. France agreed with Portugal on the "fundamental importance of Africa in the Western defense system" and had expanded cooperation between the two countries as NATO distanced itself from involvement in the continent in the 1950s. The common bonds and interests of the two countries thus boiled down to an interrelated list: "the defense of Africa, close Western solidarity, the problem of NATO, assessment of American policy and incidences of anti-

[129]Telegram, Lisbon to Secstate, 29 March 1961, Box 154, National Security File, JFK Library;
[130] Telegram, Paris to SecState, 8 March 1961, 1-2, Box 1813, CDM 1960-63, RG 59, NARA.
[131] Frédéric Bozo, "France, 'Gaullism,' and the Cold War," in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Vol. II, Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, eds. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 159-168.

colonialism in defense of the free world."[132] It was this European solidarity that prevented France from backing the young American president's call for pressure.

This solidarity was no accident. Salazar had anticipated American policy and begun strengthening continental relationships. In October 1960, he had sent his foreign minister to France, where de Gaulle confirmed his sympathy for Portugal. Daniel da Silva Costa Marcos argues that this event was important in reassuring the Lisbon regime it would not be alone in confronting looming difficulties in the colonies and the UN.[133] Encouraged by the response, the Portuguese government decided a few months later to "reduce our dependency on traditional allies," namely the United States and Great Britain, in favor of building new associations around common colonial interests and frustrations. Salazar found a number of allies perturbed at what they believed were presumptive American actions regarding imperial ties. Most European governments believed NATO was a tool for coordinating European defense, not providing a forum for the liquidation of empires.[134] In addition to de Gaulle, Salazar reached out to the conservative Dutch Foreign Minister Joseph Luns and the Belgian Secretary General of NATO Paul-Henri Spaak, who sympathized with Portuguese goals. He hoped to take refuge within a

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[132] Conversa, O ministro de negócios extranjeiros com secretário-geral do Ministério das Relações Exteriores da França, 23 August 1958, Pasta 4, AOS/COE-2, TT-PT.

[133] Daniel da Silva Costa Marcos, *Salazar e de Gaulle : a França e a Questão Colonial Portuguesa, 1958-1968* (Lisbon: Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 2007), 68.

[134] France and Portugal believed that NATO should expand to encompass colonies, and they chafed that the U.S. did not appreciate the "fundamental importance of Africa in the Western defense system." Ibid. See Compte Rendu de L'Entretien du Général De Gaulle avec M. Dean Acheson, 20 April 1961, Document 200, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Documents Diplomatiques Français 1961, Tome 1 (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1997), 493.

European bloc based largely on, as one Portuguese document explained, "Belgian, Dutch, and French dissatisfaction with the United Nations and with the United States" over colonial questions.[135] These new relationships took many forms including access to military arms, cross-border cooperation in Angola, and rhetorical support against Afro-Asian revolutions at the UN.[136] The Portuguese hoped that de Gaulle and other European leaders would provide protection from the American agenda within NATO, thwarting the coordinated pressure Kennedy desired.

Kennedy found that even Washington's most stalwart postwar ally was unwilling to directly confront Portugal over the complicated politics of Sub-Saharan Africa. In contrast to de Gaulle, Kennedy had quickly developed a bond with the Tory Prime Minister Harold MacMillan, who had famously backed decolonization in his "wind of change" speech and had the potential to make inroads with Salazar as the leader of a nation whose alliance with Portugal dated to 1386. But while the British shared the American concern with Portugal's precarious position, they were equally unwilling to take a firm stand. The United Kingdom had begun its own phased withdrawal from central Africa, and it did not appreciate the precedent of either the UN or NATO meddling in colonial affairs. As one Whitehall official explained to an American diplomat, the British were doing "our best . . .to avoid making trouble for [Portugal]. . . Inevitably the attack is

[135] The national assembly approved the motion on 3 January 1961. "Notas sobre a Politica Externa Portuguesa," 12 January 1962, Pasta 5, AOS/CO/NE-30B, TT-PT.
[136] PIDE Info, 1011/61-GU, 16 June 1961, Pasta 58, AOS/UL-32C, TT-PT.

to some extent directed at all European Powers with interests in Africa."[137] As a result, Britain expressed sympathy for the American approach and even joined – over the objections of the foreign minister – in requesting that Portugal supply information on the colonies to the UN. But Whitehall adopted, in the words of historian Glynn Stone, "a more reserved attitude toward putting pressure on Portugal," seeking to temper international criticism and moderate African opinion in ways that would help preserve stability in a region still critically important to British interests.[138]

Discouraged but not dissuaded, the Kennedy administration made a final push for coordination over the summer. Again, the goings were difficult for the United States, with ministerial meetings among NATO's big three accomplishing little. The French preferred, according to a British diplomat, "to wait and give the Portuguese a chance to weather the storm both in Angola and in the United Nations," while the British refused to commit to any unified action.[139] The president finally took charge of the situation himself in June, broaching the Portuguese subject in a meeting with President de Gaulle. The elder statesman briskly ended the conversation, declaring it a mistake to "bully Portugal or place it in the pillory of world opinion."[140] In contrast, the Portuguese ambassador to

[137] "Portuguese Overseas Territories Talking Points," [nd – likely May 1961], DO 195/181, United Kingdom National Archives (Kew, England) [Hereafter UKNA]..
[138] Glynn Stone, "Britain and the Angolan Revolt of 1961," 119, 117-121. See also Foreign Office to Lisbon, 20 April 1961, FO 371/155438 JP 1018, UKNA.
[139] "Tripartite Talks in Oslo: Portuguese Africa," no date [c. 4 May 1961], FO 371/155445, UKNA.
[140] Entretien du Général De Gaulle avec le Président des États-Unis à l'Elysée, 1 June 1961, Document 265:III, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, *Documents Diplomatiques Français 1961*, Tome 1 (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1997), 684.

France recalled that de Gaulle had told him personally that Portugal should continue to resist American pressure and that "France will help you."[141] Kennedy had clearly underestimated Portugal's position within the alliance and overestimated allied willingness to promote decolonization, meaning any American action would likely be unilateral and effectively in opposition to European wishes. By the middle of the summer, Kennedy's approach to Portugal was paying few dividends but exacerbating NATO tensions.

Faced with serious opposition, the Kennedy administration began to revisit its strategy toward Lisbon. As early as the end of May, State Department officials recognized that dire predictions of Portugal's collapse had not come true, and they recommended that Kennedy take a step back to see if Salazar could restore order in Angola, then open a less contentious dialogue.[142] Moderating its initial concern with Portuguese collapse and recognizing Salazar's surprising level of support domestically and in Europe, the Kennedy administration was slowly coming to the point that it desired little more, in the words of one diplomat, than to "put the Angola question 'on ice.'"[143] If African nationalist desires for increased American pressure were to become a reality, they would need to find new ways to steel the president's resolve in the face of a cool reception from his most important European allies.

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[141] Interview with Marcello Mathias, quoted in Antunes, 283.
[142] Memo, George C. McGhee to McGeorge Bundy, 25 May 1961, Box 154, NSF, JFKL.
[143] John Ferguson, the new ambassador to Morocco, said the U.S. wanted to put the Angolan question literally "in the fridge" ["'no frigoríco"]. Conversa com Sr. John H. Ferguson, 15 May 1961, PAA 287, Pasta 922, AHD.

The Anti-Colonial Lobby in the United States and Great Britain

The solution lay in the emergence of a popular anti-colonialism in the Western world. Portuguese diplomacy had successfully rallied continental frustration with the United States to blunt the Kennedy administration's initial hope for an international consensus on the Lusophone colonies, but Salazar could not control the growth of popular foreign criticism. For a brief period in the summer of 1961, Angola became a transnational rallying cry for a small but vocal segment of liberals and radicals concerned about Africa. A short-lived coalition of activists, grassroots humanitarians, and policymakers pushed both the United States and Great Britain to take action. Under pressure from his liberal base, Kennedy weathered European criticism to adopt the most severe measure to date – arms sale limitations – which tellingly followed a similar British action, itself a product of popular protest.

ACOA emerged as one of the first voices pushing Kennedy to continue the momentum begun at the UN. In the year preceding the Angolan rebellion, ACOA had taken an active interest in the Portuguese colonies. It had published two sizeable pamphlets: one urging Americans to write the president in support of Angolan freedom and another on the Portuguese forced labor system. ACOA distributed these at the UN and in Washington, becoming one of the first sources of information as both policymakers and the general public scrambled to educate themselves when the rebellions began.[144] Houser arranged for

[144] ACOA, "Annual Report, June 1, 1960- May 31, 1961," [ND June 1961]; See Homer Jack, "Angola: Repression and Revolt in Portuguese Africa," (ACOA, 1960) and Marvin Harris, "Portugal's African

distribution of UPA statements and speaking events for Holden Roberto, notably the Angolan's participation in the annual Africa Freedom Day. There he shared the stage with civil rights leader James Farmer, Hubert Humphrey, jazzman Dizzy Gillespie, Tom Mboya, and African National Congress leader Oliver Tambo.[145] In most of these appearances Roberto presented a vision of an inclusive, multiracial Angola and demanded that the United States cease supplying arms to Portugal. ACOA helped integrate Roberto into the wider currents of civil rights and liberal politics, which he used to expand his brand in the United States through additional speaking events and positive mentions in the black media.[146]

ACOA also helped publicize the equally negative perspective on Portugal being adopted by the Protestant churches. Methodist and Baptist missionaries had been active in Angola and Mozambique since the early 1900s, but tensions with Lisbon increased as Salazar believed the foreigners threatened his control of the colonies. A number of the Angolan and Mozambican nationalists including Neto and Mondlane had been educated and groomed by missionaries, who often quietly supported calls for liberalization. As a result, the Portuguese associated Protestantism with nationalism and targeted African converts in the early stages of pacification, inspiring reports of government massacres that

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'Ward'," (ACOA, 1960), African Activist Archive (Michigan State University): http://africanactivist.msu.edu/ [Hereafter, AAA].

[145] Civil rights and union organizations sponsored the event, including CORE, the Americans for Democratic Action, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, and the United Auto Workers. Program, Africa Freedom Day, 17 April 1961, AAA.

[146] Charles P. Howard, Sr., "Report NATO Bombs Used to Kill Angolan Civilians," *Afro-American*, 2 December 1961.

challenged press coverage emphasizing only nationalist violence.[147] American Methodist Ralph Dodge, whose central African bishopric included Angola and Mozambique, urged action from the National Council of Churches (NCC), an ecumenical bureaucracy based in New York that coordinated the activities of American Protestant denominations on matters of national and international importance. The NCC sent a letter of protest to the Lisbon government in May, but this did little to prevent Salazar from imprisoning and expelling most of the American and British missionaries he blamed for the rebellion.[148]

Salazar's actions inadvertently strengthened domestic American concern with Angola. Beginning in the early summer, Protestant missionaries returned to the United States with harrowing stories. With NCC assistance, they recounted tales of Portuguese brutality to congregations across the country and demanded parishioners write the U.S. government. They hoped their fellow Christians would take a stand in support of self-determination, if not necessarily the violence associated with the UPA rebellion. The result was what one Portuguese operative in the United States called "an aggressive publicity campaign against Portugal and its administration of Angola" that would continue into 1962.[149] The most influential of these missionaries was Malcolm McVeigh, who warned that only a "radical re-thinking" of Portuguese policy could avert an all-out war along racial lines. ACOA, having good relations with the nearby NCC through Houser and other

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[147] See letter, unknown [Nova Lisboa] to Theodore Tucker, 26 July 1961, and George W. Carpenter, "Visit to Kimpangu and Kimpese – July 5-6, 1961," 8 August 1961, Box 11, RG8, PHS.
[148] Draft Letter, National Council of Churches, 19 May 1961, ibid.
[149] Letter, Martin Camacho to Pedro Pereira, 7 December 1961, ibid. Four Methodists were imprisoned for nearly three months, gaining their freedom in late 1961 and touring America to speak of their experiences in Angola. Eugene L. Smith, Report to the Council of Bishops and the Board of Missions, 9 March 1962, ibid.

religious civil rights activists, welcomed the new voice speaking on behalf of African liberation and distributed missionary testimonies via its secular mailing list.[150]

The visibility of this liberal-religious coalition pushed the Portuguese alliance to the front of domestic debates about American engagement with the world. The administration could not help but take notice. The State Department played middle man between the churches and Portugal as they discussed remuneration, and both ACOA and the NCC used personal and professional connections to lobby Washington politicians and officials – mostly in the executive branch.[151] ACOA membership included administration liberals such as Kennedy adviser Arthur M. Schlesinger, while church officials could speak of millions of Protestant votes.[152] Civil rights groups, unions, and student organizations also began to pledge at least rhetorical support for African liberation.[153] The gradually expanding coalition pushed for a stronger government response, with ACOA even asking in June that Kennedy and Rusk consider expelling Portugal from NATO if violent reprisals continued in northern Angola.[154] These pleas received a particularly friendly hearing in the State Department's Africa Bureau. Kennedy had staffed the upper echelons of the fledgling unit with civil rights proponents he thought might be supportive of decolonization, most

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[150] Malcolm McVeigh, "The Present Situation in Angola," July 1961, attachment to Houser letter, 12 July 1961, AAA.
[151] "Record of Special Meeting on Angola," 20 June 1961, Box 11, RG8, NCC Papers, PHS.
[152] Both Schlesinger and Mrs. Bowles were members of the national committee listed on ACOA stationary.
[153] Examples included the National Student Association and the Transport Workers Union later in the year. M. Stanton Evans, *Revolt on Campus* (Chicago: H. Regnery Co., 1961), 155; Malcolm Nash, Rebel Leader Says Portugal Uses NATO Arms in Angola," *New York Amsterdam News*, 2 December 1961; Letter, Douglas C. Cook to National Christian Student Federation members, 3 November 1961, Box 11, RG8, NCC Papers, PHS.
[154] "NATO Ouster Threat Over Angola Urged," *New York Times*, 23 June 1961.

notably appointing the progressive former Michigan governor G. Mennen "Soapy" Williams as assistant secretary for African affairs.[155] ACOA and the churches provided Williams' office, the UN staff, and other sympathetic officials with information on occasion, with ACOA even becoming part of the Africa Bureau's new advisory council.[156] Their greatest impact was likely to reinforce the existing liberal belief that, at some level, American citizens were concerned about decolonization.

Such demonstrations of support were necessary because the most pro-African members of the administration faced an uphill battle against official indifference toward Angola as the summer progressed. Rusk's decisions to cut nearly a million dollars in military aid to Portugal – made as much on budgetary grounds as on principle – convinced many moderates within the administration that they had done all they could on the matter of Angola and faced decreasing returns if they continued to push the matter. While most American officials agreed with Kennedy's assessment of the inevitability of decolonization, there remained different judgments of American responsibilities in this arena and the direness of the situation in Angola. The tepid response of U.S. allies in Europe further encouraged advocates of a "wait and see" approach, notably George Ball and Ambassador Elbrick.[157] Shortly after the aid reduction, the State Department's Policy Planning staff wrote Kennedy security adviser McGeorge Bundy urging patience: "At this

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[155] Muelenbeck, 41-44; Schneidman, 19-22.

[156] Houser was pleasantly surprised by the invitation, but doubted the effect of his advice. Houser interview; Houser, Rain, 268-269.

[157] The cut was part of a nearly $200 million trimming of the military aid program for 1962. Though support for naval and air force continued, Elbrick worried that reduction of aid to the Army would confirm for many in Lisbon that the Washington was "writing off" Portugal. Telegram, Lisbon to Secstate, 24 May 1961, Box 154, NSF, JFKL.

juncture it is doubtful any useful purpose would be served by the United States applying further pressures. . . We now should give Portugal a reasonable time to see if it can restore peace and order in Angola."[158] Kennedy seemed to accept this logic for at least part of the summer as European cooperation proved difficult, but liberals within the administration such as Williams and critics outside of it continued to agitate for action.

Seeking to establish a more coordinated response to the situation, Rusk created a task force headed by Williams to study the Portuguese question. Williams designed the task force in a way that would prioritize a commitment to self-determination and the improvement of Afro-Asian relations. In early July, he completed a draft report, making the bold claim that Angola represented "for much of the world, as Berlin is for Europe . . . the test case of America's commitment to freedom." The authors recommended that the United States seek ways to persuade Portugal to grant Angola a new level of self-government, and "failing such persuasion, provide the leadership to compel the achievement of this objective." Yet the details of how the administration should compel the Lisbon regime were complicated. The report recommended that the United States deny authorization for the export of arms and equipment to the colonies, but also made clear that NATO assistance should continue and that American diplomats should also seek to dissuade African governments from providing equipment to African nationalists. Concurrently, U.S. officials should expand contacts with responsible nationalists and establish training programs for Lusophone Africans. Presuming that Portugal could not

[158] "Status Report on Portuguese Africa," attachment memo, McGhee to Bundy, 25 May 1961, Box 154, NSF, JFKL.

hold out long against nationalist forces, Williams recommended that the United States move in bold new directions should the Salazar regime persist in its policies: recognizing an African government in exile and seeking a new leadership in Portugal. [159]

Williams' conclusions were striking and reflected the most assertive liberal opinion within the administration, but they were in the minority. State officials from the European Bureau fearful of alienating Portugal balked at the initial report's vigorous tone. The Defense Department expressed concern that "overly aggressive implementation of policies" would surely rupture the American alliance with Portugal and potentially other European countries, costing the United States access to important bases like the Azores pivotal to the defense of Western Europe and the Middle East.[160] While recognizing such concerns as legitimate, liberals nonetheless dismissed them as acceptable costs in the courting of Afro-Asian states deeply attentive to issues of decolonization. Full agreement on the proper approach to the Portuguese situation was nearly impossible.[161] The result was a greatly watered down report that finally made it to the president in mid-July over military protests, which advocated for arms restrictions, educational aid, and refugee assistance. Kennedy approved many of the recommendations but, in direct contradiction to Williams' more assertive plan, requested that implementation occur "quietly insofar as possible."[162]

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[159] G. Mennen Williams, "Report of the Chairman of the Task Force on Portuguese Territories in Africa," 2 July 1961, Box 1816, CDM 1960-63, RG59, NARA.
[160] Memo, Samuel Belk to Bundy, 29 June 1961, Box 154, NSF, JFKL.
[161] Memo, J. Wayne Fredericks to SecState, 13 July 1961, Box 1816, CDM, 1960-63, RG59, NARA
[162] Memo, Bundy to SecState, 18 July 1961, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada* (Washington: USGPO, 1994), 902.

Most importantly, the Kennedy administration continued to rely on its European allies to pressure Portugal. Almost half of the initiatives approved by the president in July required the support of European allies. Even Williams, who had recommended deposing Salazar, maintained deference to NATO and presumed that American initiatives within the alliance and at the UN would be undertaken with the aid of France and Britain.[163] However much Kennedy and his administration sympathized with the cause of African nationalism, they still understood decolonization as a process bounded and constrained by the geostrategic requirements of the Cold War and Africa's relationship to metropolitan interests. Groups like ACOA could prioritize the global South, but Europe was still the priority and demanded careful consideration. Kennedy had broken with the rhetoric of his predecessors, but he still had to balance the needs of his most important allies with demands for a new form of global leadership coming both from within the United States and abroad.

Not coincidentally, Kennedy's most assertive policy occurred in conjunction with similar actions by a European ally – export controls for Portuguese arms. Kennedy's approval for the policy happened almost concurrently with a similar British decision made in the face of domestic pressure. More than in the United States, the population of the United Kingdom was primed to respond to events in Portugal and its colonies. Lusophone colonialism was not a completely foreign issue, as the Indian dispute over Goa in the 1950s had garnered extended Parliamentary attention. Lawyer João Cabral had established an information office representing the nationalist Goa League in London around 1960, which

[163] See pages 8-10, 13 of Williams, "Report of the Chairman," 2 July 1961.

he also allied with the socialist parties that made up the CONCP. Cabral built relations with an informal bloc of mostly Liberal and Labour members of Parliament (MPs) associated with the domestic anti-colonial movement, who naturally gravitated to a critical readings of their oldest ally's ancient empire. At the same time, this interest was encouraged by the presence in London of a number of Portuguese exiles with ties to African liberation leaders, providing an important anti-fascist element to nationalist condemnations of the *Estado Novo*. Though concentrated in London, the activities of Cabral and the anti-Salazarists provided an alternative view of metropolitan and colonial realities that contrasted with the rosy depictions offered by Lisbon.[164] Britain's unique connections to Portuguese imperialism therefore provided a more conducive political context, though little concrete policy was made until the events of 1961 sparked a national movement.

As in the United States, religious Britons challenged the government's ambivalent policies toward Portugal, offering the first glimpses of a transnational network with foundations in the Protestant churches. In June, the World Council of Churches (WCC), an ecumenical confederation of national Protestant organizations that included the American NCC, delivered a statement that it identified as "one of the strongest ever issued" calling for Portugal to accept demands for self-determination. It requested that Portugal avoid violent reprisals and that 176 constituent congregations of the WCC "press upon their governments the urgency of the situation."[165] This request was taken up especially strongly

[164] Pedro Aires Oliveira, "Generous Albion? Portuguese Anti-Salazarists in the United Kingdom, 1960-74," *Portuguese Studies*, 27:2 (2011), 185-186.
[165] World Council of Churches, Press Release, 22 June 1961, Box 11, RG8, PHS.

in Britain, where Baptist missionaries were returning with the same tales of atrocities carried by their American colleagues.[166] Shortly after the WCC's statement, reports of Portugal's use of NATO arms in Angola spurred British ministers. They demanded the Parliament halt all military sales to Salazar's government, collecting in one day more than 37,000 signatures of support that a Labour MP presented to the government.[167] Pickets also began at the Portuguese consulate, while one concerned Baptist walked 158 miles to personally protest Portuguese violence at Westminster.[168] The Baptist demonstrations publicized the problem of Western aid to Portugal in ways that inspired the creation of new organizations such as the London-based Angola Action Group.[169] Conscious of the limitations of anti-colonial appeals in the waning years of the British Empire, these organizations depicted Salazar as a fascist heir to Hitler, making Angola a humanitarian crisis that demanded international response. Letters of protest poured into the government, and religious leaders pressed the Foreign Office for face-to-face meetings on how it would address the matter.[170] A clergyman noted, "On every hand we heard of MP's being inundated with letters until some even pleaded for mercy."[171] Even more than in the United

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166 "Angola Protest by Missionaries," *The Guardian*, 19 June 1961.
167 "Baptist Minsters' Angola Protest," *The Guardian*, 26 June 1961; "Churches' nation-wide support for Angola petition," *The Guardian*, 28 June 1961.
168 "Church protest on Angola growing," *The Guardian*, 24 June 1961.
169 Angola Action Group, "The Facts about Angola," no date [likely mid to late 1961], Folder 89, KZA Papers, Institute for International Social History (Amsterdam, Netherlands) [hereafter IISH]. This organization was apparently distinct from the Angola Action Committee that formed in the wake of the religious protests, "Campaign for Angola 'above party politics," The Guardian, 20 July 1961.
170 One newsman noted that "the Churches have not been so 'worked up' since Suez." "Church leaders' request to see Lord home about Angola," The Guardian, 21 June 1961; Angola Action Group, "The Facts About Angola," no date [likely mid 1961], Folder 49, KZA Papers, IISH.
171 Addicott, 71.

States, popular concern with the Portuguese colonial crisis grew rapidly and directly targeted Western aid to the dictatorial regime.

Portuguese African nationalists welcomed these developments. Whereas Roberto's UPA was most active in the West among Americans, the CONCP took the lead in Europe and particularly the United Kingdom.[172] In addition to his work on Goa, João Cabral had represented the MPLA and PAIGC in London since at least 1960, among other activities facilitating the visits of African nationalists. Amílcar Cabral made his first major international appearance in London in early 1960 and coordinated with noted journalistic authority on Africa Basil Davidson to publish a well-distributed pamphlet, *Facts About Portuguese Colonialism*.[173] Just four months before the March uprising, a Labour politician even hosted MPLA spokesmen at a press conference in the House of Commons, where Mário Pinto de Andrade criticized the British and American governments for long tolerating Portugal's claims that its colonies were legitimate components of an extended NATO defense system.[174] Yet beyond these largely symbolic demonstrations of sympathy, African nationalists had received no concrete support from the British government. But the events of 1961 changed the political playing field. As broad public discussion of Angola grew – much of it "in our favor" – João Cabral recommended to CONCP Secretary

[172] MPLA leader Hugo de Menezes traveled to London, Frankfurt, and Paris in 1959 and attempted, with limited success, to develop support for the nationalists. See various exchanges, Menezes and Lúcio Lara, *Documentos e Comentários para a História do MPLA, até Fev. 1961*, ed. Lúcio Lara (Lisbon: Dom Quixote, 1999), 87-110.

[173] de Andrade, *Amílcar Cabral*, 53; Amílcar Cabral, Unity and Struggle (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979), 17; Marcelino dos Santos, **"**Organização do trabalho do Secretariado da CONCP," Pasta 04604.023.003, CONCP, Movimentos Anti-Coloniais, Documentos Amílcar Cabrl, Projecto Casa Comum, Fundaçao Mario Soares.

[174] Conferência dos Líderes Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas, "Communicado à Imprensa [Press Release]," 6 December 1960, *Documentos e Comentários para a História do MPLA*, 569.

Marcelino Dos Santos that the parties press their advantage in the country.[175] The socialists reached out to their existing contacts and worked to construct a campaign that would depict their parties as the logical heirs to Portugal's collapsing rule. By July, mainstream organizations such as the War on Want, a development organization with ties to the Labour Party, began making material donations to Angolan nationalists – including the MPLA.[176]

The CONCP also reached out to the influential liberals of the Movement for Colonial Freedom (MCF) and their pacifist chairman, MP Fenner Brockway. Long opposed to British imperialism and increasingly concerned with the threat of apartheid, the MCF had not regularly agitated against other European empires. But Portugal was a different case, both because of the colonies' close proximity to Anglophone territories like South Africa, Namibia, Tanzania, and Rhodesia and because of the historic relationship between the two countries. It was Brockway and other MCF MPs who had shown interest in João Cabral's activities, and they now saw an opportunity. At the request of the MPLA, Brockway worked with Portuguese exiles in Britain to form the Council for Freedom in Portugal and the Colonies to lobby the government. It pressured Lisbon to moderate its most repressive actions in Angola's wake, achieving among other things the transfer of MPLA President Agostinho Neto from a Portuguese prison to house arrest, from which he would eventually escape.[177] The MCF also produced pamphlets and broadsides introducing

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[175] Letter, Cabral to Marcelino dos Santos, 8 June 1961, Pasta 04604.023.009, CONCP, Movimentos Anti-Coloniais, DAC, CC.

[176] War on Want first donated 2,000 medical books for MPLA personnel. Letter, Marcelino Dos Santos to Franck Mercourt-Munning, 23 July 1961, Pasta 04604.023.024, CONCP, Movimentos Anti-Coloniais, Documentos Amílcar Cabrl, Projecto Casa Comum, Fundaçao Mario Soares.

[177] Fenner Brockway, *The Colonial Revolution* (London: Hart-Davis, MacGibbon, 1973), 400. See AAG, CFPC "Cause for Alarm," September 1962, Folder 49, KZA Papers, IISH.

the British public to Portugal's colonies, linking them strategically with South Africa, which had itself been the object of popular scorn for its shooting of unarmed protesters in the township of Sharpeville barely a year before. For a brief period, the MCF actually shifted its focus to Portugal, which seemed at the time to be the most aggressive and vulnerable of the colonial redoubts in southern Africa. "During the last three months," Brockway told a crowd of 300 in July at Trafalgar Square, "more Africans have been killed in Angola than in the Union of South Africa in the last century."[178] Portuguese imperialism grabbed British popular attention even more than it did in the United States, inspiring the idea that solidarity with Angolans could topple Lisbon's empire and begin chipping away at white minority rule in southern Africa.

The growth of domestic attention to Angola demanded an official response. Parliamentary criticism inspired by religious activism had increasingly zeroed in on Lisbon's use of NATO weapons to pacify the revolution, and officials began to worry how Britain's African allies (and subjects) might respond. Labour MPs in the House of Commons repeatedly used Angola to attack the Conservative government, demanding a review of the policy for supplying arms to Portugal and its colonies.[179] Facing both this domestic pressure and African anger, the government began reconsidering its approach in June. As Baptist ministers threatened to make the matter a by-election issue, MacMillan finally decided to publicly distance Britain from its oldest ally.[180] The government claimed

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178 "'Portuguese spies at Angola rally,'" *The Observer*, 9 July 1961.
179 See "'Flimsy Excuses' Over Portugal," *The Guardian*, 6 July 1961; "On Record," *The Guardian*, 25 June 1961.
180 Stone, 125-127.

it would not sell or ship military equipment specifically designated for the colonies. It would, however, continue to supply weapons and equipment as part of Portugal's NATO requirements, and British officials quietly admitted that they would "not look behind Portuguese statements re[garding] such use."[181] The decision drew the ire of Portugal, but MacMillan seemingly had few other options. Popular and political pressure demanded action from a leader who, like Kennedy, had publicly indicated that Britain would sail with the "wind of change." In the words of one Tory backbencher, anything less would have shown a "lack of moral leadership."[182]

The British arms policy provided an opening for Kennedy to implement the most aggressive measure in William's task force report within a broader Trans-Atlantic context. American officials had known about the diversion of NATO equipment to its colonies since June and likely earlier, quietly requesting that Portugal cease such transfers.[183] Salazar had not complied, but the United States had hesitated to act even after Kennedy approved the task force recommendation to deny export authorizations for arms. But popular attention continued to grow. By late July, the religious-liberal campaign on Angola was making official inroads. Led by Harlem Representative Adam Clayton Powell, a handful of congressman challenged the administration to stop the use of American arms in Angola, specifically referencing reports by missionary Malcolm McVeigh to make their cases.[184]

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[181] Telegram, Lisbon to SecState, 16 August 1961, Box 154, NSF, JFKL. [Day 1 51); Memo, Rostow to President, 14 September 1961, Box 154, NSF, JFKL.
[182] Norman Shrapnel, "Tory back-bencher rebukes Premier on Angola," *The Guardian*, 23 June 1961.
[183] Telegram, Lisbon to Secstate, 21 June 1961, Box 154, NSF, JFKL.
[184] Harlem Representative Adam Clayton Powell entered McVeigh's story into the Congressional Record on July 31, inspiring opposition to Portugal's use of NATO arms for what one congressman called "the

Kennedy now had to contend not only with liberals in the State Department but also those within his party. Britain had set a precedent in the matter of selling military equipment to Portugal, legitimizing a similar American policy at the same time that popular concern reached its apex. On August 16, the government finally – and quietly – announced the limitation of arms sales to Portugal for use in the colonies.

Though lauded by many at the time and since, the realities of the policy demonstrated the ambiguous approach the Kennedy administration took toward the contested issue of African self-determination. On August 16, Elbrick explained to Noguiera that the U.S. forbade the diversion of equipment to the colonies, requested any equipment already in use be returned, and required all military aid be "certified by Portugal as actually needed by Portuguese NATO forces in Europe."[185] Kennedy and subsequent presidents would portray the policy as an embargo, but it was only slightly more stringent than its British counterpart. Shipments of arms continued to go to Portugal and judgment of needs for all but the largest items were left to Lisbon, which was also responsible for returning NATO materiel to Europe. When the media reported that bombs stamped "Made in America" had fallen on an Angolan village shortly after the policy began, the government simply released a statement reiterating its earlier stance without seriously pressuring Portugal on the matter.[186] Over the next two years in office, the administration

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most serious disruption of peace in the world today." See Frank Kowalksi statement, 8 August 1961, Congressional Record – House, 14962.

[185] Telegram, Lisbon to SecState, 16 August 1961, Box 154, NSF, JFKL.

[186] Memo for SecState and Secretary of Defense, 20 August 1961, Box 154, NSF, JFKL. U.S. officials rarely expressed concern about the diversion of weapons and ordinance, only sustaining complaints on exceptional items –notably NATO F-86 Sabers stationed in Guinea. Less noise was made about the diversion of older planes.

would approve the sale of items officials claimed had little value in Africa yet were retrofitted and adapted to become key components of Portugal's imperial wars, notably naval craft that became the backbone of Lisbon's riverine warfare.[187] The use of American military equipment in colonial wars had troubled administrations dating back to the late 1940s, and Kennedy proved only slightly more successful than his predecessors. But the effects of the supposed embargo were far less important than the image it communicated – both to the American people and to allies outside Europe.

This high tide of public concern both abroad and domestically also justified Kennedy implementing other suggested measures concerning the nationalists. Kennedy quietly followed through with the task force's recommendations regarding the courtship and training of a native Portuguese African leadership. The State Department established a small program to train a new generation of African leaders at Lincoln University under Dr. John Marcum, an ACOA board member and arguably the premier U.S. expert on Angolan politics. The student body numbered barely twenty by the end of 1961, mostly Angolans and Mozambicans recruited from refugee centers in neighboring states.[188] The government focused on recruiting young men with leadership potential, because "a trained, non-communist native cadre would be essential regardless of what happens in Angola."

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[187] Aniceto Afonso and Carlos de Matos Gomes, eds, *Guerra Colonial*, 4th edition (Cruz Quebrada: Noticias, 2005), 104-104, 162-163, 176-177; John P. Cann, *Brown Waters of Africa: Portuguese Riverine Warfare, 1961-1974* (St. Petersburg: Hailer Publishing, 2008), 61-63.

[188] Memo, Deming to Fredericks, 8 January 1962, 2, Box 1815, CDM 1960-63, RG 59, NARA. Report to the President, "Sub-Saharan African Students Seeking Higher Education in the United States," State Department, September 1961, Box 2, NSF, JFKL. The program later expanded to Rochester University and included students from South Africa, Rhodesia, Sudan, and even Spanish Guinea (now Equatorial Guinea). Marcum estimated several hundred students took part in the program. John Marcum, phone interview with author, 24 September 2012.

This attitude was shared throughout the administration among liberals and the more cautious alike.[189] But as with the aid to Roberto, this program had no intention of ousting Salazar. Few if any students were politically active. Kennedy was simply building connections with a generation of leaders whom he hoped would look kindly on the United States when independence inevitably arrived. In the American approach, investment in moderate Africans did not necessarily contradict the desire to retain the Portuguese presence. Indeed, this dual approach seemed to offer the best option for maintaining pro-western stability in Angola and Mozambique for the long-term with minimal political impact on the Salazar regime.

While many historians view the American actions of 1961 as proof of Kennedy's commitment to actively pursuing decolonization, the reality is more complex. The president and many of his advisers recognized the strength of anti-colonial nationalism, but they remained cautious in their dealings with Europe. Concerned with Portugal maintaining a semblance of control and dissuaded by its allies from adopting an overtly critical rhetoric, the Kennedy administration moved carefully in the months after the UN vote. The most assertive initiatives advocated by liberals like Soapy Williams were often moderated by the bureaucracy, incredulous allies, and the president himself. Though there were some attempts to court an African leadership, these moves were covert or unobtrusive. Indeed, the single most dramatic move – the arms restrictions – owed much to British precedent and domestic criticism. The result was a policy that sought to pressure Portugal without

[189] Memo, Blue to Tyler, 27 September 1961, Box 1815, CDM 1960-63, RG 59, NARA; Telegram, Geneva to SecState, 10 July 1961, Box 5A, NSF, JFKL.

threatening its ally's core interests in a situation where it was unclear who would prove victorious in the near term.

Portugal Pushes Back

Perhaps not coincidentally, the height of American activity coincided with the final weeks of the Angolan crisis. Lisbon's military response to the rebellion had begun to pay dividends by August, and the rebellion slowly faltered throughout the fall as pacification operations proceeded. At the same time, Salazar undertook a multi-pronged offensive against the American administration. He approved limited reforms to undermine international criticism, launched a propaganda campaign in the West, and leveraged Portugal's one trump card in its relationship with the United States – NATO membership and access to the strategic Azores, where the United States operated a mid-Atlantic air base and submarine tracking station at Lajes Field on Terceira Island.[190] The result of this careful diplomacy was a shift in the tenor of domestic discussions of Portugal, which further restrained the already cautious Kennedy. As a result, American pressure for decolonization declined as the year came to a close.

In order to reach this point, however, the Portuguese had to convince their Anglo-American allies that their fears of a second Congo were unfounded. Over the summer, the massive influx of Portuguese soldiers and materiel had set the stage for Operation Viriato,

[190] The islands' strategic value as a transatlantic technological center provided the impetus for the growth of US-Portuguese relations during World War II and had justified Portugal's membership in NATO despite its dictatorial politics. José Medeiros Ferreira, *Os Açores na Política Internacional* (Lisbon: Tinta-da-China, 2011), 54-77.

which beat back the UPA rebellion and pacified the countryside. Beginning in August, the Portuguese military began recapturing a number of key settlements in the area between the capital of Luanda and the Congo border, declaring the "reconquest of the north" on August 8.[191] The restoration of colonial control after the deep UPA incursion surprised many outside observers who had underestimated Portuguese abilities and given undue credit to Roberto's poorly trained revolutionary forces. Liberal members of the Kennedy administration remained skeptical, but by December the Lisbon embassy considered order to have been reestablished.[192] Throughout the fall the fear of a Portuguese colonial collapse that had motivated American policy since March waned.

At the same time, Portugal instituted measures that allowed Kennedy to ease pressure without losing face. Building on a mild reform program that had actually begun shortly before the rebellion, the Lisbon government improved labor conditions, created local elective councils, and expanded health and social services in the colonies. Throughout the summer the privately confrontational Salazar had struck a more conciliatory tone in public. While still criticizing "certain of [Portugal's] Atlantic alliance partners" for their contribution to the "disintegration" of Africa, the aging dictator admitted in May that Portugal "may have erred on the side of excessive caution" and would move more swiftly in the future to bring colonial populations "into local political and administrative life."[193] At the end of August, the newly installed overseas minister announced a broad package of

[191] Rui de Azavedo Teixeira, *A Guerra de Angola, 1961-1974* (Lisbon: Quidnovi, 2010), 71.
[192] Ambassador Galbraith questioned the claim from India, showing a liberal tendency to consider nationalist victory inevitable. Telegram, Lisbon to Secstate, 8 December 1961, Box 155, NSF, JFKL.
[193] "Text of Questions Put to Salazar and His Replies," *New York Times*, 31 May 1961.

reforms that made all African subjects nominal citizens of Portugal while also pushing for greater mainland emigration to Angola. The state also made plans to expand the education system, in a seemingly direct response to Anglo-American concerns.[194] Soapy Williams and the most pro-African State Department officials criticized the measures for failing to address the issue of self-determination and actually endangering long-term prospects by strengthening the political power of white settlers, an opinion quietly shared by a British officials facing similar concerns in nearby Southern Rhodesia.[195] But most of the administration, including Rusk, chose to side with the more hopeful reading offered by Elbrick in Lisbon that the measures offered "considerable hope for the future," if only by providing some signal of progress to the UN and temporarily quieting international criticism.[196]

As officials in Washington pondered how to react to the new state of affairs in Africa, the Portuguese government sought to strengthen moderate opinion by building popular foreign support for their empire – in direct competition with the pro-liberation campaigns of the churches and groups like ACOA. Soon after the March uprising, a regime-backed assembly of Portuguese businessmen hired the Madison Avenue advertising agency of Selvage and Lee along with the conservative British public relations consultant E.D. O'Brien to burnish the *Estado Novo's* tarnished image in the Anglo-American states. The tastemakers believed that Lisbon's image problem grew from the fact

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[194] Marcum, Vol I, 190.

[195] Memo, Williams to Secstate, 12 September 1961, Box 1815, CDF 60-63, RG 59, NARA.

[196] Telegram, Lisbon to Secstate, 31 August 1961, Box 1815, CDF 60-63, RG 59, NARA. Beginning in June, the United States had pressed the Portuguese to announce reforms in order to "improv[e] Portugal's international position." Lisbon to Secstate, 29 September 1961, Ibid.

that few Westerners and even fewer Americans knew about Portuguese Africa before March: as Selvage and Lee explained, "about 99 people in this country or more out of 100 did not know whether [Angola] was a country or a goat." When Angola suddenly became newsworthy, press and experts alike had turned to the "hostile propaganda put out by certain committees in this country" – namely ACOA – who had anticipated the revolt.[197] What was needed was an alternative perspective. Therefore, Selvage and Lee helped coordinate a government propaganda barrage in the United States, while also funding the Portuguese-American Committee on Foreign Affairs (PACFA) under the leadership of New England lawyer Dr. Martin Camacho. The combative immigrant became the regime's primary American proponent, regularly attacking anti-colonial groups and distributing pro-Portuguese literature.[198] Through these efforts, Salazar's regime hoped to discredit critics and establish a more positive image of Lusophone colonialism.

Beginning in the early summer, a steady stream of publications provided counterpoints to ACOA and church depictions of Portuguese rule in Africa. Among the major themes was the familiar idea of Lusotropicalism, which highlighted Portugal's supposed success in preparing racially mixed states for self-rule as evidenced by Brazil. In one English-language pamphlet, a University of Coimbra professor argued that Angola and

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[197] Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives of Foreign Principles in the United States," (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), 849-850

[198] The regime backed Overseas Companies of Portugal hired Selvage and Lee for over $1,000,000, with half of the funds being spent in the first year. See Daniel M. Friedenberg, "The Public Relations of Colonialism: Salazar's Mouthpiece in the U.S." *Africa Today* 9:3 (April 1962), 4-6, 15-16. O'Brien had previously consulted for various British colonial interests. Philip Murphy, *Party Politics and Decolonization: The Conservative Party and British Colonial Policy in Tropical Africa, 1951-1964* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 108.

Mozambique would follow Brazil in creating "two multi-racial nations" when "their respective populations have attained a social and political status enabling them to part from the Mother Country as a ripe fruit breaks away from the parent tree."[199] Depictions of Westernized blacks interacting with white populations in the rapidly modernizing cities of Luanda and Laurenço Marques seemingly attested to this maturation process, proving to many Americans steeped in racialized depictions of African backwardness the value of Lusophone development. While there was some truth to claims that Portugal lacked a formal system of segregation – visitors regularly expressed surprise that black and whites lived side-by-side in the poor neighborhoods of colonial cities – this myth downplayed the political and economic realities weighted heavily in favor of ethnic Europeans, even in the unique context of Brazil.[200] It also hinted at an embrace of racial miscegenation that few continental Portuguese accepted and Salazar himself had adamantly opposed until he found such images offered a novel defense of empire.[201] Despite the gulf between claims and reality, such depictions appealed to Americans who equated Westernization with stability and accepted a racialized responsibility to promote Euro-American visions of modernization.

Positive portrayals of Portuguese rule seemed most attractive when juxtaposed against graphic anti-colonial violence, which Portuguese propagandists depicted as racially

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[199] Armando Cortesão, *African Realities' and Delusions* (Lisbon: Agénica Geral do Ultramar, 1962), 50. Though published in 1962, the pamphlet is representative of Portuguese propaganda produced throughout the 1960s.

[200] See António Alberto de Andrade, *Many Races, One Nation* (Lisbon: Agénica Geral do Ultramar, 1961); Bender, 200-204, 212-217.

[201] See George S. Schuyler, "The Portuguese Way: Racial Integration and Intermarriage," *Pittsburgh Courier*, 1 July 1961; De Meneses, 358-359.

motivated and encouraged by international communist agitators. This intertwining of racial and Cold War fears worked particularly well in the United States, where southerners confronting the Civil Rights Movement depended on similar justifications for the maintenance of white governance.[202] Pamphlets distributed throughout the country included sensational pictures of mutilated white Angolan settlers and condemnation of American policy. Portugal claimed the role of bulwark protecting the West from the violent excesses of communist-stoked nationalism. According to one publication on the March 15 uprising, these atrocities showed undeniably that the nationalists were unfit to govern and should not "merit the support of the United Nations, or any Christian, civilized society."[203] Salazar's apologists understood Kennedy's actions since March as directly aiding Portugal's enemies, and they begged the question of whether Americans in fact agreed with their government. As one publication of Camacho's PACFA asked "Men, women, and children – white and black – tortured and maimed on explicit directives attributed to Communist-backed leader – should the U.S. support the forces behind these unspeakable acts?"[204] Presuming most readers would answer in the negative, Salazar hoped American sympathy with Portugal's plight would undermine Kennedy's strategy.

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[202] See and Thomas Noer, "Segregationists and the World: The Foreign Policy of the White Resistance," in Brenda Gayle Plummer, ed., *Window on Freedom: Race, Civil Rights, and Foreign Affairs, 1945-1988* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 141-162; and Jeff Woods, *Black Struggle, Red Scare: Segregation and Anti-communism in the South, 1948-1968* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2004).

[203] Quote: "On the Morning of March 15th," (Boston: Portuguese-American Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1961?). See also Adriano Moreira "In the Name of the Victims," Speech delivered at the Angola Legislative Council, 2 May 1961 (Lisbon: 1961).

[204] Portuguese-American Committee on Foreign Affairs, "A Story of Depravity," (Boston, no date [1961?]), Box 25, International League for the Rights of Man Records, Central Branch, NYPL.

In linking fears of racial violence and international communism, Portugal's allies had tapped into a strategy that had largely defined American involvement in Africa since the beginning of the Cold War. And they wielded it efficiently, attacking pro-liberation organizations while building support among conservative constituencies. Selvage and Lee provided carefully managed junkets to Portugal and its colonies for members of the conservative press, who returned to the United States depicting the Iberian state as a champion of Western interests in Africa. Among Portugal's American allies was the retired army general and vice-president of New York University Frank Howley, who wrote approvingly of Portugal's management of its colonies after a Lisbon-sponsored trip to Angola. His widely reprinted article first appeared in the November issue of *Reader's Digest* alongside a critical piece on Kennedy's African policy by reformed communist Max Yergan, whose American-African Affairs Association was directly supported by the apartheid government in South Africa.[205] While conservative members of the press lined up on the Portuguese side, Lisbon and its representatives viewed African American support as particularly important due to the widespread association of the minority with continental issues. *Reader's Digest* had demonstrated as much by citing its inclusion of white and black perspectives as representing two sides of the argument on self-determination, despite the fact that Howley and Yergen both sided with Portugal.[206] Beyond Yergan, the conservative columnist for the *Pittsburgh Courier* George Schuyler became a particularly vocal

[205] The two articles were reprinted together as Frank L. Howley and Max Yergan, *Behind the Terror in Africa/ Angola: the Strange American Policy* (Pleasantville, NY: Reader's Digest, 1961).
[206] See Marguerite Cartwright, "World Backdrop: Portugal," 18 August 1962.

proponent of Portuguese rule in the black press, praising Portuguese multiracialism, depicting Roberto as a communist pawn, and accusing ACOA of "serving the Soviet purpose" in Africa.[207] With increasing regularity after the declarations of Anglo-American arms policies, apologists openly criticized anti-Portugal initiatives and the nationalist cause, with Howley even testifying at the UN.[208]

Portugal's American allies capitalized on this improved situation to press for greater political support against Kennedy by doubling down on the Cold War appeal. Selvage and Lee declared it an "absolute top priority" to woo elected officials, who were likely to side with Portugal in order to appear tough on communism while appeasing Northeastern constituents with ethnic ties and Southerners ambiguous about black self-determination.[209] A number of politicians had already expressed concern about Kennedy's policy, with Senate Minority Leader Everett Dirksen (R-Il) publicly registering his objections to the March UN vote as "hardly a proud moment for Uncle Sam."[210] Beginning in August, Portuguese-Americans – likely Camacho's organization – began meeting with congressmen and State Department officials to defend Salazar's position in Africa.[211] PACFA also sent letters critical of ACOA and the NCC to organizational board members, politicians, and newspapers in the latter months of 1961 into early 1962 claiming their

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[207] George S. Schuyler, "Views and Reviews," *Pittsburgh Courier*, 30 December 1961.
[208] Schuyler, "Views and Reviews," Pittsburgh Courier, 7 April 1962 and John Chamberlain, "United Nations Plot is Building Against Angola," *Oscala Star-Banner*, 12 September 1963.
[209] Letter, Kenneth T. Downs to Paul Wagner, 12 October 1961, cited in "Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives of Foreign Principles in the United States," 849.
[210] *New York World Telegram*, 23 March 1961, quote in Marcum, Vol I, 182.
[211] Memo, Samuel Belk to Bundy, 24 August 1961, Box 154, NSF, JFKL.

actions deserved serious scrutiny.[212] These appeals adopted self-consciously Cold War rhetorical devices, as revealed by the pro-Portuguese letters sent to a list of mostly Southern and mid-Western legislators that claimed Roberto's real mission was "to make Angola a satellite in the communist orbit . . . for the rich raw materials of that territory to make Russia more powerful against America and the free world."[213] While liberal legislators were likely skeptical, many others concerned about rumors of Soviet involvement in the Congo felt duly warned. Congressmen now had to weigh religious and liberal interest in decolonization against the necessities of Cold War defense in Africa.

The revolutionary parties had difficulty combatting the Portuguese information offensive. Roberto lacked the resources of the Portuguese state and was distracted by the collapse of the UPA rebellion in Angola. When he did respond directly to Portuguese-sponsored attacks such as the ones carried in *Reader's Digest*, he was rebuffed by the editors who had no interest in supporting purveyors of violence.[214] Missionaries like Malcolm McVeigh had greater success in presenting objections to the pro-Portuguese propaganda, but they were responding to arguments of national security with humanitarian appeals that merited limited attention during this period of renewed Cold War tensions.[215] While the black press largely allied itself with nationalist aspirations, the presence of authors like Schuyler and the mainstream media's own hesitation to weigh in too heavily

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[212] Letter, Camacho to Roger N. Baldwin, 20 December 1961 and statement, folder: General Correspondence Portugal (1), Box 25, International League for the Rights of Man Records, Central Branch, NYPL; Letter, Leonard M. Perryman and George M. Daniels to Friend, 7 March 1962 and accompanying attachment, Box 11, RG 8, PHS.

[213] Letter, José Alves Rodrigues to Barry Goldwater, 30 November 1961, PAA M288, AHD.

[214] Marcum, Vol 1, 186, 344-345.

[215] See "Letters to the Times," *New York Times*, 20 October 1961.

on the Angolan issue after the summer hindered the development of anything resembling a united front. As the year drew to a close, Houser worried that the colonial propaganda was having a greater effect than ACOA's own efforts.[216] While there was little chance the administration would completely abandon its approach, the pro-Portuguese activities helped stir congressmen to the defense of NATO ally Portugal and made Kennedy's plans to quietly pursue diplomatic pressure increasingly difficult, much to the executive branch's dismay.[217]

And if activists had any hope that the heretofore more successful British movement might help entice Kennedy with action from Whitehall, they would be sorely disappointed. Portuguese propaganda was equally active in the United Kingdom, courting conservative MPs still smarting over the decline of Britain's empire.[218] Moreover, the hollow victory of Britain's limited embargo had sapped the strength of the shallow British movement. The policy gave pacifists the illusion of victory at the same time the Portuguese cracked down on missionaries, ending the flow of new information to the most important religious organizers. Without their sources on the ground, groups like the Angola Action Group had little to publish and slowly dissolved into obscurity.[219] As memories of Portuguese atrocities faded, that section of British public opinion interested in Africa returned to its own colonies and former dominions, especially as Southern Rhodesia's transition to

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[216] Letter, Houser to National Committee and Executive Board, 30 November 1961, ACOA Microfilm, Reel I.
[217] Memo, Samuel Belk to Bundy, 24 August 1961, Box 154, NSF, JFKL.
[218] "Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives of Foreign Principles in the United States," 851.
[219] Based on copies of the newsletter available in various archives, the Angola Action Group continued into 1962 but likely fell into inactivity soon after.

independence threatened to extend white minority rule beyond South Africa's borders. The MCF, Council for Freedom in Portugal and the Colonies, and the Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) did hold a conference in early 1962 on the "unholy alliance" of Portugal, South Africa, and Rhodesia, but this would be a pyrrhic moment for the nationalists.[220] After this one event, the AAM distanced itself from the Portuguese issue, fearing in the words of chronicler Roger Fieldhouse, that such tangential activities "would dilute its primary campaign against Apartheid in South Africa."[221] Likewise, the MCF had never built close relations with the liberation movements, and attention returned promptly to matters of empire and race in the Anglophone as the flow of information from Portuguese Africa shrunk.[222] As a result, MacMillan's government faced less domestic pressure to isolate Portugal and returned to its previously passive approach, denying liberals within the Kennedy administration an important international ally.

Finally, Salazar helped stoke domestic and international complaints against Kennedy's policy by leveraging Portugal's most important Cold War asset, the Azores Islands. By the end of 1961, Salazar was tying the American position on Angola to the looming bilateral lease renegotiations that had taken place regularly since the 1940s. The Azores facilities were valuable strategic assets for the Americans; the air and sea abilities had proved vital in the transport of troops to Lebanon in 1958, Berlin in 1961, and the

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[220] Patrick Keatley, "Campaign to End Arms Deals," *The Guardian*, 22 January 1962. Rosalynde Ainsley, *The Unholy Alliance* (Anti-Apartheid Movement, 1962).

[221] Fieldhouse, 42 and 69.

[222] Fenner Brockway had quickly moved on from the revolutions, not mentioning the Portuguese colonies in his 1973 autobiography. In his study of global race relation completed in the midst of the Lusophone revolutions, he devoted a mere page to the trio of colonies but three times as much to Australia. See Brockway, *This Shrinking Explosive World: A Study of Race Relations* (London: Epworth Press, 1967).

Congo in the first two years of the decade, while the communications facilities would prove important during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.[223] All this led the military to claim in the summer report on the Portuguese situation that "The military air base at Lajes in the Azores is the single most valuable facility which the United States is authorized by a foreign power to use."[224] And Salazar was conscious of this value. Having little else with which to bargain, the Portuguese prolonged the negotiations for the base rights that were set to expire at the end of 1962. In a conversation with President Kennedy, Ambassador Elbrick explained that "it could be expected that the Portuguese will demand some political compensation from the US in connection with the Azores base agreement," and that an abstention for future public criticism might assist in the long-term prospects for a successful bilateral agreement.[225]

The Azores maneuver irked American officials, but it was only one element contributing to a larger reconsideration of American policy as the year approached its end. Many within the State Department saw it as a negotiating ploy and believed that in all likelihood Salazar was probing for signs of American weakness. But there was a minority within the administration who took the aging dictator at his word and believed he might go even further, not only denying a renewal of the base lease but potentially exiting the American-led NATO alliance. Beginning in March, Portuguese officials had repeatedly

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[223] Mahoney, 209. The United States worried about maintaining access to Greece, the Middle East, and Africa, which stood outside the protection of its NATO commitments. Alternate air routes existed through Canada-Britain and South America-Africa, but each was longer and more likely to encounter problematic weather. See Memo, HHS to Robert Komer, 31 January 1962, Box 155, NSF, JFKL.

[224] "Presidential Task Force on Portuguese Territories in Africa," 12 July 1961, Box 1816, CDF 1960-63, RG59, NARA.

[225] Memorandum of Conversation, 27 November 1961, FRUS Europe, 907.

made clear that Salazar would abandon NATO before he would leave Africa. The Portuguese intimated that they were far from alone in their frustrations, and that other European states might follow their precedent, including France and the Netherlands.[226] The thinly veiled threat took on a new seriousness after the arms policy of August. The *Estado Novo's* diplomats constantly reminded their American counterparts that the choice between the Western alliance and their African possessions threatened to undermine the foundations of NATO. "Portugal would have no interest in 'US victory over USSR,'" Noguiera told Elbrick after the August embargo, "if in achieving it Portugal itself should be lost."[227] In this context, denying American base rights became a symbolic severing of ties between Portugal and the larger Cold War alliance system. The true danger of the Portuguese threat to the Azores was that it would be the first step in a major reordering of NATO and European defense.

American diplomats downplayed such concerns, but they could not completely ignore them. Tensions were high in NATO, and at times it seemed it would not take much for the house of cards to topple. Elbrick had captured American concerns succinctly shortly before Kennedy entered office: "If France joined Portugal in such a move [leaving the alliance] for reasons of its own, the whole fabric of NATO would be destroyed."[228] Kennedy's trouble finding aid over the summer had illustrated to the neophyte president just how wide the distance was between Washington and continental governments

[226] Lisbon to SecState, 7 March 1961, 2 (corrected), Box 1813, CDM 1960-63, RG59, NARA.
[227] Memo, Bundy to Kennedy, 31 August 1961, FRUS Africa, 548.
[228] Memo, "Ambassador Elbrick's meeting with Mr. Hare," 27 October 1960, Box 1813, CDF 1960-63, RG59, NARA.

concerning decolonization. Most recently, the Dutch government in The Hague, and specifically arch-imperialist Foreign Minister Joseph Luns, had been engaged in increasingly heated debates with Kennedy over its colony in New Guinea. Conservative Dutch officials wondered if similar American attitudes toward Belgium and Portugal implied a broader American indifference to European priorities.[229] The always colorful adviser Bob Komer did not think "Netherlands would quit NATO or otherwise cut off its nose to spite its face," but a simultaneous exit by Portugal and France could change circumstances dramatically.[230] Here was a wholly different domino effect from the communist variety, where one NATO defection could bring down the whole structure. This political backdrop loomed over Azores negotiations, creating a level of American anxiety that went far beyond the loss of the airbases. By December, the energy with which the administration had initially approached the Angolan program had all but disappeared, discouraged by European recalcitrance and Portugal's neutralization of domestic supporters of decolonization. With a semblance of order restored to the colony, the president was seriously reassessing his approach to Portugal and the potential cost of prioritizing African self-determination.[231]

As officials in Washington continued to debate, it was events beyond Africa that helped make the Anglo-American retreat a fait accompli. During the previous months, both

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[229] Marc Frey, "Decolonization and Dutch-American Relations," in *Four Centuries of Dutch-American Relations*, *1609-2009*, Hans Krabbendam, et. al., eds, (Albany: SUNY Press, 2009), 609; MemCon, 22 March 1962, *in FRUS Europe,* 834.
[230] Memo, Komer to Rostow, 30 November 1961, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia* (Washington: USGPO, 1994), 469.
[231] Memcon, President and Elbrick, 27 November 1961, Box 154, NSF, JFKL.

the United States and England had assuaged Portugal's worst fears by assuring Salazar that neither government wished to see Portugal forcefully ousted from any of its possessions and would not aid neighboring states pondering invasion or rebellion. But neither side had seriously considered the fate of Portuguese Goa when making such statements. India had long roiled over Portugal's ongoing presence in the coastal enclaves of the sub-continent, and Jawaharlal Nehru saw in the Angolan rebellion an opportunity. Under pressure from both domestic critics and African nationalists – including the CONCP leadership – Nehru prepared to launch a military action that would finally resolve the issue and burnish his reputation as a leader of the Third World.[232] After years of unsuccessfully seeking a peaceful transfer of power, the student of Gandhi now declared that the West had been "backing the wrong horse" and that India was obliged to act.[233] As Kennedy was reconsidering Portuguese policy in December, India invaded Goa and the small enclaves of Daman and Diu, overwhelming the paltry European garrison that had been unable to receive reinforcements due to Portugal's military commitment in Africa. Though Salazar ordered his troops to fight to the death, casualties were minimal and surrender came quickly. On December 19, Portugal's 450 year old Indian empire ended amidst cheers from

[232] See Letter, J. Cabral to Marcelino Dos Santos, 17 August 1961, DAC, CC; "Action or U.N. to Oust Portuguese," *Times of India*, 22 October 1961. One British official believed that "African criticisms of Indian 'weakness' over Goa had a most powerful influence in persuading Mr. Nehru to agree finally to the resort to force." "India: The Invasion of Goa," 29 December 1961, CRO Ref: SEA 41/1 No. 37, DO 201/12, UKNA. Nehru himself acknowledged the pivotal role of Angola. A.G. Mezerik, *Goa: Portuguese Colonial Policy, Indian Campaign, UN Record, Chronology* (New York: International Review Service, 1962), 45.

[233] "For the Sake of Peace, Let Colonialism Go," *The Times of India*, 21 October 1961. Also at the conference was a member of the U.K. Committee for the Liberation of Portuguese Colonies.

African nationalists who hoped the invasion might inspire similar actions against the remaining colonies.[234]

Salazar was apoplectic at Goa's loss and would severely punish the military commanders who returned home in defeat, but he also cast blame on inaction in Washington and London. In the weeks preceding the invasion, the dictator had entreated his allies to dissuade India - a member of the British Commonwealth and major recipient of American aid – from its militaristic course. Though MacMillan's government had attempted to diffuse the matter, it refused to arm or otherwise defend its oldest ally when negotiations proved futile, presuming the use of British weapons against a major Commonwealth partner would be a political disaster.[235] The United States proved more assertive in its entreaties to India, but the liberal Ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith personally accepted Nehru's claim to Goa and purposefully avoided the appearance of "doing the work for the Portuguese."[236] American officials had no enthusiasm for the task of defending Goa and therefore achieved little. At the last hour, Galbraith unsuccessfully sought to defer the conflict with a plan that would have Portugal cede sovereignty while maintaining its economic and cultural influence in the region, a proposal Salazar would not

[234] For details on the Indian invasion, including Nehru's Third World motivations, see Sandrine Bègue, *La Fin de Goa et de l'Estado da India*, Vol II (Lisbon: Colecção Biblioteca Diplomática do MNE, 2007), 1058-1070, 1093-1143; Oscar Kambona, the Tanzanian foreign minister, reportedly threatened to "follow the example of action adopted by India in the case of Goa." Quoted in Francisco Proença Garcia, *Analise Global De Uma Guerra: Moçambique, 1964-1974* (Lisbon: Prefácio, 2003), 153.
[235] Telegram no. 1035, Foreign Office to Lisbon, 12 December, 1961, FO 371/159706, UKNA; "Message to Mr. Nehru from the Prime Minister," no date, PREM 12/1118, UKNA.
[236] Memo, Robert J. Johnson to Kaysen, 12 December 1961, Box 155, NSF, JFKL.

accept but one that revealed the thinking of even liberal American policymakers.[237] After the invasion began, UN Ambassador Stevenson provided what one historian has called a "violent diatribe" against India to the surprised appreciation of the Portuguese delegation, but satisfaction turned sour when a Western proposal for a ceasefire was vetoed by the Soviet Union amidst relatively mild protest from the United States.[238] As Nehru began the process of occupation and annexation, Kennedy chose not to challenge India, while MacMillan wished nothing more than to "bury this bone as soon as possible."[239] Even more than the vote in March, Salazar viewed the loss of Goa as a Western betrayal, steeling the dictator's resolve to work independently of the Anglo-American powers.

New Year's 1962 was arguably the nadir of Portugal's relationship with its Anglo-American allies, and the threat of a NATO exit was more real than ever. Salazar had shown in Goa that he planned to protect his empire to the last man, while Portugal's erstwhile friends had proved themselves untrustworthy in his eyes. Watching from New York, Mozambican nationalist Eduardo Mondlane believed Goa "represented a precedent or a lesson for Portuguese Africa . . . [it] would harden the Portuguese government, [but] still it was obvious that it felt humiliated and abandoned by its allies."[240] The prediction proved

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[237] *The Washington Post* claimed that the plan would protect Portuguese mining interests and guarantee Portuguese be taught in schools. Bernard D. Nossiter, "Ingenious U.S. Plan to Prevent Invasion of Goa is Revealed," 22 January 1962. Most Portuguese felt the negotiations were insincere, with one unnamed official describing the Galbraith-Nehru exchange as "talking as one anti-colonialist to another." Charles Lewin, "Portuguese Most Irked at America's Actions," *The Austin Statesman*, 24 January 1962.
[238] Bègue, 1146-1153.
[239] Telegram, Harold MacMillan to Prime Ministers of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, 27 December 1961, PREM 11/3782; See Benjamin Welles, "Lisbon Praises U.S. Criticism of India in U.N. On Goa Invasion," New York Times, 20 December 1961; Telegram, New Delhi to Secstate, 18 December 1961, Box 155, NSF, JFKL.
[240] Quoted in Duarte de Jesus, Mondlane, 85-86.

prescient; American and British diplomats found Portuguese officials increasingly inflexible and unpredictable in the first months of the new year, choosing retrenchment when the regime seemed at a loss for what to do next.[241] Where there had been some hope in the fall that Salazar might work with the Anglo-American entente to continue reforms, this now seemed unlikely. It was almost impossible to imagine the dictator moderating his approach to the colonies – in the words of a widely circulated American report – "without benefit of a frontal lobotomy."[242] Given the deep resentment present in Lisbon, American officials expected Salazar to immediately end the renewal of the Azores lease when he made his first public appearance of 1962. What happened next would be beyond American control. "Goa," one pessimistic foreign diplomat told a reporter, "could be the king-pin which brings down the United Nations and NATO."[243]

Salazar was stubborn and emotional in his attachment to the colonies, but he was nothing if not calculating. The dictator realized that Goa had changed the international mood, and he refused to give up his last trump card.[244] In January, the dictator declared only an intent to review his nation's membership in the UN, though he did publicly threaten the Azores, NATO, and future cooperation with the British in Africa [245] These statements tapped into the currents of Western anti-communism Salazar had cultivated over the previous months, working especially in the United States to promote a backlash against

[241] Telegram, Washington to Jamieson, 27 February 1962, FO371/163794, UKNA.
[242] Memo, Paul Sakwa, "U.S. Policy towards Portugal," 17 January 1962, Box 154, NSF, JFKL.
[243] UPI, "Portugal Provides Concern," *The Austin American,* 24 December 1961.
[244] At least one British official recognized that relations had greatly worsened from the period he referred to as "before Goa." Minutes, K.D. Jamieson, 16 February 1962, FO371/163794, UKNA.
[245] "Portugal May Quit U.N., Salazar Says," *The Washington Post*, 4 January 1962.

Kennedy's seeming dependence on the UN and his poor treatment of European allies in favor of states in the global South. The Western press had been almost universally critical of Nehru's actions, and conservative pundits in the United States in particular openly sympathized with Portugal in a direct rebuke to the president.[246] Goa proved to many the hypocrisy not just of the UN but of the Kennedy administration, which had broken with Portugal over its use of arms in its own colony of Angola but had seemingly acquiesced to an Indian invasion. Journalist Roscoe Drummond captured the prevailing mood against such seeming double standards when he wrote "African and Asian nations are disposed to support the use of force when they like its purposes (as in the case of Goa) but oppose it when used by Western countries."[247] Republican congressmen in particular used the situation as a bludgeon against the administration, criticizing its seeming dependence on the UN and its ongoing abandonment of European allies.[248] The trend line connecting Angola to Goa worried many in the political establishment, helping to promote a new domestic defense of Portugal – specifically around the Azores base negotiations. Cold War politicians and pundits now believed the state of Luso-American relations was less about military necessity or African self-determination so much as "the solidarity of NATO," just as Salazar had desired.[249]

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[246] See "Third" political cartoon, Thomas J. Hamilton, "Policy Problem at U.N.," *New York Times,* 28 January 1962; Morris Ruskind, "The Day America Lost Oklahoma," *Los Angeles Times*, 29 December 1961.
[247] Roscoe Drummond, "U.S. Shouldn't Quit U.N. in Huff," Los Angeles Times, 23 January 1962.
[248] See Robert C. Albright, "Rusk Defends U.S. Policies Abroad Before Increasing Congressional Criticism," *Washington Post*, 21 December 1961.
[249] "The Strategic Azores," *New York Times*, 31 December 1961.

The resulting shift in opinion cemented Portugal's popular diplomacy from the fall and created an increasingly hostile environment for Kennedy to launch new initiatives in favor of self-determination. The majority of the Congress adopted a hostile view of Kennedy's approach to Portugal, worried less about the role of NATO arms in Angola than the potential loss of Portugal as a trans-Atlantic partner.[250] Republicans and conservative southern Democrats were especially concerned on this front, but so too were politicians from states like Massachusetts and New Jersey with large numbers of Portuguese-American constituents. Before the end of the year, even the veteran liberal legislator Tip O'Neill (D-MA) would come to Portugal's aid, noting that "the Belgian Congo indicates that freedom for a former colony is by no means the solution to that colony's difficulties" in a statement where he compared Angola and Mozambique favorably with Alaska and Hawaii.[251] After Goa, administration critics felt comfortable expressing concern with the direction of Portuguese relations given clear evidence of Afro-Asian overreach, an incensed NATO ally, and a greatly weakened anti-colonial lobby. Salazar had weathered the storm created by the Angolan rebellion and now seemed capable of maintaining a multi-continental Portugal for the foreseeable future.

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[250] As one Republican congressman from Massachusetts noted, cooperation with Portugal, "a bulwark of our European alliances, is now strained to a dangerous level." See statement of Hastings Kieth, 29 January 1962, Congressional Record, 1126; Statement of Thomas Kuchel, 16 January 1962, Congressional Record, 1962. By June, Congressman Porter Hardy (D-VA), a prominent member of the armed services committee, was peppering the administration with letters encouraging it to appease Portugal. Folder: Portugal Subjects Azores Base 6/12/62-6/19/62, Box 155, NSF, JFKL.

[251] Tip O'Niell, Statement, 4 October 1962, Congressional Record, 22426

Conclusion

For much of 1961, Angola had forced Portugal and its colonies to the forefront of international discussions of decolonization in the Cold War. But by January of 1962, the momentum created by the UPA rebellion had foundered amidst the surprisingly stalwart response of Salazar's *Estado Novo*. While international observers from India to the United States still viewed decolonization as inevitable, there was a noticeable loss of confidence in just how rapidly the wind of change would progress down the continent. The pacification of Angola, the mobilization of a potent Portuguese propaganda machine, and the contentious invasion of Goa had convinced many Westerners that a pause was needed to reassess the style and pace of African self-determination. Kennedy hesitated to wholly abandon his previous policy, but international and domestic trends argued for more cautious maneuvering. One last time the administration joined with Britain to criticize Portugal at the UN in January, casting its vote for a mild resolution in the General Assembly deprecating repressive measures in the maintenance of empire in Angola and urging political reforms. Though historians have occasionally classed this alongside the March vote, the resolution was toothless and widely supported, garnering only two predictably negative votes from South Africa and Spain alongside a single French abstention.[252] Only on such innocuous matters was Kennedy willing to oppose Portuguese interests.

[252] Marcum, 269. The British voted positively to avoid alienating Afro-Asian states that had watered down a more extreme version that could have included sanctions. Cabinet Conclusions, 25 January 1962, CAB/128/36, UKNA.

In this first international round of Portugal's battle against decolonization, the *Estado Novo* had beaten back the nationalist challenge, and this was nowhere more apparent than in the United States. Where Kennedy had once had a Congress and public largely sympathetic to his initial desire to lean on Portugal, he faced a much different situation in 1962. Salazar's fall offensive – both in Angola and among Anglo-American populations – had proven better organized, better funded, and more convincing than the nationalist appeals. ACOA and the churches continued to speak on behalf of Roberto and the independence movement, but they had little news to convey and found dwindling support. When both Roberto's UPA and Portugal based their appeals on Cold War logic, the historic Western preference for a European-backed status quo was likely to prevail in the long run.

American opinion now aligned closely with that of much of Europe, which had expressed disapproval of Portuguese actions but had no interest in pursuing the issue. Britain, often the bellwether for American action on Portuguese matters after the summer, embraced a political retreat, since Goa and reduced domestic interest made haggling with a still fuming Salazar an unprofitable prospect. And the Portuguese understood they had achieved the upper hand. Speaking with Rusk in March 1962, Foreign Minister Nogueira smugly marveled that "It was extraordinary what we [Portugal] had done in the space of a year with American public opinion. There was no doubt that the atmosphere was entirely different and in our favor." Proponents of Portugal both in the United States and abroad – particularly the French – believed that the pacification of Angola demanded the United States reassess its policies toward its ally, and Rusk found himself in reluctant

agreement.[253] Kennedy had seriously moderated his initial approach to Lisbon in the preceding year based on a growing fear of a NATO crisis, and this momentum accelerated as the concern about a Portuguese collapse in Africa subsided. American interests now seemed better served by preventing a sudden Portuguese exit from NATO than in promoting self-determination in Africa. Salazar had subtly shifted Kennedy's conversation on decolonization into a referendum on NATO's commitment to European values, with the Azores becoming a symbol of trans-Atlantic tensions. Always a conflicted champion of Africa who viewed the continent from a strategic perspective as much as an ideological one, Kennedy was headed toward an acceptance of the fait accompli with Portugal – at least for the near future.

Yet there remained a possibility for the United States to take one last stand on behalf of Lusophone self-determination. As the Kennedy administration weathered a storm of criticism for its handling of Portugal and the UN, Eduardo Mondlane was working quietly to bridge the gap between the two nationalist internationalisms and form a new political party that had not yet turned to armed struggle. The Mozambique Liberation Front (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, or FRELIMO) would still be open to a negotiated solution to the issue of decolonization, and it would look to the United States and Western Europe for assistance in achieving its goals. It would not be communist in its politics, but neither would it or its leader use Cold War anticommunism as the foundation for American support. With friends from both the Euro-American Protestant networks and the political

[253] Noguiera, conversa com Dean Rusk, 4 May 1962, Athens, Pasta 5, AOS/CO/NE-30, cx 409, TT-PT.

left, the party promised to rise above the sectarian conflict that had splintered the Angolan movements and defined liberation in terms of Cold War strategy. Yet with both the United States and Britain moving toward an acceptance of continued Portuguese rule in Africa, it was by no means clear if FRELIMO could change the hearts and minds of Westerners struggling to view the value of self-determination outside of superpower conflict.

Chapter 2: "The Winds of Change Stopped Here"

The Struggle to Separate Decolonization from the Cold War

It is unlikely the students taking Dr. Eduardo Mondlane's sociology class at Syracuse University knew their tall, balding professor would one day become the father of independent Mozambique. In 1962, he had spent the better part of ten years in the United States, marrying an American and starting a family. Mondlane could have easily settled into the staid life of an academic, but he remained driven to help free his homeland from Portuguese rule. While working in the trusteeship system of the United Nations, the Mozambican had built contacts with other nationalists scattered across the globe. These included committed Marxists like Marcelino dos Santos with close ties to the CONCP, as well as exile youth attending college in Europe. Yet Mondlane had been unable to participate in nationalist politics from his position in New York. This likely frustrated Mondlane, but it also meant he remained above ideological and personality divisions that hampered the movement in its early years. Therefore, when the president of newly independent Tanganyika (Tanzania after 1964), Julius Nyerere, insisted that any Mozambican independence movement operating within his country represent a united front, Mondlane seemed the natural leader – respected by a number of independent parties but tied narrowly to none. The result was his election as the first president of FRELIMO, a merging of Dos Santos' National Democratic Union of Mozambique and two other

nationalist parties operating in the Tanganyikan capitol of Dar es Salaam.[254] Mondlane's rise to prominence effectively united the radical and religious strands of African internationalism, introducing into the CONCP alliance new avenues for courting Western support.

Indeed, Mondlane's election was as much symbolic as practical, demonstrating the central importance of internationalism in the Lusophone struggles for liberation. Mondlane commanded respect outside Mozambique and the African continent. As Dos Santos recalled, the party elected the "American" professor due in no small part to his "connections and influence abroad."[255] As a party in exile, FRELIMO understood the revolution as a global process that demanded the participation and assistance of outside actors, and Mondlane was the best resource for navigating competing international rivalries.[256] His background made him uniquely prepared to sell the revolution to foreign audiences. One party member later recalled, Mondlane "was able to speak for us the language of other men – the language of the diplomats, the language of the universities, and the language of power."[257] In contrast to other nationalists like Holden Roberto, Mondlane did not speak in the language of the Cold War. Rather than seeking advantage in playing one global camp against another, FRELIMO sought to build a transnational

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[254] Eduardo Mondlane, "The Struggle for Independence in Mozambique," (1963), 6 and 18-20, available in Aluka Digital Archive; Barry Munslow, *Mozambique*: The Revolution and its Origins (New York: Longman, 1983), 79-80.

[255] Marcelino Dos Santos quoted in Vladimir Shubin, *The Hot "Cold War:" The USSR in Southern Africa* (London: Pluto Press: 2008), 121-122. Helen Kitchen, "Conversation with Eduardo Mondlane," *Africa Report*, 12:8 (1 November 1967), 31.

[256] Interview, Joaquim Chiassano with Sellström, 2 May 1996 in Tor Sellström, ed., *Liberation in Southern Africa – Regional and Swedish Voices* (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2002), 38.

[257] Editorial, *Mozambique Revolution* 37 (February 1969) (hereafter listed as MR).

alliance network that committed allies from both East and West against a single enemy. FRELIMO's foreign policy was, in the words of Mozambique's first president Samora Machel, "an expression of our fundamental principle of internationalism . . . against colonialism and imperialism, against exploitation, and in favour of the building of a new society based on social justice, democracy, progress and peace."[258]

Mondlane's job was to sell to the world a vision of a newly independent Mozambique under FRELIMO – both destructive in its anti-colonialism and constructive in its pursuit of social justice. This would not prove difficult in the East or the global South, where long histories of anti-imperialism fit well with Lusophone visions of independence. The difficulty would be making this appeal in the Western alliance and the United States, devoid as it was of Cold War or national security rhetoric. This more than anything was Mondlane's task. Americanized down to his love of baseball and Sunday football, the Mozambican understood how to operate in the United States and work with Euro-Americans. Though he held a positive view of communism and dismissed Western sensitivity to it, he understood how to articulate FRELIMO's most radical policy departures in terms of global justice, equality, and even human rights.[259] He would become the CONCP parties' most prominent proponent in the Western world.

Yet his ambitions for Western and specifically American assistance were unattainable. Continued deference to Cold War considerations would prove a major

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[258] Samor Machel, "The People' Democratic Revolution," in Barry Munslow, ed., *Samora Machel: An African Revolutionary – Selected Speeches and Writings* (Harare: College Press, 1987), 67.
[259] Memo, Directo to Governeor General of Mozambique, 23 October 1963, pasta American Committee on Africa, SCCIM/A/20/71, TT.

obstacle, especially as the Angolan revolution took a backseat to larger regional crises in southern Africa. Continued attempts to build solidarity that could influence foreign policymaking in the United States and the United Kingdom accomplished little, leading nationalists to take up arms as the only solution to the problem of Portuguese rule. While neither Roberto nor the CONCP parties would give up on the promise of Western pressure on Lisbon, the gradual embrace of the last European empire by John Kennedy and his successors would demonstrate to the leftist nationalists in particular the limitations of extant strategies.

In these frustrations, however, the CONCP nationalists – Mondlane in particular – learned valuable lessons about selling the concept of revolution abroad. Angola would recede from the global agenda, not because colonialism triumphed or fell, but due to the internal weakness of the nationalist movement and the sudden shift of international attention to new hotspots in Africa. A successful revolution at home and abroad required unity – as well as constant demonstrations that the nationalists were gaining ground. Cold War strategic considerations would be difficult to overcome at the official level, but sympathetic populations existed who were willing to prioritize humanitarian and egalitarian concerns over power politics. However, relationships had to be maintained, strengthened, and expanded if such groups were to prove effective in terms of sustained material and political aid, and not fade as did initial Angolan solidarity efforts. Perhaps most importantly, Mondlane and FRELIMO learned that the early 1960s were not the best time to champion foreign revolutions: a period of high tension in the Cold War and real domestic progress in the United States. The CONCP parties would benefit from a period

in the near future when traditions of anti-communism and anti-radicalism faltered under the weight of the global Cold War. These lessons, however, would be hard learned and come only after Western and American assistance seemed nearly unattainable.

Closing the Door to the White House: Kennedy's Final Years

To FRELIMO and the other CONCP parties, the key to gaining Western support was disconnecting decolonization from the Cold War.[260] The United States and Great Britain viewed the future of the Lusophone colonies through the lens of great power conflict. When given the choice outside a crisis, they would cautiously side with the reactionary stability offered by Salazar over the potentially chaotic postcolonial future. FRELIMO understood this, but hoped it could provide Westerners with a more positive vision of what could happen if they compelled Portuguese decolonization. The party presented itself as a solution to Western policymakers sympathetic to nationalist demands. Here was a united front that represented peoples from across Mozambique, led by a moderate, articulate leader with a clear affinity for Western democracy – if not necessarily an equal warmth for capitalism. Though refusing to pander to Cold war fears as had Roberto, Mondlane's FRELIMO kept a careful distance from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. FRELIMO made "a tremendous effort," as one party member later recalled, "to

[260] This perspective was most pronounced in FRELIMO, but also was part of the global vision of Cabral and the MPLA's Neto as well. One MPLA official remembered Neto as "very independent, both in relation to thinking and in the way he was leading the struggle. He wanted to be at a comfortable distance to the countries that could help us militarily, that is the former socialist countries." Interview, Alberto Ribeiro-Kabula with Sellström, in Sellström, *Regional and Swedish Voices*, 27.

depolarize the issue of the liberation struggle."[261] In short, Mondlane's FRELIMO was the perfect party with which any administration that tolerated neutralist countries could work – carefully reformist, Western-friendly, and still willing to negotiate. Historians such as Roberto Rakove have argued that John Kennedy led such a government, and Eduardo Mondlane shared this opinion when he took control of FRELIMO. "While the Portuguese are not rational," the Mozambican explained to an American audience, "the rest of mankind is."[262]

What Mondlane failed to grasp is that Kennedy and his administration had little choice but to view the Third World in the context of the Cold War. The president had always understood the nationalist question within the context of the global conflict, fearing the long-term ramifications of ignoring the demands of majority populations in Africa and Asia. Though the United States had tried desperately to separate decolonization from Cold War interests at the strategic level, at least subconsciously most American policymakers knew this was unrealistic. Salazar's use of the Azores and Portugal's membership in the NATO alliance to combat the president's agenda inextricably linked the two global processes. Stability in both Europe and Africa – as it had been throughout 1961 – remained the priority for the president and his advisers, but the variety of options for pursuing this course shrunk as Portugal manipulated both international and domestic politics. As the decade progressed, working directly with the *Estado Novo* seemed the only viable path

[261] Interview, Sérgio Veira with Sellström, in Sellström, *Regional and Swedish Voices*, 55.
[262] Memo, Directo to Governeor General of Mozambique, 23 October 1963, pasta American Committee on Africa, SCCIM/A/20/71, TT.

forward. Kennedy's reluctant acceptance of this fact set into motion a policy momentum that continued under his successors, eventually leading to the full embrace of Portugal under Richard Nixon and the successful negotiation of a new Azores lease.

American officials accepted the necessity of working with the *Estado Novo* relatively quickly after the pacification of Angola and the Goa incident. The administration had always desired that its NATO ally maintain a presence in Africa, albeit in a modified form. As Rusk clarified to a number of European ambassadors, "our policy is to encourage Europeans to stay in Africa because they have important interests and contributions to make there which in case of Portugal is almost unique because of language factor."[263] The United States had learned from its experience in the Congo that it had neither the interest nor the motivation to manage a transfer of power without a capable metropolitan partner, who would necessarily retain some level of influence after its official departing. Therefore, the implied reasoning that had motivated American policy during the period of the Angolan rebellion now emerged more clearly. Maintaining Portugal's position on the continent was necessary to avoid the "violence, chaos, and distress . . . from which only the communist bloc would profit," but the administration maintained this would only be possible through "an evolution of Portuguese policies to make possible a continued Portuguese role."[264] The United States was committed to self-determination but it made clear that, as Rusk stated simply, "'our' [idea of] autonomy or self-determination is not that of the United

[263] Telegram, State to Lisbon, 28 July 1962, Box 1814, Central Decimal File, 1960-63, RG 59, NARA.
[264] Aide Memoire to Portuguese Government, Department of State, 8 October 1962, Box 1814, Central Decimal File, 1960-63, RG 59, NARA.

Nations."[265] Far from wanting Portugal out of Africa, American officials wanted to find a way to insure Lisbon's continued influence – a fact few nationalists fully understood.

As a result, the Kennedy administration changed its tone greatly in 1962, approaching Salazar with more measured rhetoric and cautious proposals. The goal was to encourage a restructuring of Portuguese rule without resorting to the frenetic efforts that had classified earlier actions. American diplomats seized on every opportunity to praise Portuguese initiatives and promote gradual liberalization. For instance, the reform package of the late fall of 1961, as well as the appointment of the relatively liberal Adriano Moreira as overseas minister in the cabinet reshuffle, encouraged many State Department officials, who used this opening as a way to deflect international critics and justify cooperation with Salazar's government.[266] Foreign Minister Franco Noguiera even held talks with conservative Angolan nationalists. They did not include either the UPA or MPLA, but were innovative enough to assure sympathetic observers like Burke Elbrick that a moderated change was possible.[267] Real progress was unhurried at best, but the United States acclaimed stale initiatives as "steps in the right direction" that would "provide the best assurance that Portugal will be able to continue in Africa."[268] With the possibility of near-term collapse greatly reduced, the State Department embraced "a new

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[265] Noguiera, Conversation with Dean Rusk, 4 May 1962, Athens (transcript signed 14 May 1962), Pasta 5, cx 409, AOS/CO/NE-30, TT.
[266] Elbrick had been especially supportive of the fall reforms. Memcon, Embaixador dos Estados Unidos, 19 September 1961 and untitled Dossier Especial (Special Dossier on NATO Council Statements), no date (c. late 1962) PAA 287, AHD.
[267] Joint Weeka 35, 1 September 1961, Box 1815, CDM 60-63, RG 59, NARA.
[268] Aid Memoire to Portuguese Government, 8 November 1962, Box 1814, CDM 60-63, RG 59, NARA.

approach to Portugal" that emphasized cooperation rather than public criticism. Even the Williams' Bureau of African Affairs, which just a few months prior had advocated for the overthrow of Salazar, now shifted their efforts to designing generous economic assistance packages tied with new political concessions for the colonies.[269]

That the Kennedy administration's primary interest was restoring order in the region is perhaps best revealed by the tight diplomatic focus on Angola. American discussions with the *Estado Novo* throughout 1961 focused on the largest colony, and this continued after the collapse of the rebellions. Washington often spoke broadly of social and economic assistance to Portugal's overseas possessions, but there was limited concrete interest in Mozambique and virtually no mention of the other African colonies like Guinea-Bissau, Cabo Verde, or São Tomé and Príncipe. Certainly, American officials believed that convincing Portugal to grant self-government to its most economically important colony would provide a path for the others to follow, but at its core the issue concerned a perceived need to arrest the spread of regional unrest for strategic reasons rather than pursue decolonization on its own merits. When Nogueira at one point asked Rusk why the Americans expressed minimal interest in Portugal's other African colonies, the secretary captured the American mindset by responding that Angola was "the current problem, and it was imposed against his will."[270] Simply managing the crisis had always

[269] Memo, Henry J. Tasca to Williams, 16 March 1962, CDM 60-63, RG 59, NARA.
[270] Relato de conversa, Noguiera and Rusk, 28 June 1962, in Ministry of foreign affairs, pasta 7, cx 409, AOS/CO/NE-30, TT.

been the top priority of the president and his senior advisers. Without looming catastrophe, the Kennedy administration was now seeking ways to compel Salazar to continue implementing reforms without threatening the wider alliance.

Reinforcing this adjustment to policy were the ceaseless negotiations over the Azores base. While Kennedy hoped to improve Portuguese relations and preserve NATO unity, he refused to retreat for broader diplomatic reasons. As Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara explained to Dean Rusk, "the military assets we derive from Portugal and South Africa must be weighed against those now available to us in the 'African bloc.'"[271] Any visible sign of abandoning the embargo or rhetorical criticisms of Portugal would draw African ire and threaten important American assets. Therefore, even as the president decided against further criticizing Portugal at the UN and sought more constructive policies that would effectively bribe Portugal toward reform, he accepted the need to prepare for the potential loss of the islands – even after they proved valuable for tracking submarines during the Cuban Missile Crisis.[272] Indeed, Kennedy's most pressing concern was retaining the unity of NATO, which the more cooperative strategy seemed to accomplish. Salazar failed to request that the Americans leave the islands when the formal lease ended in 1963, preserving the status quo – albeit without any assurances that Portugal would continue to do so in the future.[273] With tensions easing throughout 1962, this

[271] Letter, McNamara to Rusk, 11 July 1963, in James E. Miller, ed. *Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-1968, Volume XII: Western Europe* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2001), 957. (Hereafter, FRUS Europe).
[272] Memcon, President and Elbrick, 5 September 1962, Box 154, NSF, JFKL.
[273] See, memo, Schlesinger to Robert Kennedy, 1 July 1963, FRUS Africa, 497 and Memo, McNamara to Kennedy, 14 August 1963, FRUS Europe, 965-967. Reviews showed that Terceira's importance as an

undesirable but workable standoff proved acceptable to both sides, since few in the United States or elsewhere believed that Salazar would be likely to waste his "only trump card" when relations were on the mend.[274] Kennedy was prepared to abandon the bases, but he felt the pressure to moderate future approaches in order to avoid an ongoing conflict that could, as one widely circulated report warned, "severely damage NATO."[275]

Unwilling to distance itself from its rhetorical pledge for self-determination, the Kennedy administration assuaged Salazar's damaged ego by taking into account a whole host of minor complaints about American policy. In addition to the obvious anger at past UN votes, the Portuguese regularly complained about U.S. political contacts with African nationalists – Lusophone and otherwise – as well as statements critical of colonialism made by liberal members of the administration, most notably Soapy Williams. Salazar also learned quickly of the Lincoln program, and demanded it be shuttered. At the very top of the list of issues drafted by the Foreign Office were the actions of the American Committee on Africa (ACOA) and affiliated organizations such as the Methodist Church and the AFL-CIO, who were aiding the nationalists and Angolan refugees that had fled to the Congo.[276]

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airbase was falling. These reviews, and Kennedy's call for the identification of alternative routes, came in spite of the repeated military papers arguing for the bases necessities in 1962, which garnered the support of close presidential adviser Maxwell Taylor. McGeorge Bundy hinted at the reasoning behind these decisions when he commented to George Ball that military claims to indispensability are simply "never so." Telcon, 12 July 1963, Box 7, Papers of George W. Ball, JFKL. Moreover, the key was keeping Portugal in the alliance, since the bases would remain accessible to the American military during times of NATO deployment even if the lease lapsed. Ted Sorenson believed this might be a preferable arrangement in terms of African, European, and fiscal policy. Memo, Theodore C. Sorensen to President, 4 June 1962, Box 155, NSF. JFKL.

[274] Memcon, President and Elbrick, 5 September 1962, Box 154, NSF, JFKL.

[275] Memo, Paul Sakwa, "U.S. Policy towards Portugal," 17 January 1962, Box 154, NSF, JFKL.

[276] Memo, "Motivas de atrito nas relaçôes Luso-Americanas," no date, PAA 288, Processo 922, AHD; "Apontomento," ministerio dos negocios estrangeiros, 10/7/1962, Pasta 4, AOS/CO/NE-30, cx 409, TT.

ACOA earned much of Portugal's ire, not least because Salazar assumed its elite membership – notably Kennedy adviser Arthur Schlesinger – helped shape foreign policy, reinforced by the greatly exaggerated role Lisbon attributed to Houser on the African Bureau's advisory council.[277] Salazar was especially irate that Americans were assisting Roberto in the form of monetary aid, medical supplies, and political networking in the United States.[278] The conspiratorial Salazar became convinced that these groups – and ACOA in particular – were acting as pro-revolutionary proxies for the government, regardless of American protests to the contrary.[279]

That these non-governmental groups became the primary stumbling block in Luso-American relations had much to do with increasing official accommodation of many Portuguese demands. In an attempt to calm the NATO crisis, Kennedy made a number of moves to reassure Salazar of his good intentions. Washington could not control independent organizations like ACOA, but the State Department sought to quiet vocally liberal elements of the administration – notably ordering that speeches by Stevenson and Williams on the topic of Portugal receive departmental approval.[280] Rusk went so far as to pay a personal visit to Salazar in June of 1962, hoping to discuss forthrightly and honestly the issues dividing Portugal and the United States; however, little came from the meeting

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[277] "Resumo dos assuntos, para localização," no date, PAA 288, Processo 922, AHD.
[278] PIDE's attribution of power to ACOA was inconsistent, even accusing it of linking Roberto to Castro's Cuba. SCCIM Informational bulletin, 19/62, 25 September 1962, SCCIM/A/20/71, TT.
[279] Rodrigues Nunes, "Projecção do auxílio americano nas actividades terrroristas," no date, PAA 288, Processo 922, AHD; SCCI Memo no 45/1963, ND, Pasta: American Committee on Africa and Oficio 4.247/15.009.070 (0), de 31/v/962, Gabinete dos negocios, extract, Nd (1962), SCCIM/A/20/71, TT.
[280] Noguiera, Conversation with Dean Rusk, 4 May 1962, Athens (transcript signed 14 May 1962), Pasta 5, cx 409, AOS/CO/NE-30, TT.

that the secretary likened to having a séance with a ghost.[281] In an attempt to further shift the tone of relations, Kennedy replaced Ambassador Burke Elbrick with Admiral George Anderson over the protests of State Africanists in early 1963. While the promotion was a way of removing the contentious navy officer from Washington, the selection of a military man gave the Portuguese a vocal champion within the diplomatic apparatus.[282] Taken together, these efforts communicated to the Portuguese and the wider world a willingness to work with the Lisbon government.

A new approach to the UN accompanied the changing rhetoric and confirmed for many that Kennedy's aggressive policies from the summer of 1961 were the somewhat panicked reaction of a neophyte administration. Throughout 1962 and into 1963, American officials cooperated with the Portuguese at the UN. In an attempt to appease all parties involved, the United States proposed a UN rapporteur visit Angola and Mozambique in order to report favorably on the reforms installed in the wake of pacification, to which Salazar surprisingly agreed.[283] Washington officials hoped the maneuver would diffuse international pressure and force Lisbon into dialogue with the UN, but it served primarily to disillusion both Roberto and the African countries that supported him. When an African delegation ignored American calls for moderation and denounced Portugal's "mass extermination of the indigenous population of Angola" in a resolution calling for sanctions, the United States joined Portugal, South Africa, and most of its European allies in voting

[281] Dean Rusk, As I Saw It (New York: Penguin, 1991), 270.
[282] Schneidman, 52.
[283] See telegram, Secstate to Lisbon, 26 July 1962, Box 1814, CDF 1960-63, RG 59, NARA.

negatively. The new sense of Western solidarity helped calm Salazar, whose government began backing away from earlier threats to abandon both the UN and NATO.[284] But Kennedy's new approach to Portugal effectively completed the strategic retreat, undermining the only peaceful pathway African nationalists believed might compel Portugal to decolonize. Despite the high hopes of many around the globe, the initial U.S. vote from March 1961 now appeared, in the words of historian Witney Schneidman, "more as an anomaly than as a point of departure for a new policy on decolonization and Third World issues in general."[285]

As the administration distanced itself from the proverbial stick method used unsuccessfully in 1961, Kennedy's hope for Portuguese reform now depended on lucrative combinations of "carrots" that might help offset the loss of certain colonial benefits while guaranteeing the Iberian state a continued role in Africa. The culmination of these initiatives came in the final half of 1963. The Bowles plan, named for its author, the former Undersecretary of State Chester Bowles, set out a detailed roadmap for accomplishing "some means of orderly transition" toward relative independence in the African colonies. It hoped to take advantage of improving Luso-American relations and the goodwill supposedly created by Portugal's moderate reforms to identify a "third choice" for Portugal between an isolated stand against the winds of change or a humiliating retreat from the continent. It offered sizeable American aid that would promote the "(1) substantial and rapid economic progress for metropolitan Portugal, and (2) simultaneous development of

[284] Telegram, Ball to SecState, 29 August, 1963, box 155, NSF, JFKL.
[285] Quoted Schneidman, 36.

the overseas territories toward early self-determination."[286] Bowles admitted that his initiative was unlikely to effectively guide developments, but he was optimistic that it might "at the very least enable us to strengthen the moderate forces . . . and at best to lay the basis for a rational constructive solution."[287] The new offer would be delivered personally by Undersecretary of State George Ball.

The decision to present the plan to the Portuguese through Ball cemented the drift of Kennedy era policy after 1962. In contrast to Rusk, who more readily agreed with his president on the significance of the Third World, Ball was an ardent realist and a Europhile at heart, who was often dismissive of the African continent and its importance to international affairs.[288] He seemed a prime choice to negotiate with the conservative Salazar. At the end of August, Ball delivered to the aging dictator a lengthy letter that hued closely to the Bowles Plan, then returned again after a week's travel to continue talks. The pair of conversations covered familiar ground regarding self-determination, but there was no doubt that the tone was far from adversarial. As the undersecretary explained, "the United States was searching for a basis of a position that would allow us to support the Portuguese position."[289] Washington would welcome any sign of an evolution in political participation, which Salazar did not reject out of hand. At one point, Ball even proposed

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[286] Memo, "Proposal for a Breakthrough in U.S.-Portuguese Relations in Regard to Africa," Bowles to Secretary, 10 January 1963, 5, Box 1815, Central Decimal File, 1960-63, RG 59 Records of the State Department, NARA.
[287] Ibid, 2-3.
[288] Months before being sent to Portugal, Ball dismissed Soapy Williams' staff as a bunch of "missionaries . . . holding some tribal dances down in the African bureau." Telcon, Ball and Bundy, 13 July 1963, Box 9, Personal Papers of George W. Ball, JFKL.
[289] Memcon, Salazar, Ball, et. al., 7 September 1963, Lisbon, Portugal, Box 155, NSF, JFKL.

the creation of "a bond similar to that between the United States and Puerto Rico."[290] For the Portuguese who had often compared their colonies to the U.S. territories, this change in rhetoric was a victory. Disagreement continued to be over the question of timing, with the Portuguese believing that the level of African civilization prevented any swift move toward political expression while Ball pressed for a more tangible timetable.[291] Ball reiterated that the United States desired to assist in the expansion of educational opportunities in order to prepare a responsible social citizenry in the colonies. Salazar acknowledged the offer of education and infrastructural aid, but claimed that concrete plans had not been submitted to the U.S. government because of unspecific complications associated with the UN.[292] As Ball prepared to leave in September, he promised to continue the dialogue through an exchange of letters.

Ball and many in the administration saw the interchange as an important step in the direction of reform, which was more forthright and honest than previous exchanges. But the reality is it accomplished little. Over the following months, serious discussions occurred about how to manage what Ball argued was a period of rapid transition from the traditional European-dominated order to an as yet undefined state of affairs in Africa. The United States hoped Portugal would play an active part in shaping this new reality in a way that would protect Western interests and preserve NATO unity.[293] But the Portuguese were

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[290] Notes on the audience of the president of the Council (Salazar) and George ball, 7 September 1963, pasta 14, cx 409, AOS/CO/NE-30, TT. The Portuguese account of the conversation is nearly identical to American descriptions in terms of tone and content.

[291] Telegram, Paris to SecState, 31 August 1963, 3 p.m. (Section IV of VI), Box 155, NSF, JFKL.

[292] Telegram, Paris to SecState, 31 August, 1963, FRUS Europe, 971-977.

[293] (JFKL 3 140). One American document argued a ten year period free of "outside interference" and benefiting from "capital injections" from allies would provide the opportunity "for beneficially affecting

unwilling to imagine an alternative to empire. When pressed on a timeline for self-determination, Salazar and his acolytes continued to speak grandly about centuries of European tutelage. The *Estado Novo* was willing to dabble in minor reforms at the margins of its political control of the colonies, but officials believed that even the most open-ended statements on self-determination were bound to fail, since, as Nogueira told the president, they "unleashed forces which cannot be controlled."[294] The Portuguese refused to accept American infrastructural assistance if it meant losing their complete sovereignty over their colonies. The hidebound, hierarchical Salazar believed that Ball's old order was in decline because European leaders lacked the vision and resolve to maintain it. The rhetoric of self-determination was a Pandora's Box, and no amount of American aid would convince Lisbon to even hold the key. This was the ally the United States was now gradually embracing for Cold War strategic reasons, subsuming the widespread faith in the inevitability of decolonization.

Lyndon Johnson inherited this state of affairs after John Kennedy's assassination in November of 1963. The United States remained in the Azores on the whim of the aging Salazar, but the new approach to Portugal had calmed bilateral tensions and effectively quieted threats to bolt NATO and the UN. Angola remained quiet, as did Mozambique. The PAIGC had launched a revolution in January 1963, but few American officials took much notice. Africa was not high on Johnson's priority list and he had only the most

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African attitudes in a manner conducive to an eventual option favorable to Portuguese aspirations for a continuing presence in Africa." "Political Aspects of U.S. Proposal," Enclosure to Telegram, Lisbon to Secstate, 18 September 1963, Box 203, Country File, NSF, LBJL.

[294] Memcon, Kennedy, Ball, Noguiera, et. al. 7 November 1963, White House, Box 154B, NSF, JFKL.

general affection for nationalist causes, though he too viewed colonialism as antiquated. He therefore followed his predecessor's lead with limited enthusiasm, authorizing continued discussions with Portugal about financial assistance. Little progress would be made, but at least from the American perspective both the African and European status quos seemed sustainable for the near future, while more pressing matters in Vietnam and elsewhere began to demand presidential attention.

Nationalist Frustrations

That is not to say that Kennedy wholly abandoned his previous interest in moderate nationalists before his death. Existing policies remained in place, most notably the arms embargo. The Lincoln program also continued, though the emphasis on Lusophone students lessened as Portuguese complaint increased.[295] Despite these efforts, the administration failed to seriously expand contacts with nationalists, despite the emergence of attractive actors like Mondlane and FRELIMO. Indeed, beginning in 1962, the Kennedy administration proved frustratingly ambiguous in its approach to black African demands for self-determination in the colonies, offering little more than token amounts of political aid that frustrated both anti-colonials and their most ardent American supporters. By the time of his death, Kennedy had not simply made peace with Portugal; he had succeeded in alienating most nationalist movements, bequeathing to his successor a situation that would almost inevitably be resolved through a conflict of arms.

[295] Marcum interview.

The limitations of Kennedy's willingness to support nationalist claims to authority was evidenced by the administration's cautious handling of both Roberto and the more charismatic Mondlane. Around the same time FRELIMO was coming together in Tanzania, Roberto formed a political front to help legitimize his movement by expanding it beyond his predominantly northern, Bakongo constituency. The UPA became the core of the new National Liberation Front of Angola (*Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola,* or FNLA), which included the relatively obscure Kikongo-dominated Democratic Party of Angola (*Partido Democrático de Angola*) and a handful of Ovimbundu from the south of the colony – notably the missionary educated Jonas Savimbi. Barely a week into its existence, the FNLA declared the Angolan Revolutionary Government in Exile (*Govêrno Revolucionário de Angola no Exílio,* or GRAE). Roberto acted as president and appointed Savimbi foreign minister, though the vast majority of the leadership positions were dominated by Bakongo appointees. The goal was to show to the world the continued relevance of the Angolan nationalist movement, despite recent setbacks on the military front, and to offer the world an identifiable alternative to imperial Portugal. That the FNLA was barely more than Roberto's cronies in Leopoldville and a poorly managed relief service for Angolan refugees mattered less than the symbolic gesture of declaring the government. A series of African governments moved to recognize the GRAE, followed by a handful of Eastern bloc states courting Third World nationalists. A year later, when the newly formed Organization of African Unity (OAU) decided to financially support nationalist movements through its Liberation Committee, it chose the FNLA over the

MPLA due to its somewhat dubious claim to be the most ready to govern an independent state.[296]

Outside Africa, response to the FNLA's declaration was far less enthusiastic. Europeans ranging from Portugal to Britain clearly had no interest in recognizing the government, but the United States also objected negatively to the new state of affairs. The Kennedy administration quietly appreciated Roberto's attempts to create a unified nationalist movement, but it responded with mild horror at the FNLA's claim to government status. Many officials feared it would force Portugal into a defensive position, leading to a collapse of Portuguese relations with the Congo and closing any possibility of a negotiated transition of power. There was virtually no discussion of supporting the GRAE idea outside the African Bureau, and the Kennedy administration actively opposed Roberto's initiative. American officials secretly advised Congolese President Cyril Adoula not to recognize the FNLA's exile government, though this proved unsuccessful thanks to Roberto's extensive ties to high-ranking Congolese politicians.[297] The United States was unable to prevent the formation of the GRAE, but in trying to do so it demonstrated to Roberto the inherent conservatism of the American government.

As Luso-American relations gradually improved, African perceptions of the Kennedy administration worsened. Though Roberto benefited from both governmental and private American aid – albeit less so than either Portugal or some anti-Western detractors presumed – the president of the FNLA became increasingly frustrated with the United

[296] Guimarães, 55-57.
[297] Telegram, Pairs to Secstate, 31 August 1963, Box 155, NSF, JFKL.

States after 1962. Kennedy had been far less helpful on the global political front than early indications had promised, and American actions after the exile government declaration further soured relations. By the end of 1963, the U.S. embassy in Leopoldville, which had the most extensive contacts with the FNLA head, noted that "he feels that he carries the reputation of an American stooge without receiving any of material benefits."[298] A tinge of anti-Americanism began to creep into official pronouncements as a lack of military success in Angola led Roberto to cement his control of the party and nationalist movement by appealing to local frustrations with the Western bloc. This frustration was directly attributable to the inconsistency with which the administration was handling the nationalists – providing nominal covert aid on the one hand and offering minimal public support on the other. Reflecting a widespread attitude, one ACOA representative working with the FNLA in the Congo complained, "American policy is so ambivalent, in a situation in which there is no room for ambivalence."[299] Roberto himself began to denounce the American tendency to pay "lip service to self-determination" while supplying "arms that are used to kill us."[300] Frustrations were convincing Roberto that he might find more reliable support from the countries he had long denigrated in pursuit of U.S. assistance: China and members of the Eastern bloc.

Rapprochement with the Portuguese and rapidly cooling relations with nationalists like Roberto led to a reconsideration of American policy, encouraged by less sympathetic

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[298] Telegram, Leopoldville to Secstate, 30 December 1963, Box 3815, CFP 1963, Rg 59, NARA.
[299] Letter, Ian Gilchrist to Dorothy Stoneman, 21 October 1963, Box 79, ACOA Papers, ARC.
[300] Quoted in Schneidman, 49.

members of the State Department like Ball and the European Bureau. The widespread African support to the FNLA represented by the OAU Liberation Committee decision to back it over the MPLA seemed to have emboldened Roberto, who now adopted a more aggressive rhetoric – not just in terms of the United States, but the larger struggle overall. American diplomats began hearing reports that Roberto was threatening to drive the Portuguese from the country, while also criticizing the "mestiço" MPLA.[301] Though skeptical of some information, they nonetheless worried that such pronouncements did "not jibe with impression that US policy seeks to create [of] reasonable Negro leadership willing to negotiate and recognition of continued Portuguese Mission in Africa."[302] With Roberto beginning to drift slightly from his original pro-Western stance and the new realization that the MPLA – with its Portuguese contacts – might actually be more likely to negotiate, Rusk actually ordered foreign diplomats not to choose between the movements in favor of waiting to see how the "fast-moving" situation played out.[303] While hoping to remain on good grounds with both parties, the reality is that the United States was gradually distancing itself without cutting ties to Roberto, who it was coming to see as more independent and anti-Portuguese than served American purposes. Nationalists like Roberto had only ever been part of the solution, but now they could be potential liabilities as the Americans sought to work more cooperatively with the *Estado Novo*. The Kennedy

[301] While some reports were likely exaggerated or even fabricated, there is evidence that Roberto and the FNLA regularly disparaged the MPLA along racial lines and adopted a more aggressive approach to Portugal, especially once Savimbi began to represent the party abroad. See letter, Jonas Svimbi to Mr. Okuma, 12 September 1961, Box 11, RG 8, NCC, PHS.
[302] Telegram, Luanda to Secstate, 30 July 1963, Box 3815, CFP 1963, RG 59, NARA.
[303] Telegram, Secstate to Leopoldville, 16 July 1963, Box 3815, CFP 1963, RG 59, NARA.

administration had changed tactics, with the president personally admitting to Nogueira that his government's actions in 1961 had been "precipitous."[304] The current approach was to work with European powers like Portugal, rather than compelling moves toward self-determination through the UN or directly aiding African nationalists.[305]

The limitations Kennedy placed on assistance to moderate nationalists is perhaps best exemplified by the experience of Eduardo Mondlane. Outwardly westernized, highly educated, and judicious in his rhetoric, the American-trained Mondlane was the model revolutionary from the American perspective. While in the United States he had established connections with officials in New York and Washington, with the State Department producing a praiseworthy profile of Mondlane while he taught at Syracuse.[306] His relations with American government officials were sufficiently close that he gave them warning of his plans to return to Mozambique to become involved in the liberation movement, assuring them just months before his election as FRELIMO president that he remained committed and indeed hopeful of a negotiated transition of power.[307] It was therefore no surprise that when Mondlane returned to the United States in 1963 seeking government assistance for FRELIMO's educational and medical efforts operating in Tanzania, he was granted an

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[304] Quoted in Schneidman, 52.

[305] Memcon, Rusk, Camile Alliali, et. al. 22 October 1963, Part III of IV, Box 3816, CFP 1963, RG 59, NARA. As Rusk explained, "we felt that the best place to exert our influence was in the capitals of the countries involved," in this case meaning Lisbon and Pretoria. Rusk said recent American actions were "a reflection of our desire to maintain our influence not only at the United Nations but directly in Lisbon."

[306] "African Educators Lecture in America," *African Students' Outlook on America*, June 1962 reproduced in Index, José Manuel Duarte de Jesus, *Eduardo Mondlane: Um Homem A Abater* (Lisbon: Almedina, 2010), 451-452.

[307] Memcom, Edurdo Mondlane with Robert Stephens and Charles W. Grover, 8 February 1962, Box 1814, CDF 60-63, RG 59, NARA. (NARA 8-10 I 323)

audience with Attorney General Robert Kennedy. The fact that the meeting was not with the president or a member of the State Department demonstrated the distance the administration was keeping from the nationalists, but it likely worked in Mondlane's favor. The younger Kennedy was enthusiastic, praising Mondlane as "a terrifically impressive fellow."[308] Here was an opportunity to reinforce American linkages to nationalists who had not yet taken up arms against Portugal.

The president was interested in working with Mondlane but hesitated to make a serious commitment to the nationalist cause. According to John Marcum, Mondlane asked for more than just funding, urging the United States to move "to the forefront in this struggle for freedom."[309] Kennedy agreed FRELIMO deserved assistance in its social efforts among the refugees, but he balked at taking a public stand at the issue – especially when Mozambique remained a non-issue. The president and secretary of state also wanted to keep a clear distance from donations to even the most mundane refugee causes, requesting funds be funneled through third parties.[310] A short time later, FRELIMO's request for $100,000 from the Ford Foundation was granted, which was likely the result of unofficial government requests to the foundation's director, former diplomat and Kennedy adviser John McCloy.[311] Administered officially through the African-American Institute,

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[308] Kennedy Dictabelts Conversation, 18B.3, Miller Center, http://millercenter.org/presidentialrecordings.
[309] Quoted in John Marcum, "The Politics of Indifference: Portugal and Africa, A Case Study in American Foreign Policy," *Issue* 2:3 (Autumn 1972), 11.
[310] Kennedy Dictabelts 18B.3.
[311] The $100,000 was the total sum discussed by the Kennedys in the earlier recording, in which Bobby specifically mentioned discussions with the Ford Foundation. It was provided to Mondlane by the Ford Foundation through the auspices of the African-American Institute. Schneidman claims on the basis of a confidential interview that an additional $60,000 was provided to Mondlane by the CIA through the AAI, but it is unclear if this payment occurred or if it was specifically directed to FRELIMO. See Request no.

the money helped establish the Mozambique Institute in Tanzania under the direction of Mondlane's white American wife Janet; it initially provided education to Mozambican refugees on behalf of FRELIMO, but later expanded to incorporate a number of medical and social services.[312] It did not commit the American government to supporting the nationalist cause nor seriously increase political or economic pressure on Portugal. By outsourcing aid to FRELIMO and insulating the administration from Portuguese accusations through various third parties, Kennedy elided the question of self-determination at the international level. To Mondlane, the silence was as good as supporting Portugal.

Mondlane was deeply troubled by the weak American response. Though appreciative of the financial aid, the FRELIMO president realized that a successful turn to self-determination – negotiated or taken by force – would necessarily demand a weakening of the relative power held by Portugal over its colonies. It was clear from his interactions with American officials that the United States, and the wider NATO alliance, would not participate in this process – whatever their previous public pronouncements. Only months after meeting with Bobby Kennedy, Mondlane expressed to ACOA's Houser FRELIMO's "great disappointment with the position of [the U.S.] government in relation to Portugal," noting that even Soapy Williams had adopted an increasingly uncritical public approach to

OD 1252G, 27 May 1963 and Program Action File L62-1404, Grant File PA no. 63425, Records of the Ford Foundation, Rockefeller Archives (Sleep Hollow, NY).

[312] Nadja Manghezi, *Meu Coração Está nas Maos de um Negro: Uma História da Vida de Janet Mondlane* (Maputo: Centros de Estudos Africanos, 1999), 237-239; FRELIMO, *The Mozambique Institute* (Dar es Salaam: FRELIMO, June 1967), 3-5.

Lisbon.[313] Publicly, the FRELIMO head was even more frustrated with the "anti-African" position of the NATO countries. "All along these powers have been expressing their sympathies for the rights of self-determination of the colonial peoples of Africa, but when occasion was offered for demonstrating this in a concrete form they balked," Mondlane complained to a U.S audience, "It is reprehensible that such great powers as the United States, Great Britain and France, hide behind a screen of pretty words when they should be taking positive action in support of the people's struggle for freedom."[314]

It was not just the nationalists who felt that the Kennedy administration had failed to live up to its initial promise. American activists from the churches and ACOA were equally distressed by the direction of American policy, which had visibly retreated to the status quo since early 1962. Attempts to reverse this momentum had met with little success. Sympathetic officials from the African Bureau were finding themselves increasingly marginalized within policymaking circles, while senior advisers like Rusk offered lip service to anti-colonial efforts in the United States but little else. Nationalist frustrations as well as Ball's approach to Salazar worried ACOA that Kennedy's forthright anti-colonial position was all but lost.[315] Increasingly, Houser began focusing his efforts less on the executive branch that had seemed most promising in 1961 and more on the Congress, where he faced the difficult task of overcoming Portugal's successful efforts in wooing ardent Cold Warriors. However difficult the task, Houser thought this would be the most

[313] Letter, Eduardo Mondlane to George Houser, 3 September 1963, Folder 38, Box 142, ACOA Papers, ARC.
[314] FRELIMO, press conference, 3 September 1963, Box 142, ACOA Papers, ARC.
[315] Letter, Houser to Ian Gilchrist, 3 September 1963, Box 79, ACOA Papers, ARC.

likely source of pressure to move Kennedy and Rusk in bolder directions.[316] But despite this change in tactics, the reality was that Portugal's careful diplomacy had effectively quieted the empire's most ardent critic in the Western world. Houser admitted before Kennedy's death that he did "not feel very encouraged by conversations I have had [in Washington]."[317] Just over a year later, the generally optimistic secretary for ACOA had become sufficiently disillusioned to advise his African friends that it might be prudent to save their resources rather than traveling to Washington, since the likelihood of successfully lobbying the government was almost nil.[318] That ACOA, which had worked for a decade to connect African nationalists with American officials, was giving up hope provided a testament to just how rapidly and completely the American government had abandoned its earlier policy.

After 1961, Kennedy played a double game that sought to publicly maintain relations with Portugal while very quietly courting the nationalists, but the policy truly satisfied neither party. While scholarly advocates of Kennedy's Third World policies have blamed Lyndon Johnson for the defection of sympathetic nationalists, the reality is that many had become disillusioned before Kennedy's death.[319] Kennedy's attempt to play a double game failed to achieve full cooperation with Portugal on a host of issues and slowly

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316 Letter, Houser to Roberto, 1 April 1963, Box 79, ACOA Papers, ARC.
317 Letter, Houser to Mondlane, 23 September 1963, Box 142, ACOA Papers, ARC.
318 Letter, Houser to Ian Gilchrist, 4 January 1965, Box 79, ACOA Papers, ARC.
319 Robert Rakove contends Johnson "departed substantially from Kennedy's approach" to the Third World, while Phillip Muehlenbeck says the "American attitude in regard to Africa seemed to change overnight after Kennedy's death. Neither are wholly wrong, but they underestimate the extent to which Kennedy had already begun backtracking from his own policies, and what effects this had in Africa. Rakove, XXV, Muehlenbeck, 231.

alienated the revolutionaries, who increasingly saw armed revolution as the only solution to the impasse.[320] Well before Kennedy's assassination, Amílcar Cabral's PAIGC launched its own military revolution against Portugal in Guinea-Bissau, followed just over a year later by FRELIMO's infiltration of Mozambique from Tanzania in September of 1964. The military struggles left little room for negotiated settlement. The CONCP parties would take advantage of military assistance from African and Eastern European states, while undermining Portugal's war effort through continued calls for Western governments to economically and politically isolate the NATO member. This would be the most efficient way to defeat the *Estado Novo* – empowering the nationalist movements while weakening the empire. If the Euro-American alliance continued to aid Portugal, the nationalists would fight until the West lined up on what they considered the right side of history.

ACOA and the Unfulfilled Promise of Pan-African Solidarity

Civil society groups struggled to arrest the drift of their government and contribute to the anti-colonial cause in what ways they could. They sought to replicate the grassroots pressure for Western action against Portugal that had peaked during the summer of 1961 during a period when no crisis existed. This proved difficult as Portuguese Africa disappeared from the papers and there were few victories or atrocities with which to motivate activity. ACOA's primary hope during this period was to link anti-colonialism to the idea of transnational Pan-Africanism, marshalling the collective voice of U.S. blacks

[320] Amílcar Cabral's PAIGC had never seriously courted the United States after its gambit in Britain achieved little, while a brief visit by the MPLA's Neto to the United States in 1962 had met with little success.

to sway a democratic president dependent on their vote for reelection. The assumption that African Americans had keen interest in events on the continent was a simplistic one recently popular among white politicians, but there was a certain truth. Over the previous decades, blacks had experienced moments of intense interest in the continent. Martin Luther King had become fond of citing decolonization as a source of momentum that fed the Civil Rights Movement, and a number of radical young blacks had disrupted the UN after the murder of the Congo's Patrice Lumumba in 1960. Many still remembered the popular furor at the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935. Such displays of solidarity had often been spontaneous; none had ever formed into a truly cohesive movement after World War II, certainly not on the scale of the Civil Rights Movement operating in the 1960s. ACOA's desire to harness the power of the grassroots campaign for equal rights in the United States and link it with anti-colonialism would be a difficult one, made only more challenging by the divisions in Angola that prevented its revolutionary policies from finding a unity of their own.

ACOA had to try, though. After 1961, the anti-colonial organization and its religious and liberal allies did their best to aid the liberation movements, but they did so on a small scale with decreasing returns. ACOA worked in vain alongside American missionaries like Malcolm McVeigh to keep the Portuguese colonial plight in the public eye, despite waning press attention. Mostly they provided limited humanitarian relief. In January 1962, George Houser and John Marcum crossed the Congo border into northern Angola to deliver medicine and supplies bought with funds raised since the beginning of the armed struggle. Upon their return they issued a number of statements and reports,

launching a sustained campaign to raise funds and material aid for Angolan refugees in the Congo (with some material likely crossing over into the shrinking rebel-held territories of Angola).[321] ACOA worked especially closely with the UPA/FNLA's medical wing, the Serviço de Assistência aos Reugiados de Angola (The Angolan Refugee Assistance Service, or SARA). Houser and Marcum carried with them the first shipment in a series of humanitarian contributions to the Angolan struggle for independence, with additional material and transportation provided in coordination with Protestant and Catholic relief agencies.[322] ACOA also helped facilitate the visitation of skilled doctors and a donation of $5,000 worth of drugs from the AFL-CIO, which may have also reflected the desires of the Kennedy administration that some assistance finds its way to Angolan refugees in the Congo.[323] Though ACOA's ability to fundraise for aid would decline as Portuguese Africa continued to recede from the popular conscious, avenues for assistance established through religious services would remain open for much of the decade.[324] These efforts, however, did little to isolate Portugal.

The American anti-colonial movement needed a way to demonstrate to the government that there was a true popular interest in the case of Portuguese and southern Africa that stretched beyond the small leadership circles of ACOA and the religious groups. Participaion by liberal organized labor groups moved in this direction, but what ACOA

[321] The Emergency Relief for Angola drive distributed 115,000 brochures and raise enough to fund the work of a Western doctor in the Congo. ACOA, 1962 Report (New Yok: 1963) and Houser and Marcum, Joint Press Statement, Overseas Press Club of New York, 1 February 1962, AAA.
[322] Letter, Houser to Jose J. Lihuaca, 5 March 1962, Box 79, ACOA Papers, ARC.
[323] Letter, Robert to Houser, 16 June 1962, ibid.
[324] Letter, Malcolm McVeigh to Houser, 25 March 1966, ibid.

and indeed the nationalists had always desired was a grassroots movement. Fortunately for Houser, there already existed a mass movement dedicated to ideas of global equality in the Civil Rights Movement, and key leaders such as Martin Luther King Jr. had connections to ACOA. Scholars such as Jim Meriwether and Brenda Gayle Plummer have documented how successful decolonization fueled a growth in black American interest in Africa, which Houser and others hoped to harness to pressure the government into supporting Lusophone liberation.[325] Portugal had in fact been greatly concerned about the possibility of merging civil rights and anti-colonialism in the United States, and it had devoted resources into courting the black public – notably winning over George Schuyler and the anti-communist Max Yergan. Lisbon was equally happy with silence, and had even greater success convincing the American public that the situation in its colonies was too complex for a simple reaction based on a vague shared identity. This strategy quieted enough critics that Roberto complained about Portugal's "grandiose propaganda machine" and its surprising ability to silence black newsmen.[326] Despite this success, legitimate concern remained. As late as 1963, Selvage and Lee advised Portugal that the "attitude of black American leaders" represented the greatest danger to improving relations with the United States, especially with the inveterate politician Johnson assuming the presidency with an eye toward reelection.[327]

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[325] See Meriwether, chapters 5-6. Plummer argues that "the African vista presented . . . an alternative to white nationalism and its political agendas," though less radical leaders had trouble crafting a viewpoint beyond that neatly defined by the American states. Plummer, In Search of Power, 344.

[326] American Negro Press, "Angolan Leader Says Negro Newsmen Selling Out," *Atlanta Daily World*, 31 December 1961.

[327] Author's translation. Memo, Ponto de Vista relativo a Portugal, from Washington, Selvage and Lee, 25 November 1963, pasta 40, Box 413, NE-21, Antonio Salazar Archive, Torre do Tombo (Lisbon, Portugal).

The domestic political potential of a Pan-African commitment to anti-colonialism is exactly what ACOA hoped to realize when it helped organize the American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa (ANLCA) in the fall of 1962. A. Phillip Randolph, James Baldwin, James Farmer and Bayard Rustin all sat on the board of ACOA. Randolph in particular believed that the African American leadership should expand the movement for civil rights into a transnational struggle for global equality by taking a forthright position on the necessity of rapid decolonization. With Houser's assistance, he pushed for a major convocation to outline a black agenda for foreign policy. This gathering of minds would address Angola and its sister colonies, while also calling for an American policy that would isolate South Africa and advance discussions on self-rule in Southern Rhodesia. The stated goal of the ANLCA was to "activize (sic) the political influence of America's 19 million Negro citizens on their government's role in the councils of the United Nations and other diplomatic channels on the critical areas of Sub- Sahara Africa."[328] The participants who gathered at Arden House on the campus of Columbia University in late November were a practical listing of the Who's Who of the Civil Rights Movement and black leadership more broadly, assembling more than 100 participants including conveners Randolph, Farmer, Martin Luther King Jr., Whitney Young of the Urban League, and Dorothy Height of the National Council of Negro Women. Experts from across the country submitted dozens of reports on the challenges of decolonization and development in Africa. ACOA's John Marcum provided the paper on Angola, and Eduardo Mondlane – recently elected

[328] "Press Release," American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa, 4 September 1962, African Activist Archive, Michigan State University. Available: http://africanactivist.msu.edu/index.php. Hereafter AAA.

president of FRELIMO – offered another on Mozambique, though a national press still unfamiliar with the revolutionary reported his contribution to be on Kenya.[329] The FNLA also sent a delegation to act as observers.[330]

The gathering of so many people of African heritage to discuss African liberation and development illustrated a widespread interest in the topic and the possibility of concerted political action. Some present, like the labor activist Randolph, urged the creation of a political front dedicated to articulating black demands as part of a single transnational project. This could force the U.S. government to take decolonization as seriously as domestic civil rights. As a first step, Randolph counseled black Americans to articulate clearly "the meaning of Africa to them," so that they could "be informed, awakened, aroused, and mobilized to protest, demonstrate, and march for African freedom." Randolph wanted to develop concrete initiatives that would communicate a popular solidarity with an Africa still suffering under colonialism and racial repression, even proposing a major labor strike to protest apartheid.[331] Mondlane lent support to these more vigorous initiatives, advising black Americans to stop "acting within the acceptable lines, typical of the American bourgeois."[332] Though Randolph shared Mondlane's view that the struggles for domestic equality and global self-determination were inextricably linked, his proposals captured a tension. African Americans remained poorly informed about events on the continent, and there was no consensus as to what a newly rediscovered

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329 "Call 100 Top Leaders to 3-Day Summit Meet," Chicago Daily Defender, 19 November 1962.
330 ANLCA, "Resolutions," 13 December 1961, List of Participants, AAA.
331 AP, "U.S. Negroes Urged to Back Africa," Christian Science Monitor, 24 November 1962.
332 Mondlane, "The American Negro and the Struggle for Independence in Portuguese Africa," quoted in Daniel H. Watts, "American Leadership Conference on Africa," *Liberator*, Vol III, 1 (January 1963), 14.

African identity meant on a daily basis or how it fit with the civil rights goal of full participation in U.S. society. Over the coming years, Pan-African identifiers like "black" and "African American" would replace "negro," but what did such transition in identity mean in practical political terms? As one black paper explained in the wake of the ANLCA, "only the stupid will declare that they 'ain't lost nothing in Africa," but the next step beyond this most basic identification was less clear cut.[333]

It was in this confusion about identity and action that the stultifying power of the Cold War proved dominant. Rather than accepting Randolph's challenge to contemplate their obligations to an ancestral continent, more ANLCA attendees agreed with Roy Wilkins, the head of the NAACP and keynote speaker, who warned that "In developing this activity, we should not relax our prime effort to achieve our proper place in our own country." Wilkins believed, like many well-intentioned Americans before him, that aiding Africa would arise as a natural consequence of gaining equality in the United States. Therefore, his demands focused more on the need for black participation in the diplomatic corps, an international extension of the equal hiring practices demanded by the Civil Rights Movement. Once fully integrated into domestic society and the policymaking establishment, blacks could guide the tiller of state in a parallel course with moderate African self-determination. No displays of international solidarity could prove more effective, despite the more strident proposals offered by Randolph and Mondlane.[334] Here

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[333] "Tremendous Opportunities in Africa for Those of Great Vision, Stout Hearts," *Philadelphia Tribune*, 8 December 1962.
[334] Ibid.

in microcosm was the division between African Americans in the early 1960s. Randolph's more radical solidarity with Africans as equals positioned itself against an internationalized, integrationist reading of the Talented Tenth, where black *Americans* would help their continental brothers after carving out a place in a more equalized society. These two conflicting visions of Pan-African identity – one focused on direct action with a sense of single struggle, the other one more elite-based and intent on working with the executive branch to cooperatively change American policy in Africa – hampered the growth of an effective solidarity movement. With no clear understanding of their relation to the continent, African Americans could not agree on a clear political agenda.

Hemmed in by Cold War definitions of Americanism and focused primarily on guaranteeing civil rights, the less ambitious form of cooperation championed by Wilkins won the day for the time being. The ANLCA's conclusions proved circumscribed. They eschewed Randolph's calls for further exploring a transnational identity and engaging in mass protest, instead requesting the American government to act on behalf of the African American community on the world stage.[335] The conclusions on Portuguese Africa are illustrative of the overall program. The conference recognized the need for self-determination, but avoided the question of armed revolution. It encouraged the Kennedy administration to end shipments of military equipment to Portugal (mostly affirming existing policy), but said little about the continuing inflow of arms and aid through NATO. It made no requests for political assistance to the liberation movements beyond non-

[335] This prescription had perhaps been preordained given the name of the conference, "The Role of the Negro Community in United States Policy Toward Africa" – itself a reflection of the relative caution of prominent leaders like King, Wilkins, and Young.

governmental humanitarian relief. Nowhere either were there calls for African Americans to expand contacts with the liberation leaders, despite the fact that Roberto and Mondlane were present and desired greater exchanges.[336] These results in many ways confirm the positions of Brenda Gayle Plummer and Penny Von Eschen, who have noted that Cold War conformity and an emphasis on winning support for the Civil Rights Movement greatly weakened elite black internationalism.[337] This reality was not lost on attendees, with one participant lamenting:

> if our brothers and sisters in Africa are waiting or depending on the American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa for aid and support, they might just as well make their peace with [Prime Minister of South Africa Henrik] Verwoerd, [Prime Minister of Portugal Antonio] Salazar, and [Prime Minister of Rhodesia Roy] Welensky.[338]

The moderation inherent in the ANLCA did little to advance the domestic anti-colonial movement, remaining firmly within the realm of acceptable and loyal action defined by Cold War American culture.

The ANLCA remained the most prominent demonstration of African American interest in Africa for the rest of the decade, but it would never overcome the limitations placed on it by its cautious leadership. It met rarely and accomplished little. For these elite actors involved with the Civil Rights Movement, the international struggle would benefit most from their full integration into society. Any attempts to push the liberal Cold War

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[336] ANLCA, "Resolutions," 13 December 1961, Section V, AAA.

[337] Von Eschen, 3. Plummer offers a more nuanced approach, seeing the elite advocates of narrow civil rights as diverging from popular black opinion. Plummer, Rising Wind, 304.

[338] Daniel H. Watts, "American Leadership Conference on Africa," Liberator, Vol III, 1 (January 1963), 14. Watts began the article quoting Eduardo Mondlane's criticism of the African leadership for not fully integrating the civil rights struggle into the larger anti-imperial struggle.

envelope could undermine the necessary domestic achievements. As a result, the next meetings in 1964 and 1967 produced additional lukewarm calls for governmental action even as the majority of African Americans became ever more disillusioned with both American foreign policy and the government's willingness to advance real equality.[339] At the third ANLCA, Eduardo Mondlane complained that the anti-colonial cause had weakened in the United States. African Americans had failed to keep pace with many Southern legislators sympathetic to the white minority regimes of southern Africa who "contribute a great deal to the strength and power of the Portuguese."[340] By that point, the very future of the ANLCA – what George Houser called disappointingly a "part time operation" – stood in doubt.[341] The civil rights leaders had missed an opportunity. During the mid-1960s when their influence was at its height, leaders like King, Wilkins, and others had been "too preoccupied by their own civil rights movement to pay much attention to Africa's."[342] By the late 1960s, their time had passed, replaced by a younger generation of militant Black Power activists who understood African liberation as the core of a domestic movement, and were gradually organizing to support the Portuguese African cause (see

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339 Randolph, generally known as one of the more radical leaders of the Civil Rights movement, praised Lyndon Johnson for his leadership in Africa during a time when most Africans had grown disaffected with the American government due in part to its slow rapprochement with both South Africa and Portugal as well as its toothless criticism of Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence. See A. Phillip Randolph, Address to the Third Biennial Conference of the American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa, 26 January 1967, AAA.

340 While Mondlane did not directly identify the "people on the other side," an African American working on Capitol Hill defined them as "Southern legislators with an 'empathy' for the white Governments of Rhodesia, the Portuguese territories, and South Africa." Joseph R. L. Sterne, "American Negro Leaders Urge Aid to Black Africa," *The Sun,* 29 January 1967.

341 George Houser, Memorandum on American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa, March 1967, AAA.

342 Sterne, "American Negro Leaders Urge Aid to Black Africa."

chapter 5). Portugal, however, had delayed this grassroots organizing for years, and the moderate African American leadership that had the ear of multiple presidents had chosen not to spend valuable political capital. The pursuit of domestic equality within the Cold War United States had simply taken precedence over continental liberation.

The impotence of the ANLCA was the major reason American policy was allowed to drift toward a closer embrace of Portugal, but it was just one instance of the failure of Pan-African unity. Equally important in allowing the United States to retreat from its position of 1961 was the wholesale collapse of the Angolan rebellion due to deep nationalist divisions, which also threatened the dedication of the nascent solidarity movement. By 1962, most interested Americans knew the FNLA was not the only anti-colonial movement in Angola. Agostinho Neto visited the United States in the fall of that year, making contact with George Houser via Methodist Bishop Ralph Dodge and likely engaging in discreet discussions with government officials.[343] Despite Neto's past communist affiliations and strong socialist program for an independent Angola, he sincerely wished to gain political and material assistance from the United States – both its government and its people. Neto wanted to maintain an independent foreign policy even as he began receiving military aid from the Soviet Union, and he believed working with Western countries was a way of balancing Cold War rivalries. Ideology mattered a great deal domestically, but less so on the international stage so long as allies were committed to the independence of Angola. As one MPLA member later explained, "One of the

[343] Letter, Houser to Neto, 2 October 1962, Box 79, ACOA Papers, ARC. Government documents from 1963 note a positive impression of Neto that contributed to the growing rift with Roberto.

principles guiding our relations with other countries and political organizations is that each one respect the other's independence and right to follow the road suitable for the defence of the interests of their respective peoples."[344] This line was an important element of CONCP internationalism, already accepted by ACOA and religious activists to a certain extent in their work with Mondlane and FRELIMO.

But MPLA initiatives did not reproduce the working relationship with ACOA that Roberto had developed. While Houser responded positively to Neto's initiation overtures by offering his assistance at the UN, there remained a hesitance to commit the organization to seriously aiding the more leftist organization. Houser repeatedly stressed the need for unity while doing his best to avoid ACOA intervening in what he viewed rightly as an African debate. Eventually, he pledged the committee to respect the party favored by the OAU after its formation in 1963.[345] In reality, ACOA continuously favored the FNLA for most of the 1960s even after doubts had begun to grow in the United States and among African countries about Roberto's leadership. ACOA sent almost no material aid to the MPLA until 1969 and had very little contact with Neto or other party leaders after 1962.[346] Admittedly, MPLA activities were limited by poor relations with the Congolese government and difficulties gaining access to Angola, but after 1962 FNLA operations were also minimal. The Portuguese pacification of Angola meant neither party could seriously claim to be the leading nationalist movement. Rather, ACOA's longtime

[344] António Alberto Neto, "Report from the MPLA to the Lund Conference," April 1972 Folder 3, Committee for Freedom in Mozambiqe, Angola, and Guinea, Bishopsgate Institute (London, England).
[345] Letter, Houser to Neto, 2 October 1962, Box 79, ACOA Papers, ARC.
[346] Letter, Neto to Houser, 30 May 1969, Ibid.

preference for Roberto relied on a long relationship of friendship and mutual trust, though Houser could not deny that Cold War considerations may have played some role in the decision.[347] Whatever the causes, the decision by ACOA and most American organizations to remain loyal to the FNLA would greatly complicate efforts to aid the cause of Angolan independence.

For at the same time irregular ANLCA meetings were failing to sway government opinion, the FNLA's revolution was suffering a slow collapse under the poor leadership of Roberto. The FNLA declaration of the government-in-exile had been a bold move, but it was unable to parley this into military or international success. Attempts to find common ground between the MPLA and FNLA were equally unsuccessful. Both sides harbored deep suspicions of the other, and Roberto feared he would be unable to maintain control over the resulting union. A war of words broke out, with the FNLA criticizing its competitor for being mestiço dominated, while the MPLA dismissed Roberto as an ethnocentric racist. It had been this exchange that disturbed American diplomats, leading to a cooling of relations with Roberto. Relegated to the margins of Angola by the successful Portuguese pacification, verbal sniping devolved into violent confrontations that reinforced existing animosities. Intraparty intrigue followed soon after. One MPLA faction under party founder Viriato da Cruz defected for the FNLA after the Congolese recognition of the exile government, which Marcum partially attributes to a rejection of Neto and the predominately mestiço leadership.[348] A badly beaten MPLA fled Leopoldville across the

[347] Letter, Houser to Roberto, 19 July 1965, ibid.; Houser interview.
[348] Marcum, Vol II, 90.

river to Brazzaville in the Republic of the Congo, where the party gradually rebuilt its strength. The period of troubles had temporarily weakened the MPLA, but it did little to aid the long-term prospects of the FNLA.[349] Only Portugal claimed victory, using the situation to justify their continued control of their most valuable colony.

Soon the FNLA faced its own crisis of leadership. Though it had greatly diversified its base membership, the party remained dominated by a small cadre of French-speaking Bakongo nationalists loyal to Roberto. Those identifying with other ethnicities and regions of Angola often felt marginalized, most notably the European-trained minister of foreign affairs, Jonas Savimbi. Savimbi had been born in the Ovimbundu region of southern Angola and received his education through Protestant missions. Well-spoken and charming, if also sometimes overbearing, Savimbi had received his senior position in the exile government as a symbol of the FNLA's claim to represent all Angola. He became a key component of the FNLA's international strategy – notably building an affinity for Maoist China when Roberto considered engaging with the Marxist state.[350] But when Roberto continued to appoint corrupt Bakongo allies in regions populated by Ovimbundu refugees, tensions rose that allowed Savimbi to build an independent base of support within the exile government. Seeing such actions as treasonous, Roberto moved to consolidate his personal power by removing disloyal followers. Savimbi and a number of other senior FNLA officers proactively fled the party, accusing Roberto of dictatorial and insufficiently

[349] For an overview of this period, see Guimarães, 62-63, 66; Marcum Vol II, chapter 2.
[350] Fernando, 68-73; Fred Bridgeland, Jonas Savimbi: A Key to Africa (New York: Paragon House, 1987), 58-9; Letter, Ian Gilchrist to Houser, 22 January 1964, and letter, Gilchrist to Houser, 3 January 1964, Box 79, ACOA Papers, ARC.

revolutionary politics.[351] While Savimbi toyed with joining the MPLA, he eventually decided to form the *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* (The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, or UNITA) around an Ovimbundu core and with Chinese aid in March 1966.[352] Though the Zambia-based UNITA was the weakest and most militarily unsuccessful of the three major parties, its formation further splintered the already chaotic Angolan nationalist movement.

The CIA seems to have kept Roberto on its payroll for informational purposes, but by the time of Savimbi's defection the U.S. government had limited contacts with the nationalists. ACOA was the primary organization aiding the FNLA by this point, and it found itself pulled into the internal conflicts despite Houser's best efforts to stay above the fray. In addition to Savimbi, Roberto was deeply suspicious of the internationally well-connected SARA medical branch, which included the Canadian physician Ian Gilchrist. Dr. Gilchrist was an ardent proponent of the nationalist cause, having developed a strong commitment to African independence during a childhood spent in the Congo. Sponsored by ACOA to work with the FNLA beginning in 1963, Gilchrist offered Houser a firsthand look at Roberto's loss of control and the collapse of the once-promising movement.[353] When the head of SARA joined Savimbi and a number of others in fleeing the party, Gilchrest began to worry for his own safety. As he finally prepared to leave, the physician

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[351] Fernando, 79.

[352] Guimarães, 78-79; Fernando, 80-83.

[353] At one point. Gilchrist wrote that Roberto was effectively holding his family as leverage in the Congo by purposely losing their passports, while also complaining Roberto spent money on parties instead of feeding or clothing Angolan troops and refugees. Letter, Gilchrist to Houser, 14 March 1964, Box 79, ACOA Papers, ARC.

warned Houser that the FNLA had become a party of "bandits, thieves, and scoundrels" and Roberto no longer represented the Angolan people.[354] These events did not convince ACOA to immediately abandon the FNLA, but they revealed to many within the organization and in related missionary circles the underlying flaws of Roberto's organizations. The nationalist movement in the most important and visible of Portugal's colonies was irreparably broken. Despite years of effort, Roberto was incapable of formulating a Pan-African Angolan identity that could unite the country across ethnic lines. Not only was he unable and unwilling to unite with the MPLA, but now his own party had splintered. With both foreign governments and civil society groups looking to Angola to measure the health of the Portuguese empire, the disintegration of the revolution effectively confirmed Lisbon's claim to continued sovereignty in its overseas territories.

The disintegration of the FNLA seriously damaged relations with international supporters from which the party would never fully recover. Political purges effectively gutted SARA to the point that the Red Cross ended the refugee assistance it had provided since 1961, which had been among the most important sources of foreign aid.[355] It also produced a radio silence between Roberto and his American allies that lasted two years.[356] When Roberto finally reappeared, Houser maintained the relationship with the FNLA because he believed "There is no alternative," but he was finding it harder to defend his old friend.[357] As the decade progressed, many of the party's international allies outside of

[354] Letter, Gilchrist to Houser, 19 September 1964 and letter, Gilchrist to Houser, early November 1964, Box 79, ACOA Papers, ARC.
[355] Letter, Gilbert Jonas to Roberto, 16 October 1964,Box 79, ACOA Papers, ARC.
[356] letter, Roberto to House, 25 March 1966, Box 79, ACOA Papers, ARC.
[357] Letter, Houser to Gilchrist, no date [July or August 1964), Box 79, ACOA Papers, ARC.

the Congo disappeared. Arguably the most important, the OAU, recognized the MPLA alongside its faltering rival in 1964, steadily increasing contributions to the leftist party over the decade. In Brazzaville, the MPLA rebuilt itself on a less ambiguous commitment to Marxism and the socialist bloc, which helped arm a small but effective military group active in Angola's oil rich enclave of Cabinda. By 1968, the FNLA received no funds from the OAU, and three years later the African organization withdrew its recognition of the GRAE as Angola's government in exile.[358] Roberto's professed anti-communism had done much to win him friends abroad, but it could not hold together a multi-ethnic movement that chafed at his authoritarian leadership and Bakongo nepotism. A decade after it had commanded global headlines, the FNLA was the rump party behind a shell government almost wholly dependent on the Congo for its continued existence.

The potential of Pan-Africanism had shown its limitations both in the United States and Angola. The limitations of black American identification with revolutionary Africa were laid bare at the ANLCA, even as events in Angola – the country best positioned to advance the winds of change – demonstrated just how difficult it was to achieve real unity. The dramatic collapse of the revolution in Portugal's largest and most visible colony robbed ACOA and the nascent solidarity movement of a centerpiece for its campaigns, hampering organization and educational efforts as much if not more than the Cold War caution displayed by initially promising initiatives like the ANLCA. In the United States, as in Britain before it, solidarity with Portuguese African liberation receded to the

[358] Guimarães, 73-75. For more on the internal ACOA debate over Roberto, see chapter 4. As foreign ministers, Savimbi had been important in gaining OAU support and his exit hurt perceptions of the FNLA.

background during a period when the West's most powerful governments were embracing imperial Portugal.

Southern Africa Threatens the Cold War

The absence of a strong domestic commitment to liberation and the end of the Angolan crisis allowed the Western powers a freer hand in their relations with Portugal. They could be deliberate, but also now had the luxury of indifference, ignoring the issue of Lusophone decolonization as more pressing matters arose. These two factors would typify the Anglo-American reaction to Portuguese Africa into the 1970s. Kennedy's retreat had largely set the stage for this state of affairs. The Johnson administration continued to follow the Bowles Plan in wooing Portugal toward greater reform, but the State Department was unwilling to invest either serious resources or prestige into a new initiative if Salazar remained difficult.[359] There was little reason to do so considering American calculations of Portuguese strength in its colonies. The likelihood of a worthwhile payoff for the additional pressure, either political or strategic, was simply too small. The collapse of the nationalist movement in Angola allowed the anti-colonial revolutions to fade from the global agenda, and as Terrence Lyons has famously argued, Johnson had few qualms about

[359] As late as the summer of 1965, Johnson dusted off the Bowles Plan. In exchange for a negotiable timetable for self-determination as mentioned previously, the United States would provide technical and economic support and also encourage NATO allies to do the same. The country would arrange for moderate African states to pledge noninvolvement, while it would condemn those radical countries like Guinea and Congo (Brazzaville) that would likely to continue to support nationalist violence. Portugal still refused. Telegram, State to Lisbon, 9 June 1965, Box 203, Country File, NSF, LBJL.

leaving them there.[360] Portugal provided an element of stability – so much so that when events in sub-Saharan Africa once again demanded attention, the Anglo-American powers would find themselves looking to Lisbon for assistance in managing another crisis.

By 1965, Western policymakers believed Portugal had proved itself to be the only power prepared to govern the areas of Mozambique and Angola. The failure of the 1961 Angolan uprising made American officials increasingly skeptical of the real strength of Portuguese African nationalists. The revolution in tiny Guinea-Bissau was of limited importance; Mozambique demanded only slightly more attention. According to American intelligence reports, FRELIMO's struggle was "limited and ultraclandestine" due to "public apathy," Portuguese power, and the paucity of its trained fighting force. CIA reports quoted Mozambican leader Eduardo Mondale just months earlier describing the war against Portugal as hopeless, and it stressed that the early launch of military operations may well be a desperate bid to return international attention to Lusophone Africa in light of recent events in Angola.[361] In contrast to such official dismissals of the nationalist movements as weak, intelligence analysts commented on the "unexpected" and "surprising" health of the Portuguese economy, the stability of Salazar's regime, and the effective Portuguese pacification of the Angolan countryside.[362] The CIA believed that

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[360] Though Lyons exaggerates the Johnson administration's indifference to the continent, it was far from primary in its importance and the president very much desired regional stability as had his predecessor. Terrence Lyons, "Keeping Africa off the Agenda," in *Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World: American Foreign Policy, 1963–1968*, ed. Warren I. Cohen and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 245–78

[361] CIA, "Anti-Portuguese Campaign in Africa Shifts to Mozambique," 18 December 1964, Box 95, Country File, NSF, LBJL.

[362] CIA, "Portuguese Economic Outlook and its Political Implications," 22 May 1964, Box 203, Country File, NSF, LBJL.

nationalists would likely succeed in the long run given increasing support and Portugal's weak settler presence, but it did not believe a nationalist victory would be achievable in the foreseeable future. Since Johnson and his administration still fretted over the possibility of another Congo collapse and the possible spread of such instability, Salazar was the ally of the moment. Change remained necessary, but it would have to wait until Lisbon accepted it.

This trend toward embracing Portugal gained momentum as a new crisis of self-determination threatened Africa – the expansion reactionary white minority governance beyond apartheid South Africa, specifically in the form of an independent, white-led Southern Rhodesia. Since the 1950s, Britain had been trying to solve the problem of the settler state that was surrounded by predominantly African colonies. As John Darwin explained in his seminal work *Britain and Decolonization*, officials in London believed that a continued influence in the region depended on their ability to create a relative peace between the races.[363] A number of schemes had been tried to create a polity that could assuage all parties, but all had failed – most notably the collapse of the Central African Federation. After MacMillan acknowledged the "wind of change," the Conservative government bowed to pressure and granted independence to Nyasaland (Malawi) and Southern Rhodesia (Zambia) in 1964, and began a similar process for its protectorates on the borders of South Africa. The future of Southern Rhodesia remained unsettled, much to the chagrin of the minority government in Salisbury that felt increasingly endangered by

[363] John Darwin, *Britain and Decolonization: The Retreat from Empire in the Postwar World* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1988).

metropolitan plans for the African empire. With negotiations for this final transfer of power going poorly, the British feared throughout much of the early 1960s that Southern Rhodesia might break with Britain to follow its South African neighbor in establishing an independent minority regime.

It was in part the fear of exacerbating racial tensions and undermining plans for the region that had led the British to handle Portugal with kid gloves. South Africa had been actively pursuing new allies in the region, and London diplomats in 1961 were fearful of how African states might react to a formal pact between white minority governments. Such an alliance would not only reinforce Portuguese intransigence, but potentially inspire the declaration of white minority regimes in Angola or Mozambique even if Lisbon accepted through some miracle the necessity of decolonization. Thus, Macmillan had warned Kennedy as early as 1961 about the dangers of pushing Portugal or its colonial constituents "into the arms of South Africa."[364] Any policy that might encourage Angola or Mozambique to adopt apartheid-like policies or form an alliance with South Africa would surely prove, as one contemporary official expressed, "fatal to British hopes of multi-racial co-operation in Africa."[365] Salazar's Lusotropicalism was certainly a myth, but it nonetheless appealed to both British and American officials who were concerned about alternatives"[366] And MacMillan hoped to keep it that way. British policy toward the Salazar

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[364] "Washington Talks." The British Cabinet also voiced these fears privately, explaining that "the Portuguese might be tempted to respond to tentative South African suggestions of establishing an area of white domination." Conclusions of the Cabinet, 25 April 1961, UKNA, CAB/128/35.

[365] Conclusions of the Cabinet, 26 February 1962, 4, UKNA, CAB/128/36.

[366] According to some British officials, the Portuguese problem was "not parallel" to apartheid because there was "no colour bar in A[ngola]." Notebook of Sir Norman Brook, Cabinet Minutes, 6 June 1961, 5, UKNA, CAB/195/19.

regime thus became a delicate matter, as Britain sought reform while avoiding any provocation that might trigger a white settler backlash. This had been a major factor behind British reticence to work with Kennedy after the Angolan rebellion.

The United States had expressed concern about these issues as well, but race issues had been of secondary or tertiary concern. Yet as Britain continued to lose influence in an increasingly independent South Africa and struggled to manage the transfer of power in Southern Rhodesia, concerns about regional race politics crept into Luso-American discussions. The Ball-Salazar letter exchange of 1963, for example, revealed the oft-unspoken American belief that both Angola and Mozambique occupied a special, transitional location between independent Africa and the minority governments. Ball's concern with defining a new order implied that the United States hoped this would be one that would preserve the multi-racial image of Africa championed by Britain and its other Western allies, which also had the best odds of preserving Western interests on the continent. Ball warned that a return to arms in Angola would "perforce become racial. The position of the white man and even the mulatto will become impossible."[367] The nagging potential for a "race war" was clearly undesirable from the American point of view, not least because it would almost certainly invite some level of Cold War intervention.[368] Therefore, a component of the American search for stability had always involved

[367] Draft Letter, Ball to Salazar, 17 October 1963, Box 154B, NSF, JFKL.

[368] Both officials and the public used the terms "race war" and "race conflict" to describe the potential for a regional conflict incited by the white minority regimes and the Portuguese colonies, especially after Rhodesia's UDI. See for example, Stanley Meisler, "Black Guerrillas Preparing for Great Africa Race War," Los Angeles Times, 21 April 1968; Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, 15 January 1969, CAB/129/140, UKNA; Telegram, State to Lisbon, 17 January 1964, Box 203, Country File, NSF, LBJL.

approaching Portugal in a way that would not lead to the creation of a formal alliance of minority regimes in southern Africa.

Unfortunately for Anglo-American officials, Portugal had already begun to strengthen its ties to the minority regimes. Portugal had long been economically linked to South Africa and Rhodesia. Its colonies provided rail service to ocean ports, while it effectively rented Mozambican labor to work in Rand gold mines and as seasonal agriculturalists. Throughout the 1950s, Salazar saw in these relations the potential for more durable alliances in the face of rising African nationalism. Therefore, when Portugal began distancing itself from Britain and the United States, it logically embraced "the possibility and the advantage of concluding with these countries secret military pacts local, mutual assistance, and forms of economic co-operation to be regulated by bilateral treaties."[369] According to military historian Luís Barroso, covert informational and military cooperation with Pretoria began in the late 1950s but greatly accelerated after the Angolan rebellion, with a regional alliance becoming particularly important after FRELIMO launched its revolution on the borders of Rhodesia and South Africa.[370] Though much of this diplomacy was conducted in secret, the British heard enough to worry about the ossification of the "white redoubt" in southern Africa to be cautious. In contrast, the United States reacted less strongly to hints of the growing ties between Portugal and its reactionary

[369] "Notas sobre a Politica Externa Portuguesa," 12 January 1962, Pasta 5, AOS/CO/NE-30B, TT.
[370] Luís Barroso, *Salazar, Caetano, e o "Reduto Branco"* (Porto: Fronteira de Caos, 2012), 127-9, 233, 353-4.

white allies, continuing to deprioritize racial elements of the regional stand-off into the Johnson period.

Southern Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) in November of 1965 challenged these calculations. After months of tense negotiations, the British threat to impose direct control on the Rhodesian parliament inspired the state to proactively declare independence, using Jefferson's 1776 document as a model. The British government was furious and spent the following months attempting to compel the capitulation of the regime under Ian Smith through political and economic isolation. Breaking with precedent, the British resorted to UN action, passing a number of condemnatory resolutions that culminated in the first ever mandatory trade sanctions placed on a country in December 1966. Working closely with the United States, the British hoped sanctions might reign in the rogue regime, but fear of confrontation with South Africa meant the measures passed by the UN lacked effective coercive power.[371] Enforcement of the economic embargo depended heavily on the cooperation of the surrounding states. The Portuguese government controlled the vital oil importing ports of Beria and Laurenço Marques, meaning it was a necessary ally in the suffocation of Rhodesia. Lisbon, along with the government in Pretoria, had provided the sole negative votes and refused to comply with international demands. Unwilling to start a shooting war

[371] UN Resolution 221 gave Britain the right to enforce the sanctions by establishing a blockade at Beira, but this proved limited. Not only could Mozambique export oil to Rhodesia through other ports, but Britain hesitated to give its naval commanders the rights to fire upon ships. See Luise White, *Unpopular Sovereignty: Rhodesian Independence and African Decolonization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), chapter 5 and Richard Mobley, "The Beira Patrol: Britain's Broken Blockade against Rhodesia," *Naval War College Review* 55:1 (Winter, 2002): 63-84.

with either state, Prime Minister Harold Wilson wagered the future of British policy on the slight possibility that he could convince Portugal and South Africa to abandon Smith's regime.[372] While Portugal gave little indication it had any interest in cooperating, UDI effectively reinforced Britain's willingness to work with Portugal and compelled a reevaluation of American priorities in the region.

In reality, Portugal – and to a lesser extent South Africa – benefited from Rhodesia's existence, even as it continued to claim a multiracial empire. The international furor induced by the UDI distracted some of Portugal's most vocal critics in Africa, who worried more about the expansion of white minority rule than the continuation of an anachronistic form of colonialism they presumed to be on its last leg.[373] Salazar appreciated this fact but also sympathized with the country's refusal to succumb to black nationalist demands, defending the Salisbury regime in such a way that rhetorically tied his government to the white settler state as early as 1963.[374] Therefore, Portugal had no intentions of working with its oldest ally to squeeze Rhodesia. Shortly after the crisis began, Salazar agreed with a South African special envoy that:

> It is important that Portugal and South Africa form and present a "united front." He did not properly suggest an alliance. But a firm solidarity by both on the Rhodesian question, discouraging those who would take drastic actions against [our] two countries. . . . We should be prepared for a conflict with England and the United States; not an armed conflict, but an open conflict with these two countries.[375]

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[372] Memorandum, "Rhodesia," 9th December 1966, 8, UKNA, CAB/129/127.

[373] Telegram, Lusaka to SecState, 9 September 1969, Box 2441, CFP 1967-69, RG59, NARA; "The Good Neighbor Policy," reprinted in Martin Minogue and Judith Molloy, eds, *African Aims & Attitudes: Selected Documents* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1974),202.

[374] Telegram, Paris to Secstate, 31 August 1963, Box 155, NSF, JFKL.

[375] "Conversation with Ambassador Burger, special envoy of Prime Minster Verwoerd," 31 January 1966, pasta 12, AOS/CO/NE-30A, TT.

But this consolidation of the "united front" behind the scenes did not preclude Portugal from justifying its empire on claims to Lusotropicalism. Rather, Portugal continued to decry "white racist" government in diplomatic conversations, even as it shored up its colonial borders by allying with minority governments.[376] The result was a deceitful but crafty diplomacy that proved surprisingly effective in prolonging the *Estado Novo's* control of its colonies.

Despite Portugal's two-faced diplomacy, British officials still believed Lisbon offered the best opportunity of escaping their dire situation. Taking encouragement from Salazar's continued criticism of white minority rule, Britain began actively courting Portugal in hopes it would prove the weak spot of the redoubt. This continued despite Portugal's refusal to commit to any noteworthy actions. After more than a year of discussions, a cabinet continued to identify Portugal as the linchpin of the entire Rhodesian embargo. South Africa was determined to resist foreign pressure lest Rhodesia set a precedent for foreign intervention in the region, but it also had no interest in diverting attention from Salisbury's politics to its own apartheid. The British believed that Pretoria was trapped in an awkward situation and might be tempted to pursue "a more cautious policy and if the supply of oil to Rhodesia through Mozambique were stopped it might not be wholly replaced by supplies from South Africa."[377] Britain therefore devoted much

[376] Telegram, Lisbon to Secstate, 12 August 1969, Box 2441, CFP 1967-69, RG59, NARA

[377] Conclusions of the Cabinet, 13 December 1966, 8, UKNA, CAB/128/41. Portuguese Mozambique also provided the best option for the military invasion of Rhodesia. The port of Beira provided the most efficient infrastructure so support the movement of men and materials for an occupation of the rebel state. Portuguese acquiescence would be necessary for such an operation, lest a forcible violation of colonial territory invite a South African response. Memo, Anderson to Rusk and President, 18 May 1965, 1. Box 203, Country File, NSF, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, Texas (hereafter, LBJL).

energy to negotiating with Portugal despite the lack of real progress, wholly abandoning its already muted pressure for colonial reform in hopes of winning Salazar's cooperation.[378] Alienating Salazar would serve only to strengthen the white redoubt and threaten the economic well-being of the recently decolonized states of Malawi and Zambia – two landlocked Commonwealth nations dependent on Portuguese rail routes. After the UDI, the possibility of a South Africa-Rhodesia-Portugal axis appeared more realistic, and preventing its formal declaration became the primary motivation shaping British policy toward Lisbon.

Deeply troubled by events in Rhodesia, American officials nonetheless deferred leadership to the British, which had lasting ramifications for how Lyndon Johnson's administration approached Portugal. The president had largely continued Kennedy's policies, but he lacked the personal investment in the Third World that his predecessors had brought to the Oval Office. The preservation of stability in central and southern Africa was the primary commonality between the two administrations, becoming ever more important as the United States became more deeply committed to the conflict in Vietnam after 1965. A new Cold War battlefield in Africa would further tax increasingly limited American resources, meaning a swift diplomatic conclusion to the Rhodesian crisis was desirable from the president's perspective.[379] The intersection of Portuguese colonialism

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[378] See for instance, Conclusions of the Cabinet, 21 March 1968, 4, UKNA, CAB/128/43. The Portuguese occasionally showed a sign of warming to its minority-run neighbors, despite Lisbon's professed dislike for the segregationist policies. The Rhodesian air force repeatedly sent fighters to land in the Portuguese colonies, and Lisbon and Pretoria communicated about the possibility of joint infrastructural projects on the border shared by Angola and Southwest Africa.

[379] The Portuguese fully understood this reality, wryly remarking to the South Africans at one point that the United States was unlikely to become too closely involved in the region because "Vietnam was enough."

with white minority rule seemed the most likely source of conflagration.[380] The State Department believed postcolonial nations would judge the United States on its dealings with southern Africa generally and the segregationist practices of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia in particular. Seeking to assuage continental anger and connect its foreign policy to its domestic focus on civil rights, the Johnson administration verbally denounced the minority states. Johnson's 1966 speech on the third anniversary of the OAU asserted that the United States "will not support policies abroad which are based on the rule of minorities or the discredited notion that men are unequal before the law." [381] Nonetheless, officials in Washington did not consider all states equal in southern Africa, and the stirring speech mentioned only Rhodesia by name at the expense of a more ambitious regional approach.

Following Britain's lead, the American government prioritized the resolution of the Rhodesian question. The State Department reserved its strongest rhetoric and most concrete policies for Smith's government in Salisbury, identifying Salazar as an asset in moderating the situation. In a memo to the president, Rusk set out American strategy towards its sometime ally: "Because of the location of the Portuguese territories of Angola

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No title (Nogueira conversation with Henrik Verwoerd), no date (likely 1967), pasta 14, AOS/CO/NE-30A, TT.

380 Memo, Robert W. Komer to President Johnson, 19 June 1965, in Nina Davis Howland, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXIV, Africa* (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1999), 306.

381 President Johnson said, "We are giving every encouragement and support to the efforts of the United Kingdom and the United Nations to restore legitimate government in Rhodesia. Only when this is accomplished can steps be taken to open the full power and responsibility of nationhood to all the people of Rhodesia--not just 6 percent of them." Lyndon Johnson, "Remarks at a Reception Marking the Third Anniversary of the Organization of African Unity," 26 May 1966, Woolley and Peters, *The American Presidency Project*, available: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=27619&st=african&st1=unity

and Mozambique . . . we need Portuguese assistance in order to help the British achieve success in restoring constitutional rule in Rhodesia."[382] Lisbon's rule was the final remnant of the increasingly discredited practice of direct colonialism. American officials rarely doubted its eventual failure. Apartheid and the domination of African peoples by local minority governments appeared far more threatening, and the UDI implied its spread northward. The United States believed these developments most directly threatened stability in the region, and it joined the United Kingdom in placing the former settler states at the top of its priority list. Policymakers sidelined the long-term desire for African independence in pursuit of a strategic alliance that might solve the more urgent issue.

The attraction to increasingly strong relations with the Portuguese government in the region also grew from a new American acceptance of Portuguese proclamations regarding its non-racial aspirations. Many of Portugal's most influential Washington critics had been pushed out of the State Department or reassigned, with Soapy Williams being among the last to depart in early 1966.[383] Though diplomats remained skeptical of the realities behind such sentiments, the Lusotropical ideal stood in stark contrast to apartheid and became increasingly reassuring. State Department reports from the last years of the decade continued to acknowledge the economic restrictions placed on black Africans, but

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[382] Rusk also noted that Portuguese support would be valuable in "reaching a solution to the Franco-NATO problem," another important aspect of Kennedy era policies that carried over into Johnson's administration. Equally important, Rusk made no mention of the Azores in this memo. The island bases were not the central strategic issue shaping Luso-American relations, even as they remained a nagging point of departure between the two governments. Memo, Rusk to President, "Request for Appointment for Portuguese Ambassador Garin," 14 May 1966, Box 203, National Security File, LBJL.

[383] Williams had been frustrated with presidential inattention to Africa and the way Vietnam tended to override other diplomatic interests. Thomas J. Noer, *Soapy: A Biography of G. Mennen Williams* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006), 293-299.

they also highlighted the increased Portuguese investment in education and infrastructural improvements that had come from Portuguese policies enacted after the Angolan rebellion. Additional reforms from the mid-1960s onward gave American officials hope that the *Estado Novo* might eventually achieve a smooth transition even as armed confrontations with liberation groups occurred with some frequency in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique. In a detailed memorandum to the secretary of state, the new Ambassador to Portugal W. Tapley Bennett summarized the opinion:

> in Angola and Mozambique the process of educational, economic, and social development has begun; there can be no turning back from the effects of this course. Whatever the failure in realizing the full ideal, race relations in Portuguese territories probably function more smoothly than in most parts of the world. Therein lies the hope that political strains anticipated for the future may be tempered on a base of human understanding.[384]

Bennett advocated for a policy of closer relations, where U.S. friendship would encourage new policies that benefited African subjects and dissuaded the colonies from allying too closely with South Africa.[385]As Ambassador Bennett explained to Rusk in a way that would have met with Salazar's approval, "The multiracial ideal as an ideal (rather than as an established reality – which it is not) is one on which the Portuguese cannot be faulted. 'Multiracialism' would seem to be a healthy alternative to black racism or apartheid."[386] This was in many ways a logical progression of the policy enacted under Kennedy in 1962,

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[384] Airgram, Lisbon to Department of State, "The Dilemma of Portuguese Africa," 29 September 1967, Box 1783, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1967-1969, RG 59, NARA.
[385]Ibid.
[386] Airgram, Lisbon to Department of State, "Bases of Portugal's Attitudes and Policies," 14 July 1967, 4, Box 2353, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1967-1969, RG 59, NARA.

now reinforced by the contrast between Portuguese colonial policy and apartheid.[387] The cooperative reform strategy now offered the best opportunity to compel a peaceful transfer of power without risking a repeat of the Rhodesia situation in either Angola or Mozambique.

This drift toward greater cooperation with Portugal was reinforced in 1968 by the sudden incapacitation of Antonio Salazar. In September, a pair of intracranial hemorrhages incapacitated the septuagenarian dictator. He would linger for nearly two years, but he was incapable of ruling. In testament to Salazar's impressive control of the nation and its colonies, the *Estado Novo* did not collapse as many would have predicted. Instead, control of the regime passed relatively smoothly into the hands of Marcello Caetano, who had held high office in the 1950s and developed a reputation as a moderate reformer. Though he had no desire to dissolve the empire, Caetano softened some of Salazar's harder edges. He renamed the regime the *Estado Social*, reorganized the PIDE secret police, and allowed opposition parties to participate in elections, albeit at a great disadvantage to government candidates. He also doubled down on the Lusotripical justification of empire, and invited the United States to reopen negotiations on the Azores bases.[388] The smooth transition of power demonstrated to the United States, Britain, and other world powers the still surprising strength of the *Estado Novo*, while Caetano's more flexible leadership

[387] Airgram, Consul General Laurenco Marques to State Department, 5 March 1968, 10, Box 2345, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1967-1969, RG 59, NARA.
[388] De Meneses, 601-605 and for information on Caetano's role in the *Estado Novo*, see chapter 7. Tom Gallagher, *Portugal: A Twentieth Century Interpretation* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1983), 165-170.

convinced Portugal's allies their hope for a gradual decolonization – and improved cooperation in terms of Rhodesia – were not misplaced.

Portugal also benefited from Caetano's economic reforms. Facing a crisis of agricultural and economic production, he opened the economy in a way that promoted greater investment from Europe and the United States. This openness extended to the colonial economies, simultaneously bringing in new sources of income to help prosecute the war while entangling its most critical allies in the long-term fortunes of the African territories. Salazar had first shown an interest in developing colonial oil resources in the early 1960s, desiring in particular to work with an Anglo-American company, likely as a way of influencing official policy.[389] But the removal of political barriers quickened under Caetano, who even more than Salazar saw this tactic as a way of reassuring allied governments of Portugal's willingness to negotiate. Under Johnson, American officials had argued that increased investment was a way of winning Portugal away from the minority regimes, anticipating Nixonian strategies and the more famous Reagan era policy toward South Africa of constructive engagement.[390] By 1970, Portugal profited from Gulf's discovery of oil off the shores of Angola, and it soon looked to European firms to help it construct a massive hydroelectric dam in Mozambique.

Johnson's embrace of Portugal finally closed the door on the African nationalist hope of having the major Western powers force Portugal out of Africa. Britain had

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[389] Apontamento 300, Doc 32, 12 April 1966, Box 12, PS/AMC/01, TT; Kenneth Maxwell, *The Making of Portuguese Democracy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 22-29.

[390] Airgram, Consul General Laurenco Marques to State Department, 5 March 1968, 10, Box 2345, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1967-1969, RG 59, NARA.

continuously retreated from its 1961 position, and the high point of American relations with Lisbon was yet to come. The election of Richard Nixon was the nadir of American interest in African independence, marking a break from past policy in the alacrity with which it embraced the minority regimes. Most presidents since Eisenhower had expressed at least a nominal interest in promoting decolonization. The realist team of Nixon and his influential national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, displayed little such concern. Indeed, the president was openly sympathetic to Portugal, having enjoyed a visit to the country as a private citizen during his wilderness years. Nixon had assured Franco Nogueira during this period in 1963 that he believed independence was "not the best thing for Africa or the Africans." Now as president, he brought a similar ideology to the Oval Office.[391] Outwardly, State Department diplomats continued to speak of self-determination, but policies aimed to shore up the tenuous alliances with Portugal and the other white regimes. Early in 1969, the White House issued a directive ending all contacts with nationalists, though the CIA effectively defended Roberto's regular retainer. Nixon also sought to encourage improved high-level dialogue, meeting with both Caetano and Nogueira in his first few months in office. Both conversations sought to assure the Portuguese that Luso-American relations had turned a page.[392] At one White House celebration in honor of the 20th Anniversary of NATO, Nixon (probably intoxicated)

[391] Quoted in Thomas Borstelman, *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 238.
[392] Schneidman, 112.

grasped Nogueira by the shoulders and promised, "I'll never do to you what Kennedy did."[393]

This final policy shift was formalized in National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 39, which first presented the policy famously dubbed by former Foreign Service officer Anthony Lake, the "Tar Baby Option."[394] The memo presented a variety of options, but the one embraced by the White House extended the logic that had allowed the Anglo-American powers to embrace Portugal and South Africa to the entirety of the region. In a global context where the United States had to manage myriad regional crises in order to focus on its priority of competing with the Soviet Union, Portugal and the neighboring white minority regimes represented an invaluable source of stability. Both Lisbon and Pretoria had weathered a decade of constant antagonism and seemed unlikely to fall. Therefore, the United States needed to begin a "relaxation" of existing policy, "broadening the scope of our relations and contacts gradually and to some degree in response to tangible—albeit small and gradual—moderation of white policies." Therefore, Kissinger and Nixon embraced the predictability of unpopular stability, theorizing that increased corporate and diplomatic ties with the United States might encourage political and economic liberalization.[395] While the latter factor was no more likely to work for Nixon than it had for his predecessors, the value derived from the strategy depended on abandoning any level of commitment to self-determination in southern Africa in favor of

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[393] Franco Nogueira, *Diálogos Interditos, Vol II* (Lisbon: Intervenção, 1979), 249-252.
[394] Anthony Lake, *The "Tar Baby" Option: American Policy Toward Southern Rhodesia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), 124-130.
[395] "Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Interdepartmental Group for Africa," 9 December 1969

access to resources and political capital for use in areas of greater importance. Nixon summarized his view succinctly in a staff meeting in late 1969: "It is obvious that we have to avoid the colonialist label but we must analyze where our national interest lies and not worry too much about other peoples' domestic policies."[396] Domestic policies in this case included not only the actions of the white minority regimes, but the continued rule of Portugal over its colonies.

From 1970 onward, critical observers witnessed a rapid thaw in Luso-American relations. Seeking to avoid the label of colonialist, Nixon did not abandon either the embargo against Portugal or a similar one in place against South Africa, but he did issue an order to allow the export of "non-lethal equipment which has dual civilian and military."[397] Kennedy and Johnson had done so on a case-by-case basis, but this opened the doors for large items forbidden under previous administrations. An early and controversial example was the sale of a pair of Boeing 707s in February, which the Portuguese had configured to carry troops and cargo. Made with reinforced undercarriages specifically for landing in warzones, the long-distance planes became the workhorse of the Portuguese military – almost doubling air transport capacity by flying 299 missions in 1973 alone.[398] With both Nixon and Caetano seeking to improve relations, Portugal finally took

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[396] Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting, 17 December 1969, Document 20 in Myra Burto, ed. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXVIII, Southern Africa* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2011): https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v28 [Hereafter, FRUS Africa 1969]

[397] National Security Decision Memorandum 38, 28 January 1970, Document 23 in *FRUS Africa 1969*.

[398] According to Cann, they were the highest utilized 707s in the world and saved the armed forces millions of dollars annually. John P. Cann, *Flight Plan Africa: Portuguese Airpower in Counterinsurgency* (West Midlands: Helion, 2015), 131-132.

its last trump card off the table. In December 1971, the two countries reached an agreement on the Azores lease for three years, which provided a $400 million Export-Import line of credit to the government for infrastructural improvements, millions more worth of surplus agricultural commodities, and a smaller amount of non-offensive defense department supplies.[399] While most of these funds went to mainland Portugal, they did much to free government spending for use in the colonies.

A decade after the Angolan revolution had threatened to sever Luso-American relations, Portugal had returned to the Western fold. No longer threatening to abandon NATO or even the UN, the resilient Lisbon regime benefited greatly from its participation in military and economic exchanges with its Euro-American allies. This had been the result of the small country's capable management of events largely outsides its control, continuously positioning itself in a way that could help manage Anglo-American anxiety in Africa and the wider world. The collapse of the revolution in its most visible colony of Angola and the struggles of Western anti-colonials to sell liberation abroad had allowed Portugal to reaffirm its position as guarantor of African stability, slowly building foreign confidence as Caetano's *Estado Social* hid from the world the reality that, outside of Angola, its authority was on the wane.

FRELIMO, PAIGC, and the Revolution at the Margins

[399] Telegram, SecState to the Department of State, 4 June 1971, Document 268 in James E. Miller and Laurie Van Hook, eds., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XLI, Western Europe 1969–1972 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2012): https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v41

While Portugal successfully quieted diplomatic criticism of its empire, the country increasingly struggled to replicate its Angolan success in the other colonies. After the beginning of the armed revolutions in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique in 1963 and 1964, respectively, the CONCP parties of PAIGC and FRELIMO slowly gained ground against a determined imperial resistance. With greater internal cohesion and safe harbors in the stable neighboring states of Guinea and Tanzania, respectively, the two parties used foreign weapons, training, and supplies – provided by African and Eastern European states – to carve out small spaces of liberated territory. It was in these territories they began building their socialist nations. Though PAIGC and FRELIMO faced inner dissent during this period, they generally avoided the pitfalls of factionalism that had hamstrung the Angolan movements. For much of the mid-1960s, managing the armed struggle demanded party attention, but as situations improved then settled into a state of guerrilla war, both parties again looked abroad to help break the impasse. Though Cabral's PAIGC focused initially on the socialist bloc, Mondlane continued to look Westward in an attempt to balance his alliance system and navigate the dangers of the Cold War.

The gradual revival of Western interest in Lusophone anti-colonialism owed much to the military gains achieved by PAIGC and FRELIMO as the disjointed Angolan revolution stagnated. The PAIGC campaign had begun in the early 1960s with the methodical infiltration of the colony. The development of a discreet political presence allowed Cabral to launch a revolution in 1963 that soon claimed territory stretching from the Guinean to the Senegalese borders, mostly in rural areas where there had never been a strong Portuguese presence. The PAIGC's army consisted mostly of local peoples armed

with Eastern European weapons, led by a handful of officers trained abroad in China, Ghana, and North Africa.[400] Weapons and newly trained recruits traveled mostly via neighboring Guinea, where the leftist nationalist leader Sékou Touré had allowed Amílcar Cabral to establish his headquarters in exile. Though dogged at first by internal divisions exacerbated by Guinea-Bissau's ethnic diversity and what Cabral disparaged as a tendency toward authoritarian militarism, historian Patrick Chabal estimates that PAIGC liberated roughly half of Portugal's least settled colony by 1966.[401]

Arguably Portugal's least important colony, the *Estado Novo* nonetheless identified it as a key symbol of empire. Salazar had built his government on the idea of an indivisible multi-continental state, so the loss of even this minor colony would weaken Lisbon's ability to hold power in the larger and more valuable colonies of Angola and Mozambique. And Cabral understood this reality, seeking not just the liberation of Guinea-Bissau but his home islands of Cabo Verde. The small, isolated archipelago offered a more difficult prospect for revolution, so Cabral gambled the best bet for achieving independence would be to wage a costly struggle in the mainland that would force Portugal to reassess the very idea of empire. The likelihood of a decolonization en masse would be strengthened by similar victories in the major colonies of Angola and Mozambique. This Pan-African logic sometimes struggled to overcome ethnic tensions – especially within the PAIGC where some Guineans remained suspicious of assimilated Cabo Verdeans who the Portuguese had long used as colonial middlemen – but it provided the foundations for the socialist CONCP

[400] Dhada, 12-20.
[401] Chabal, Cabral, Chapter 3.

alliance. As a result, both the nationalists and Portugal viewed Guinea as a potential linchpin within the continental struggle for Lusophone independence. To combat the influx of Eastern (and later Soviet) arms, Portugal used its NATO connections to send a large, comparatively well-equipped army to fight a protracted guerilla war in the tiny colony. American-made boats and planes, French helicopters, and German small arms defended Europe's last empire against a slowly emerging alliance between global East and South.[402]

The liberation of territory allowed Cabral and PAIGC to pursue a second revolutionary goal that had been impossible in Angola: the establishment of a rudimentary socialist state. Cabral's theory for a mass revolution involved winning the active participation of Guinea-Bissauans through the provision of some basic necessities. Rejecting Roberto's failed assumption that a mass revolution could arise spontaneously, Cabral understood that local people "are fighting to win material benefits, to live better . . . to guarantee the future of their children."[403] A successful revolution had to deliver on at least some of its promises in order to win sufficient numbers of recruits. By 1964, PAIGC had begun establishing medical clinics, schools, and cooperative "people's stores" where locals bartered produce for consumer goods. Though the quality of these institutions varied and their numbers were surely exaggerated for propaganda purposes, they nonetheless offered some of the first public services to Africans in rural regions where Portuguese development was largely absent. Mustafah Dada estimates that by 1970, the PAIGC

[402] John P. Cann, Interview with author, 30 June 2014 (Charlottesville, VA). John Cann's trilogy on guerilla, marine, and air warfare in Portugal's colonial wars provide specifics on the weapons used.
[403] Amílcar Cabral, *The Revolution in Guinea* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), 86.

operated over 160 schools, 120 clinics, and four regional hospitals.[404] These efforts helped legitimize the PAIGC and swell its ranks, but it also demanded the acquisition of medical supplies, educational materials, and goods for barter. Cabral, more a diplomat than a general, looked abroad to help build these services since so few could be independently produced even in free African states.

The merging of military and social activities provided an attractive model for selling the revolution to the West in particular, justifying donations to PAIGC on humanitarian grounds as much as anti-colonial ones. From this perspective, Cabral's party was not only fighting for the freedom of Guinea-Bissau, but providing services to citizens that Portugal had promised as part of its civilizing mission but had never actually fulfilled. Unfortunately for PAIGC, the small colony demanded little press attention. Crises in Rhodesia, the Congo, and Nigeria demanded the majority of international press attention, especially in the West and the United States. Given the state of affairs, Cabral could have ignored the Euro-American alliance. A number of countries including the Soviet Union, Guinea, Cuba, and East Germany donated medical supplies and provided educational training, but the expansion of services in the 1960s demanded additional contributions.[405] The Western world represented an important resource, especially in terms of medicine and the consumer goods needed for barter in people's stores.

Cabral had courted the West in the early 1960s, but had grown frustrated and spent much of the later years building relationships in Eastern Europe. But Eduardo Mondlane's

[404] Dada, Appendix C Tables 14, 15, and 44.
[405] For a list of medical and educational assistance, see Dada, Appendix C, Tables 6-8.

FRELIMO had never fully abandoned his hope for Euro-American aid, though he too had refocused his attention as his party began its own revolution. Beginning a little more than a year after Guinea-Bissau, FRELIMO had begun armed operations in Mozambique in September of 1964. A simultaneous revolt throughout the country on the PAIGC model had failed, defeated by a far more extensive colonial government that arrested many would-be conspirators soon after the beginning of hostilities. As a result, FRELIMO's operations were limited at first to Niassa and Cabo Delgado, the less densely populated northeastern provinces of the y-shaped country closest to the exile base in Tanzania.[406] The party faced a number of political crises as it struggled to manage the war, but it gradually consolidated its control of the two provinces and expanded its campaign to Tete province in the northwest. By 1968, FRELIMO claimed that it had liberated twenty percent of the country, though such figures were vociferously denounced by the Portuguese state that maintained complete control of vital cities located in the southern half of the country.[407]

As in Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique depended heavily on foreign arms to fight Portugal, but there were differences in the way these two allies approached their international alliances. More suspicious of the Soviet Union, Mondlane did not spend the same amount of time courting the world power. Instead, he worked with African and independent Eastern European states who had existing relations with FRELIMO's host, Tanzania. Algeria proved incredibly important, training Mozambican revolutionaries and

[406] Munslow, 87, 92-96.
[407] Isaacman and Isaacman, 86-87.

providing the weapons that helped launch the armed struggle.[408] Algeria remained FRELIMO's major ally, but the party also received arms or other military support from Egypt, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and – in all likelihood – Romania.[409] Yugoslavia also became a surprising stalwart friend, moving beyond military needs to also donating scientific instruments for educational purposes, providing technical assistance, and sending at least one educator to Tanzania.[410] Yet perhaps what set FRELIMO apart from PAIGC the most during its period was its utilization of Western aid to help fund social programs, now provided primarily through independent agencies with limited government contacts such as ACOA and church relief services.

Like Cabral, Mondlane understood the provision of social services as vital to the revolution, but FRELIMO had better utilized them to appeal to the Western humanitarian interests that had rallied to the Angolan cause at the beginning of the decade. Like Cabral, Mondlane identified the provision of "schools, health centres, and the promotion of trade, internal and external" as the only way to "[prove] to the people that a better life is both really possible and worth struggling for."[411] It had been with this idea in mind that he founded the Mozambique Institute in 1963 with the assistance of the Ford Foundation. The

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[408] Raimundo Domingos Pachinuapa, *40 Anniversário II Congresso da Frente de Libertação de Moçambique: Memorias* (Maputo: R.D. Pachinuapa, 2009), 26-28. Kitchen, 32. FRELIMO, "O Segundo Congresso da FRELIMO: Discurso Oficial de Comité Central," Ronald Chilcote Papers, University of Southern California, available in Aluka Digital Archive. 14.

[409] FRELIMO, "O Segundo Congresso

[410] Memo, "Subject: Activities of FRELIMO," 18 November 1968, FRELIMO, PT/TT/PIDE/D-A/1/2826-4, Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo (Lisbon, Portugal) (hereafter TT). Alliance Against Imperialism," *Mozambique Revolution*, 48 (September 1971), 5.

[411] Eduardo Mondlane, "The War in Mozambique," Venture, 20:7 (July-August 1968), quoted in Munslow, 97.

Tanzania-based organization provided educational and relief services to Mozambican refugees before the beginning of the armed struggle, but shifted to become the primary coordinator of social programs in the liberated territories. After Portuguese complaints to the Johnson administration helped end Ford Foundation aid, assistance from the Swedish government and ACOA allowed the institution to expand to meet growing Mozambican needs.[412] The medical clinics in the liberated territories required medication, which were partially filled by donations from ACOA and the NCC's Church World Services. Indeed, ACOA had shifted much of its aid efforts to FRELIMO after its difficulties with Roberto.[413] While far from the only source of medical and educational aid, FRELIMO found Western contributions valuable for their high quality – particularly in terms of medicines.[414] But the Western solidarity movement had struggled to expand much beyond the core that had existed in 1961, frustrating nationalist like Mondlane who still prioritized the isolation of Portugal.[415]

With Johnson and later Nixon committing to a policy that embraced Portugal, the question remained: how could the nationalists and their foreign allies affect policy? Houser had identified the Congress as a target in the early 1960s, but this hope had faded as national interest in Africa did as well.[416] Since that time, the liberation cause had been further

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412 Mondlane, Struggle For Mozambique, 173; Interviews with Joaquim Chissano and Janet Mondlane, in Swedish and Regional Voices, 28, 41-44.
413 See letter, Houser to Neto, 11 June 1969, Box 79, ACOA Papers, ARC; by 1969 ACOA's annual contributions to the Mozambique Institute had reached $50,000. ACOA, "Special Meeting on Mozambique," 8 December 1969, Box 92, ACOA Papers, ARC.
414 See "Summary of Discussion," 3 November 1967 and correspondence between Jan van Hoogstraten and Janet Mondlane, Box 22, RG 8, NCC, PHS.
415 Mondlane, The Struggle for Mozambique, 213.
416 Stanley Meisler, "The US Congress and Africa," *Africa Report* 9: 8 (August 1964), 3.

weakened by the activities of independent Rhodesia, which shared with Portugal and South Africa a belief that lobbying of Western legislators was an efficient way of protecting its position. The rogue regime soon became the most vigorous member of what one NCC official referred to as a "powerful lobby" to defend the white regimes in the United States and Western Europe. Many of the same Republicans and Democrats who had sympathized with Portugal came to the defense of the white redoubt, including such notables as Senate Minority Leader Everett Dirksen (R-IL), Senate Republic Policy Committee Chairman Bourke Hickenlooper (R-IA), and Senate Judiciary Chairman James Eastland (D-MS). The long-serving southern democrats who dominated congressional committees were particularly hostile, given the shared interest racial conservatives had with the minority regimes.[417] With Nixon and Kissinger embracing the "Tar Baby Option," the Congress offered arguably the best opportunity for changing U.S. policy, but it would be difficult. Even liberal congressmen who chafed at the racialized internationalism of their colleagues had little to gain from rejecting NATO solidarity and bucking institutional leadership in support of African independence. "Some congressmen will be unable, and others will be unwilling to support southern African concerns," one NCC lobbyist explained succinctly, "without some expression of concern from their constituents."[418]

Herein lay the hope for nationalist foreign policy in the West, specifically that of the CONCP parties. While Cold War concerns had triumphed over the interest of

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[417] Quoted aide memoir, "An Account of an Interiew with Wayne J. Fredericks," 23 October 1968, Box 23, RG 6, NCC, PHS. See also William K. DuVal, Memo from Director of Southern African Affairs – no. 9, 17 March 1967, Box 23, RG 6, NCC, PHS.

[418] Kenneth Carstens, "Report on Visits to Congressmen, 23 June 1967, Box 23, RG 6, NCC, PHS.

decolonization, the anti-communist consensus and the search for stability in the Third World that underlay this logic had begun to show cracks. These openings were not in the White House, where Nixon and Kissinger had doubled down on a traditional reading of foreign policy, but in the streets and even in the Congress. The Vietnam War that had done much to distract attention from Lusophone Africa inspired a new generation of young people to question the tenets of the Cold War and look at the world through new eyes. And at the same time, the civil rights revolution that had broken down barriers for African Americans in society and politics was helping to empower new actors, who openly sympathized with the liberation struggles. In one such case, Charles Diggs (D-MI), a long-serving African American congressmen from Detroit gained the chairmanship of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa in the same year Nixon entered the White House. While his position could not change American policy, the plethora of hearings he held after years of committee inactivity helped spread knowledge of the successful liberation struggles beyond ACOA or the churches during a period when young people were searching for innovative ideas.

These changes at the margins of American society and politics caught the attention of the CONCP nationalists and their U.S. allies. By 1967, both ACOA and the NCC were lobbying on behalf of southern African issues, partly in response to the newly aggressive activities of Rhodesia. Houser went so far as to place a full time staffer in ACOA's new Washington office.[419] The nationalists supported these efforts, hoping that a blow to

[419] Memo, Houser to Steering Committee, 27 November 1972, Reel IV, ACOA Microfilm.

Portugal from abroad might help break the stalemates they were experiencing in Guinea and Mozambique. Mondlane began returning to the United States in an attempt to encourage fundraising and the broadening of solidarity efforts. In 1967, FRELIMO sent former Cairo representative Sharfudine Khan to New York, where ACOA helped him operate an office as the first Lusophone nationalist permanently stationed in the United States. There he not only lobbied the UN, but actively publicized FRELIMO to the country. Encouraged by Khan's success, PAIGC sent its own roving ambassador to the United States on occasion – Gil Fernandes, an American educated Guinea-Bissauan who was also active in Scandinavia.[420] After five years of lessened activity, the CONCP parties had once again embraced the potential of a global revolution.

But in contrast to earlier elite lobbying strategies, the CONCP hoped to construct a grassroots solidarity – a mass movement of people and organizations that could provide material aid and perhaps wield enough political power to force change on their democratic governments. Changing social conditions in the United States hinted that this might be possible, as did similar situations in Europe. The problem was overcoming the reactionary Cold War mindset that Portugal and other southern African minority regimes had used to buy Western complacence. "The whole problem basically is a lack of information . . .," PAIGC representative Gil Fernandes explained, sounding a great deal like a young Mondlane, "I think that, if Americans were informed about what is happening, they would very likely come and help us. . . . There is always the possibility of getting some amount

[420] Letter, Houser to Mondlane, 14 December 1966, Box 142, ACOA Papers, ARC.

of aid from the United States – not the government, of course."[421] Years of frustration had taught the CONCP parties of FRELIMO and PAIGC valuable lessons about how best to appeal to the Western world. They would have to be united, consistent in their struggle, and present their revolutions as agents of social justice. They would have to work with groups like ACOA and the NCC to provide information, but they would have to do so in a way that resonated with a generation of Americans who questioned the Cold War anti-communism that justified minority rule. This strategy would win the nationalists allies in the Western world that could support their revolutions, and potentially amass the political power necessary to change official policy. But it remained to be seen if they could manage this transnational solidarity campaign, or if security concerns would again overwhelm their appeals, which were based on the still unrefined international norms of self-determination and global equality.

Conclusion

At the end of the 1960s, the Cold War had triumphed over decolonization in southern Africa. The momentum that had seemed almost unstoppable in 1961 had ground to a halt at the edges of Portugal's two largest colonies. This reality was clear by 1963, but the subsequent independence of Rhodesia confirmed it for many around the world. The West – and the United States in particular – was willing to sacrifice African self-determination for a modicum of stability, even as the slow embrace of sitting colonial and

[421] Gil Fernandes, "A Talk with a Guinean Revolutionary," Ufahamu 1:1 (1970), 19.

minority governments inspired a turn to arms by frustrated nationalists. Britain accepted this status quo in the Portuguese colonies and South Africa in an unsuccessful attempt to manage its regional transfer of power, but calculations were different for the United States. Washington, from Kennedy to Nixon, demanded crisis to devote serious attention to the continent.

While it is true that Kennedy invested the greatest weight to courting free African states and pushed Portugal harder than did any other president, the reality is that he was very much responding to a singular moment in 1961. The collapse of an already divided Angolan revolution amid ethnic and ideological squabbling and the lack of any sustained domestic political pressure removed the impetus for American action. Thus, Kennedy began to repair Lusophone relations in a pragmatic step that would establish a new direction in policy that would be taken up and encouraged by his successors. This strategy at its base involved active cooperation with an unpopular regime in Africa that had nonetheless proved itself resilient, hoping that private pressure and inducements might encourage gradual reform toward a more durable modus vivendi in southern Africa. Johnson reaffirmed the American desire to work with Portugal when Rhodesia provided a different moment of crisis, while Nixon achieved new levels of cynicism and hypocrisy when he used the same basic logic to strengthen ties with all of the southern African regimes. The *Estado Novo* had used a diplomacy of stubborn conviction, opportunism, and deceit - or to critics, "backwardness, tenacity, and pure accident" – to weather the wind of change in a way its European compatriots had not. Portugal could truly claim the mantle

of last empire.[422] There was less clarity on whether this state of affairs could last, and for how long.

[422] Telegram, New Delhi to Secstate, 5 December 1961 (one of two), Box 1815, CDF 1960-63, RG 59, NARA.

Chapter 3: "A War against the Whole NATO Machinery"
The Development of a European Solidarity Movement

By 1969, the major western powers retreated into NATO solidarity to validate their continuing acquiescence to Portuguese imperialism. Official victory for Lisbon did not however mean that transnational solidarity had been defeated. Even as ACOA seemed to be fighting a rearguard action in the United States and British activity all but disappeared, the liberation movements witnessed greater success on the margins of the European continent. Here, imperialism and great power politics did not play as large a role in the day-to-day operations of their governments. The revolutionaries achieved their first real breakthrough in Sweden, whose non-aligned foreign policy allowed it to avoid the East-West conflict in favor of addressing North-South divisions. Yet this was the exception; more common were cases where governments lined up behind Portugal as part of the North Atlantic alliance. In these states, pressure from the bottom up was necessary to compel governments to adjust their policies. Solidarity initially grew – as it did in the United States – in the form of highly motivated and organized minorities, but in Europe it progressively expanded to become matters of truly national concern in a number of countries – notably the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

The growth of this movement owed much to the radicalization of the generation of 1968. Popular disillusion with the Vietnam War, ideological conformity, and the spiritual emptiness of the contrasting models of the Cold War bred widespread popular protests,

particularly in the western world.[423] As Quinn Slobodian has shown in the case of Germany, the specific style and content of this grassroots movement owed much to the influence of citizens of the global South operating in Europe.[424] This mass rejection of the extant international system and its accepted modes of conduct opened up broad spaces for the articulation of new identities. While much scholarship has rightfully focused on the domestic programs of these movements, youth activists also sought to revise unequal imperial relationships that had dominated the North-South exchanges for centuries. Activists at the time, as do historians today, understood this anti-imperialism in terms of the war in Vietnam, but it also drew on African revolutions to help it define its goals. As left-leaning socialists, the CONCP parties had a natural affinity with this new generation of radicalized youth.

For their part, the nationalists recognized the promise of the revitalized European left, and they worked to link the transnational struggles. FRELIMO led the way, using the effective personal diplomacy of Eduardo and Janet Mondlane, as well as the positive social aspects of their ideological programs, to create an effective transnational network of European activists who championed solidarity in increasingly successful ways. Given the centrality of these individuals, Mondlane's assassination in 1969 threatened to sever ties, but the opposite became true. The setback actually inspired FRELIMO to renew its international efforts, committing to the creation of a stronger international coalition.

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[423] Jeremi Suri, *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003).
[424] Quinn Slobodian, *Foreign Front: Third World Politics in Sixties West Germany* (Raleigh: Duke University Press, 2012).

Already active in Europe in a way they had not been in the United States, Cabral and PAIGC soon followed suit, concentrating their diplomatic efforts especially strongly on the continent in the 1970s. Consistent contact as well as an annual meeting of support groups from across Europe helped guide individual national campaigns and reinforce leftist identification with the CONCP parties.

Importantly, the CONCP parties were not focused solely on the attraction of this radicalized leftist youth movement. Rather, they desired a broader solidarity network that incorporated an array of ideological and racial constituencies behind their cause. This, they believed, was the most likely way to achieve a critical mass of supporters that would be able to influence official policy, place pressure on Portugal, and, perhaps, directly support their liberation campaigns. The efforts helped build bridges – or in some cases reinforce existing connections – between the radical left and the more moderate elements of countries like the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. In so doing, solidarity movements convinced a number of nations who, outside of Sweden, had been firm members of the Cold War alliance, into backing leftist liberation movements in Africa. This broadened coalition achieved a level of political saturation that not even anti-Vietnam protests had fully achieved, while extending the critique of unrestrained Cold War alliance politics beyond Southeast Asia. The CONCP parties' strategy in Europe occurred simultaneously in other areas of the world, but the early signs of success in Sweden, the Netherlands, and even the United Kingdom confirmed the Portuguese African model of broad solidarity building. Victory in the margins of Europe began the process of deconstructing the Cold

War consensus in Africa, opening the doors for similar developments in the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States.

The First Success: The Evolution of Official Solidarity in Sweden

The socialist parties of the CONCP had long had an interest in courting Europe. With ties to leftist parties in Britain and France, PAIGC and the MPLA targeted these countries in the early 1960s as potential allies that could help compel Portugal to accept the necessity of decolonization. The nationalists, however, had not anticipated the extent to which Gaullist dreams of an African empire and British concerns with managing its own transfers of power would lead Europe's major powers to embrace the dictatorial *Estado Novo*. While there were strains in the North Atlantic alliance, for the most part the system continued to provide Portugal with the weapons and supplies it needed to maintain its trio of wars. Arms unavailable due to the Anglo-American export limitations were provided by France and Germany.[425] With the great powers of Europe choosing Portugal, the most likely source of assistance was likely to come at the margins of NATO, where concern with communism was less prolific and direct political interests in Africa were minor.

Given these realities, it made sense to the nationalists that they found their first warm reception in the chilly climes of Scandinavia. Sweden in particular offered the perfect confluence of political factors in which anti-colonial solidarity could grow. Sweden had

[425] See various profiles on the weapons and vehicles used in Aniceto Afonso and Carlos de Matos Gomes, eds. *Guerra Colonial*, 4th edition (Cruz Quebrada: Noticias, 2005). John Cann's trilogy on guerilla, marine, and air warfare in Portugal's colonial wars also provides specifics on the weapons used. A number of American plans and weapons used extensively in the colonial wars were actually provided by France.

founded its postwar foreign policy on a platform of non-alignment, which meant the country was not a member of NATO. There was little doubt Sweden was part of the West, aligning itself in most matters with Scandinavian partners like Norway and Denmark that were parts of the European alliance, but it retained an independent streak, especially as it applied to matters of the Cold War.[426] Beginning in the 1950s, Sweden had begun pursuing an internationalist policy that emphasized building relationships with the global South through the expansion of aid programs. Despite having little official interests in Africa, Sweden nonetheless had important popular connections to the central and southern parts of the continent in the form of religious missionaries. For while Sweden never possessed a colony or a noteworthy African expatriate community, the writer Anders Ehnmark has noted "There has always been . . . a cousin Agnes working for the mission in Congo."[427] Therefore, African issues demanded attention in a way they did not in other countries, providing an avenue for liberation leaders to cultivate Western allies.

As would be the case in other countries, though, Lusophone parties were not present at the genesis of the solidarity movement. Rather, the issue of South African apartheid provided an early impetus for grassroots organizing. After the Afrikaner government established apartheid in 1948, international concern about the policy had grown steadily. By the late 1950s, a small but vocal movement had appeared in Sweden protesting the policy, centered on students who had visited the region or interacted with South African

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426 See Stif Hadenius, *Swedish Politics During the 20th century: Conflict and Consensus* (Stockholm: Swedish Institute, 1997).

427 Anders Ehnmark, Resan till Kilimanjaro (Stockholm: Norstedts, 1993), 17, quoted in Tor Sellström, *Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa*, Vol. 1 (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1999), 42.

exiles attending university in Scandinavia. Even before the Sharpeville Massacre of March 1960, civil society organizations had begun fundraising to aid black South Africans, though the revelation of official brutality inspired a popular boycott against goods imported from the country.[428] A few politically active South Africans studying in Sweden, notably Billy Modise, joined with some progressive students to form the Swedish South Africa Committee to help organize such activities.[429] From this youth core grew a popular movement, which brought into its fold newspaper publishers, churches, and even Swedish politicians. The African National Congress, banned from South Africa in 1960, welcomed these developments and began sending representatives to Sweden, notably its exiled leader Oliver Tambo.[430] During this period the newspaper *Expressen* also devoted much space to the Angolan rebellion and conducted a relief campaign, but participation was limited.[431] It was popular opposition to apartheid that ran wide and, in some places, deep. Unfortunately, the banning of the African National Congress (ANC) and the imprisonment of much of its leadership greatly weakened the South African anti-apartheid movement. As had happened for Angola elsewhere, a lack of news led to a declension in activism. By the middle of the 1960s, the solidarity movement had faded, though a widespread concern with inequality in Southern Africa remained.

Anti-apartheid organizing had expanded popular interest in Africa and the plight of black citizens, and it coincided with an equally propitious set of events that would provide

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[428] Sellström, 136-155.
[429] Billy Modise, Interview with *Liberation in Southern Africa – Regional and Swedish Voices*, Tor Sellström, ed. (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2002), 157.
[430] Sellström, 182-205.
[431] Sellström, 383-393.

an opening for the CONCP. For during this same period, Swedish foreign policy began a gradual transformation from active non-alignment to a more assertive internationalist foreign policy. Leading this charge was the creation of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) in 1965. Whereas the Foreign Service had a somewhat conservative character that defined non-alignment as non-involvement, SIDA recruited from a younger generation that had come of age during the period of popular boycotts and protests. The organization therefore had few qualms about supporting nationalist programs.[432] That same year, a young politician named Olof Palme first became a prominent force in guiding Sweden's foreign policy. An early and vocal critic of the expanding Vietnam conflict and the larger Cold War, Palme pushed from his position within the ruling Social Democratic cabinet for a foreign policy that could make Sweden a "third force in international politics."[433] Drawing on his party's long history of transnational labor solidarity, he argued for a similar connection with the global South and the search for economic and political freedom:

> the efforts to achieve liberation set their stamp on the world today . . . What we are hearing are the same demands for liberty and equality for the great mass of the population as kindled the hopes . . . of the emerging workers' movements in the countries of Europe. The only difference is that the present demands are at least partly directed at us.[434]

SIDA was a first step in aiding these movements, but as Palme rose through the ranks – eventually becoming prime minister in 1969 – he pushed his country to adopt ever greater

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[432] Sellström, 49,

[433] Ann-Marie Ekengren, "How Ideas Influence Decision-Making: Olof Palme and Swedish Foreign Policy, 1965-1975," *Scandinavian Journal of History* 36:2 (May 2011), 124

[434] "Extract from a speech by Mr. Palme, Minister without Portfolio," 30 July 1965, quoted in Sellström, 232.

engagement with the problems of the Third World. Together, these developments would open the door for cooperation with the nationalists.

This new foreign policy direction coincided with the expansion of the revolutions into Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, making the CONCP parties natural allies for a country with a long history of socialist solidarity. The services programs established by FRELIMO and PAIGC in the liberated territories and their exile bases were attractive candidates for Swedish aid. While the government shared the liberal American concern about directly supporting armed revolutions, it had few qualms about aiding the nation-building aspects of revolution. As it would in other Western countries, FRELIMO pioneered contacts, sending Janet Mondlane to tour the country and speak with influential national unions. In 1965, SIDA made its first donation to a liberation party, directly contributing to the Mozambique Institute during the same period that the Ford Foundation withdrew its funding.[435] Already impressed by the organizing the newspaper *Expressen* had done during the Angolan rebellion, Cabral made overtures to Sweden after FRELIMO's success. Though slower to receive aide than FRELIMO, politician Pierre Schori remembers Cabral as a "master of diplomacy" who "understood the importance of making personal links."[436] He built a friendship with Palme, paving the way for additional aide as relationships with the CONCP parties matured.

The two parties became the primary beneficiaries of Swedish aid, receiving increasing amounts of assistance as the years progressed. Both FRELIMO and later the

[435] Joaquim Chissano, interview with Tor Sellström, in Swedish Voices, 38-39.
[436] Pierre Schori, interview with Tor Sellström, in Swedish Voices, 333.

PAIGC sent representatives to Sweden on multiple occasions, with a handful taking up extended residence with support from the government.[437] As trust between Swedish officials and the liberation leaders grew, so too did the financial donations to the social programs of the parties. The Mozambique Institute was the major recipient in the early years, but PAIGC was the first of the southern African parties to receive direct support. But they desired more than just material aid, requesting political help in isolating Portugal. Though this had presented a problem in the American context, Sweden more readily aligned itself with the nationalists due in part to its lack of membership in NATO. With no standing in the alliance, Swedish politicians instead criticized Portugal's membership in the European Free Trade Association, through which Portugal sold almost a third of its total exports. As early as 1967, Sweden raised objections to Portugal's membership in the organization, since it used the revenues acquired from its expanding continental business dealings to finance its war machine.[438] Sweden would return to the issue repeatedly over the years, constantly threatening Portugal with exclusion from the important body. Both Mondlane and Amílcar Cabral applauded these efforts, especially after Norway joined its neighbor in lambasting Portugal, this time in NATO council meetings.[439]

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[437] The permanent representatives were generally students, and PAIGC's Onésimo Silveira proved especially important in connecting Swedes with the liberation movement as he was studying political science in Uppsala. In 1969, Silveira helped organize a conference that brought both Cabral and Marcelino dos Santos to Uppsala where they interacted with more than 300 people. Lars Rudebeck, interview with author, 25 October 2013 (Uppsala, Sweden); see also Sellström, 77.

[438] "Portugal and EFTA," *Mozambique Revolution* 31 (November 1967), 5.

[439] Amílcar Cabral, "A Brief Report on the Situation of the Struggle," *Ufahamu* 2:3 January-August 1971), 21.

The two liberation parties also encouraged the government to provide aid to the MPLA. The Angolan socialist party was a member of the CONCP, but other nationalist groups were also active in Sweden – particularly UNITA. Unable to launch an armed struggle from it base in Zambia, the FNLA separatists who formed the party with Jonas Savimbi took a proactive approach to international diplomacy. In Sweden, they acquired influential political friends in the ruling Social Democratic party, with Savimbi visiting the country in 1967.[440] Yet they were unable to claim aid from the government. Both PAIGC and FRELIMO representatives urged their Swedish allies to embrace the MPLA. As UNITA member Jorge Valentim recalled, "[The CONCP] acted as a group. They represented each other, and that had some influence."[441] The result was an acceptance of the socialist Angolan party as part of a larger Lusophone movement, linking all three together in a singular conception of Portuguese African social revolutions. That the MPLA had liberated nothing meant little when associated with the successful revolutions of its fellow CONCP members. As SIDA official Soren Lindh remembered, friendship with one CONCP party naturally produced good relations with others; it was therefore very easy to be a "Lusophonist" within the government.[442]

The official interest in the Lusophone liberation movements grew in unison with the revival of popular activism. During the mid-1960s, Sweden was not immune from the growth of political protests against the restrictive democratic capitalist system of the Cold

[440] Sellström, 406-407.
[441] Jorge Valentim, interview with Tor Sellström, in Swedish voices, 35.
[442] Soren Lindh, skype interview with author, 18 December 2013.

War. For while Sweden was not part of NATO and proved a vocal critic of the Vietnam War, it remained deeply integrated into Western social and economic systems.[443] Swedish youth who identified with the 1968 generation therefore channeled their opposition to the Vietnam War to demand a greater emphasis on national morality, which the government attempted to subdue with its public criticism of the United States. Nonetheless, youth adopted an aggressive anti-imperialism that owed much to Third World critiques of traditions of Northern hegemony of which Swedish corporations and society were still a part. This manifested itself most vociferously in terms of opposition to the Vietnam War, but it also included a southern African component. When a Davis Cup tennis match was scheduled between Swedish and Rhodesian players, a number of young activists associated with the South Africa Group in the university town of Lund organized a mass protest of more than 700 people, which included religious organizations and unions.[444] Though relatively small, it nonetheless refocused Swedish attention to the problem of colonialism and minority rule in southern Africa. Yet because Rhodesia lacked an active revolutionary movement, popular attention quickly shifted to the cause of the Portuguese colonies.[445]

Given the economic integration of Sweden into the much maligned Western system, activists specifically aimed their ire at corporations active in southern Africa. The

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[443] Aryo Mako, "Sweden, Europe, and the Cold War: A Reappraisal," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 14:2 (Spring 2012): 68-97.

[444] Swedish Africa Groups, "From Apartheid to Anti-Imperialism," no date [1970?], Box 1, Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea, Bishopsgate Institute (London, United Kingdom). Hereafter, CFMAG Papers.

[445] According to Bertil Högberg, much of the popular organizing in the late 1960s and 1970s focused on the Portuguese colonies to the extent it proved difficult to start organizations focused on South Africa and Namibia until 1976, when the Africa Groups began to shift their attention after the Portuguese colonies gained independence. Bertil Högberg, interview with author, 21 October 2013 (Uppsala, Sweden).

most successful campaign revolved around Swedish participation in the construction of the Cahora Bassa Dam. The Lisbon regime had long dreamed of building a dam across the Zambezi River in order to modernize the country, but in the late 1960s the plan morphed into one of imperial survival. Plans for the dam now involved a major settlement scheme around the hydroelectric plant. The influx of Portuguese, it was hoped, would help pacify the Tete province where FRELIMO had gained the military advantage. At the same time, Portugal would sell its excess electricity to neighboring Rhodesia and South Africa, providing much needed funds to fight its wars.[446] Unable to pursue the goal alone, Lisbon looked to its allies to provide the loans and expertise needed to complete the massive project. The ZAMCO consortium that coordinated these multinationals contained British, French, American, German, and Swedish companies. The economic equivalent of NATO, the transnational cooperative drew the ire of solidarity movements across the world and became the first major target of the Swedish activist movement.

Among the companies was the Swedish hydroelectric engineering firm ASEA. FRELIMO had already pointed its allies in the country toward the company as early as 1967, so when the news of the firm's ZAMCO bid went public, a handful of groups interested in South Africa launched a national campaign. They found willing collaborators among newspapers and youth organizations who chafed at the Swedish governments' seemingly two-faced policy of criticizing the southern African regimes while allowing the participation of major companies in imperial development plans. A number of

[446] See Allen J. and Barbara Isaacman, *Dams, Displacement, and the Delusion of Development* (Athens: University of Ohio Press, 2013), Chapter 3.

parliamentarians devoted their time to the cause, while leaflet campaigns helped organize workers within ASEA factories. Sit-ins, teach-ins, and local debates culminated in a large demonstration that featured the local FRELIMO representative in Sweden, Miguel Marupa.[447] Though never violent, the movement demanded attention through highly public and occasionally militant actions, which commanded the attention of local media and helped expand membership.[448] Faced with strong domestic pressure, ASEA eventually pulled out of the ZAMCO syndicate.[449] The news vindicated the solidarity efforts. FRELIMO praised the campaign in its English language publication as "an event of the utmost significance, for it demonstrates the influence and effectiveness of organized public opinion." Such popular organizing, the author continued, "can be as effective a contribution to our liberation struggle as material assistance . . . [because Portugal] can wage war against our country only because of the support she receives from her capitalist allies."[450] According to Dick Urban Vestbro, it was the combination of the Cahora Bassa campaign and the Rhodesian tennis match that revived attention to southern Africa.[451] For while Vietnam dominated headlines and activist attention, members of the Portuguese African solidarity movement felt it important to remind the country that inequality existed outside Southeast Asia and that Sweden was complicit. As one Swedish activist group that backed the MPLA explained, it was important that "Swedish public opinion is given several

[447] Uppsala South Africa Committee, "Sweden and Cabora Bassa," Paper submitted to Easter Conference 1970, 29 March 1970, Folder 1, CFMAG Papers.
[448] Dick Urban Vestbro, interview with author, 22 October 2013 (Uppsala, Sweden).
[449] For information on the campaign, see Sellström, 474-505.
[450] "ASEA Withdraws from Cahora Bassa," *Mozambique Revolution* 40 (September 1969).
[451] Vestbro interview.

examples of the different forms of imperialism," including those in which their own country played a role.[452]

It was in part the growth of this popular movement along with existing sympathies within aid agencies that encouraged the government to expand its relations with the liberation movements. Beginning in 1969 after the Cahora Bassa campaign, the government provided the first financial assistance directly to a liberation party, with the understanding this would be acceptable to the public. Agencies such as SIDA had heretofore given assistance primarily to independent service organizations like the Mozambique Institute, but the government decision went further in legitimizing the parties and treating them as legitimate components of the international system. Official aid grew rapidly, so that by 1972 grants to PAIGC social programs amount to $900,000.[453] These contributions not only funded major programs in education and medicine, but helped offset the costs of goods that were then exchanged for agricultural products in the people's stores.[454] By the time Portugal finally collapsed in 1975, Sweden had provided humanitarian assistance worth roughly $10.3 million to PAIGC and $4.4 million directly to FRELIMO.[455] While Sweden, and its Nordic allies, had never been able to truly isolate Portugal either in the European Free Trade area or in regional politics more generally, Olof Palme's government had met the expectations of the Lusophone movements. Sweden had remained separate from the East-West conflict, and engaged seriously in an active foreign

[452] Angola MPLA Gruppen, Circular Letter, no date [1971?], Box 1, CFMAG Papers.
[453] Afrikagrupp, circular no 5, 6 February 1972, Box 3, CFMAG.
[454] Gil Fernandes, "A Talk with a Guinean Revolutionary," Ufahamu 1:1 (1970).
[455] The number does not include the funds distributed to the Mozambique institute. Numbers are 23 million and 53.5 million SEK, respectively. Sellström, 432-433.

policy that sought to redress North-South inequalities. The question would be whether countries that were integral parts of NATO could adopt the same approach to international affairs.

Dutch Solidarity Work: The Angola Comité and the Birth of a Movement

After their success swaying Sweden, the nationalists hoped the Netherlands would follow. If Sweden proved the exception by providing official assistance early, then the Netherlands provides an alternative example whereby official support grew from popular agitation. The small country has appeared sparingly in histories of radical internationalism produced outside of its own borders, but the rise of a new, more probing left rattled the firm NATO member and launched a major reassessment of its role in North-South relations. At the time, radicals hoped the Netherlands could become what politician Bas de Gay Fortman called a "guiding country" (gidsland), moving the Western alliance toward a more egalitarian relationship with the global south.[456] There has been debate as to what extent this desire came true, but in terms of Portuguese African solidarity, the Netherlands did help set the standard for wider organizing.[457] The Angola Comité (AC) and its longtime

[456] Bas de Gaay Fortman, "Nederland Gidsland in Noord-Zuidbetrekkingen," *Interntionale Spectator*, 55: 7/8 (July/August, 2001), 375-379.

[457] Most of these histories deal very briefly with Portuguese African solidarity as part of a review of the founding of Komitee Zuidlijk Afrika, which began as the Angola Comite in 1961. Genevieve Lynette Klein, "De Striijde Tegen Apartheid: The Role of the Anti-Apartheid Organisations in the Netherlands, 1960-1995," MA Thesis, University of Pretoria, 2001; Roeland Muskens, "Aan de Goede Kant: Een Geschiedenis van de Nederlandse Anti-Apartheidsbeweging 1960-1990," PhD Dissertation, University of Amsterdam, 2013. The exceptions to this rule are the excellent overview provided by Sietse Bosgra, "From Jan van Riebeeck to solidarity with the struggle: The Netherlands, South Africa, and Apartheid," in SADET, ed. *The Road to Democracy in South Africa Volume 3: International Solidarity*, Part 1 (UNISA Press, 2008) and Jos Van Beurden and Chris Huinder, *De Vinger op de Zere Plek: Solidariteit met Zuidelijk Afrika, 1961*-1996 (Amsterdam: Babylon-De-Geus, 1996).

head, Sietse Bosgra, became arguably the most formidable node in the network of anti-colonial western activists assembled by the CONCP countries. It would eventually become a center of information on the Portuguese struggles, as well as one of the innovators of popular organizing methods. In a country that had strong ties to the Afrikaners and hesitated to criticize their policy of apartheid, the activities of the AC and the success of the Portuguese movements helped focus popular attention onto southern Africa.

This solidarity was neither natural nor easily constructed. The Dutch had a long, uneasy history with southern Africa. It had been the Netherlands that founded the first European colony in South Africa, whose descendants would become the Afrikaans architects of apartheid. Linguistic and cultural ties continued to inform relations between the two states. As international criticism grew in places like Sweden and the United States, the majority of the Dutch population actively avoided the topic, preferring to strike an ambiguous pose that neither supported nor abandoned their colonial kin. This proved especially true as the Netherlands debated its future as an imperial power in Asia. The willful ignorance of events in Africa extended to neighboring colonies, as the government had little to gain from newly independent black governments but much to lose from weakening its economic and social ties to Pretoria. As a result, the Dutch government and more importantly the public was slow to take notice of events in the region during the tumultuous 1960s until a single organization led by the small cadre of committed leftists forced the nation to recognize the struggles.

As in the United States, Angola became a rallying cry for foreigners concerned about southern Africa, particularly leftists already concerned with issues of European

empire. AC founders Sietse Bosgra and Bertus Dijk had been involved in anti-colonial causes for some years. Bosgra had rebelled against his father's support for the Dutch Empire in Indonesia in the late 1940s, and he had become involved in campaigns against the French war in Vietnam while a student and later in solidarity with Algeria. These various interests had combined into a broad front known as the Third World Group, which had constituent committees on Cuba, Algeria, South Africa, and a handful of other causes.[458] As fighting against the French began to near its end, the Angolan rebellion offered a new opportunity to adopt the cause of an ongoing revolution. The decision to launch the Angola Comité was a continuation of a larger struggle, not one of East vs. West but rather against the lingering problem of global inequality. Later addition Aart ter Stege completed the trio that would undertake the majority of the organizing in the early years.[459]

Though historians have tended to privilege the histories of Anti-Apartheid groups due to their later prominence, the original Dutch manifestation, the Comité Zuid-Afrika (CZA), simply did not motivate much action either before or after Angola. Bosgra and a few other early members of the AC had participated in CZA activities, but they had grown distrustful of the relatively conservative leadership running the constant part of the more radical Third World Group. He explained to South African activist Ruth First, "I'm not so happy with these people, not very active, very formal, not to [sic] progressive."[460] The

[458] Interview, Sietse Bosgra and Trinike Weijdema with author, 13 October 2013, Diebergen, Netherlands.
[459] Letter, S. Bosgra to George Houser, 9 July 1962, Folder 32, KZA Papers, IISH. Though the official letterhead boasted a handful of relatively well-known Dutch personalities, these others rarely partook in AC activities
[460] S. Bosgra to Ruth First, 4 October 1962, Folder 32, KZA Papers, IISH. Bosgra noted later that most of the anger with the committee came from the "younger people" due to their disappointment with the fact

problem was that Dutch society had extremely ambivalent relations with South Africa. The Afrikaner people had developed from the original Dutch settlers, and they continued to draw emigrants from the motherland in the twentieth century.[461] Most Dutch were critical of their own empire by this point and overwhelmingly against racialism, but cultural and familiar bonds colored the way the country related to South Africa.[462] Jan Van Pronk, later minister for development cooperation, remembered later: "South Africa in Holland always had been an important issue, though racism was not."[463] To those on the left, the Dutch response to both South Africa after Sharpeville and Angola a year later illustrated more than just indifference. National complacency illustrated a disturbing ability to overlook the inhumanity practiced by both Portugal and South Africa toward its black subjects. Bosgra shared this opinion at the time, noting "there are not to [sic] many people openly pro-Apartheid, but a lot are secretly. They can understand the difficulties of Whites in S.A."[464] This covert affinity for the Afrikaners meant that the CZA hesitated to even endorse a consumer boycott, feeling that it could harm the population of the apartheid state and the committee's future in the Netherlands. These historical, cultural, and linguistic ties enhanced the unease that existed in Britain and the United States about how to deal with the question of the settled Afrikaners. Angola and its case of clearly defined settler

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that the group did not believe in sanctions or boycotts. Bosgra to George Houser, 20 November 1962, Folder 32, KZA Papers, IISH

461 In the decade and a half preceding the Angolan rebellion, more than 30,000 Dutch men and women emigrated to South Africa. Peter Baehr, Monique Castermans-Holleman, Fred Grünfeld, *Human Rights in the Foreign Policy of the Netherlands* (New York: Intersentia, 2002), 198.

462 Bosgra, 534-536.

463 Jan Pronk, Interview with Thomas G. Wiess, The Hague, Netherlands, 7 February 2000, Columbia Oral History, Columbia University Special Collections (New York, NY), 12.

464 S. Bosgra to Ruth First, 4 October 1962, Folder 32, KZA Papers, IISH.

colonialism presented a simpler gateway into southern African activism. The AC recognized this fact, and it used the cause to break with the CZA permanently.[465] The apparent moral simplicity of the anti-Portuguese solidarity cause could make it especially attractive in the Netherlands, as it provided an area for action that initially skirted the question of opposing the Afrikaner community.

Given the general unease with which the nation viewed the situation in southern Africa, it was not surprising that the news of the Angola rebellion only momentarily grasped the public consciousness in 1961. Many of the country's daily papers initially ran headlines on the violent revolution, but as the war dragged on, press attention wandered to other more pressing topics that did not include the continent.[466] Seeing a cause worth defending, the AC took action to keep Angola in the public eye. The committee initially adopted some of the same tactics being used in the United Kingdom during this period, most notably a petition (see chapter 1). Already at this point a few young activists understood Portuguese imperialism as not just an African problem, but one that directly undermined the supposed western commitment to freedom. Taking specific aim at the NATO alliance that now harbored two empires in the form of Portugal and France, Bosgra and Dijk worked with the Actie Informatie Algerije (Action Information Algeria) to circulate letters among prominent leftists. They demanded the government support self-determination in Angola and Algeria in the United Nations, voting against its close allies and effectively undermining the unity of NATO. It distributed posters across the country,

[465] Bosgra and Weijdema Interview.
[466] Twintig Jaar Angola Comité (Amsterdam, 1981), 5

trying to maintain public interest in the topic of African decolonization.[467] In contrast to the broader religiously inspired efforts in the United Kingdom, this first action assembled a mere 7,000 signatures despite occurring over a much longer period of time.[468] Such numbers proved disappointing, but from the beginning the AC provided a subtle critique of the Cold War order from a new perspective: that of redefining North-South relations.

In 1961, the opinions of 7,000 leftists stood little chance of swaying the Dutch government, one of the most loyal NATO members on the continent. A strong sense of anti-communism had invested large segments of Dutch society since before World War II, so the Dutch Labour Party (Partij van de Arbeid or PvdA) led coalition naturally aligned itself with the Atlantic alliance. The Netherlands was not a completely unquestioning ally, especially in regards to the sometimes impetuous United States, but a "deeply felt sense of mutual interest" tied the government firmly to the NATO alliance.[469] Foreign Minister Joseph Luns was currently invested in his own battle to defend the Dutch empire in Indonesia and directly sympathized with Lisbon's goals. The conservative Catholic "still had difficulties adjusting to a world in which former colonized territories played a more important role than age-old European countries" according to historian Marc Frey, and he invested Hague diplomacy with an imperial conservatism for the entirety of his nearly two decades in power.[470] While the general population may not have cared as deeply about its

[467] Twintig Jaar Angola Comité, 6.
[468] Letter, A. Dijk to Secretary of the Union of Angolan Populations (UPA), 29 April 1962, Folder 32, KZA Papers, IISH.
[469] Paul Koedijk, "The Netherlands, the United States, and Anticommunism during the Early Cold War," in Hans Krabbendam, et. al. Eds, *Four Centuries of Dutch-American Relations*, 1609-2009 (Albany: SUNY Press, 2009), 603.
[470] Marc Frey, "Decolonization and Dutch-American Relations," in in Hans Krabbendam, et. al., 616.

empire as their foreign minister, NATO ties and an ambiguous relationship with colonialism led most people to feel little concerning the Portuguese situation. Whatever interest there was in Angola faded rapidly as the Portuguese pacification effort succeeded. In 1962, Bosgra lamented "In Holland, people show little interest in Angola and the newspapers publish very little news about it."[471]

The AC became the only consistent font of information on the Portuguese colonies and the continent more generally. The group distributed posters across the country trying to maintain public interest in the topic of African decolonization.[472] It also produced two pamphlets on Angola in the year after the revolutions began.[473] Since there were almost no Dutch books available on the problem of Portuguese colonialism, it looked abroad to sustain its education campaigns. It developed relationships with a number of the liberation groups, as well as the primary solidarity organizations in the United States and Britain. It sold foreign language material and even translated activist-produced literature from English and French, most notably the British "Unholy Alliance" released by the AAM, MCF, and Council for Freedom in Portugal and the Colonies.[474] In 1962, it launched the Dutch bimonthly *Angola Bulletin*, providing constant updates on not just the struggle in

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[471] Letter, S. Bosgra to George Houser, 9 July 1962, Folder 32, KZA Papers, IISH.
[472] Twintig Jaar Angola Comité, 6.
[473] "Angola, Facts and Background of the Revolt" and "Resistance in Angola." Letter, A. Dijk to George Houser, 30 May 1962, Folder 32, KZA Papers, IISH.
[474] Letter, Bosgra to Rosaline Ainsly, 2 January 1963, Folder 33, KZA Papers, IISH. The AC kept in semi-regular contact with the most active British organization in the CFPC. Letter, Dijk to [no addressee], 28 April 1962, Folder 32, KZA Papers, IISH. The AC also had ongoing contact with the most influential American organization working on the topic of Portuguese colonialism in the early years, the American Committee on Africa, from which it received a subscription to the monthly, *Africa Today*. It undertook to translate ACOA's Mozambique pamphlet, though its unclear if this ever occurred or was simply used to write the Dutch publication on the country that appeared in 1963.

Angola but news on all of the Portuguese colonies.[475] These efforts were complimented by the distribution of leaflets and posters that hoped to raise awareness of the solidarity cause, especially among the nation's youth.

Though relatively modest, this early effort demonstrated the AC's ongoing interest in tying the cause of Portuguese Africa to the topical events of the day that were motivating leftist activism in particular. By targeting NATO, Bosgra and his allies attracted a number of youthful constituencies, including the segment of the population that was starting to demonstrate an interest in the American war in Vietnam. By 1963, this youthful generation participated in the AC's most visible public display to date, when hundreds of activists rushed onto the pitch of the Amsterdam Olympic Stadium during a NATO celebration that included a Portuguese military band. Soon after the committee would lead the occupation of the Portuguese consulate in Amsterdam in protest of Salazar's fortieth year in power. All of these activities were accompanied by calls for financial support, which eventually funded the publication of more than 30,000 books for MPLA schools.[476] Unlike in Britain, the AC found success by focusing its activities solely on the matter of Portuguese anti-colonialism. The natural affinities between the Lusophone struggles and other causes like those in Algeria and the one developing in Vietnam meant that cooperation was natural. They created public actions by diluting the central message and built relationships by appealing to common goals of Third World development.

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[475] Komitee Zuidelijk Afrika, *Twintig Jaar Angola Comité* (Amsterdam: Komitee Zuidelijk Afrika, 1981), 7.

[476] Arquivo Historic Moçambique, Brothers from the West (Amsterdam: Netherlands Institute for Southern Africa, 2005), 13.

Another reason for the success of Dutch activism emerged from the genuine solidarity with the nationalists. Sietse Bosgra and the leadership of the organization consistently sought to tie their activities to the needs and ideologies of the parties operating on the frontlines of imperialism. After founding the committee, the Dutch activists quickly sent letters to the major Angolan parties requesting guidance on support work.[477] They eventually committed themselves to working with the communist MPLA due to the natural sympathies that existed between the leftist groups.[478] In 1962 and 1963, the committee arranged for MPLA representatives to speak in the Netherlands, launching a series of personal appearances by liberation leaders that helped expand popular interest in the revolutionary cause, especially in the capital of Amsterdam.[479]

In the quest to consult with the MPLA, the AC opened lines of communication to the other anti-Portuguese nationalist movements. In late 1961, committee members began a correspondence with the CONCP as its other member parties were preparing to launch their own revolutions.[480] The PAIGC began operations in 1963, while FRELIMO (formed in 1962) would launch its own armed struggle in Mozambique the next year. These other

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[477] Unable to make contact with the MPLA, they looked first to the CONCP. In their initial letter, the committee requested international contacts on whether a campaign against NATO would be appropriate. Letter, Joao Cabral to Dijk, 27 November 1961, Folder 31, KZA Papers, IISH.

[478] "Angola, Facts and Background of the Revolt" and "Resistance in Angola." Letter, A. Dijk to George Houser, 30 May 1962, Folder 32, KZA Papers, IISH. In these early years, Bosgra wrote to Holden Roberto as well as the MPLA, though if his reminiscences are correct the AC quickly realized it was more ideologically compatible with the multiracial radicals from Luanda. Part of the initial confusion may have been caused by the fact that it took more than a year for the AC to finally make contact with the MPLA.

[479] A representatives of the MPLA's medical wing visited in early 1962, while the parties Paris delegation came in the spring of the next year. Letter, Deolinda Almeida to S. Bosgra, 11 March 1963; Letter, Camara Pires to Angola Comite, 24 April 1963, Folder 33, KZA Papers, IISH.

[480] Letter, Dijk to [no addressee], 28 April 1962, Folder 32, KZA Papers, IISH; See also Letter, Aquino Bragança to Angola Comite, 29 March 1962, Ibid.

fronts proved even more successful than had the rebellion in Angola, and Bosgra and the AC adapted their work to represent the entirety of the CONCP alliance. Eventually, the internal coherence of the PAIGC and FRLEIMO, as well as their commitment to building international ties, allowed them to eclipse the MPLA as the primary allies of the AC.[481] These connections were cemented when FRELIMO President Eduardo Mondlane and his American wife Janet visited the Netherlands in September of 1964, followed just seven months later by PAIGC head Amilcar Cabral.[482] The pair of visits would launch the beginning of the AC's activity as the organization representing all of socialist Portuguese Africa in the Netherlands.

The relationship with FRELIMO proved especially important. Under Eduardo Mondlane, the party remained the most committed of the CONCP parties to developing an influential solidarity in the Western states. Within a few years of Mondlane's first visit, the AC would devote the majority of its energy to aiding the Mozambican party through Dutch action.[483] The party's socialist ideology melded well with the Dutch activists' politics, as did its commitment to multiracialism. FRELIMO stood out in particular to its commitment to this latter issue. While many African nationalist parties made claims to inclusion and often were sincere, FRELIMO had actually acquired a number of white members.[484] But

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[481] Bosgra made contact with FRELIMO just a few months after its founding, by which time he was already preparing a new pamphlet on the changing situation in Mozambique. Letter, Angola Comite to FRELIMO, 20 January 1962 [Actually 1963]. Folder 33, KZA Papers, IISH.

[482] Twintig Jaar Angola Comité, 9.

[483] Brothers from the West, 14.

[484] Jacinto Veloso, a Portuguese military officer, defected in 1963. Other white members of FRELIMO included João Ferreira, later the Agricultural Minister in independent Mozambique, Dr. Hélder Martins, and his wife, Helena. See Joseph Hanlon,Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire (London: Zed, 1984), 29. Also see Pachinuapa, II Congresso, 44.

perhaps most importantly, Mondlane's party articulated its revolution as one against a reactionary Cold War mindset, which particularly appealed to the radical Dutch activists. As Mondlane explained in 1965, the CONCP welcomed the support of "peace-loving peoples of Europe and the Americas," but noted that if the West continued to side passively with Portugal "Then our war against Portugal in Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea is a war against the whole NATO machinery."[485] What the nationalists were asking their allies to do was not simply provide aid, but rather to challenge the very foundations of the Western alliance.

In pursuit of this goal of weakening the North Atlantic alliance and isolating Portugal, FRELIMO consulted regularly with Bosgra, requesting that the committee undertake certain actions in Holland. The most important of these requests involved the search for official government support. By the late 1960s, FRELIMO and the PAIGC had built an effective movement in Sweden that convinced the government to provide non-military material aid to the liberation movements. FRELIMO hoped that the Netherlands would be the second western country to offer such support. Yet in order to achieve this goal, the party understood that a wide swath of the Dutch public would have to support the movement, since foreign policy remained committed to maintaining the NATO alliance. Trinike Weijdema, Bosgra's wife and one of the most active members of the AC, recalled, "[Marcelino Dos Santos and Janet Mondlane] came to us . . . she thought that the Dutch government could be the second [After Sweden to offer official support]. If we wanted

[485] (MR 14 Jan 1965, p 2)

that, we'd have to move more to the center . . . so we changed."[486] Taking the request to heart, the committed leftist core of the AC began to shift its focus away from radical action toward crafting the broad front that could sustain a mass movement in support of the cause of self-determination. Only such an inclusive movement could hope to place sufficient democratic pressure on elected officials to achieve a meaningful adjustment to government policy.

Much of the AC's work focused on gathering and publicizing information about western involvement in Portugal's colonial wars. The committee hoped that confronting their own complicity would force the Dutch public to urge political action within the NATO alliance. Yet because NATO was an international body, they did not limit their work to Dutch borders. They sought to implicate all of the governments of the North Atlantic. In one case, Sietse Bosgra worked with a number of groups including the American Committee on Africa to produce a pamphlet critically examining accusations of ongoing support to Portugal. Not content with hearsay or rumor, Bosgra spent months researching in libraries across Europe, including a few military repositories where he worked under the watchful gaze of soldiers hovering over his shoulder.[487] The result was the pamphlet, *NATO and the West*. In Dutch, English, and French, it described with copious statistics the way that Portugal used western support to sustain its military campaigns on three distinct fronts. Beyond the familiar assertion that Portugal used NATO arms illicitly, the book revealed that European loans allowed Lisbon to devote over half its state spending

[486] Bosgra and Weijdema Interview.
[487] Bosgra and Weijdema Interview.

to the colonial wars without inciting domestic rebellion.[488] For the first time, solidarity activists had a tool for concretely binding their domestic governments to the colonial wars. The popularity of the pamphlet was immense, and it produced at least three English editions updated in 1970 and 1971. The AC even produced a Portuguese language version for distribution within the dictatorship itself. The pamphlet contributed to the demystification of defense and foreign policy that had traditionally been the realm of a narrow political elite, feeding into a popular desire to democratize both domestic and international policies in Western Europe.[489]

The criticism of NATO had a dual effect. In addition to shining light on the cooperation that helped sustain the Portuguese war machine, it also endeared the AC to the large portion of the country that was growing increasingly tired of the Cold War and the rigid anti-communism of the Western alliance. A sense of independence, absent earlier in the decade, had developed as East-West tensions decreased and the United States became increasingly bogged down in the unpopular Vietnam War. The formation of the Nieuw Links (New Left) within the Labour Party (PvdA) provided for the creation of a vocal opposition to the heretofore accepted Cold War ideology. Anti-Americanism grew at a rapid rate in the late 1960s, focusing on NATO as the institution linking the Netherlands to an unjust war. This involved not only resistance to Vietnam but also the inclusion of undemocratic, imperial Portugal. PvdA politicians actively demanded the ouster of

[488] S.J. Bosgra and C. Van Krimpen, *Portugal and NATO*, 3rd Ed (Angola Comite, 1969), 9. The number rose to %60 if the modernization of colonial airstrips was included.
[489] Frank Zuijdam, "Dutch Left-Wing Political Parties and NATO," in Krabbendam, 659.

Portugal, threatening a Dutch exit if the fascist state remained.[490] In the midst of more general protests against the stilted power relations of Dutch society, protests against NATO were not just statement of foreign policy but acted, according to historian Rimko Van Der Maar, as "a means of putting pressure on the establishment."[491] The links between the two causes were further cemented by the inflow of both American and Portuguese deserters, who found refuge with leftist groups like the AC.[492] The Portuguese colonies were certainly less central than Vietnam to popular protest, but they offered additional proof of the corruption of the NATO system. By linking the wars together through the centerpiece of the alliance, the AC refocused some of the energy of the revolutionary left onto the struggles in Portuguese Africa.

Ironically, the committee's efforts were assisted by the government itself. The Conservative, anti-communist Minister of Foreign Affairs Joseph Luns refused to even broach the topic of using NATO to confront unpopular allied policies. Luns had held tenaciously to the last Dutch colony in Indonesia despite internal demands for decolonization, and he viewed the Portuguese situation in a similar light. As protesters demanded the Dutch government address the issues of the NATO wars in the institution's council, the minister dug in his heels. On Vietnam, he defied the Parliament when it urged a censure of the American invasion of Cambodia in 1970, while his response to Portugal

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[490] Ibid. Hans Loeber, "Dutch-American Relations 1945-1969," in Loeber, ed. Dutch-American Relations 1945-1969: A Partnership Illusions and Facts (Maastricht: Van Gorcum, 1991), 51-54.
[491] Rimko Van Der Maar, "Dutch American Relations and the Vietnam War," in Hans Krabbendam, et. al, 685.
[492] Brothers from the West, 24; Bosgra and Weijdema Interview.

was even more favorable.[493] Luns, a ceremonial knight of the Portuguese "Order of Christ," stood before the Dutch assembly that same year and said that it would "not do to let a NATO partner down like that," before praising Salazar's leadership and lauding the Portuguese civilizing mission in Africa.[494] The foreign minister's bold support for both imperial Portugal and the United States horrified the youth left, reinforcing the links between the two causes. "He was on the wrong side," Bosgra noted later, "but in a way he helped us very much."[495] Luns' vocal refusal to abandon Portugal helped raise the profile of the African revolutions to the level of the U.S. war in Vietnam, since both were tied very closely to the question of continued Dutch participation in the NATO alliance. As the Vietnam War began to slow in the early 1970s, the secondary matter of Portugal came to the fore. The AC had failed to change government policy under Luns, but in this denial it gained a new level of notoriety that would carry it into a new era of activism devoted to the Portuguese colonies.

The AC parlayed their newfound status into one of the single most successful solidarity campaigns in the history of Europe. The committee had always tried to tie its informational duties to action, but they had often struggled to find the right cause that would mobilize the full population advocated by FRELIMO. NATO was certainly a hot topic, but targeting it appealed primarily to leftists. Moderates still considered it a

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[493] In 1970, Luns was the only NATO minister to support Nixon's invasion of Cambodia. Van Der Maar, 688.

[494] Quoted in Brothers from the West, 22.

[495] Bosgra and Weijdema Interview. Wijdema noted that Luns actively disliked both the AC and Bosgra for their role in promoting anti-NATO agitation. Whenever the foreign ministers caught site of Bosgra in a room, he would immediately become combative and turn red with anger.

worthwhile institution. The AC needed an object universal enough that most of the Netherlands could take action, but clear enough in its moral choice that few would challenge the legitimacy of action against it. The ultimate solution was brilliant, because it proved to be an essential element of Dutch society that drew on long associations with colonialism. It was coffee. Bosgra remembered: "When Indonesia became independent, [coffee importers] went to Angola. The Netherlands imported more coffee than all the other European countries outside of Portugal . . . Coffee is a very good subject to campaign on. . . you drink at the church meeting and after it, coffee. In the schools, coffee."[496] Coffee was ever present in Dutch lives, and it also was one of Angola's single largest exports. Given the use of such profits to fund the wars and the exploitative labor conditions within Portuguese Africa, the opportunistic import of Angolan coffee had the potential to outrage not just the political left but also the humanitarian moderates who had yet to become fully involved in the cause.

Beginning in February of 1972, the Coffee Campaign urged consumers to boycott coffee roasters and grocery stores that sold stocks from Angolan farms. The purpose of the action was twofold: it aimed to remove the Portuguese profits used to sustain the wars while also shifting Dutch business to independent coffee growers like Tanzania that supported the liberation movements.[497] As the second largest importer of Angolan coffee in the world (after the United States), the loss of Dutch profits would be a noticeable blow

[496] Bosgra and Weijdema Interview.
[497] Angola Comité, "Dutch Trade with Angola Dropped Heavily," 21 December 1972, Folder 181, KZA Papers, IISH. The AC specifically requested that roaster replace Angola coffee with imports from independent African countries.

to the Portuguese balance of payments. The AC published a number of small pamphlets and leaflets, which they distributed in front of stores and in commuting stations. Bearing graphic images, including one of a severed black head lying on a bed of drying coffee beans, they shocked the public. Local groups, labor unions, and political parties all helped expand the boycott, while newspapers devoted attention as well.[498] One contemporary poll found that 85 percent of the country knew about the problem of Angolan coffee, and many supported it.[499] Within a matter of a few weeks, public consternation had reached the level that most roasters agreed to end their imports from Angola. In April, the committee proudly proclaimed that 98 percent of Holland's traditional imports from Angola would no longer be entering the country by the beginning of 1973.[500] At the same time, coffee trade with independent states on the continent had more than trebled in direct correlation to the drop in sales from Angola.[501]

The Coffee Boycott also proved a boon to the wider activities of the AC. The circulation of the *Angola Bulletin* nearly doubled to 15,000, as did the orders of books and pamphlets. At the height of the campaign, the small AC was sending out more than 400 leaflets, posters, and books a week. The outflow of information also produced more feet on the street, as the number of local groups associated with the AC tripled to roughly 30

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498 Angola Comité, "The Second Coffee War," October 1973, Folder 181, KZA Papers, IISH.
499 Bosgra and Weijdema Interview.
500 Angola Comité, "Report by the Dutch Angola Comité and Mondlane Foundation," Easter 1972, Folder 2, CFMAG Papers.
501 Angola Comité, "Dutch Trade with Angola Dropped Heavily," 21 December 1972, Folder 181, KZA Papers, IISH. The action also served as a warning to other companies. Gulf Oil proactively decided to not import any of its Angolan oil into the Netherlands, as it already faced similar protests in the United States and did not care to be a target on two fronts.

scattered across the country.[502] The expansion of the boycott activities also promoted the growth of material assistance. As Weijdema explained "Every campaign was based on political action here and support to the liberation movements."[503] The Coffee Campaign was no different. As new organizations contacted the AC asking what they could do, recommendations included not just picketing but material aid collection as well. The committee tapped into this newly expanded network for the 1972 fall fundraising campaign, which collected more than 70,000 blankets for the liberation groups. Profits from the same drive came to $60,000, buying two heavy trucks for the MPLA.[504] In the span of barely a year, the AC had effectively expanded beyond a leftist group into a broad front that was able to mobilize mass power in support of the liberation struggles.

The new power of the AC became evident when the national supermarket chain Albert Heijn (popularly abbreviated AH) threatened the initial success of the Coffee Boycott by reneging on its promise not to sell Angolan product in 1973. Even as the grocery giant prepared to restock in August, Sietse Bosgra and his committee had drafted a response. Dockworkers unloading the coffee marked Angola had alerted the committee to the arrival of the product, familiar with their efforts in the spring. Before the coffee even appeared on shelves, papers were already going to print with the AC press release and more than 800 organizations received letters announcing the news.[505] Though concerned about

[502] Angola Comité, "Report by the Dutch Angola Comité and Mondlane Foundation," Easter 1972, Folder 2, CFMAG Papers. Bosgra and Weijdema Interview.
[503] Bosgra and Weijdema Interview.
[504] Angola Comité, "Report by the Dutch Angola Comité and Mondlane Foundation," Easter 1972, Folder 2, CFMAG Papers.
[505] Bosgra and Weijdema Interview.

the poor publicity, AH continued with its sale of "Indonesian" coffee (which contained 30% from Angola) under the myopic slogan "A free choice for free people." The company hoped this appeal to the Dutch sense of independence would boost sales, but it simply fed the reignited movement. Negative press and radio reactions followed. The AC produced its own scorching response, which linked anti-colonial solidarity with a leftist critique of the moral bankruptcy of the unrestrained capitalist system. "Albert Heijn does not advertise here for the freedom of the consumer, but for the freedom of the producer," the AC wrote, "Albert Heijn wants to have the freedom to choose for the bondage of others if he can increase his profit that way. What Albert Heijn wants to sell here is bondage and forced labour in Angola."[506] Labor unions and politicians joined the committee in condemning the sales, while local political parties, women's groups, and citizens groups all boycotted the stores. By the 12th of October, the cost to sales and the distraction of constant picketing led the management of AH to again abandon the import of Angola coffee after only six weeks.[507] Twice the AC had marshalled the full force of the country against economic immorality, achieving for the first time a total victory for a boycott aimed at a minority regime in southern Africa.

The Coffee Campaign represented the pinnacle of the AC's national organizing. It demonstrated not only the potential of mass action, but the barbarity of colonial and minority rule in southern Africa and European complicity in it. The reverberations of this victory echoed beyond the Dutch border, inspiring similar actions among other solidarity

[506] Angola Comité, "The Second Coffee War," October 1973, Folder 181, KZA Papers, IISH.
[507] Ibid.

efforts. In Eastern Europe, Poland became the first communist state to pledge an end to imports of Angolan coffee.[508] In mid-1973 in Canada, the Southern Africa Information Group launched by far the broadest movement outside of Holland, taking aim at corporations including Maxwell House, Taster's Choice, and Nescafe that accounted for roughly 6.4% of Angola's exports.[509] In October alone, activists covered more than 80% of Ottowa's major supermarkets with protesters, while a coalition of organizations "blitzed" Quebec Province with 50,000 leaflets and 20,000 informational pamphlets.[510] The activists achieved a two/thirds decrease in imports in less than a year.[511] The AC boycott became a model for emulation, attesting to the development of a truly transnational solidarity network around the Portuguese cause.

The AC also pioneered new ways to provide information to the nationalists, which they used to advance the revolutions. In the 1970s, the growing discontent with NATO and its wars in the developing world turned Holland into a refuge for soldiers avoiding service in Vietnam and the Portuguese colonies. The AC was especially active in working with Portuguese deserters, and it built an extensive network of contacts with sympathetic left-leaning soldiers who had remained in the military. AC member Paul Stahl became the intermediary between this hidden oppositional element within the Portuguese state, feeding it information on the African nationalist views of the ongoing wars and acting as currier

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[508] Angola Comité, "Circular Letter from the Angola Committee and Mondlane Foundation," 30 October 1972, Folder 181, KZA Papers, IISH.
[509] "Coffee for Canada Means Blood for Angola," December 1973, Folder 181, KZA Papers, IISH. According to SAIG, 10% of these revenues went toward suppressing Angolan independence. SAIG, "Coffee for You, Blood for Angola," no date [1973], Ibid.
[510] "Partial Summary of Boycott Activities October 9 to November 10," no date [1973], Ibid.
[511] SAIG, "Canadian Coffee Trade with Angola Dropped Heavily," 29 November 1973, Ibid.

for the publication of secret government documents that publicly admitted in the 1970s how poorly the war was going in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique.[512] The AC's activities revealing the success of the revolutions helped legitimize FRELIMO and the PAIGC and reinforce the commitment of African allies in particular to support the liberation struggles.[513]

Most importantly, the mobilization of mass opinion did succeed in changing Dutch government policy. Beginning in 1970, the AC had succeeded in convincing a majority of the Dutch Parliament to fund the Portuguese liberation movements over the objections of minister Luns. This attitude had emerged gradually over the prior years, after CONCP parties had personally met with Dutch parliamentarians and convinced them to publicly criticize Portugal and NATO.[514] The aid amounted to a few hundred thousand guilders per year, split between the three CONCP liberation organizations. The AC gained permission to hold the funds and purchase items at the request of the liberation groups.[515] The organizing around the coffee campaigns helped fuel popular interest in the revolutions and expanded the movement to isolate Portugal within NATO, leading to a new level of political pressure on the government.[516] In 1973, a new left-leaning coalition government

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[512] Bosgra and Weijdema Interview

[513] In aid discussions, the LCA of the OAU used Portuguese documents collected by the committee to gain support for a renewed commitment to FRELIMO's increasingly successful military campaign. Dinah Richard Mmbaga, "Historical Description of the African Liberation Committee: Reconstructing the Process," H6, 28, SWAPO Party Archives, (Windhoek, Namibia).

[514] "Dutch Parliament Condemns NATO Support to Portugal," *Mozambique Revolution*, 42 (March 1973), 22-24

[515] Bosgra and Weijdema Interview.

[516] In March of 1972 alone, dozens of individuals wrote to the government complaining of the official government policy toward Portugal. See various postcards, Inv Nr: 23899, Ministerie van Buitlandse Zaken, Nationaal Archief van Nederland (The Hague, Netherlands).

came into power, placing the Labour politician Jan Pronk in the position of minister of development cooperation. Pronk dramatically expanded the program, putting the equivalent of 6 million Euros into the 1975 budget for aid to the liberation groups (most going to the newly independent leaders of Mozambique, Angola and Guinea Bissau).[517] The government also helped sponsor the AC program to select *cooperantes*, Dutch citizens who volunteered to work for the newly independent countries of southern Africa for short periods of time after independence. By the time freedom arrived in 1975, the AC had built the broad solidarity movement that FRELIMO and before it the CONCP had envisioned.

One Success Follows Another: The Re-Emergence of Solidarity in the United Kingdom

As FRELIMO and the PAIGC gained ground in their military struggles, Western solidarity groups outside of the Netherlands began to take notice. The Vietnam War radicalized many young people, opening a space within Cold War societies where solidarity with the predominantly leftists African nationalists could find some support. In the United States, the American Committee on Africa chose to concentrate its efforts on the Portuguese colonies. In Sweden, a handful of activists broke with the predominant spirit working against the war in Southeast Asia to back the Lusophone groups in Africa. British society may have lagged behind, but it also took note of the growing success of the Lusophone liberation leaders. As it did in the Netherlands, support developed around

[517] Bosgra, 561 and 569.

FRELIMO, branching out to embrace the other movements. Though the solidarity efforts in the United Kingdom would never rival the success of the AC, it too developed a broad following and greatly expanded interest in the socialist agendas of the Portuguese African liberation parties. Due to Britain's preoccupation with South Africa, these two movements would work closely together, and increased attention to the colonies provided a boost to the flagging activity around South Africa.

Both the Anti-Apartheid Movement and the Movement for Colonial Freedom rediscovered Portuguese Africa in the late 1960s. As the only revolutions actively undertaking an armed revolt, FRELIMO, the PAIGC, and the MPLA demanded attention. When Jamaican Rhodes Scholar Trevor Munro invited Eduardo Mondlane to visit Oxford, the MCF and AAM organized a number of public appearances for the liberation leader in London. The FRELIMO president attended a press conference at the House of Commons, gave interviews to a number of national newspapers, spoke to a handful of international organizations, and addressed the students at Oxford.[518] He even gave an interview for the Portuguese broadcast of the BBC.[519] Finding a predominantly positive response to their leader, FRELIMO raved that the visit "proved the British people . . . is in solidarity with the struggle for the liberation of oppressed peoples." Noting that this popular sentiment likely swayed the London government to ignore Portuguese demands that Mondlane not be admitted, the party claimed that "the British people therefore can force [Prime Minister

[518] Anthony Gifford, *The Passionate Advocate* (Kingston: Arawak, 2007), 62.
[519] Gaster interview. The reporter was reportedly sacked shortly thereafter, as BBC policy was never to broadcast the actual voice of liberation leaders.

Harold] Wilson to change his position towards the colonial policy of Portugal."[520] The Mozambican leader may have been encouraged by his reaction, but he was also distressed during his visit to learn just how little these same audiences truly understood about his struggle. Not a single organization worked in support of the Lusophone states, nor did much information penetrate the largely indifferent mass media. "Appalled" at the state of affairs in the United Kingdom, Mondlane and his party sought to develop a domestic organization that could replicate the role played by the AC in Holland.[521]

To accomplish the task, FRELIMO tapped two of its own. A year before Mondlane's visit, a pair of British nationals had become inspired by the socialist, multiracial party and begun work in Tanzania with the FRELIMO government in exile. Polly Gaster and Margaret Dickinson had been traveling across the continent when they met Eduardo Mondlane in a Cairo bar. Inspired by the charismatic man and attracted to the idea of spending time in the exciting milieu of revolutionary Dar Es Salaam, the two progressive young women offered their services to FRELIMO. A budding filmmaker, Dickinson joined the Department of Information with the goal of creating a record of FRELIMO's activities in the liberated territories and began working with Mondlane on the book *Struggle for Mozambique*. Gaster quickly became an indispensable addition to the main office, helping draft letters in support of FRELIMO's international relations and

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[520] "FRELIMO President in UK," *Mozambique Revolution*, 33 (March 1968). Emphasis in original.
[521] Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola, and Guine, "Report: April 1968-1970,"no date, Box 80, American Committee on Africa Papers, Amistad Research Center, Tulane University (New Orleans, LA). The CFMAG noted that Mondlane was "appalled by the lack of knowledge that he found."

assisting Janet Mondlane in the administration of the Mozambique Institute.[522] It had partially been through their efforts that Mondlane had first made contacts with the AAM and MCF before his visit to the United Kingdom. When Tanzania forced the pair out after a failed coup temporarily ignited the anti-western paranoia of Julius Nyerere's government, they seemed the logical choice to head the new organization in London given their close connections to the Mondlanes and dedication to FRELIMO.[523]

The Committee for Freedom in Mozambique launched operations in 1968 with Polly Gaster as its primary organizer. The committee drew on some of the more avant-garde elements within the anti-colonial movement that advocated for direct support to the liberation movements and an expansion of interests beyond the traditional confines of British domains. Judd came to feel that "the watershed in southern Africa was going to be the Portuguese territories."[524] Judd joined with Gaster, the widely published expert on African liberation Basil Davidson, and the young Lord Anthony Gifford, a protégé of Fenner Brockway and the chair of MCF's 1968 event with Mondlane.[525] While either the MCF or the AAM would have been likely champions for Mozambique, their focus on the British colonies and decisions to articulate campaigns *against* colonialism did not quite

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[522] Nadja Manghezi, *O Meu Coração Está nas Mãos de um Negro*, 2nd. Edition (Maputo: Centro de Esutdos Africanos, 2001), 271-272. Also, Gaster interview and Margaret Dickinson, Skype interview with author, 2 October 2013.

[523] Gaster Interview.

[524] According to Judd, it had actually been Frank Ferrari of the American African Institute that first convinced him of this position. Lord Frank Judd, Interview with Christabel Gurney, 29 November 2000, reproduced on the Anti-Apartheid Movement Archives Committee Forward to Freedom Project, online: http://www.aamarchives.org/

[525] Dickinson at this point remained in Kenya working with Mondlane on the book, but she would rejoin Gaster and the newly formed CFM upon her return to the UK in May 1968. Other early supporters included Liberal Hilary Wainwright, Labour MP Frank Judd, and Lord Kilbracken, the latter of which mainly occupied a prominent place on the letterhead.

capture the transnational goals of FRELIMO. Rather, Mondlane desired an organization that could pledge, as Gifford remembered, "solidarity *with* the nationalist movement."[526] The main difference was the emphasis laid by the activists on their support for the revolutionary aspects of the solidarity struggle:

> We had a difference in approach in that we were directly in support of FRELIMO, rather than against anti-colonialism. The Anti-Apartheid Movement tells you what it is against, but it's not very clear what it is for. . . We supported FRELIMO without reservations . . . We believed not only in their goals, but we believed in their methods –their means, which was, although they were a military movement . . . to educate, and uplift, and eventually liberate their people.[527]

This committed core of activists devoted their energies to publicizing FRELIMO, often promoting a slightly more radical agenda than the AAM that felt obliged to cater to the mainstream public. This focus on the rightness of the active armed struggle appealed to the '68 generation that had grown disillusioned with the preference for non-violence still dominant in the British Anti-Apartheid movement. Angola and Mozambique were more understandable for students who had come to support the struggles in Vietnam and Cuba.[528] Membership ranged from center socialist MP Judd to a handful of communists.[529] The positive socialist nature of this work as well as its relation to an armed military movement helped bridge the gap between southern African and popular organizing around Vietnam in a way that the AAM had not yet managed.

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[526] Gifford, 62-64. Quoted, 63. Mondlane introduced Gifford to Gaster at the MCF event, while both had existing contacts with Basil Davidson.
[527] Tony Gifford, phone interview with author, 1 August 2013 (Jamaica).
[528] Peter Brayshaw, Interview with Christabel Gurney, December 2013, reproduced on the Anti-Apartheid Movement Archives Committee Forward to Freedom Project.
[529] Judd Interview, AAM.

This did not mean that the Committee for Freedom in Mozambique rejected the established anti-colonial groups; rather it considered itself an important compliment to the activities of these broader based movements. It remained small without a rigidly enforced structure as a way of maintaining flexibility and accomplishing its goals with a minimum of bureaucratic waste. Margaret Dickinson remembered, "It wasn't a membership organization. It was a kind of 'anyone who wants to put in a bit of work can come and work with us.'"[530] In order to build the mass political base in Britain that FRELIMO desired, it worked closely with the AAM. The committee would tap into the national network of local South African committees to find support for its programs and help distribute its literature, welcoming anyone who was willing to give their time to the liberation parties. In this way, the committee literally worked fist-in-glove with the larger AAM, using its established manpower to create a new movement that included a more diverse political and racial array.[531] As the committee began distributing its pamphlets on FRELIMO and traveling around the country, the other CONCP parties requested that the committee also work on their behalf, since the three considered their struggles to attain socialist African states as indivisible. With the quick approval of FRELIMO, the group broadened its activities to include the other embattled colonies, changing its name to include them as the Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola, and Guine (CFMAG).[532] By 1969, the CFMAG had

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[530] Interview, Margaret Dickinson.

[531] According to Margaret Dickson "We didn't expect to get mass rallies on this issue. What we expected to get was apartheid would get mass [rallies], but the issue of the Portuguese colonies would be one of the things" brought to the public attention.

[532] CFM, "Secretary's Report 18 November 1969," Folder 40, CFMAG Paper, Bishopsgate Institute; Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola, and Guine, "Report: April 1968-1970,"no date, Box 80, ACOA Papers; Gifford, 63; Gaster interview.

become the most vocal proponent for the Portuguese colonies in the United Kingdom. Given the lull in South African activism during this so-called "difficult decade," the Lusophone liberation cause swiftly ascended to be among the most important popular issues of the early 1970s.

Much like the AC in the Netherlands, the committee adopted as its primary mission the publicizing of the ideologies and activities of the three Lusophone parties. The first publication set a tone for future campaigns when *Mozambique – County at War* appeared in early 1969. In the introduction, Eduardo Mondlane depicted in sometimes grisly detail the Portuguese war in his country and British complicity in providing financial and military support. Yet more important was his overview of Mozambican efforts to build a society in the liberated territories. Indeed, in his final message to the British people, he urged them to force political action against Portugal not for the negative purpose of destroying colonialism, but for the more positive and universal campaign to overcome racialism and economic inequality.[533] Sadly, the CFMAG's commitment to this cause would be tested by Mondlane's tragic death in 1969.

Mondlane's assassination emerged from deep divides within FRELIMO that extended back into the years before the union of the various parties in 1962. Power struggles for leadership of the party, as well as disagreements over the requirement of educated youths to fight on the frontlines led to criticisms of the sitting president, notably attacking his marriage to a white American. Though Raimundo Pachinuapa, the military

[533] Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, *Mozambique – Country at War* (London: no date [late 1968 or early 1969]), introduction.

commander of Cabo Delgado, maintains that the majority of the people and all of the military backed Mondlane, the situation in Tanzania became toxic.[534] With possible encouragement from antagonistic southern African security forces, the internal conflict culminated in February of 1969 when a bomb hidden in a book killed Mondlane. The party filled the void left by the assassination with a triumvirate leadership that include Marcelino dos Santos, military commander Samora Machel, and longtime vice-president, Uriah Simango. This situation lasted only a few months, as tensions continued until Simango was expelled from the party's central committee, taking with him a number of other high officials who would eventually form a small, competing nationalist party. The Simango defections included representatives in Egypt and Sweden, effectively broadcasting to the world the depth of the schism.[535] Though FRELIMO quickly righted itself, it faced an uphill battle convincing the world that it remained able to persecute the war.

As a result, nationalist diplomacy accelerated again after 1969. According to Samora Machel, this infighting effectively "paralyzed" the party's leadership between 1967 and 1969, providing Portugal with an opportunity to claim a partial victory in Mozambique.[536] Moreover, Lisbon had effectively used the rise of conservative governments in the United States and Britain to gain new financial and military support.[537] These developments threatened the gains of the liberation movements in all of the colonies, particularly Mozambique and Angola. The CONCP solution: "the internationalization of

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[534] Raimundo Domingos Pachinuapa, *40 Anniversário II Congresso da Frente de Libertação de Moçambique: Memorias* (Maputo: R.D. Pachinuapa, 2009), 45.
[535] Hanlon, 33.
[536] Quoted in Hanlon, 27.
[537] See chapter 2.

colonialist aggression must be opposed with internationalized anti-colonial and anti-imperial action."[538] Winning Portugal's allies to its cause would strike a double blow in this battle, weakening Lisbon while strengthening the nationalists. Moreover, the growth of interest in the revolutions in Sweden and the Netherlands proved to the CONCP parties that they could find a positive reception among a wide swath of Europeans. Therefore, the liberation movements agreed that changing events had made "the mobilisation of public opinion in the West . . . a task of the first importance."[539]

The events surrounding FRELIMO provided the CFMAG with more reasons to expand its informational campaign, which produced impressive results in a short time. In addition to its publications, which included the magazine *Guerillheiro*, CFMAG members became regular staples on the university and union speaking circuits. Especially popular were the handful of films that committee members accompanied around the country, including a Yugoslavian movie about FRELIMO and the British-produced documentary on the military struggle in Guinea-Bissau.[540] Miffed by the focus on armed conflict, CFMAG member Margaret Dickinson journeyed to Mozambique to make her own film, privileging the social reconstruction occurring in the liberated territories. Her film, *Behind the Lines*, became one of the CFMAG's most important contributions to spreading

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538 "The Rome Conference," Mozambique Revolution 44 (September 1970).

539 "The Rome Conference June 1970," Mozambique Revolution 42 (March 1970), 19 and 21. The most important proof of this change in attitude was the CONCP movements' decision to call the Rome Conference. The movements gathered western solidarity groups together in a single location, so they could decided as a group how best to organize campaigns to isolate Portugal and undermine its ties to the Western alliance.

540 Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola, and Guine, "Report: April 1968-1970,"no date, Folder 40, CFMAG Papers, Bishopsgate.

knowledge about the revolutions, though the film proved too controversial to be shown on BBC.[541] The committee also hosted half a dozen visits by FRELIMO party members, as well as one each from the PAIGC and MPLA within the first two years of its existence.[542] The committee did not seek to establish local affiliates but rather to encourage existing organizations to establish their own solidarity programs. By 1971, student groups, community organizations, and unions in nearly a dozen cities had begun working for the cause of African liberation. In 1970, the Labour Party even passed a resolution at its annual conference favoring moral and material support for the liberation movements. The CFMAG remained skeptical of the extent to which the nice words would translate to concrete action, but it noted with satisfaction that the resolution "makes a useful weapon."[543]

The success of the revolutions and CFMAG information campaigns in Britain provided an opportunity for the expansion of British solidarity into something larger, which might recapture some of the grassroots participation of 1961. This earlier coalition had included the AAM, which CFMAG had worked with closely since it founding. Impressed by the success of Portuguese solidarity network and having little news to work with in South Africa, the older organization gradually shifted its emphasis away from South Africa toward a much broader approach to the region. By 1970, the movement had come to realize

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[541] Margaret Dickinson, "Journey with a Camera," Mozambique Revolution 45, October 1970; Dickinson Interview.
[542] Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola, and Guine, "Report: April 1968-1970,"no date, Box 80, ACOA Papers.
[543] CFMAG, "Report of Activities, 1970-1971," Paper submitted to Easter Conference, 1971, Folder 1, CFMAG Papers.

that "battles fought in any one of the Southern African territories will be battles for the future of the whole region." Portuguese Africa had become the center of the active struggle, and thus one of the primary objects of British activism.[544] But in order for these parties to grow this coalition and build a true grassroots movement, they needed a cause that resonated in Britain. And the problem of Cahora Bassa that had so affected the Swedish offered the perfect solution, because within the transnational conglomerate assisting in the construction of the dam were a handful of British firms. Sietse Bosgra had first revealed this fact in an exposé on the project published in the Angolan bulletin.[545] But it would be more than mere information that would be shared, because the British Cahora Bassa campaign would be the first to benefit from the formalization of the emerging transnational solidarity network.

This took the form of a meeting Italian activists organized on behalf of the Portuguese colonies in Rome. The conference had emerged from FRELIMO's concern with its international standing and a wider CONCP anxiety about Portugal's sudden attempts to ingratiate itself in the Western alliance under Marcello Caetano. With a special reference to large-scale economic projects like the Cahora Bassa dam, the parties feared the "open-door policy in the colonies. . . corresponds to a more accentuated international type of aggression" that might threaten the progress they had made in the West. The conference was designed to reaffirm the commitment of European solidarity groups and

[544] Anti-Apartheid Movement, "Report on Activities and Developments: Annual Report October 1972 – September 1973," (Fall: 1973).
[545] Polly Gaster of the CFMAG was in regular contact with Sietse Bosgra. Both the AAM and the CFMAG also participated in annual solidarity conferences among European groups, which began in 1970 and continued each Easter until the coup following the 1974 conference.

create structures for the exchange of information and tactics.[546] At its heart, though, the conference also hoped to reinforce Western identification with the global South through the affirmation of what FRELIMO called a singular "internationalist identity." The Rome gathering would show "in practice that there is identity of interests among the masses of all continents, thus contributing to the consolidation of friendship and solidarity among the peoples of the Portuguese colonies and the peoples of the world."[547]

While the conference would be pivotal in formalizing a Western network, this first meeting was a truly global event. More than 250 delegates representing 177 solidarity organizations from 64 countries attended the event. More than just a gathering of activists, unions, religious groups, youth and women's movements, student organizations, and political parties were all represented. Among the participants were members of the AC, the CFMAG, the AAM, various Swedish solidarity groups, and a handful of radical American groups just beginning to cohere (see next chapter). They were joined by representatives of African, Asian, and Eastern European countries, as well as the senior leaders of the three CONCP liberation parties. The gathering was the culmination of the inclusive internationalist movement the parties had been building for half a decade, providing evidence, according to FRELIMO, than the anti-imperial "interests which link the peoples fighting for independence, the Western peoples opposing capitalist oppression and the peoples of the socialist countries, are already understood by everybody." As a result, individual sessions focused less on specifics of ideology than on practical matters,

546 "The Rome Conference," *Mozambique Revolution* 42 (March 1970), 21.
547 "The Rome Conference," *Mozambique Revolution* 43 (June 1970), 19.

specifically how to organize a "mass popular action" in the West that could prevent Portugal from implementing new military strategies to combat the revolutions.[548] Individual sessions provided activist and their allies with an opportunity to meet each other, exchange ideas, and plan future projects. It was here that groups like the CFMAG and the AAM learned how they could replicate successful grassroots organizing around Cahora Bassa, which they launched with similar success to its Swedish predecessor in the United Kingdom. After, its conclusion the AAM marveled the conference was "the first of its kind, [and] marked a significant advance in international recognition of the liberation movements and increased support for the struggle of their peoples."[549] Annual Easter Conferences reuniting the Western solidarity movements would continue until 1974, providing a forum for regular exchanges of information and campaign ideas.

Encouraged by this international show of solidarity, CFMAG and AAM launched their own campaign against Cahora Bassa around the time of the Rome Conference. With the assistance of a handful of other progressive groups, they took aim at the ZAMCO consortium as part of the inspirationally named Dambusters Mobilising Committee.[550] According to longtime MCF chair Fenner Brockway, the dam represented the "climax" of both Portuguese Africa's integration into the regional bloc of southern Africa and the regime's attempts to buoy its wars through the entanglement of its Western allies.[551] As

[548] "The Rome Conference," *Mozambique Revolution* 44 (September 1970), 13.
[549] AntiApartheid Movement, "Annual Report September'69/August '70," (London: AAM, 1970), 33.
[550] The name of the committee played on the famous "Dambusters" raid of 1943, attesting to the important role played by solidarity groups in packaging solidarity action in a way that directly appealed to local contexts.
[551] Brockway, The Colonial Revolution, 391.

such, the campaign made sense as both solidarity with Portuguese Africa and with the anti-apartheid cause. These facts have led many like Roger Fieldhouse to attribute the genesis of the work to the AAM, but clearly this is at best an oversimplification.[552] Polly Gaster confirms that the AAM came to the CFMAG with the idea of a protest program, but the organization and its ANC allies drew directly from FRELIMO and the inspiration of the Swedish, Dutch, and German movements that had already taken action by the fall of 1969. Moreover, though the CFMAG received almost no mention in the literature on Anti-Apartheid organizing, Polly Gaster and Lord Gifford were important components providing knowledge of the Mozambican revolution and introducing the matter into political debates.[553] It was this coalition that decided to focus their activism on Barclay's Bank, which was providing loans to ZAMCO.

Cahora Bassa inspired a two year war on Barclay's. The Dambusters urged a boycott of the bank, pushing members to close their accounts and discouraging students from opening new ones. Pamphlets, posters, speaking engagements, and teach-ins pushed the message that supporters of repressive southern African regimes "are in every town and high street."[554] As with coffee before it, banking with Barclay's implied the use of blood money. The Mobilising committee also explored novel methods of publicizing their activities, hosting a "Cabora Bassa game" that encouraged public participation in the

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[552] Fieldhouse, 87. Fieldhouse claims that Dambusters Mobilising Committee was "set up at the behest of the ANC."

[553] Gaster was the representative of FRELIMO interests on the DMC, while Gifford introduced the topic into the House of Lords with great fanfare. See Minutes of Meetings, Dambusters Mobilizing Committee, 1970, in Folder: Dambusters Mobilising Committee and the Cahora Bassa Dam, MSS AAM 1083 Anti-Apartheid Papers, Rhodes House, Bodleian Library (Oxford, UK). Gifford Interview.

[554] "Mozambique – Cabora Bassa – stop sanctions busting now," no date [1970], ibid.

problem in order to raise awareness.[555] Very quickly, public sympathy started to build. In midst of campaign, CFMAG hosted Amílcar Cabral, who made appearances in Manchester and London. In stark contrast to Mondlane's appearance three years earlier, thousands attended Cabral's speeches.[556] Cabral proved especially popular with Britain's black, primarily Caribbean community, who came in masses to hear him speak. Urged by the Guinean leader to look beyond their race to the cause of solidarity, he and other liberation representatives who visited Britain during these years urged that African peoples cooperate with progressive groups like the CFMAG and the AAM.[557] As a result, black participation in the campaign grew tremendously in the early 1970s, adding yet another element to the broad front targeting Barclay's.[558] Cognizant of the growing hostility to the dam, the British government prepared statements with the expectation that its foreign officials would be questioned in Parliament. British companies were involved in the ZAMCO consortium to back the dam, but it elided the more problematic role of Barclay's in offering to finance the project.[559]

After two years of protest, the bank finally withdrew from the ZAMCO consortium in 1972. Like ASEA before it, the company protested that other factors forced it to revisit its investment plans. Activists claimed victory nonetheless. Whatever the exact truth, the

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[555] CFMAG, "Report of Activities, 1970-1971," Paper submitted to Easter Conference 1971, Folder 1, CFMAG Papers.
[556] Tony Gifford Interview.
[557] Polly Gaster Interview.
[558] Tony Gifford noted that it was especially strong for the End the Alliance Campaign of 1973.
[559] Speaking notes [for defensive purposes only], "Southern Africa," no date, Folder: UK Policy for Export of Ammunitions to Portuguese Africa, FCO 45/513, United Kingdom National Archives, (Kew, United Kingdom).

Dambusters campaign was a milestone in organizing around the cause of southern Africa. As the AAM noted in its annual review for 1971, the campaign "exposed the role of western economic involvement . . . in Southern Africa in a highly specific way" and "brought those companies involved into open conflict with anti-apartheid forces."[560] Investigations into the bank also revealed its extensive dealings with South Africa. Even after the company ended its participation in the dam scheme, the AAM maintained its boycott until the bank finally withdrew completely from South Africa in 1986. As chronicler Roger Fieldhouse has argued, the bank campaign that began by targeting Portuguese colonialism became "one of AAM's most high profile" in the history of the movement.[561]

More importantly for this narrative, the activities of the CFMAG and its allies effectively changed the British view of Africa. As Polly Gaster recalled, the Dambusters were "The first thing that put the Portuguese colonies on the map."[562] Now cognizant of the CONCP parties and their policies of socialist self-determination and interracialism, subsequent campaigns were able to draw on a greatly expanded base of sympathizers. When dictator Marcello Caetano visited Britain in 1973, the CFMAG marshaled thousands of activists to take to the street demanding an end to the centuries old alliance with Portugal. Streets leading to Buckingham Palace were crowded with protesters estimated at well over ten thousand.[563] Planned to be the debut of Caetano's modern totalitarianism to the

[560] Quoted in Fieldhouse, 88.
[561] Ibid.
[562] Polly Gaster Interview.
[563] Tony Gifford Interview.

European public, the visit turned into a fiasco much to the dismay of the Lisbon regime.[564] Importantly, this mobilization did not fall away after Caetano left British shores, as a number of the local committees established to organize demonstrations became the first iterations of CFMAG sub-groups across the country.[565] The ability of the CFMAG to marshal these forces was never fully realized though, as the Portuguese regime collapsed under domestic pressure nine months after Caetano's visit. Yet far from representing a failure, the creation of this solidarity movement and the forging of transnational connections across the continent would set the stage for the revival of the anti-apartheid movement.

Conclusion

After the Angolan rebellion of 1961, Portuguese Africa became one of a number of causes backed by European champions of the developing world. Though not as widespread as the later anti-apartheid movement or the contemporary anti-Vietnam demonstrations, activists developed effective campaigns to support the cause. As the Cold War helped remove barriers to support for socialist parties, solidarity with Portuguese Africa emerged as one of the preeminent European movements of the 1970s. During this period, activists created extensive networks of contacts with the socialist liberation parties. FRELIMO in

[564] Tony Gifford believe that the failed publicity tour had much larger effects, stating that "I have no doubt at all that the Caetano visit led directly to the overthrow of Caetano . . . I do think there was an example there about the combination of the work of the liberation movement with solidarity movements like ours, being echoed inside Portugal." Tony Gifford Interview.

[565] Polly Gaster estimates there were about 10-20 that conducted activities after the End the Alliance campaign, though the collapse of the regime nine months later meant that the effects of the newly expanded CFMAG were never fully tested. Polly Gaster Interivew.

particular was especially active in promoting the expansion of solidarity, pushing its European allies to develop the broadest possible movements in order to sway official policy against allied Portugal. While the movement struggled in early years, it began to make progress in the late 1960s based on a strategy of tying its campaigns to radical critiques of both the Cold War in Vietnam and elsewhere. Though most activity emerged from the left, the pursuit of international justice in the form of domestic boycotts helped incorporate the socialist CONCP parties of Portuguese Africa into the moderate mainstream of European politics. These events in the midst of the Cold War helped pave the way for widespread acceptance of similar parties from Zimbabwe and South Africa in later decades.

The tactics pioneered during this period would also become mainstays of future movements. Successful boycotts, the use of stock to disrupt corporate shareholder meetings, and government lobbying were all perfected in the early 1970s around the question of Portuguese Africa. In some cases like that of the AC, this expertise would be directly carried over into a new organization. Thus, anti-apartheid organizing was able to draw on a professional activist leadership that had learned from both its success and its mistakes in the 1960s and 1970s. Many of these individuals, like Sietse Bosgra, had a bevy of contacts in Africa, Europe, and even the Americas that contributed to the creation of a kind of transnational civil society. Many of these groups had also established extensive contacts within the government by the collapse of the Portuguese empire, making it far easier for Bosgra, Tony Gifford, and others to have new ideas on South Africa considered seriously – if not always successfully – in the halls of power. European solidarity had

established the model, especially in the NATO countries of Britain and the Netherlands. It remained to be seen whether a similar movement could be assembled in the United States.

Chapter 4: "Something More than Words"

The New Left, Liberal Humanitarianism, and Grassroots Solidarity

In April of 1970, the struggle for Portuguese African liberation was finally taken up by American activists, not in the form of bombs or bullets, but by a cross-section of American society wielding ballots at the annual shareholders' meeting of the Gulf Oil Corporation. The Pittsburgh-based oil giant was the single largest American investor in Portuguese colonialism, turning a sizeable profit from its drilling facilities off the coast of Angola. For nearly a year, popular pressure had been building to launch a major boycott of Gulf, which would unite radical, religious, and liberal communities. More than three dozen protesters arrived at the shareholders' meeting, holding tickets in proxy for major investors or having bought a single share that would allow them entrance to the Carnegie Music Hall. Four hundred more protesters marched in front of the entrance waving flags emblazoned with "Gulf Kills," chanting constantly for the corporation to abandon its alliance with Lisbon's blatant colonialism. The goal of the agitators was to make it impossible for Gulf to conduct its business as usual so long as the company remained steadfast in working with Portugal to exploit the African continent as usual.

And disrupt the meeting they did – loudly, obnoxiously, but peacefully. The crowd of predominantly young people chanted and yelled slogans, quieting to let those among them share prepared statements. Activists lined up at the floor microphones to make long impassioned speeches on the wrongs of Gulf Oil, some taking so much time that Gulf Chairman E.D. Brockett declared them out of order and had the protesters removed forcibly

from the room.[566] Their list of demands was simple and put them in solidarity not just with Angola but many Third World peoples: end exploitation of resources in the developing world, stop feeding the military sectors of the United States and Portugal, and replace the board with representatives democratically elected from the communities in which Gulf operated.[567] One by one, protesters nominated their own candidates for the board, drawn mostly from the liberation movements abroad and the radical fringes of American society. Among other names proffered were PAIGC head Amílcar Cabral, David Dellinger of "Chicago Seven" fame, and Black Panther Angela Davis. George Houser of the American Committee on Africa (ACOA) nominated Agostinho Neto of the MPLA in a lengthy speech, before pro-management attendees shouted him down as he attempted to read excerpts from Neto's poetry. Regular chants of "throw him out" proved almost as disruptive as the demonstration itself, reminding one young activist of the Passion play cries of "crucify him" she had grown up with in church.[568] The disruptions eventually led to a number of arrests, mostly of students who refused to abandon microphones despite polite threats from security officers.[569]

In contrast to the predominantly male, white, upper-class business crowd speaking on behalf of Gulf, the protesters represented a spectrum of interests and ideologies. From radicals to national religious leaders, they united in support of the Angolan cause and in

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566 "Gulf Oil Earnings Skidded 15% in Quarter; Protesters Set Off Uproar at Meeting," *Wall Street Journal*, 29 April 1970.
567 Gulf Action Project, "Demands to be presented April 28, 1970 at Gulf Stockholders' Meeting," [nd], Private Papers of Gail Hovey (provided to the author).
568 Gail Hovey, phone interview with author, 9 July 2014; Hovey, Journal, 83, Private Papers of Gail Hovey.
569 Philip Greer, "10 Arrested at Gulf Meeting," *Washington Post*, 29 April 1970.

opposition to Gulf's exploitative activities elsewhere. Speakers represented Houser's ACOA, the Southern Africa Committee (SAC) from New York, the pacifists of the Quaker American Friends Service Committee, and church organizations. The local Pittsburgh Gulf Action Project helped organized the event, joining internationally minded groups with union-based demands that Gulf respect community calls for greater transparency and the interests of its workers. Ideological and tactical divides complicated relations between the 40 or so protesters, with most chuckling at the communist demands to do away with a money system, while some senior church leaders were noticeably uncomfortable in the increasingly loud context. John Coventry Smith, the secretary general of the United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, had come to Pittsburgh to voice his denomination's dismay at Gulf practices in Angola, but he was noticeably uncomfortable with the tactics and rhetoric used by his younger colleagues. When it was his time to speak, he declined, replying that he had communicated his objections to chairman Brockett earlier in a written statement.[570] Such divisions, however, were not apparent to outside observers, who only saw the success of the movement in achieving their goal: disrupting the business of Gulf Oil.

Brockett and Gulf President B.R. Dorsey spent much of the two and a half hours defending their record overseas and at home. Amid the commotion, no one had a chance to nominate the management's slate to the board of directors or elect outside accountants. Brockett announced both before he had a chance to pick up ballots for shareholders voting

[570] Gail Hovey, phone interview with author, 9 July 2014; Hovey, Journal, 83, Private Papers of Gail Hovey (provided to the author).

in person, providing an illustration of the undemocratic nature of the corporation that confirmed for the activists one of their central criticisms. Despite their successful efforts to bring attention to Gulf's foreign transactions, the forty demonstrators did not have the power to upset the board nominations or pass their amendments on transparency and exploitation. They had, however, made a point, and they exited the auditorium before the meeting concluded to march through the city and link up with other local protests conducted concurrently. During the period of quiet, Brockett announced that earnings had fallen 15% in the first quarter despite an increase in production volume.[571] He did not speculate about the relationship between the drop in profits and the protesters who had overtaken the room.

The Gulf boycott effectively launched that day was the most successful of a number of initiatives deployed by activists to help isolate Portugal and strengthen the revolutionary parties of the CONCP countries. As the most active and successful liberation movements during this period, the Lusophone struggles became a shorthand for wider demands for self-determination in southern Africa as they had in Europe. And also as in Europe, the growth of solidarity was heavily influenced by the Vietnam War, which disrupted Cold War politics and carved a space for activists across the political spectrum to question liberal dogma and articulate wider criticisms of American foreign policy. The solidarity movement grew in this space around a network of young radicals who understood FRELIMO and other CONCP parties as transnational extensions of the domestic civil

[571] Greer, "10 Arrested at Gulf Meeting,"; "Gulf Oil Earnings Skidded 15% in Quarter; Protesters Set Off Uproar at Meeting"; Gulf Action Project, "Demands to be presented April 28, 1970 at Gulf Stockholders' Meeting."

rights movement. These youths were in essence a part of the New Left, merging religious humanism with left-leaning Marxism, even as they retained ties to mainstream institutions like the National Council of Churches (NCC) and the ACOA. It was here that the liberation solidarity differed from much of the historiography of the anti-war movement. Whereas the rise and fall of a mass protest culture has been well documented, it has largely overlooked the margins of this fight where young radicals worked extensively and efficiently with establishment organizations.[572] Uniting behind the CONCP and its member parties' calls to build a mass movement to change American policy provided common ground that linked the far left to the center. A variety of organizations established distinct ideological, strategic, and regional identities. Yet most worked actively with any group championing decolonization, in shared actions like the one in Pittsburgh in 1972 and well into the decade often depicted as the vacuous dénouement to the idealistic 1960s.[573]

This chapter builds on the contention that a new American internationalism emerged from global anti-racist and anti-imperial struggles, inspired largely by national liberation movements that, according to Max Elbaum, "seemed to be daily shattering the notion of U.S. invincibility."[574] Internationalists abandoned the idea that the United States

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[572] Charles DeBenedetti with Charles Chatfield, *An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1990); Terry H. Anderson, *The Movement and the Sixties* (New York: Oxford, 1995); Douglas Rossinow, *Visions of Progress* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2008), chapter 6.

[573] See Todd Gitlin, *The Sixties: Year of Hope, Days of Rage* (New York: Bantam, 1993); David Farber, *The Age of Great Dreams* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1994); Melvin Small, *Antiwarriors* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002). Michael Kazin, *American Dreamers: How the Left Changed a Nation* (New York: Vintage, 2011), 248-264

[574] Max Elbaum, "What Legacy from the Radical Internationalism of 1968?" *Radical History Review* 82 (Winter 2002), 38. See also Cynthia Young, Soul Power: Culture, Radicalism, and the Making of the U.S. Third World Left (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006); Van Gosse, *Rethinking the New Left* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

had the right or indeed the ability to intervene in the developing world, embraced socialist nationalists in these regions, and agitated for a serious reorganization of the global economic system that maintained deeply unequal relationships between the global north and south. Yet in contrast to Elbaum's emphasis on Marxist-Leninist radicals, the development of the Portuguese African solidarity network reveals a much broader shift to the left.[575] While young radicals certainly embraced a vaguely Marxist critique of the international system, many liberal and centrist groups also abandoned Cold War pretenses in favor of an internationalist outlook that demanded a new foreign policy based on greater cooperation with Third World priorities and moral constraints on unbridled capitalism. This leftward movement occurred in response to international events, but also with the encouragement of young radicals integrated into and allied with establishment institutions. This coalition harnessed various constituencies disillusioned with the Cold War and Vietnam behind a new internationalist outlook, which began the process of building a decentralized, diverse, but influential solidarity movement with socialist African liberation parties. Elbaum is correct that the Marxist aspects of this leftward shift withered in the 1970s, but he and others fail to see that the broader and only slightly less radical critique of American society became embedded in a broad range of institutions – churches, lobbying organizations, and even the government – that offered a major dissenting voice against the ongoing Cold War and national power projection in the Third World.

[575] Max Elbaum, *Revolution in the Air: Sixties Radicals Turn to Lenin, Mao, and Che* (Verso: 2002), chapters 2-3.

Religious Radicalism: New Left Missionaries and the Zambia Group

More so than in Europe, religious ties laid the foundations for the growth of solidarity in the United States, but here too the movement depended on youth activists attracted to the inclusive leftist ideology of the CONCP parties. The Protestant missionary linkages with Angola, Mozambique, and South Africa helped introduce the cause of African liberation to the United States. Yet the boycotts of the 1950s and the religious outcry over the Angolan rebellion had been fleeting. The central role of the missions and Cold War concerns meant that Holden Roberto received the majority of American aid due in large part to his self-depiction as an anti-communist.[576] As the Portuguese continued their campaign against foreign Protestants and Roberto became increasingly distracted by political infighting, American agitation for liberation receded. Certainly, South Africa and to a lesser extent Portuguese Africa remained a concern for religious leaders, but there was no meaningful action on the topic. The violence of the revolutions also alienated many churches, notably pacifists like the Quakers. Christians were concerned about racial and social justice overseas, but there were many ideas and few solutions.

Even as national attention to southern Africa waxed and waned, the churches could not ignore the rapidly shifting landscape of the international system. Decolonization challenged not only political but also religious borders. Most affected were missionaries, many of whom were concentrated in Third World countries. In the 1950s, a new generation of internationally minded Christians began to reconsider the traditional missionary impulse

[576] See letter, William Channel to Duncan Wood, 15 February 1963, Folder: Mozambique and Angola, Box: ISD 1963 Refugee Prog. Overseas, American Friends Service Committee Archives (Philadelphia, PA). (Hereafter AFSC).

within the context of changing perceptions of morality, economic development, and North-South relations. Among the leaders of this movement was Margaret Flory, the dynamic Presbyterian secretary for student work of the Commission on World Mission of the National Student Christian Federation (NSCF).[577] She believed Protestant churches had to rethink their patriarchal, Eurocentric forms of international engagement, but exactly what should replace the tradition was not clear. The question, as one of Flory's programs would later put it, was "How can the movement of missions be shifted from the pattern of the West sending to the East, the older sending to the younger churches, to one of the whole Church – the churches together as peers – going together to live and work in the midst of frontiers that exist in every part of the world?"[578] Flory hoped to find the answers by sending young people to explore a set of global challenges created by revolution, demands for racial equality, and the East-West conflict.

In the closing days of 1959, the 18th Ecumenical Student Conference on the Christian World Mission began the process of addressing the heady topic. Under Flory's leadership, the gathering of more than 3600 students from over 75 countries focused on a handful of these new "frontiers" – months before the election of the president that would introduce a similar vocabulary to the nation. They asked how the churches could deal with a range of issues from technological upheaval to the growth of a "university world," but the majority of the nine frontiers dealt with matters connecting the West with the Third

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[577] For more information on Flory and her role in the Christian international mission, see her memoir, Margaret Flory, *Moments in Time: One Woman's Ecumenical Journey* (New York: Friendship Press, 1995).

[578] "Frontier Internships" CR.33/8/60 (nd, c 1960), Box 13, RG 86 Margaret Flory Papers, Yale Divinity Library (New Haven, CT). Hereafter, Flory Papers, YDL.

World: racial tensions, new nationalisms, responsible statesmanship, displaced peoples, and communism.[579] The conference provided a forum for the exchange of new ideas for how young, socially minded people could address the emerging global problems of the 1960s, led by an international roster of famous contributors including Martin Luther King Jr.

Also at the Ohio Conference was Eduardo Mondlane, a pivotal figure driving a sustained interest in Africa within Protestant churches. As mentioned in previous chapters, his studies at Oberlin and Northwestern had been arranged and partially funded through the NCC, the New York-based bureaucracy that acted as a kind of deliberative council for the diverse Protestant churches, especially in international affairs. Through his church connections, he became a regular presence at Christian camps and deliberations as a spokesperson for African nationalism.[580] It had been at these camps that he made connections with religious youth ranging from his wife, Janet, to the future civil rights leader Andrew Young. He also spoke regularly at churches, introducing middle-class parishioners to moderate African nationalism.[581] This travel built a network of contacts in

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[579] "Annual Report: Department of Lay Ecumenical Action of the Division of Ecumenical Relations," 1960, Box 1A, Flory Papers, YDL.

[580] See "Record of Special Meeting on Angola," 20 June 1961, Box 11, RG 8, National Council of Churches Papers, Presbyterian Historical Society (Philadelphia, PA). Hereafter, NCC, PHS.

[581] For example, Mondlane spoke at the North American Assembly of African Affairs alongside NCC Africa Committee head Emory Ross, addressed Africa's place in a "turbulent world" at the Evanston Missionary Union in 1954, and joined St. Mark's Methodist Church in Harlem for an Africa symposium in 1959. See Richard J.H. Johnson, "Christians' Unity Help World Need," *New York Times*, 17 June 1952; "Mission Union Will Convene at St. Mark's," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, 21 October 1954; "Symposiums on Africa Set for St. Mark's," *New York Amsterdam News*, 24 October 1959. In 1952 alone, Mondlane attended Methodist Youth Conference Camps in 5 states and another interdenominational one at Purdue. See Letter, Clerc to Ross, 14 July 1951 and Letter, Mondlane to Ross, 12 December 1952, Box 15, RG 8 Division of Overseas Ministries, NCC Papers, PHS.

the church and progressive political communities that dwarfed Roberto's. Among its members was Margaret Flory, whom he had known since 1953.[582] Nearly a decade of activism and travel provided Mondlane access to the religious youth culture that would prove vital in building a solidarity movement.

This youth culture had one of its first African tests in 1961, when the Angolan revolution and the persecution of Protestants demanded church attention. The Methodist and Baptist missionaries who raised relief funds with dramatic tails about atrocities, torture, and imprisonment had a major impact on students. Young people were interested in hearing directly from Africans with experiences in the colonies, and Mondlane was the logical choice. He spoke widely in the wake of the Angolan revolution, often to youth and church organizations.[583] In one example, the Methodist Student Movement focused their 1961 annual conference on the plight of Portuguese colonies, and they looked to Mondlane to help organize it. He became the bridge to nationalist Africa. One staff member recalled: "[Mondlane] worked side by side with [Methodist students], relaxing over coffee, talking far into the night, explaining fine points of political or economic analysis, telling stories of his people, their suffering, and their victories."[584] Discussion bred action. The NSCF – a coalition of campus church groups – urged its members to lobby the government and the

[582] Flory, *Moments in Time*, 83.
[583] Henry Crane, "Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane, 1920-1969," no date [c. 1969], Box 22, RG 8 Series II Africa Committee, Division of Overseas Ministries, NCC, PHS.
[584]Ruth Harris, "Ruth Harris," in Sara M. Evans, ed., *Journey That Opened Up the World: Women, Student Christian Movements, and Social Justice, 1955-1975* (2003), 34.

UN on Angola, distributing resolutions drafted by Union Theological Seminary in New York and ACOA to build support.[585]

These interactions provided a window into African struggles and introduced Americans to a new, more vibrant vision of African culture. They also inspired interest in the emerging frontiers of global life that Flory had begun to explore.[586] Among the individuals leading this movement was Henry (Hank) Crane, the son of Congo missionaries, who had met Mondlane in the 1950s and roomed with him at the Athens Conference. In long conversations about both the politically volatile Congo and Africa more generally, Mondlane would "unmask the vagaries, inconsistencies, and hypocrisy of U.S. foreign policy in relation to Africa, exposing the vast chasm between the ideals we profess publicly as a nation and the narrow self-interest which actually determines our relations with the black people of Africa." Crane would later remember that these conversations "largely shaped my own attitudes toward events in Africa since."[587] While Mondlane's return to Mozambique and the Portuguese reassertion of power dampened youth activism, it could not erase the impact that this early period had on people like Crane, their views of the continent, and its peoples' struggles. As one youth without Crane's personal ties to Africa remembered, "This exposure to the situation in Angola was

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[585] Letter, Douglas C. Cook (Director of World Mission of NSCF) to friends, 3 November 1961, Box 11, RG 8, NCC, PHS.

[586] Elmira Kendricks Nazombe remembered the Methodist Student Movement Conference as her first introduction to Africa, and one that would stay with her for years. "Elmira Kendricks Nazombe," in Evans, 91.

[587] Henry Crane, "Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane, 1920-1969," no date [c. 1969], Box 22, RG 8 Series II Africa Committee, Division of Overseas Ministries, NCC, PHS.

unforgettable. Students discovered a part of the world they had hardly heard of before and were drawn into personal connections with it."[588]

It was these personal connections and direct experiences of life on the global frontiers that Margaret Flory hoped to capture and build upon. While Angola was still grabbing headlines, Flory was formulating an innovative experiment in missionary activity that would put Christian youth on the conceptual frontiers first explored at the Athens conference. The result was the Frontier Internship in Mission (FIM). Beginning in 1961, the program recruited politically active young people – Christian and non-Christian alike – to spend two years abroad, engaging daily with issues of poverty, urbanization, racial tension, and nationalism among others. All interns would live at a subsistence level to provide perspective on the realities of life in their adopted communities, the majority of which were in the countries of the global South at the center of what one FIM publication called the global "revolutionary upheavals . . . based in large part on the Christian belief in the worth of the individual."[589] The FIM broke with traditional missionary practice and the concurrent efforts of the Peace Corps: the emphasis was less on spreading western knowledge than on learning. Interns went abroad to learn from those at the forefront of global change – people like Eduardo Mondlane. It sought to explore "the mission strategy of tomorrow: to come not as one having answers, but as one deeply desiring to discover the ultimate questions."[590] The goal of the FIM was to encourage young people to make

[588] "Jeanne Audrey Powers" in Evans, 57.
[589] Pamphlet, "Frontier Internship in Mission," January 1963, Box 13, Flory Papers, YDL.
[590] Pamphlet, "Frontier Internship in Mission," [nd. c. 1964], Box 13, Flory Papers, YDL.

direct contacts with foreign peoples and "to be present, to listen, to study, to try to understand and to discover what new patterns might emerge to give guidance to the whole Christian community in its mission in that [frontier]."[591]

The learning aspect of the FIM required a special kind of student, one who appreciated the challenges of revolutionary change and possessed the humility to recognize the United States and its Christian churches had much to learn from Third World peoples commonly considered backward. Flory was deeply interested in progressive politics and the FIM was backed by the NCC, which had supported civil rights and would become a vocal critic of the Vietnam War, so it was natural that participants would be young people already engaged with the frontiers of American society: race issues, poverty relief, and campus activism.[592] Their time abroad then would be a way of pushing these youth already interested in changing American society to think and act more globally. It would be a new kind of religious internationalism that would make global events integral parts of daily life.[593]

The merging of domestic and international activism is typified by the experience of two of the FIM's first class of members, David and Marylee Wiley.[594] The couple had learned about the interaction of race and power supporting African American candidates

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[591] Confidential Memo, "Frontier Internship in Mission," ND (c. late 1960 or early 1961), Box 13, Flory Papers, YDL.
[592] Applications specifically asked interns about participation in social action and protests. Box 15, Flory Papers, YDL.
[593] For more on Flory's idea about internationalism, see Margaret Flory and Alice Hageman, *The University, The Church, and Internationalization* (St. Louis: UMHE Publications, 1968), 1.
[594] Now Marylee Crofts.

for regional election while David was chaplain at the University of Delaware.[595] The FIM sent them in 1961 to Salisbury (modern Harare), the capital of Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). David Wiley taught night school, and they led work camps to promote interracial learning, discovering some of the liberation ideologies taking root under the minority government.[596] The experience helped progressive youth like the Wileys see the world from a new angle. It also led them to question the role that Western powers, specifically the United States, played in supporting governments like the one in Rhodesia. As the pair explained at the time, "the universal fact is that all of us learned to open our eyes and ears. We thought we had the ideas and techniques, but we learned that we had only knowledge – others had the wisdom. . . . We uncovered our hidden prejudices about the superiority of Western or American knowledge and techniques."[597] Here was the beginnings of Flory's goal in mission, to convert not foreign peoples but progressive Americans – convert them to a new way of seeing global problems as inherently intertwined and perhaps susceptible to cooperative transnational intervention.

When the Wileys returned to the United States in 1963 at the end of their two-year mission, they fit naturally into the space created by youth activism around Angola and the horror of Sharpeville. Open revolution and the violent response from both Lisbon and Pretoria forced young Christians to reassess how they viewed the nationalists in Africa. The church leadership had rallied against Portugal due to their missionary connections but

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595 David Wiley, Interview with Peter Limb and John Metzler, 20 November 2012 (East Lansing), Interviews in African Studies at Michigan State University: http://www.lib.msu.edu/general/collections/asis/

596 Wiley interview. Marylee Crofts, telephone interview with the author, 12 June 2013.

597 Pamphlet, "Frontier Internship in Mission," [nd. c. 1964], Box 13, Flory Papers, YDL.

blanched at the idea of directly supporting armed freedom movements, quietly using funds to bankroll refugee services in the Congo but providing little political assistance for the nationalists themselves. Drawing on their experiences over the last decade with the peaceful protests of the civil rights movements, most church members believed violence was unacceptable no matter the perpetrator. It was students with direct experience in Africa like the Wileys who began to question the universality of Protestant non-violence. In 1964, at the Student Conference on the Christian World Mission again held at Ohio, Kenneth Carstens, a young South African exile, gave voice to this sentiment. Responding directly to Angolan missionary Malcolm McVeigh's denial of violence as a legitimate nationalist tool, Carstens asked the audience "if a chance is necessary because of the injustice and cruelty of the status quo – now these are big 'ifs' – and the only change that is foreseeable is a change by means of violence, then what are we saying about the native air of the Christian faith if we condemn revolution on both sides?"[598] Carstens and the Wileys had witnessed the force minority governments used to maintain control of their states, and they understood that opportunities for peaceful protest had been exhausted. Carstens' solution was to step back from the traditional missionary paternalism of the Western church and take a page from the FIM's playbook, supporting the nationalists in addressing the problem of minority rule as they saw fit.

Carstens was not alone in his call for greater activism on behalf of southern Africa, but he and others recognized that the bureaucratic structure of the Protestant churches

[598] Kenneth Carstens, "South African Reality," address given at 19th Ecumenical Student Conference on the Christian World Mission (1964), Box 24, RG 6, NCC, PHS.

demanded that youth take the lead in building solidarity with the nationalist movements. In the early 1960s, the NSCF had begun to pay attention to the problem of apartheid in South Africa, making it a major issue within its Civil Rights Committee. Angola and tensions in Rhodesia had placed in a stark light the regional nature of racial injustice, beginning the slow expansion of focus.[599] Among the actions the NSCF took was sending Eduardo Mondlane's acquaintance Hank Crane on an extended mission to various parts of the African continent to ascertain realities on the ground. In the midst of the famed Freedom Summer of 1964, he attended the WCC's Consultation on Race Relations in Southern Africa alongside mostly Anglophone church people and nationalists, but also including Mondlane. The FRELIMO president – by then readying to launch the armed revolution in the fall – joined with the attendees in urging a radicalization of support work and an acceptance of violent resistance. Crane remembers that he explained that what FRELIMO and the other active liberation groups needed was "the help of the Christian community in learning how to use violence without hate, with maximum restraint and discipline, and with the clear goal of the establishment of a non-racial society guaranteeing justice and dignity for all men."[600] Non-violence had worked in the United States and Britain's colonies, but in southern Africa nationalists faced more dedicated foes. Under such repression, they had few alternatives but to match force with force, and Mondlane begged his Christian allies to see the humanity at the core of the revolutionary program.

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[599] Memo, "The South African Concern of NSCF," undated [c. 1964], Private Papers of David Wiley and Christine Root, African Activist Archive.

[600] Henry Crane, "Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane, 1920-1969," no date [c. 1969], Box 22, RG 8 Series II Africa Committee, Division of Overseas Ministries, NCC, PHS.

Crane returned to the United States and urged fellow youth to engage with Mondlane's vision of a non-paternalistic solidarity, which could merge the increasingly radical domestic rights movement and the African revolutions into a single if heterogeneous struggle. The search for racial justice was a global one, and in the same way northerners helped advance the southern civil rights struggle, so could those from the global North advance the campaigns waged by nationalists in Africa. The product of these calls to action was the expansion of the Civil Rights Committee's initial concern with South Africa into the independent Southern Africa Committee (SAC) of the NSCF, which formed around the core of Carstens, Crane, the Wileys, and FIM alumnus David Robinson.[601] Housed within the progressive halls of the Union Theological Seminary, the SAC found a rich ground for recruiting members who were dedicated to global justice. It also was only a short distance from the headquarters of the NCC in the Morningside Heights neighborhood of Manhattan. Importantly, the SAC did not limit itself to the Protestant churches, drawing members from Columbia University as well.[602] Despite their work within church institutions, many members were not religious or would soon drift away from their faith. What united these activists of differing commitments, backgrounds, and politics was the cause of southern Africa, and specifically solidarity with their struggles for freedom – no matter the method.[603] Within a few years, the SAC became the locus of an

[601] Gail Hovey, "Media for the Movement: Southern Africa Magazine," in No Easy Victories; SAC "Report April 26, 1966," (1966), Box 23, RG 6, NCC, PHS. Gail Hovey interview. By this point, the Wileys were in Princeton where David was in graduate school.
[602] Gail Hovey interview. Among the members that came from outside of the Christian structure was Janet Hooper, who would join the staff of ACOA in the early 1970s.
[603] Robert Maurer, who joined the SAC a few years after its founding, explained in a written letter to the author: "The members of SAC were not "religious." Their cohesiveness and longevity was based on their

increasingly radical solidarity that would outlast the university Christian movement while maintaining access to the Protestant structure.

The SAC united around common interests in Africa, but the backgrounds of its members varied widely. Unlike the elder pair of Carstens and Crane, few had extensive personal experience living on the continent. Rather, they had brief encounters through study abroad or understood African independence as a complement to the domestic civil rights movement. As a result, the SAC was in its earliest incarnation a kind of study group. Members sought to understand regional politics and devise strategies for supporting change, particularly in South Africa, which continued to be a priority for many involved.[604] It would not take long, however, for these foci to shift as the SAC matured and events on the continent continued to demand a regional approach. When Rhodesia declared independence in November 1965, David and Marylee Wiley spearheaded the publication of a special NSCF newsletter to disseminate information on the event. The bulletin would transition to a wider focus on Southern Africa news within six months, finally becoming the long-running *Southern Africa* magazine in 1967. The publications became important parts of the SAC identity, providing news on Africa directly aimed at youth readers on a regular basis. From the outside, the SAC became a kind of youthful ACOA, merging religious backgrounds, progressive politics, and educational outreach on African liberation.

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commitment to ending *apartheid,* supporting anti-colonial liberation movements, and so on." This was less true of the original founders who had initially approached southern Africa in terms of a Christian witness, but it became the norm by the end of the decade as radical politics supplanted Christian mission as the major frame informing activism. Robert Maurer, "2015 Response to JP Questions 4 through 9-1," correspondence with the author, 9 April 2015.

[604] See the early minutes of the SAC from late 1964 and early 1965 held by the African Activist Archive: http://africanactivist.msu.edu/asearch.php?keyword=southern%20africa%20committee

The SAC was a product of its times, and it set itself apart from ACOA by moving in increasingly radical directions alongside a generation of student activists. In the mid-1960s, the escalation of the Vietnam War was inspiring a mass anti-war movement, pushed by groups like the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) but increasingly involving a diverse array of participants, including Protestant churches.[605] SAC members were cognizant of the escalating war and protested against it, but they saw American cooperation with countries like South Africa and Portugal as no different from the U.S. backing of South Vietnam. As groups like SDS adopted broad anti-imperial programs, they expanded their criticism of American policy beyond Asia to the point where it intersected with the SAC.[606] While authors have rightly pointed out that this adoption of a multi-issue program distracted SDS from taking a leadership position on Vietnam, it also enabled joint action that publicized issues at the margins of the popular consciousness such as the African revolutions, which received relatively light attention during this period.[607] These connections were key to integrating solidarity activism into the wider New Left.

The joint SDS-SAC protest of Chase Manhattan Bank in 1965 is the first major example of this cooperation. The SAC explored a number of strategies to advance the liberation struggle including polite discussions with the State Department, but it gravitated

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[605] For a General overview of early religious activity, see DeBenedetti, Chapter 6.
[606] See Kirkpatrick Sale, *SDS: Rise and Development of Students for a Democratic Society* (New York: Vintage, 1973) for a general overview of the SDS embrace of leftist nationalism. See also Elbaum, Revolution, chapter 3.
[607] DeBeneddetti, 100-102, 124-127.

toward the more confrontational politics of its era.[608] The SAC had been searching for an issue that could dramatize American complicity with South Africa, so it responded positively when the New York SDS chapter approached it on the issue of Chase.[609] The bank had been a leading member of a consortium that extended credit to the South African government after international concerns over the Sharpeville Massacre led to an economic downturn. The use of American deposits to directly prop up the apartheid regime upset SDS and SAC, and they believed many young Americans would withdraw their funds if they realized how Chase used them. The groups launched the boycott alongside the Congress of Racial Equality and the NAACP with a sit-in at the headquarters in downtown New York. The SAC, seeking to broaden the movement, forged an alliance with ACOA, creating the Committee of Conscience Against Apartheid under the chairmanship of A. Philip Randolph. [610] It also reached out to the NCC and the churches, which had sizeable investments in Chase, but denominational leaders – many deeply ensconced in the business world – worried about criticizing such practices and did not act decisively. The SAC and ACOA continued to work on adjusting religious opinion even as SDS participation declined. It was slow going, and by the time the churches began to divest in the late 1960s,

[608] Members of the SAC had made contact with government officials concerned with South Africa as early as November 1964. Minutes of Committee on Southern Africa, 20 or 27 1964 [date unclear], Private Papers of David Wiley and Christine Root, African Activist Archive.
[609] Minutes of the Committee on Southern Africa 18 December 1964, Private Papers of David Wiley and Christine Root, African Activist Archive; Bruce Bevelheimer, ed,. *SDS NATIONAL PROGRAM -- 1966*, (Ann Arbor, MI: 1966), 5.
[610] Letter, Randolph to John Tomlinson, 22 June 1966, Box 23, RG 6 Division of Christian Life and Mission, Series II Department of International Affairs, NCC. PHS.

the Portuguese colonies had begun to eclipse South Africa as the focus for activism.[611] The Bank campaign would begin the creation of a broad movement and a shift to the left, but as the church hesitation showed, there were still wide differences.

In the mid-1960s, a more radical anti-imperial philosophy and how it related directly to Africa was still defining itself against the left-liberalism of organizations like ACOA and the NCC. As Hank Crane had shown a year before, it still took the influence of African leaders like Mondlane to help even the most ardent activists adapt their inherited perspectives to the reality of revolutionary southern Africa. These personal linkages and experiences were invaluable in creating solidarity, and to find them many SAC members looked to Margaret Flory's FIM. Over the next five years, the two organizations would construct an almost symbiotic relationship. Young activists approached Flory with plans for exploring the frontiers of revolutionary nationalism based on their research in New York, while FIMers in Africa would develop relationships with the SAC and its alumni through the community that Flory created.[612]

One example of this process was William "Bill" Minter. Minter had first engaged with Christian internationalism when he attended the 1959-60 Athens conference. He became interested in Africa when he spent his junior year in Nigeria as part of another of Flory's programs. When he enrolled at Union in the mid-1960s, he joined the SAC and soon became its president. There, Minter met Mondlane when he spoke on FRELIMO's

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[611] For a timeline of church actions, see "Southern Africa: Chronology of Actions," nd [c.1970], Box 14, RG 6, NCC Papers, PHS.

[612] Various interviews with activists cite Flory as a key influence in their intellectual development.

vision of a new, multi-racial Mozambican society. Minter and his wife Ruth, who also participated in the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee's (SNCC) South West Georgia project in the summer of 1965, were inspired by Mondlane's mission of merging the liberation struggle with the wholesale reconstruction of the colonial nation and began to look for ways to aid the movement. This began an exchange of ideas about how the young activists could support FRELIMO, and two years later they approached Flory with the proposal that they work directly in the exile secondary school run by the movement in Dar es Salaam. Flory agreed, and Bill and Ruth Minter found themselves among a multinational group of teachers at the school, with Janet and Eduardo Mondlane and much of the FRELIMO leadership working nearby.[613] This was exactly the kind of personal connections that inspired solidarity organizing, and the FIM made it possible by linking American activists with those already working on the global frontiers – in this case the revolutionaries themselves.

In addition to the Minters, Flory sent a number of activists to southern Africa, including early SAC members Don and Gail Morlan and in later years Tami Hultman and Reed Kramer, who would eventually found the Africa News Service.[614] But the FIM was also an important program for introducing motivated young activists to the problems of African liberation, even when the volunteers did not intern in the south. Flory's progressive politics had become increasingly radicalized under the influence of past and present volunteers and the social pressures of Black Power, Vietnam, and women's liberation.

[613] Bill Minter, phone interview with author, 11 September 2012.
[614] The Africa News Service has since become AllAfrica.com.

"There has been a growing conviction within the program," one FIM pamphlet explained, "that, in the face of Western dominance in the world, Christians must expose exploitative relationships and struggle for just and humane relations through interchange and interdependence."[615] Political and spiritual liberation became a defining element of the FIM, and Flory wanted to introduce volunteers in Africa to the movements seeking this goal – through violent and peaceful means alike.[616]

Eileen Hanson's experience provides an example of this process. The young Lutheran from the Mid-west had only a vague knowledge of the continent when she began preparations to serve in independent Cote D'Ivoire in 1966. She had worked with the NSCF in Chicago and briefly helped organize activities on southern Africa there, but it was two months of travel as part of the Southern Africa Seminar before her FIM service began that opened her eyes to the liberation cause. [617] Spending time in South Africa and Dar es Salaam, she was shocked to experience firsthand the deep segregation of minority society. Her upbringing in Minnesota and Illinois had shielded her from the worst kinds of racial discrimination, and she had not truly understood the challenges of life in South Africa or the colonies. In Zambia and Tanzania, she spoke with a variety of liberation leaders, who encouraged her to act in whatever way she could.[618] This formative event shaped the way

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[615] Pamphlet, FIM, "Frontier Internship in Mission," no date [c. 1970], Box 13, Folder 76, Margaret Flory Papers, YDL.

[616] The word liberation entered the FIM questionnaire sometime in the 1960s, brought on by the disillusionment felt toward American institutions and an increasing identification with specifically Third World ideas of development. See Frontier Internship Program Application, Folder 76a, Box 13, Margaret Flory Papers, YDL.

[617] Letter, Eileen Hanson to George Houser, 27 July 1971, Reel III, ACOA Microfilm. Phone interview, Eileen Hanson-Kelly with author, 30 May 2013.

[618] Hanson-Kelly interview.

she understood her two year mission even in independent Cote d'Ivoire, and – like the Wileys and Minters – it would inspire her to expand her work on behalf of the liberation movements when she returned home.

The FIM's most important role, however, was in cultivating an activist community, cementing and expanding the network begun with the SAC. While the Minters and the Morlans were scattered across the continent, Flory facilitated a gathering of African Frontier Interns at the home of Hank Crane in Zambia.[619] Also attending were the Wileys, in Zambia while Dave conducted his doctoral research. Most knew each other through the SAC (now part of the recently renamed University Christian Movement, or UCM) but this meeting was a watershed. The attendees wrote a document that integrated their activist experiences, close associations with the socialist nationalist parties, and immediate knowledge of life under minority rule into a common set of goals and strategies.[620] The paper captured an emerging consensus among activists on the relationship between the United States and southern Africa, expressing ideas that would influence American solidarity organizing for decades.

The group reaffirmed the regional definition of solidarity work but expanded it to include a wider condemnation of Euro-American anti-communist policies that helped sustain the conservative regimes. They recognized that as much as South African apartheid differed from the situation in Mozambique or Angola, they shared a common logic and

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[619] Flory stressed "the importance of personal ties and relationships" in operating the program, quietly building network of progressive activists that could carry the lessons of their frontier experiences back to the United States. Frontier Internship in Mission Intern's Handbook, no date [c. 1985], Folder 76b, Box 13, Flory Papers, YDL.

[620] William Minter, interview with author; Hovey interview; Wiley interview; Hanson-Kelly interview.

would require similar if unique strategies to undermine foreign support. The group pledged to work toward the creation of societies founded on the "basis of majority rule and an equitable distribution of wealth." From the nationalists, the young Americans borrowed the idea of pursuing this goal through a three-pronged approach: internal change, military revolt, and external pressure. They focused their strategizing on the final element for obvious reasons. The goal was not just to change American policy toward NATO ally Portugal, Rhodesia, and South Africa, but also to eliminate the dominant reactionary mindset in Washington that viewed the region through narrow Cold War considerations. Conditioning the U.S. government to accept southern African independence in whatever form it may come would influence the responses of other NATO powers. This shift in thinking was essential "if Western response in the future, when it is forced to act, is to be a positive contribution rather than unthinking counter-revolution on the model of Vietnam."[621] The goal then was not a simple resistance to colonialism and minority rule but sincere support for the socialist nation-building projects, which needed protection after independence as much as aid before it.

The attendees understood this would be a herculean task, so they established a five-part strategy for raising the profile of southern Africa and forcing it onto the national agenda alongside more pressing issues like Vietnam. First, sympathetic Americans needed to improve communications, both amongst themselves in the organizing of solidarity activities and with the nationalists who understood the needs of the revolutions. Second,

[621] No Author [Zambia Group], "Strategies for Change in Southern Africa," 1967, Box 23, RG 6, NCC Papers, PHS.

research was necessary to reveal the nature of American involvement in the region and what foreign influences were most pernicious in extending minority rule. Third, publications "geared to a wide variety of audiences" were necessary to expand the reach of nationalist appeals and concern with the American role in southern Africa. Fourth, activists must use this foundation as a platform for fundraising, providing material and monetary support for nation-building projects and military campaigns. Finally, each of these efforts would fuel constituency-building. The Zambia collective believed that small, local groups drawn from the broad base of universities, churches, labor unions, African exile communities, and Peace Corps alumni would inform a decentralized grassroots political solidarity structure. Contrasting their vision of what they called a "catalytic membership organization" with the more "elitist, single strategy" ACOA, the youth hoped their vision would produce a mass anti-imperial movement "concerned about constituency and supple and alert in its application of appropriate strategies."[622] They committed themselves to pursuing the same goals of liberation in southern Africa as had ACOA, but they wanted to do so in a way that privileged the needs of the nationalists and the emerging political opportunities present in the youth revolt.

Creating the Solidarity Movement: Education and Activism in the Youth Left

"The Zambia Group" or simply "The Group," as members would refer to themselves collectively, was not a formal organization but a network of like-minded

[622] Ibid.

individuals who were determined to build an American solidarity movement with progressive African nationalists. As they returned to the United States, they carried a mission to establish a web of solidarity organizations that could aid liberation efforts. Fortunately, their time abroad had come at an auspicious time. The anti-war movement had reached its peak during the same year they had gathered in Zambia, while the Black Power movement continued to strengthen in the late 1960s. The Zambia Group took advantage of this new radicalism, joining its opposition to U.S.-backed minority regimes with popular anger at undemocratic American institutions to build new alliances. Still largely at the margins, this work expanded on the previous activity of the SAC, providing forums where anti-war activists could learn how southern Africa related to Vietnam, while new recruits could discover the racial inequalities that continued to plague the international system. The religiously affiliated Zambia Group was joined in its efforts by radical organizations that used Marxist-inspired criticisms of the international system to justify African liberation. The transition from the 1960s to the next decade saw these constituencies intermix and unite in a common movement supporting African liberation. As the struggles in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique advanced, the CONCP cause would become a major element of national youth activism.

This emphasis on the Portuguese colonies grew in part from the CONCP's decision to court the West that had reinvigorated the European solidarity movement. Between the time FRELIMO first sent Sharfudine Khan to act as its emissary to the United States in 1967 and the Rome Conference in 1970, the parties used existing ties primarily forged by Eduardo Mondlane to actively expand popular support. They did so by presenting their

struggles – particularly in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique – as direct confrontations with a Euro-American imperial system, which they fought both militarily and socially behind the frontlines. Khan argued that the transnational solidarity needed to "inform and educate" the new generation of sympathetic Americans on the realities of the revolutions, so they could intensify "pressure on Portugal and the governments supporting her."[623] But the parties understood that the creation of an effective solidarity movement required Americans to translate the cause for popular consumption in their national context, so the nationalists themselves played supporting roles. Khan explained at one point "You know better than ourselves the situation in which you work, so we can only suggest ways in which you might celebrate [solidarity] with us."[624] ACOA had been successfully fulfilling this task for years among civil rights liberals and union leaders, but the Zambia Group and others of the younger generation felt that the committee was not necessarily speaking to them. As a result, it became the mission of this loose network and a growing number of radical allies to broaden the movement by speaking directly to the anti-war generation.

As FIMers returned to the United States, life took them in different geographical and tactical directions, even as they remained committed to a common strategy. The SAC continued as an important node in this network. Though the majority of its earliest members, including the Wileys and the Minters, left the East Coast for professional reasons, the committee continued to operate around a core that included Gail Morlan (now

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623 ACOA Steering Committee, Special Meeting on Mozambique," 8 December 1969, Folder 26, Box 92, ACOA.

624 "Solidarity Week with the Struggling People of Mozambique," *Sun Reporter*, 26 September 1970.

Hovey), Tim Smith, and anti-war activist Robert Maurer. The group remained on Riverside Drive in the complex of religious organizations clustered around Union and the NCC, but it slowly became independent of the church structure, outlasting the UCM that did not see the end of the 1960s. Most importantly, the SAC greatly expanded its influence with the publication of *Southern Africa* in 1967. Its news did not come via Associated Press wire but through personal relationships and information exchanges in the nascent network established often by church connections. Along with the Dutch *Facts and Report* that would begin republishing carefully selected articles from around the world shortly thereafter, it became the primary source of information on events in the region.

While the SAC expanded its influence, many of its former members continued to promote the cause of southern African liberation after they left New York. There were two main options: launch new organizations or join existing anti-imperial organizations evolving from the anti-war movement. FIM and SAC alumni would help found organizations in Chicago, Toronto, Raleigh, and elsewhere. One example was the Madison Area Committee on Southern Africa (MACSA), which played an important role in linking southern Africa to the emerging New Left. Dave and Marylee Wiley launched MACSA in 1968, when Dave took a position as assistant professor at the University of Wisconsin. They were joined later by Bill and Ruth Minter, other Africanist graduate students such as Allen and Barbara Isaacman, and a number of black South African exiles.[625] The small organization formed because there was growing interest in southern Africa but little formal

[625] David Wiley, interview with author, 23 October 2015.

organization outside New York. The Wileys argued that "'liberal,' 'student,' and 'civil rights' organizations" had failed to maintain solidarity programs because of their tangential relationship to core domestic concerns. MACSA justified its focus on Africa by taking a radical anti-imperial approach, which presented the liberation movements as fighting global structures of racism and exploitation. Nonetheless, it encouraged participation by "any person or group" committed to the "weakening of the southern African systems," and actively sought to cultivate relationships with Wisconsin politicians and other Midwestern congressmen including Charles Diggs and Donald Fraser.[626] Though never numbering much more than 20 or so active members at any one point, the committee cooperated with black, religious, and anti-war groups to engage hundreds on campus and became a pivotal element of the Madison and Midwest political culture.

MACSA focused on three activities: research, education, and coordination of activism in the upper Midwest. Taking a page from the SAC's bank campaign and the embryonic boycott of Gulf's activities, the committee explained in concrete detail how American business activities in southern Africa sustained the minority regimes, with an emphasis on Wisconsin firms. It also linked liberation in southern Africa with that of the Middle East by investigating Israel's ties to the repressive regime in South Africa, the first ever such research.[627] Other research informed articles appearing regularly in the bi-monthly newsletter distributed throughout the Midwest in the early 1970s, small

[626] David Wiley (?), "Some Hypotheses concerning the Southern Africa Issue and Wisconsin," nd (c. fall 1968), AAA.
[627] See MACSA, Is Southern Africa Wisconsin's Business? (Madison: MACSA, February 1971) and MACSA, *South Africa and Israel* (Madison: MACSA, October 1971).

pamphlets, and educational outreach. MACSA used solidarity days and teach-ins to publicize their work and mobilize support in schools, universities, and religious institutions, while cooperation with local fundraising activities allowed it to send tens of thousands of dollars to the FRELIMO's Mozambique Institute and smaller amounts to other parties.[628] Under the influence of former FIMers and other members, the committee emphasized direct contact with African revolutionaries, making Madison a waypoint for nationalists traveling the country on speaking tours including Sharfudine Khan, FRELIMO's Armando Guebuza, and Oliver Tambo of the ANC. Marylee Wiley developed the outreach program for the university's African Studies Center, which encouraged local schools and religious organizations to invite continental students studying at Madison to translate their personal experiences for local people.[629] By appealing to a diverse array of regional constituencies, MACSA acted as a coordinating point between for the various groups as they entered alliances across social and political fault lines.[630] It became a significant conduit feeding information on African issues into the New Left while also promoting activism in a section of the country often isolated from existing groups like ACOA and the SAC that operated on the Eastern seaboard.

In expanding this solidarity effort to the interior of the country, MACSA cooperated with a broader anti-imperialist collective that also served as a haven for members of the

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[628] See for example, MACSA, "February 4: Day of Solidarity with the People of Angola," nd [c. early 1970], AAA; in 1971 alone, MACS worked with the Madison Walk for Development to send between $26-30,000 to the institute, "Walk Aids Mozambique Institute," *MACSA News* 11(October 1971).
[629] Marylee Crofts (nee Wiley), phone interview with author, 12 June 2013.
[630] MACSA, "Important Meeting: Madison Area Committee on Southern Africa," 6 October [c. fall 1969], MACSA Papers, AAA.

Zambia Group: the Committee of Returned Volunteers (CRV). CRV membership consisted primarily of Peace Corps volunteers who had become disillusioned with American policy during their time abroad. They were joined by a handful of other volunteers and missionaries who had spent time in the developing world, notably former FIM member Eileen Hanson.[631] In contrast to MACSA, the CRV had not formed with the specific intention of publicizing the issues of southern Africa in one area. The CRV's critique of the American system was far broader, and its membership numbered in the thousands across nearly a dozen major cities.[632] It aimed at combating what it understood as a pernicious American imperialism that manifested itself in the developing world in terms of predatory capitalism, reactionary militarism, and indifference to deep political inequalities. Service abroad had disillusioned members with development strategies they felt were paternalistic and incremental at best.[633] The organization believed that more revolutionary measures were necessary to realistically improve the lives of Third World peoples, which included drastic structural changes and perhaps emancipatory violence on the part of Third World peoples.[634] The CRV adopted the view that the American anti-revolutionary mindset began at home, and it was by linking international and domestic

[631] Mimi Edmunds, phone interview with author, 2 July 2013. Edmunds recalls many of the church members were often more progressive than those from the Peace Corps.
[632] At its height, the CRV claimed to include 2-3,000 Peace Corps alumni alone – just under ten percent of the program to that point. Linda Matthews, "Peace Corps, VISTA Lose Their Luster," *Los Angeles Times*, 7 August 1970.
[633] As the first CRV General Assembly explained in a position paper, service abroad had led "to a new realization that present day underdevelopment is in many cases perpetuated by the negative and destructive policies of the United States." CRV Generally Assembly I, "Position Paper on the Peace Corps," 15 September 1970, Lynne Weikart Papers, MSU Special Collections.
[634] David C. Anderson, "After the Peace Corps, Some Turn Radical," *Wall Street Journal*, 18 March 1970.

structural inequalities that the group began to build solidarity with revolutionary groups abroad. As one member explained bluntly, "we are bound together by our belief that great domestic changes are needed in the U.S., and our conviction that the United States is screwing the underdeveloped countries."[635] The CRV demanded the abolition of the Peace Corps and similar programs they believed constrained such foreign revolutions, and it focused secondarily on opposing the Vietnam War as the example of American overreach par-excellence. Yet few of the returnees had actually served in Southeast Asia, so the committee soon adopted another regional focus that was more familiar to many: southern Africa and the Portuguese colonies.[636]

Most of the CRV leadership had worked either in Africa or Latin America, and they felt that American involvement in these nations should receive at least some attention alongside opposition to the Vietnam War.[637] The result was the creation of a number of regional committees that objected to, in the CRV's words, an American government that maintained "the status quo of wealth and privilege for the few and poverty and ignorance for the many" around the globe.[638] Africa committee members had served all over the continent, but the immediacy of the Portuguese wars and the influence of individuals like Hanson and Nancy Freehafer, who had worked with FRELIMO in Dar es Salaam, focused action on the outstanding issue of colonialism.[639] Freehafer also had the support of

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[635] Ken Pierce, "Salvation, Frustration, Revolution," *Washington Post*, 3 February 1971.
[636] Hanson-Kelly interview.
[637] See "General Assembly I," October 1969, reprinted from CRV Newsletter, Carole Collins Papers, MSU Archives.
[638] Africa Committee, Committee of Return Volunteers, "Mozambique Will Be Free," 1969, African Activist Archive (hereafter AAA), Michigan State University.
[639] Nancy Freehafer worked at the Mozambique Institute shortly before returning to join the CRV.

Sharfudine Khan, whose presence in New York, accessibility, and encouragement made the focus on Mozambique seem almost "automatic," as Peace Corps alumna Mimi Edmunds remembered.[640] At the first CRV Congress in 1969, the group voted to focus on southern Africa as one of two primary campaigns alongside the war in Southeast Asia. The ongoing revolutions represented to the young radicals an example of Che Guevara's widely cited dictum that there must be "1, 2, many Vietnams" in order to undermine the "international system of oppression and exploitation" that linked the United States to colonial institutions.[641] With this predilection for revolutions in mind, the struggles in Mozambique and Angola quickly became the main points of the campaign, informing two of the committee's most ambitious research studies. Mirroring closely the FRELIMO party members with whom some of them had worked, these activists hoped to isolate Portugal and prevent new countries – specifically the United States – from asserting their power in the wake of decolonization.[642]

More overtly radical than MACSA, the CRV Africa Committee also defined its mission along research and educational lines but placed greater emphasis on engagement with a consciously leftist audience. The CRV developed an aggressive plan of action that included letter writing campaigns, informational sessions, protests, and direct support for

[640] Mimi Edmunds interview. Edmunds recalls that it was easy to build personal relationships with Khan and Gil Fernandes in particular, remarking "They certainly wanted American solidarity, support, so it was relatively easy to meet with them."
[641] "National Assembly," CRV Newsletter, III:7 (October 1969), (Carole Collins Papers photo 9059), MSU Archives.
[642] Letter, Bunce, Forbes, and Yarwood to [Returnee], 20 February 1967, AAA.

the liberation movements.[643] Pamphlets like *Mozambique Will Be Free* aimed to make leftists "aware of what is happening in another part of the world" so they could organize in its defense.[644] In so doing, the group acted as a surrogate propagandist for FRELIMO. The CRV certainly took many of its ideological and rhetorical cues from the party, but they followed Khan's call to action and tailored their activism for American readers entrenched in a specific culture. The group equated Vietnam with the Portuguese colonies, predicting that they would follow a similar path from colonies to Cold War battlefield and sites of American intervention to preserve the status quo.[645] In so doing, the CRV made the argument that southern Africa might "become another Vietnam" in its most powerful form yet, which directly influenced the direction of the anti-war movement as troop levels declined in Southeast Asia after 1970.[646] The CRV and its network of over two dozen local branches injected the Lusophone colonial wars into the discourse of the anti-war left, while participating in the southern African solidarity network through the personal ties of its members.[647] After it moved its headquarters from the city of New York to the heartland

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643 The New York Chapter among other things planned to create a high school curriculum on southern Africa to help educate from the bottom up. "New York Chapter Activities," (Carole Collins Papers photo 9054), MSU Archives; One of the most noteworthy protests saw the CRV disrupt a Heart Association's annual fundraiser attended by the Portuguese ambassador and Premier Caetano's son. Heart Shaped] Leaflet, "A salute to Portugal? For the Heart Association? . . . How Heartless," Box 158, ACOA Papers, Tulane; Lisa Hammel, "Warm Hearts, and Travel, Inspire Ball – and Pickets," *New York Times*, 8 May 1969.

644 Letter, Bunce, Forbes, and Yarwood to [Returnee], 20 February 1967, AAA. Mozambique will be free was first published in 1969, and helped introduce radicals to FRELIMO. It became one of the CRV's bestselling pamphlets. "Annual Financial Statement, CRV/NY," (Carole Collins Papers photo 9042), MSU Archives.

645 See Elaine Fuller and Trudy Pax, "'Beyond Vietnam' Conference Report," (New York, 1971).

646 Compare to ACOA, "United States and Southern Africa," (New York, 1968), AAA; also Liberation Support Movement, "We don't know if Africa will become another Vietnam," (Seattle, 1969), AAA.

647 For instance, CRV and MACSA organized a joint Milwaukee protest of an award given to Dean Acheson. Picketers distributed literature and performed a skit emphasizing Acheson's support for NATO

capital of Chicago, the committee became the center of a new radicalism that would encompass disillusioned youth, religious, and myriad other constituencies under a single anti-imperial umbrella. In so doing, it reinforced the creation of a new internationalist left by merging the priorities of the anti-war and solidarity communities.

The surprisingly good relations between the various components of the solidarity movement become apparent in the actions of arguably the most influential of these organizations: the border-crossing Marxist organization known as the Liberation Support Movement (LSM). LSM emerged from the work of the radical anthropologist Don Barnett, whose dissertation at the University of California-Los Angeles had been among the first to provide a sympathetic account of Kenya's Mau Mau rebellion based on extensive interviews with veterans of the movement.[648] The activist scholar traveled widely in East Africa, spending over a year living in Dar es Salaam, where he made contacts with a number of liberation movements. Barnett's strongest bonds developed with the MPLA, whose firmer commitment to Marxist politics proved more appealing than FRELIMO's more moderate socialism.[649] As Barnett explained later, he had been impressed by the MPLA's plans for rebuilding the country and hoped it could use its riches and geopolitical position to become "Africa's Cuba . . . or perhaps its 'Vietnam.'" For its part, the Angolan party welcomed interest from an enthusiastic American who seemed willing to work on behalf of their cause in the United States and Canada. They granted Barnett access to senior

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ally Portugal, Rhodesia, and the Vietnam War. Ann Crane, "Milwaukee Anti-Acheson Protest," *MACSA News* 1 (November 1969).

[648] The dissertation would be published as *Mau-Mau from Within: An analysis of Kenya's Peasant Revolt*, published by Monthly Review Press in 1968.

[649] Ole Gjerstad, phone interview with author, 2 July 2013.

leaders who explained their goals and methods. Agostinho Neto even invited the anthropologist into Angola to document the first party assembly to be held in liberated territory in August of 1968, in the temporary camp aptly named (from Barnett's perspective) Hanoi II, roughly 175 miles from the Zambian border.[650] The scholar wrote approvingly of these experiences in a number of articles for widely read radical periodicals such as *The Guardian*, introducing American audiences for the first time in detail to the individuals and ideologies motivating the MPLA, and by implication other revolutionaries.[651]

When Barnett returned to the United States to assume a university teaching position, developing a solidarity movement became a priority. At the University of Iowa, he began cultivating a following among radical students that would become the LSM. His politics won few admirers in late 1960s farm country, so he moved to Canada's Simon Fraser University in 1968, which had become a hotbed of activist scholarship. The professor, who LSM member Ole Gjerstad remembered as an "extremely charismatic, demanding, disciplined person," pushed his students to understand world events firmly in the context of Marxist ideology. He aggressively used his academic position not for any kind of career advancement but rather to recruit dedicated youth to his movement. Politically minded students naturally gravitated to the serious academic, especially those

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[650] Don Barnett, *With the Guerillas in Angola*, 4th printing (Richmond: LSM Press, 1976), 3-6.

[651] LSM Interviews in Depth, A*ngola/MPLA: Spartacus Monimambu* (Richmond: LSM Press, 1973). Excerpts from the interview originally conducted by Don Barnett in 1968 were published in three consecutive issues of the Guardian from April 27 to May 11 under the title "In the Liberated Areas of Angola." At the same time, the Africa Research Group – a Boston organization with some ties to the SAC – had a semi-regular column in the *Guardian*.

who had taken a more circuitous path to collegiate studies and had less patience with the chaotic, ideologically vacuous protests that typified many student actions. By 1970, Barnett's LSM stretched from Vancouver, through Seattle, to its headquarters in the Bay Area with a small amount of support remaining in the Midwest. Barnett envisioned this dedicated, professional cadre as the radical center of a larger movement, mobilizing action through educational outreach, publishing, and material aid to foreign revolutions.[652]

From its founding in 1969, the LSM became one of the primary national organizations providing a radical informational alternative to groups like ACOA. While never openly hostile to the more centrist perspective, the emphasis on Marxist anti-imperialism and solidarity with the MPLA set the group apart. The other was an emphasis on presenting the stories of radical liberation leaders in their own words. The most important publications were a series of interviews that allowed MPLA revolutionaries to explain their goals to foreign audiences at length. A related FRELIMO pamphlet featured Marcelino Dos Santos, the most outspoken Marxist leader in the front to that time.[653] These "life histories," as the LSM referred to them, provided an unvarnished view of party philosophy and strategy that proved entertaining, educational, and broadly appealing. As LSM member Rick Sterling remembers them, they were seen by many as "a testament to what the realities were in that time and place," and they cut through debates on proper

[652] Ole Gjerstad interview. According to publications from 1970, the LSM had a branch in Bloomington, Indiana.

[653] See entries 1 (Spartacus Monimambu),3 (Seta Likambuila), and 4 (Paul Jorge) of LSM's Interviews in Depth: MPLA series, and LSM, *Interviews in Depth: Mozambique, FRELIMO 1 - Interview with Marcelino dos Santos vice-President of FRELIMO* (Richmond: LSM, 1974).

ideologies or ways of waging freedom struggles.[654] The LSM also reproduced documents and speeches from Agostinho Neto, along with a popular liberation calendar that featured quotes, noteworthy dates, and photos primarily of the Portuguese movements.[655] Through these publications the LSM built the impression of personal connections with the ongoing liberation movements, with the calendar providing a daily reminder of the need for solidarity.

The LSM promoted an integrated strategy of information dissemination aided by consciousness-raising protests locally and at the national level. Articles in *The Guardian* greatly raised the profile of the group, and it soon found itself in high demand as the voice for Africa on the left.[656] From 1971 until 1977, the movement conducted national educational tours featuring slide shows and films on the African liberation movements. Appearances at college campuses and community centers from the Midwest to the East Coast reinforced the growing knowledge of Southern Africa, but forays into the South with a mobile film unit introduced hundreds in places like Mississippi and Alabama to assertive black revolution for the first time. The predominantly white members were overwhelmingly welcomed by black communities there, though visits were cut short by hostile authorities on several occasions.[657] The LSM also became an important channel for connecting domestic audiences with radical African revolutionaries, working not just with FRELIMO's Khan but Marxists who rarely found themselves invited to the United States.

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654 Rick Sterling, phone interview with author, 19 August 2013.
655 LSM, *MPLA 1970* (LSM, 1970); LSM, *Getting Hip to Imperialism: ALCAN, Jamaica, and Cabora Bassa* (LSM, 1971).
656 Rick Sterling interview.
657 LSM, News Release, 24 November 1973, AAA; Ole Gjerstad interview.

In 1970, for instance, the Seattle branch arranged for a tour by Angolan guerrilla José Condesse, who spoke at local universities and met with Black Panthers before visiting Iowa City, Detroit, Reading, Harlem, and Ontario with the aid of LSM.[658] The national scope of the group raised its profile still further, and orders for publications and requests for aid came in from all over the country and Europe.[659] The publications, events, and personal appearances collected tens of thousands of dollars, funding propaganda training for MPLA cadres, the production and distribution of medical textbooks, and the shipment of medical supplies, radio equipment, surplus military gear, and a printing press.[660]

Despite the centrality of Marxism to the LSM, it adopted the same cooperative attitude as other solidarity organizations and avoided the political infighting that hobbled anti-war coalitions. The MPLA was itself a front, filled with a diverse array of perspectives. It embraced a Leninist communism more readily than any of its other CONCP allies, but still refused to adopt a single label. No activist who understood the situation in the Portuguese colonies could realistically take a strong ideological line. Rather, as was the case in Europe, activists in the LSM and other groups "always followed [the African parties'] lead" in casting a wide net to build solidarity, conflicting only with advocates of Roberto's FNLA that they associated with American imperialism. The LSM was willing to work with any group seriously dedicated to pursuing liberation on behalf of the CONCP parties. As Rick Sterling remembers, "We tended to work well with the groups that were

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658 LSM, Press Release, LSM, 16 July 1970, AAA.
659 Rick Sterling interview. LSM activist Sterling remembers that literature subscribers included a number of prominent people, including the wife of Greece's prime minister.
660 LSM, News Release, 24 November 1973, AAA. See, flyer, "Collect War Surplus for FRELIMO," nd (c. 1973).

actually doing things on the ground, either through material support or really good effective outreach activity." This included ACOA, MACSA, the Dutch Angola Comité, the SAC, Youth Against Fascism and War, and on occasion United Nations subcommittees.[661] The New York branch of the LSM even worked with Newark Black Power sage Amiri Baraka after he embraced the Marxist revolutions in Portuguese Africa in the mid-1970s (see next chapter).[662] In fact, the broad appeal of the LSM provided critical inroads into the black community due to its emphasis on African voices and cooperation with Bay Area groups, becoming one of the first non-black American organizations to print articles in the *Black Panther* and mainstream black newspapers.[663] By late 1970, the extensive contacts throughout the continent led the liberation movements and European activists to identify LSM as a "priority centre" for coordinating literature distribution and solidarity activities in North America.[664] Though the LSM occupied a position at the far left, it too found in the African liberation struggles a reason for forging unity across the political spectrum.

By 1970, the essence of the radical network had formed. The SAC, LSM, and organizations with ties to the Zambia Group like MACSA acted as the informational center of the movement. Most drew heavily on a core of activists composed of veterans of the religious youth, supplemented by anti-imperial leftists from a variety of other backgrounds. *Southern Africa* provided the monthly news on the region that rarely appeared in

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661 LSM, "1972 Liberation Calendar," nd (late 1971), AAA.
662 Rick Sterling interview.
663 See series of articles run by Philadelphia Tribune penned by LSM on the Portuguese wars, title "Vietnam Not Only Major War Going on; Wars of Liberation in Africa, Too," *Philadelphia Tribune*, 30 November 1971.
664 Mailing List, nd [1970 or 1971], Folder: Solidarity Conferences Holland 1970 1971, CFMAG Papers, Bishopsgate Institute.

mainstream newspapers. LSM gave voice to the revolutions, disseminating their Marxist-inspired analysis and illustrating in gritty detail the realities of their wars and national reconstruction projects. CRV and MACSA research provided critical analysis of American activities in the region, as did other organizations such as the Boston-based Africa Research Group, which had been founded with the assistance of SAC members. Each of these groups, their individual branches, and others like them around the country undertook varying levels of grassroots protest to dramatize their findings for the public and government officials. The main purpose of this activism was to provide an avenue for people to feel part of the movement, bring the issues to the attention of new audiences, and increase public pressure on governments and businesses to reassess their ties to Portugal and the minority governments.

At the center of this movement was not a single ideology but rather a more general internationalist outlook. The Marxist LSM, radical CRV, and academic MACSA all rallied behind a criticism of Western policy that backed a deeply unequal status quo and unrestrained global capitalism. There was an element of Christian moralism, but more central was a leftist critique of an international structure skewed against Third World peoples. Change would emerge from the periphery where Euro-American control had begun to fray under the weight of colonialism. They worried that any movement centered strictly on a domestic context and lacking in this international solidarity component represented limited reformism that lacked the power to truly restructure the unequal

system.[665] Hostility to the status quo and commitment to empowering Southern actors as part of a direct assault on the U.S. power structure provided a firm foundation for solidarity. It allowed them to focus on two key activities, providing what material support they could and building a domestic movement aimed at removing the greatest barrier to liberation: official American support for colonial wars. This latter issue proved vital for integrating African activism with the anti-war movement.

Though the combined membership of these committees working on Africa never exceeded more than a few hundred to a thousand across the country during this period, their work raised the profile of the Portuguese African wars and southern Africa generally. The Lusophone revolutions would never displace Vietnam as the preeminent radical cause, but they were quickly becoming secondary fronts in the domestic war against global American imperialism. In 1968, the Portuguese colonies would be cited along with Vietnam during the occupation of Columbia University, where many of SAC's secular members worked.[666] Activists also convinced major national campaigns to pay greater attention to the Portuguese colonies, most notably the New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (New Mobe).[667] The (in)famous activist Bill Ayers would look back at the Lusophone struggles as integral parts of a global revolution, explaining

> The world is in flames, we thought, the people of the world rising against the octopus of imperialism and cutting off its tentacles one by one. It was a compelling image, apocalyptic: Cuba, one, Korea, two, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Angola,

[665] Ole Gjerstad interview.
[666] Anderson, The Movement in the Sixties, 195
[667] CRV, "CRV and Southern Africa," (New York, February 1970), AAA.

> Algeria, Ghana, and Viet Nam, of course, number eight, where the monster had overextended itself once and for all.[668]

Groups like LSM, CRV, and MACSA helped tear down regional barriers and integrate southern Africa into a radical critique that had focused overwhelmingly on Southeast Asia.[669] When Mondlane had traveled around the United States, he often entertained small and sometimes unreceptive gatherings. After 1970, Khan found that he spoke to well-informed crowds, who more often than not wanted guidance on what actions to take as compared to justification for FRELIMO's existence. This new state of affairs testified to the valuable legwork done by American allies of the Lusophone leaders.[670] The Portuguese African revolutions had entered the American consciousness.

The growth of the solidarity movement did not proceed smoothly on all fronts. Groups generally cooperated, but they faced internal issues. Most prominent was the continuing issue of racial diversity – or a lack there of – within the movement. All of the groups were multiracial, but in reality most were predominantly white in their leadership and membership. Robert Maurer remembers being troubled by the fact that the SAC had no blacks attending meetings in the 1960s, since the one African American associated with the committee resided in Chicago.[671] Whites and African students and faculty constituted much of MACSA's membership, though the organization worked regularly with African

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[668] Bill Ayers, *In Fugitive Days* (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2001), 157.

[669] The CRV, LSM, MACSA, and the groups associated with the New World Resource Center (mentioned in the next section) played pivotal roles in founding the North American Anti-Imperialist Coalition, which provided an umbrella for coordinating radical protests of reactionary U.S. policies across the globe. Don Barnett, "Principles of the Liberation Support Movement's Anti-Imperialist Work," LSM Press, 1972.

[670] Letter, Eileen Hanson to ACOA, Field Staff, 16 March 1972, Reel II ACOA Microfilm.

[671] Robert Maurer, "2015 Response to JP Questions 4 through 9-1," correspondence with author, 9 April 2015.

American student groups.[672] Some like Maurer felt that black leaders had simply failed to fully articulate the linkages between the international and domestic freedom struggles, but the reality was a combination of this and an ongoing suspicion of alliances with whites that developed from the Black Power movement. Where groups had black memberships, there were tensions over the perceived inappropriateness of whites leading an anti-colonial solidarity movement with black African revolutions.[673]

Yet for the most part, the expansion of the solidarity movement did not lead to internal bickering and collapse, which affected some parts of the anti-war movement. The network of personal relationships that helped produce the student activists led them to maintain relationships with the liberal protest organizations that had preceded them. Above all there was ACOA, which through Houser's stewardship maintained the largest research files, the best contacts, and the most extensive (though still meager) resources. The major activist groups from the Marxist LSM to the more moderate SAC would recommend fact sheets and letters from ACOA, while mining its sources to agitate for Africa within a community that continued to view the old guard of the civil rights era with some trepidation. Moreover, so long as both the churches and ACOA voiced a criticism of government policy in some way, the activists were not going to break with them. All were opposed to the same American structures that were inhibiting independence, and, as CRVer Mimi Edmunds remembered, it was important to maintain "somewhat of a united front."[674]

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[672] Bill Minter, phone interview with author, 11 September 2012.
[673] This ideological debate would result in the Africa Research Group's dissolution in 1972. Preliminary Statement, "Dissolution of the Africa Research Group," June 1973, Lyne Weikart Papers, MSU; Danny Schechter interview.
[674] Mimi Edmunds interview.

By continuing to work with ACOA and church organizations, the radical youth maintained access to information, funding, foreign contacts, and the small handful of policymakers interested in African policy. Their presence both in and alongside these more established organizations provided the opportunity to help guide their actions, pulling what were once consistent if reluctant adherents to Cold War liberalism in increasingly revisionist and internationalist directions.

Changing the Culture: The Influence of Youthful Radicals on ACOA and the NCC

As the Zambia network and groups like the LSM made headway in joining African liberation to the larger youth protest movement, they did not turn their backs on existing organizations that championed African issues, albeit from positions more aligned with prevailing Cold War concerns. The young radicals appreciated both the commitment and influence of ACOA and the church leadership, specifically the liberal subset of ecumenists like Margaret Flory that controlled the NCC. Deeply ingrained strategies of non-violence, a lingering commitment to liberal anti-communism, and a desire to please donors separated older organizations from the younger generation, but no one wished to sever relations. All were committed to the same goal of African liberation, and all had a role to play in expanding what remained a relatively small movement. Grassroots and national organizations cooperated on projects, and young leftists gained access to the highest levels of decision making in both ACOA and the churches. As a result, the anti-imperialism and internationalist ideology of the younger generation slowly pulled these once stalwart liberal groups to the left, empowering a newly assertive activism that challenged both official and

unofficial complicity in the maintenance of white minority rule. Youthful activists were aided in this mission by the CONCP nationalists, who expanded their efforts to court American opinion in the 1970s much as they did successfully in Europe. Whereas the Vietnam War had been mired in gray areas of national security and flag-waiving patriotism, objections to Portugal's formal colonialism were less debatable. As a result, the shift away from traditional Cold War tenets of anti-communism and North Atlantic solidarity was dramatic and sudden, the doors to this political reordering thrust open by the deep national soul-searching engendered by Vietnam. The result was a broadening of the anti-colonial solidarity movement. By 1972, representatives of the CONCP parties counted among their vocal allies everyone from community organizers to the spiritual leaders of major Protestant churches.

The decentralized network that surrounded the SAC played a vital role in fueling this shift. Margaret Flory's vision of the FIM had included changing the churches from within by introducing new methods to engage with the world. She circulated the Zambia Group's 1967 strategy document to many NCC leaders.[675] The Group shared her conviction, with one of the SAC's foundational principles being to push the churches "to help make the many well-phrased resolutions [on Africa] be something more than words."[676] They also concluded at that first strategy session that shifting ACOA from "an elitist, single-strategy group to a catalytic membership organization" concerned with mass

[675] Memo, Margaret Flory to Bill DuVal, 1 August 1967, Box 23, RG 6, NCC Papers, PHS.
[676] Letter, Charles a. Wilhelm for SAC to Robert Bilheimer, 25 July 1966, Box 23, RG 6, NCC Papers, PHS.

mobilization would be vital for strengthening the movement. The Zambia Group urged individuals like ACOA employee and SAC member Janet McLaughlin (later Hooper) to push Houser in that direction, while groups like the SAC should "work as closely as feasible with them" in order to help shift the focus of the organization.[677] Getting these institutions with their experience and resources behind the grassroots organizing of the youth generation would be necessary to build an effective national movement.

Given the ties of the SAC and the Zambia group to the churches, they became the logical starting point. The NCC and the individual Protestant churches had the ability to amplify and legitimize the message of the youth organizations. Their membership constituted some of the most influential lawmakers and business officials, as well as millions of stockholders and consumers. Churches had special ties to foundations, universities, and pension funds, and the NCC had communication channels to the top of the State Department (however ineffective). By the 1970s, the national institutions held roughly $3 billion in various stocks, mostly tied to pensions.[678] Swaying the church to actively back the liberation movements not only held important ramifications for shifting official policy away from cooperation with Portugal and the minority regimes; it had the potential to pressure businesses as well. It had been with this political and social clout in mind that the SAC had appealed, initially unproductively, to the NCC and the constituent churches to join the bank campaign in the mid-1960s. Churches had initially balked at the

[677] No Author [Zambia Group], "Strategies for Change in Southern Africa," 1967, Box 23, RG 6, NCC Papers, PHS.
[678] Howard Schomer, "Little Church and Big Business," 21 April 1974, Box 14, Howard Schomer Papers, Harvard Divinity Library (Boston, MA). Hereafter Schomer Papers, HDL.

idea of divesting their funds from any firm, but as initial overtures to the banks were politely rebuffed, some of the more progressive churches took action.[679] In so doing they were consciously following the lead of the student activists, which the churches agreed had pioneered the way, investigating southern Africa problems and demanding popular attention.[680] The movement of young SAC members into the national church structure encouraged this shift, beginning with Ken Carstens in 1966, Tim Smith soon after, and Gail Morlan intermittently by the end of the decade.

By 1967, the NCC stood at a crossroads. Always more international in its outlook than the vast majority of parochial parishes, the ecumenical coordinating body had been deeply affected by the Vietnam War and the growth of national resistance to it. The result was a major reexamination of the churches' involvement in the Cold War. In a statement titled "Imperatives of Peace and Responsibilities of Power," the council asserted, according to historian Jill K. Gill, that "justice must be the foundation for true national security and international peace in an increasingly interdependent world – not occupational military forces." The NCC had long articulated a position favoring decolonization and opposing minority government, but the newfound willingness to criticize American policy forced it to revisit its approach to international relations. The NCC argued that justice must trump the search for order and stability at all costs, recommending constraints on military adventurism, the protection of human rights, and support for the economic and cultural

[679] Letter, Robert S. Bilheimer to W.E. Grenville-Grey, 7 December 1967, Box 23; NCC Memo "Southern Africa: Chronology of Actions," no date [c. late 1970, early 1971], Box 14, RG 6, NCC Papers, PHS.
[680] "Background and Discussion Paper on Southern Africa for Consultations between Representative of the British Council of Churches and the National Council of Churches," September 1966, Box 23, RG 6, NCC Papers, PHS.

vitality of all peoples through the creation of indigenous institutions free of American control.[681] The new program focused on four areas that included global race relations with a special emphasis on Vietnam and southern Africa.[682] The NCC worried that the government had embraced the white status quo in the latter region. Continuing to deny the legitimate political and moral demands of African peoples would invariably lead to violence unless something was done to move toward greater self-determination. Educational programs were needed to change the way that parishioners and the government viewed this brewing conflict, lest the hint of communist intrigue turn yet another regional conflict into the next Cold War quagmire. Importantly, even as the NCC moved to actively lobby its members and the government for a change in policy in the region, it did so with the intent of securing local rights without violence. The idea of a military revolution remained anathema to religious leaders, who hesitated to commit directly to the Portuguese colonies because they had taken up arms against Lisbon.[683] Some were also concerned that the guns that FRELIMO, PAIGC, and MPLA were using to fight their wars likely came directly from communist countries, conflicting with the liberal consensus.[684]

It was here that the sympathetic network motivated by the Portuguese colonies played a pivotal role in shifting the debate toward greater solidarity with the revolutionary movements. In addition to the members of the SAC and Zambia Group that were slowly

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[681] Jill K. Gill, *Embattled Ecumenism* (DeKalb, Northern Illinois University Pres, 2011), 208.
[682] Letter, Robert S. Bilheimer to W.E. Grenville-Grey, 7 December 1967, Box 23, RG 6, NCC Papers, PHS.
[683] NCC, Department of International Affairs, "A Position Paper Concerning Southern Africa," no date [c. late 1967], Box 14, RG 6, NCC Papers, PHS.
[684] Unpublished article on Mondlane's visit to NCC in February 1967, Folder 6, Box 22, RG 8, NCC Papers, PHS.

entering into consultative circles at the NCC, the International Affairs Department looked to former missionaries to guide its new program. Many had ties to Angola and Mozambique, including the director of the program, Murray MacInness, a Canadian missionary who had been in Angola until 1964. He had seen firsthand the violence the Portuguese used in crushing the 1961 rebellion, and he understood why Africans took up arms.[685] American religious leaders still active in the region accepted the potential of armed resistance even sooner, notably Bishop Ralph Dodge whose support for the MPLA and Mondlane earned him bans from the Portuguese colonies.[686] MacInnes, Dodge, Morlan, and Carstens helped shift church emphasis from the relatively peaceful but inactive situation in South Africa to the active revolutions in the Portuguese colonies. In late 1967, Dodge challenged the NCC to find a "new strategy" for dealing with southern Africa since its approach was not working, to which one governor responded that perhaps the temptation to focus on apartheid should be shelved "because the real issues is Mozambique, Angola, etc."[687] Young radicals and those closest to the revolutionaries urged the church to provide support where change was possible, regardless of the presence of violence.

Before his death, Mondlane and FRELIMO were pivotal figures in pushing the development of this solidarity. As a longtime advocate of Gandhian protest who had once

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685 Press Release, United Nations Press Office of Public Information, "Human Rights Expert Group Hears Witness on Angola," 20 June 1970, Box 14, RG 6, NCC Papers, PHS. In the 1970s, MacInnes would also occupy an important position with the Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Portugal's African Colonies (TCLPAC), with former FIMer

686 Per Hassing, "Ralph Dodge," *Nexus: The Alumni Magazine Boston University School of Theology*, 10, No. 1 (November 1966), 25-28: http://www.bu.edu/sth-history/graduates/selected-graduates-1901-2000/ralph-edward-dodge-33-34/

687 NCC, "Meeting with Regard to South Africa," 8 December 1967, Box 23, RG 6, NCC Papers, PHS.

lectured Andrew Young on the issue, the Mozambican appreciated the difficult position the churches faced in supporting his and other CONCP movements. In early 1967, he visited the NCC headquarters on Riverside Drive to urge church support by presenting his vision of the revolution, which combined military confrontation with national reconstruction.[688] It was these requests for medicines, textbooks, and the like that – as they had for the Ford Foundation earlier – provided an opening for church leaders to reevaluate their views of revolutionary parties, presented by someone that many knew well. Mondlane also had Khan build relationships with church members, and sent the party's vice president to speak with them as well.[689] FRELIMO also consciously separated the medical program from military operations in order to strengthen appeals to church organization that all donations could be directed toward civilian programs.[690] The NCC began to support FRELIMO after Mondlane's visit, but there were still reservations at the highest levels. As the head of the Church World Services (CWS) – the NCC's international aid arm – explained to one of Mondlane's close associates in Dar es Salaam, "we are not in the business to support political movements," especially when those movements were waging an armed struggle.[691]

The momentum, however, had shifted, and the NCC and the Protestant churches drifted toward greater cooperation with the revolutions. The young activists' overseas

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[688] Unpublished article on Mondlane's visit to NCC in February 1967, Folder 6, Box 22, RG 8, NCC Papers, PHS.
[689] "U.N. Petitioners – FRELIMO Meeting," 9 November 1967, Box 22, RG 8, NCC Papers, PHS.
[690] Letter, Edward Hawley to Jan van Hoogstraten, 28 July 1967, Box 22, RG 8, NCC Papers, PHS.
[691] Letter, Jan Van Hoogstraten to Edward Hawley, 9 August 1967, Box 22, RG 8, NCC Papers, PHS. Van Hoogstraten explained that "as soon as Edwardo [sic] takes over the male volunteers into his political-military organization – they are outside our mandate as individuals."

experience had made them valuable experts as churches and other institutions looked for information on the movements. This was especially true in the case of Portuguese Africa, where the removal of missionaries had closed traditional sources of news. During this period, Margaret Flory circulated the Zambia Group's working paper, with its emphatic support for educational, medical, and nation-building assistance to FRELIMO. After returning from the Mozambique Institute in 1968, for example, Flory also arranged for Bill and Ruth Minter to work temporarily in New York, where Bill wrote a scathing critique of the Euro-American involvement in the liberation wars (published as *Portuguese Africa and the West*).[692] Church leadership even adopted the CRV's "Mozambique Will be Free" as recommended reading.[693] The NCC recognized the value of these youthful perspectives as it advanced its Africa program, and Morlan, Carstens, Smith, and occasionally Minter contributed to deliberations on southern Africa staff work during this formative period.[694] Smith, the field aide for African affairs for the United Church of Christ, became particularly outspoken, arguing in an eight page letter that made the rounds of the NCC leadership in 1968 that

> Revolution in Southern Africa is totally justifiable theologically, ethically, strategically, and politically. . . The time is long past for us to sit and try to justify revolution theologically. It is time to try to interpret the African nationalist movements to the mass of an American fearful of any form of violence in the world, to press for a new American foreign policy (neither reactionary nor anti-revolutionary) which will insure that American will not intervene on behalf of the

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[692] Minter Interview. During this period, Ruth Minter spent six months collecting educational material at the request of FRELIMO, used to produce a textbook for the MI. She was also assisted by the FIM.
[693] Memo, to DOM Africa Committee, et al., 26 January 1970, Box 14, RG 6, NCC Papers, PHS.
[694] See for example minutes, Southern Africa Staff Group, 21 March 1969, and list of participants, 'A Working Conference: Our Strategy on Southern Africa," no date, Box 23, RG 6, NCC Papers, PHS.

> white status quo in Southern Africa, and to aid the liberation movements in as many ways as we possibly can.[695]

As the only active revolutions in the region, it was the Portuguese colonies that demanded immediate aid if real change was going to occur either there or in the white minority states.

The revolution bubbling up from the bottom of the NCC was greatly encouraged by a coalition of more established leaders. In addition to MacInnes, Bishop Dodge became the centerpiece of some denominational programs as early as 1968, telling the leadership in New York that both Mondlane and Neto had assured him their parties would "warmly welcome any assistance in meeting [humanitarian] needs in the occupied territories."[696] They were joined by a group of black churchmen under the leadership of Rev. Gayraud Wilmore, who were rapidly becoming what one internal memo called "a new force in [the NCC's] involvement with Africa."[697] Wilmore explained in 1970 that the Black Power movement had led him to embrace international black solidarity alongside interracial coalition, because he now understood "racism as a permanent, institutionalized system related to American expansion and intervention." African Americans connected to the NCC argued that "blacks must free themselves. The role of the church is to assist groups already engaged in liberation."[698] This had also been the conclusion of the World Council

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[695] Tim Smith, "Reflection and comments on a two month stint in South Africa," December 1968, Box 23, RG 6, NCC Papers, PHS.
[696] Letter, Ralph Dodge to Juel Nordby, 28 May 1968; Memo, Juel Nordby to Tucker et. al., 17 April 1968, Box 23, RG 6, NCC Papers, PHS.
[697] Memo, J. Murray Mac Inness to Members of the Sub-Committee appointed by the Chairman of the Africa Dept. NCC, 9 July 1970, Box 23, RG 6, NCC Papers, PHS.
[698] Proceedings of the Consultation on WCC Program to Combat Racism, 22 July 1970, Box 23, RG 6, NCC Papers, PHS.

of Churches (WCC) at the Uppsala meeting of 1968, adding yet another layer of support for the church's embrace of the revolutionary African movements.

By 1970, a sea change had occurred in the way the NCC and much of the church leadership viewed the liberation movements. It had swallowed its objections to violence, realizing that the revolutions were the most effective agents of change where the Portuguese government brooked no opposition. The NCC began viewing the liberation movements as governments-in-waiting which effectively implied "accepting the military side of things" within church deliberations.[699] It recognized that parties like FRELIMO had the right and indeed the moral duty to defend their people. Major contributions began to flow to the Mozambicans and the MPLA. This still consisted largely of humanitarian aid, but there was an increasing understanding that medicines, clothes, and other material would also be used to advance nation building projects in the liberated regions and rear areas rather than merely in the refugee centers.[700] Even the Quaker-backed American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), one of the most firmly pacifist organizations associated with an NCC denomination, had embraced the Portuguese African liberation movements by the early 1970s, starting their Southern African Program at the specific request of the MPLA during this period.[701] The head of the CWS also changed his tune, explaining in 1968 that he actively wanted medicines to flow with FRELIMO over the border. "My sympathy is

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[699] Letter, Gerhad A. Elston to Bob Bilheimer, 2 October 1969, Box 23, RG 6, NCC Papers, PHS.
[700] The Church World Services was sending medicines to the MPLA's SAM by 1972, though it likely began earlier.
[701] Jim Bristol and Mike Simmons, "Questions for the MPLA Representative Attending Angola Conference," 18 February 1976, General Administration OES (Commes & Orgs to General Lobbying-Policies) 1976, AFSC. Though the AFSC would note the important role the MPLA played, they developed much closer relationships with South African movements.

clearly with the Mozambique people and not with their foreign masters with whom we have through NATO an unholy alliance," he explained, confident that "our major denominational supporters have now complete sympathy with the cause."[702] And this was indeed the case. By 1969, the head of the NCC's international office offered his agreement with Gayraud Wilmore that "Assistance to FRELIMO is in this context assistance to social change in South Africa."[703] The churches had overcome the veneer of violence to see the revolutions as they had always wished to be seen. In the words of one internal NCC document, the "Liberation movements are providing hope, change, [and] dignity in contrast to the 'order' and oppression of the minority regimes."[704]

In overcoming this initial resistance to violence, the NCC and its most active church leaderships were treading new ground. Rather than remaining passive until international crises made church actions ineffectual as they had in Vietnam, the denominations were trying to play a productive role in shaping discussions on the revolutions before they directly affected the United States.[705] That the churches had decided to support leftist organizations actively fighting a NATO ally meant that they were breaking free of what the NCC recognized as the limitations of "'cold war' thinking."[706] Most importantly, they

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[702] Letter, Jan van Hoogstraten to Harold F. Miller, 19 January 1968 and Memo, van Hoogstraten to James MacCracken, 19 January 1969, Box 22, RG 8, NCC Papers, PHS.
[703] Letter, Robert Bilheimer to Gayraud Wilmore, 11 April 1969, Box 23, RG 6, NCC Papers, PHS.
[704] Recommendations to the Africa Dept. NCC from Sub-Committee appointed by the Chairman of the African Dept., 26 May 1970, Box 23, RG 6, NCC Papers, PHS.
[705] The NCC shift was supported by the individual denominations, whose leadership mostly agreed with one episcopal that "All too often the churches don't react until a crisis looms and then any action is usually too late to be really effective." Letter, J. Seymour Flinn to Robert Bilheimer, 9 October 1968, Box 23, RG 6, NCC Papers, PHS.
[706] "Tentative Criteria for Church Support to the Liberation Movements of Southern Africa," no date [c. 1970], Box 23, RG 6, NCC Papers, PHS.

were doing so in a way that linked them with the youth who were increasingly taking to the streets and lecture halls to educate the country on African independence struggles. In 1969, the NCC asked in internal discussions if a "campaign of military disengagement with Portugal [could] be organized with support of anti-Vietnam forces?"[707] The answer from members of the Zambia Group and the SAC – a number of whom participated in these specific deliberations – was an enthusiastic yes.

The search for justice that informed the creation of the new southern African program inspired a new vision of American interaction with the world that closely paralleled youth internationalism. At the heart of this stood a new responsibility for Western peoples to recognize the right Third World peoples had in developing their own futures. As one consultation between the NCC and WCC concluded, there can be "no justice in our world without a transfer of economic resources to undergird the redistribution of political power and to make cultural self-determination meaningful."[708] The churches were shifting from the paternalistic missionary activities of past generations to a new role of "empowerment," which dovetailed with the vision of a new, flexible church activism that Margaret Flory had placed at the heart of the FIM program. Yet perhaps most important, the NCC and the churches defined the fight against racism, poverty, economic exploitation, and disenfranchisement as globally unified in a single system of reactionary repression. "The problems of justice-liberation-development," one discussion among

[707] "A Working Conference on Our Strategy on Southern Africa," 21 November 1969, Box 23, RG 6, NCC Papers, PHS. SAC members Gail Morlan, Mary McAnally, Tim Smith, and Ken Carstens were all in attendance, as was Gay Wilmore and Mia Adjali.
[708] Proceedings of the Consultation on WCC Program to Combat Racism, 22 July 1970, Box 23, RG 6, NCC Papers, PHS.

denominational representatives concluded in 1971, "are problems of peoples of other countries, of peoples of our own country, and of peoples in our own neighborhoods."[709]

The change in perspective was also occurring at the churches' most important ally on African affairs, ACOA. Longtime secretary George Houser had been among the most assertive civil rights activists in the 1950s, but the necessity of keeping ACOA funded and involved in Washington discussions promoted restraint. He feared alienating liberal and church institutions as well as official allies, resulting in a careful adherence to a single-issue stance that was more anti-colonial than in solidarity with the liberation groups. ACOA had good relations with individuals like Mondlane, but this did little to dissuade youthful activists from viewing ACOA as elitist and overly cautious. And most importantly, ACOA's history of support for Holden Roberto and his FNLA put the organization at odds with radicals and youths generally, whose leftist politics placed them firmly in the camp of the CONCP and the MPLA. Despite an influx of new staff, Houser's presence and loose associations with the government led many to believe that the committee was, as fieldworker Prexy Nesbitt captured, "CIA . . . or somethin'."[710]

Yet like the churches, ACOA continued to work with the young generation of activists, which pulled the institution increasingly to the left. New blood entered in the form of SAC member Janet Hooper and Robert Van Lierop, an African American lawyer who represented the NAACP on the ACOA board and had close relations with FRELIMO.

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[709] Report, "World Justice, Liberation, and Development," Meeting of Church Representatives Organized by NCC, 18-19 February 1971

[710] George Houser (?), "Comment on Prexy's Report to the Board," 25 September 1970, ACOA Microfilm.

Van Lierop helped recruit another radical young African American in Charles Hightower, who became the second head of the Washington office. Like the churches, ACOA also looked to knowledgeable activists like Bill Minter to consult on new informational programs.[711] Each of these individuals agitated for more radical strategies to support the liberation movements, a firmer commitment to their socialist programs, and for ACOA to a take a more anti-imperial approach to international affairs. Houser hesitated, but he was encouraged by the shifting attitudes of major donors like the churches. The Zambia Group was pivotal in arranging for a donation that stipulated ACOA's creation of a new, grassroots arm that would mobilize African Americans and youth.[712] This initiative resulted in the creation of a field work position in Chicago for 1970, which Houser filled with the outspoken Prexy Nesbitt, a satellite SAC member recently returned from working with FRELIMO's propaganda office in Dar es Salaam.[713] This influx of youthful vigor combined with the rise to prominence of Jennifer Davis, a progressive South African exile, within ACOA moved the committee away from its rhetorical commitment to liberal anti-communism toward a more radical position.

There is perhaps no greater evidence of this shift in thinking than George Houser's reluctant embrace of the least successful of the CONCP groups, the MPLA. Even after

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[711] Robert Van Lierop, phone interview with author 11 October 2014; Minter wrote the ACOA fact sheet on the Azores in 1969. Memo, Gary Gappert to George Houser, 31 October 1969, Reel III, ACOA Microfilm.

[712] Rosell "Prexy" Nesbitt, Interivew with Bill Minter, 31 October 1998, *No Easy Victories*: http://www.noeasyvictories.org/interviews/int08_nesbitt.php

[713] Rozell "Prexy" Nesbitt, interview with author, August 2012 (Chicago, IL). He also attended the Rome Conference which allowed him to speak authoritatively on what the CONCP parties desired from the solidarity movement.

Holden Roberto's paranoia and ironfisted rule had taxed the FNLA's relationship with ACOA, Houser had refused to abandon his old ally. The MPLA had made contact with Houser as early as 1963, but they received no aid. He justified the decision according to the strategy of avoiding involvement in the tug-of-war between competing nationalist parties, but such attitudes were somewhat disingenuous. Roberto had long received the lion's share of ACOA and church assistance, which Houser influenced as Roberto's primary U.S. contact. In later years, Houser could not recall fully what influenced his preference for Roberto, but a vestigial belief that anti-communists were more acceptable partners in the Cold War context likely prejudiced the decision.[714] Whatever the reason, Houser's position put him in conflict with ACOA's younger elements, whose radicalism led them to back the MPLA as a socialist movement and the natural Angolan extension of the CONCP.[715] As internal agitation grew and influential allies like the churches abandoned Cold War pretenses, Houser gradually shifted his position. In 1969 ACOA assisted the medical services of the MPLA for the first time, under pressure from internal forces to recognize the MPLA's advent as the more successful liberation group.[716] Once this initial hurdle had been cleared, avenues for cooperation between ACOA and the MPLA increased, though Houser refused to abandon the FNLA completely.[717] This continued cautiousness frustrated young members of ACOA, but it was a start.

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[714] George Houser, phone interview with author, 10 March 2014.
[715] Prexy Nesbitt was the leading critic to put his thoughts to paper, but there were a number that shared his views. See memo, Prexy Nesbitt to Staff and Board of ACOA, 14 September 1970, Reel III, ACOA Microfilm.
[716] Letter, George Houser to Agostinho Neto, 11 June 1969, Box 79, ACOA Papers.
[717] Memo, George Houser to Murray MacInnes, 23 June 1971, Reel III, ACOA Microfilm.

As the Roberto debate shows, there were limitations to how much ACOA could change. It never adopted a broad anti-imperial approach to Africa as did the churches. Attempts by staff members to rally support by linking the African revolutions with struggles in Palestine and Latin America were quashed by Houser and the executive board.[718] He feared expanding advocacy work beyond southern Africa would dilute ACOA's effectiveness, fueling internal debates over where to focus efforts, alienating funders who held different views on Israel or communist internationalism, and sacrificing ACOA's prominent position in the field of African information. Houser was right from the organizational standpoint, but it stifled and frustrated young employees, notably Charles Hightower and Prexy Nesbitt. Moreover, this singular focus on Africa by a predominantly white, moderate leadership prevented ACOA from making inroads into the black community, where most viewed it with suspicion precisely because it seemed starkly removed from the radical internationalism of the Black Power movement.[719] The one concession that young activists were able to achieve is that in the late 1960s, ACOA began to connect southern Africa and the Vietnam War. While it never equated FRELIMO or the PAIGC with the North Vietnamese, it promoted a narrative in its election position paper of 1968 that American complicity in Portuguese colonialism closely mirrored the gradualist entry into Southeast Asia.[720] This new approach to selling the African revolutions among

[718] Copy of Letter, Peter Weiss to Charles Hightower, 7 August 1970, Reel III, ACOA Microfilm.
[719] Prexy Nesbitt to Staff and Board of ACOA, 14 September 1970, Reel III, ACOA Microfilm.
[720] ACOA, "The United States and Southern Africa: A Position Paper for the 1968 Campaign," 1968, AAA.

liberal audiences provided a gateway for anti-war youth to begin engaging with ACOA, who some had long suspected of representing government interests.

The problem was that ACOA and Houser were unsure of their identity. Though both had been steeped in the tradition of grassroots popular dissent, the committee's rise to prominence as a respected resource on Africa demanded it avoid an overly ideological gloss. As the head of the Washington Office on Africa, Ted Lockwood, commented a few years later, Houser's ACOA "has always been a bit uncertain as to whether it was really liberal or whether it was more left than that."[721] Whatever his natural inclinations, Houser felt that ACOA could not be too radical without undermining its own authority. He considered the organization non-establishment but not anti-establishment, meaning it was independently trying to shape policy by working with government contacts.[722] Houser did not disapprove of others taking more assertive approaches, but ACOA had to tread carefully lest it alienate important allies and become lost in the ideological infighting that undermined the anti-war movement. Rather, Houser understood ACOA as a "meeting ground for various forces" – a force for coordinating and promoting interest in southern Africa from the grassroots to the halls of power.[723]

A number of younger staffers and associates appreciated Houser's perspective. They understood that an effective solidarity movement required a variety of perspectives in order to wield political influence, and ACOA appealed to powerful constituencies still

[721] Letter, Ted Lockwood to Peter Weiss, 21 January 1981, Box 2, Series 2, Papers of the Washington Office on Africa, Yale Divinity Library.
[722] Memo, Houser to Executive Board, 29 September 1970, Reel III, ACOA Microfilm.
[723] Memo, Houser to Executive Board, April 1970, Reel III, ACOA Microfilm.

skeptical of student activists, much as the NCC was important for mobilizing religious communities. The problem then was how to involve ACOA in the grassroots aspects of consciousness raising without inheriting the suspicion youthful radicals attached to the organization – rightly or wrongly. As Robert Van Lierop explained in early 1972:

> I do not think the ACOA can or should become a radical "movement" organization . . . [it] is and probably should remain one which is capable of pressuring churches, corporations, organs of government, etc. . . . The answer I think lies in the need for ACOA itself to recognize its own limitations and to be willing to support field work and other projects without having itself necessarily identified as the sponsor of such activities. . . the ACOA may never see a return (such as increased membership or increased contributions) from supporting such efforts. But the fact remains that efforts such as these go a long way towards raising the political consciousness of many individuals within the United States.[724]

Houser had long hesitated to commit ACOA to anything for which it could not achieve at least partial recognition and maintain some modicum of control.[725] Houser was also skeptical that there was an immediate possibility for any grassroots movement on behalf of southern Africa, but the sudden proliferation of activist organizations around 1970 such as MACSA, LSM, CRV, and others chipped away at these doubts.[726] It was these attitudes that had to be adjusted, and it was here that young members had the most success in changing the old community organizer's mind. ACOA had an opportunity to help build a wider movement, if only it would embrace its role as the mentor rather than the center. It was this realization along with the shift in church attention that helped fuel popular solidarity. Beginning in the early 1970s, ACOA began to act – in Houser's own words –

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[724] Memo, Van Lierop to Members of the Executive Board of ACOA, 22 February 1972, Reel III, ACOA Microfilm.
[725] ACOA's ambiguous relation with the ARG was the most prominent example.
[726] Memo, Houser to Executive Board, April 1970, Reel III, ACOA Microfilm.

as a "catalytic agent" in the creation and support of new organizations that would play invaluable roles in building the mass movement.[727]

In one example, ACOA provided the seed money necessary to launch the Chicago Committee for the Liberation of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea (CCLAMG). Here, the full diversity of the radical solidarity movement came together to demonstrate the intertwined nature of transnational anti-imperial politics. Nesbitt's experience in Chicago had illustrated the limitations of ACOA, and it pushed Van Lierop and other more radical members of the executive board to convince Houser to accept ACOA's new role in supporting separate community endeavors.[728] ACOA needed an organization that could distribute information on the African revolutions free of institutional baggage, and the solution lay in the newly formed CCLAMG (pronounced "clam").

CCLAMG emerged from the intersecting activisms of religious internationalism and radicalism. Eileen Hanson, the former Frontier Intern and CRV member, founded the group with Nesbitt and CRV alumnae Nancy Freehafer and Mimi Edmunds.[729] The group focused on raising awareness and activism around the Portuguese colonies, since by 1971 they had become the unquestioned leaders in the southern African revolutions. They were one piece of an anti-imperial network that had emerged from the CRV in Chicago, where

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[727] Memo, George Houser to Steering Committee of WOA, 27 November 1972, Reel IV, ACOA Microfilm.

[728] ACOA Executive Board Meeting Notes, 14 September 1970, ACOA Papers, Proquest History Vault; Memo, Robert Van Lierop to Members of the Executive Board of ACOA, 22 February 1972, Reel III, ACOA Microfilm.

[729] Both Freehafer and Edmunds had been involved with the CRV and the Committee for a Free Mozambique in New York. The CRV actually dissolved around 1971, but transitioned directly into a larger anti-imperial collective that included regional working groups like the CCLAMG. History of NWRC, no date, Folder: CAIC, Carole Collins Papers, MSU; Letter, Deb Brewster to Dwight, 20 May 1973, Box 11, New World Resource Center Papers, Chicago History Museum (Chicago, IL). [Hereafter, NWRC, CHM]

a number of regionally focused groups operated in a single collective known as the New World Resource Center (NWRC).[730] The goal of the NWRC and its component organizations was to "awaken people in this country to the problems of injustice and oppression around the world, to deepen people's understanding of the fundamental causes of these problems, and to enable them to work actively for a world based on social and economic justice."[731] Though Vietnam still raged, CCLAMG was the most active component within the NWRC, and it championed broad Third World empowerment versus the more constrained message of anti-war movement.[732] CCLAMG's anti-imperialism was exactly the kind of politics Houser had traditionally avoided, but ACOA nonetheless became the single largest donor to the establishment of the NWRC during its genesis in 1971.[733]

CCLAMG became a new hub in the growth of the grassroots solidarity movement. Through the NWRC, it distributed a broad variety of literature to Chicago and the surrounding states including publications from ACOA, LSM, CRV, FRELIMO, and other regional organizations like MACSA and the Committee for a Free Mozambique (another product of the SAC-CRV nexus).[734] The group traveled widely in order to participate in

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730 Hanson-Kelley interview.
731 Funding Proposal for the New World Resource Center, no date, Box 13, NWRC, CHM.
732 Beyond prison work, Southern Africa program demanded the majority of funds for the NWRC.
733 The key link was Hanson, who had replaced Nesbitt as ACOA's Chicago organizer. She joined with Robert Van Lierop to convince Houser that radical grassroots organizations like CCLAMG and the NWRC were the best ways to achieve the expansion of solidarity, likely supported by staff members like Janet Hooper connected through the Zambia group. Houser to ACOA Officer and Steering Committee, 3 August 1971, Reel III, ACOA Microfilm.
734 NWRC Literature List, no date and NWRC, Southern Africa Literature, no date, Box 12, NWRC Papers, CHM.

anti-imperial conferences, becoming with the LSM one of the two most active groups internationally through attendance at the European Easter solidarity gatherings.[735] Members spoke in cities across the region, including Toronto, Ottawa, Washington, DC, and Iowa City.[736] Yet like many groups such as MACSA and SAC, the most important work involved constant appeals to the community. They introduced Chicago directly to the liberation movements by bringing in representatives such as Khan and Fernandes, while Nesbitt and other speakers with direct experience in the movements spoke regularly.[737] CCLAMG sponsored African dinners, visited schools, worked with churches, and boycotted local businesses involved in southern Africa including Gulf Oil and General Electric.[738] When Prexy Nesbitt had first returned to Chicago in 1969 he had found a "media wasteland" on southern Africa, but just four years later CCLAMG information saturation had become so extensive that they were able to broadcast a four part series on southern Africa on local television.[739] Though there was some tension within the collective about accepting money from the liberal ACOA, which Hanson remembered as a bit stodgy from the youth perspective, CCLAMG and the NWRC depended on the organization in their early phases as they operated just above the red.[740]

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[735] In 1973 alone, CCLAMG attended more than ten conferences outside Chicago. NWRC, Funding Proposal? (no first page), no date (1973?), Box 13, NWRC Papers, CHM.
[736] NWRC, Funding Proposal, Box 13, NWRC Papers, CHM.
[737] NWRC hosted regular events and had mailing list of 500. Attendance at events varied from 15 to 80 with 45 being average, not included traveling shows put on by CCLAMG. NWRC, Funding Proposal? (no first page), no date (1973?), Box 13, NWRC Papers, CHM.
[738] Hanson-Kelly interview; Robert McClory, "Pickets here demand GE get out of South Africa," *Chicago Defender*, 11 May 1974.
[739] NWRC, Funding Proposal? (no first page), no date (1973?), Box 13, NWRC Papers, CHM; Prexy Nesbitt, Report to Executive Committee of ACOA, 16 April 1970, Reel III, ACOA Microfilm.
[740] Hanson-Kelly interview

Most importantly, CCLAMG like its youth counterparts developed a broad reach. It took a leading role in the local anti-imperial movement, and by 1973 Angola had become part of an international triumvirate of Third World causes alongside Vietnam and (later) Chile, discussed at the majority of radical gatherings.[741] CCLAMG also reached out to other New Left causes. The "founding mothers" of the NWRC such as Hanson and Edmunds were also active in women's liberation, and they created bridges between the movements. They actively collaborated with women of the MPLA's *Organização da Mulher de Angola* (Angolan Women's Organization, OMA) who encouraged solidarity organizing among women's groups, which led local feminists to urge support for the southern African struggles.[742] Nesbitt helped provide entrance into the black community, while Hanson's church connections (despite her drift away from religion) offered a chance to reinforce the NCC's national program at the local level. When Robert Van Lierop worked with FRELIMO to produce a thirty minute film on their liberation struggle in 1972, CCLAMG showed it more than 100 times in 1973, dividing its showings evenly between black groups, churches, and students organizations.[743] CCLAMG encouraged the various constituencies to continue their research into the revolutions by directly contacting ACOA and other groups like the LSM. In this way, the CCLAMG legitimized Houser's non-establishment organization for new audiences by linking it to radical groups like LSM and

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[741] For example, Conference Information (Film showings), no date, Box 14, NWRC Papers, CHM.
[742] "Support Southern African Struggles," *Womankind* 2:2 (October 1972). Among other things, CCLAMG produced an OMA button that was widely distributed in Chicago, but also sent to the MPLA for distribution within its ranks.
[743] CCLAMG Overview, 1975?, AAA. . Given estimated attendance between 30-50 people at each viewing, more than 4,000 people saw the film in the year-long period. The CCLAMG continued to show the film dozens of times a year at the request of various groups until at least 1977.

disseminating literature. The symbiotic relationship between the two organizations illustrated the unique nature of the solidarity movement, which crafted a unity based on the common goal of international support for southern African liberation despite ideological differences.

If groups like the CCLAMG translated ACOA and indeed the churches for New Left activists, ACOA became an important conduit for connecting grassroots organizers with those in power. Houser and the churches had both forged respectable working relationships with congressmen and low level State Department officials, but they had been disappointed by the lack of action regarding southern Africa, and the Portuguese colonies in particular. Even sympathetic congressmen like Charles Diggs, the chair of the House subcommittee on Africa, were moving slowly. In early 1970, Charles Hightower complained of Diggs' "ambiguous approach" to African affairs, which clearly sought confrontation but relied heavily on academic and business interests who advised a gradual approach to Portugal and the minority regimes. "Diggs did not seem to know what he wanted: a conference of specialists, or an educative meeting of grassroots Africanists, or some combination," Hightower vented. It was up to ACOA and other influential movement organs to introduce new blood into Congressional discussions.[744] Over the next few years, ACOA and to a lesser extent the churches helped Diggs discover grassroots organizing, aided by the rise of black activism on the topic beginning in 1972 (see next chapter).

[744] Memo, Charles Hightower to George Houser, "Meeting with Congressmen Diggs and Freidel," 23 January 1970, Reel III, ACOA Microfilm.

Specifically, ACOA and the churches helped legitimize the New Left activists as reliable sources on the revolutions. Moderate institutions had come to depend on the Zambia Group and radical solidarity organizations like LSM for information, and they urged their governmental allies to do the same. Bill Minter landed high on the list of witnesses that ACOA recommended to Congressman Diggs when he began his investigation into American commitments to Portugal in 1969, as did the CRV and SAC.[745] Within a year, Diggs was reading movement materials such as the Dutch Angola Comité's *Facts and Report* and the Committee for Freedom in Mozambique's profile of FRELIMO.[746] Other congressman also embraced the more radical grassroots perspective. In February of 1972, Robert Van Lierop joined George Houser in testifying against the Azores base agreement in front of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which inspired a scathing letter from Ted Kennedy to President Nixon a short time later.[747]

The growth of ties between the Congress and the solidarity movement became formalized in 1972 with the founding of the Washington Office on Africa (WOA). ACOA's D.C. office had been in operation for four years at that point with support from individual church denominations, and the NCC had increased its lobbying efforts in the late 1960s.[748] But both had found that the Portuguese propaganda had worked in

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[745] Letter, Houser to Diggs, 15 July 1969, Box 208, Charles Diggs Papers, MSRC, HU. Houser put Minter in the company with John Marcum, Ronald Chilcote, Douglas Wheeler, James Duffy, and Malcolm McVeigh – all among the most cited authors on Portuguese Africa in the 1960s and 1970s.

[746] See Folder 10: Africa – Portuguese Territories, Box 208, Charles Diggs Papers, MSRC, HU. The CFM News and Notes was also a source of information.

[747] Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "Executive Agreements with Portugal and Bahrain," 1, 2, 3, February 1972; Edward Kennedy, "Statement on Senate Resolution 214," 4 March 1972, Box 188, ACOA Papers.

[748] Memo, William K. Du Val to International Affairs Secretaries, 13 Mach 1968 (PHS 9 11.50.33)

combination with similar efforts by Rhodesia and South Africa to build a broad sympathy in the congress, especially among influential southern congressmen who had little interest in interfering with white rule. The "southern African lobbies are working very well," a former State Department official had told NCC officials in 1968, "The only way to combat this . . . was by sustained concentrated staff work."[749] It was just such staff work by the churches and ACOA that had helped open new avenues for cooperation with Diggs and beyond, but the growth of congressional interest in regional politics and the increasing cooperation of solidarity groups provided a new opportunity. In late 1971, the NCC and ACOA agreed to combine their efforts along with a few small trade unions to create WOA. They chose Rev. Edgar "Ted" Lockwood to direct the office. An episcopal priest and lawyer who had been active in civil rights causes, Lockwood became interested in Africa when he began researching church investments in the region. The card-carrying member of the socialist party became a vocal proponent of full divestment and an ally of internationalist youth pushing this perspective within the churches (see below).[750] His appointment heading WOA was a victory for radical youth, and WOA took a polite if increasingly internationalist approach to its lobbying of Congress on African issues.

WOA was in many ways the culmination of the Zambia Groups ambitions to reshape domestic policy. It emerged as the result of cooperation between the NCC and ACOA, which had taken increasingly aggressive tacks in confronting continued white

[749] Memo, "An account of an interview with J. Wayne Frederichs (sic), the Ford Foundation," 23 October 1968, Box 23, RG 6, NCC Papers, PHS. (9. 11.10.38)
[750] Ted Lockwood interview with David Goodman, 16 November 2004, *No Easy Victories*: http://www.noeasyvictories.org/interviews/int12_lockwood.php

minority rule. After its founding, it became an important source of both pressure and information opposing continued cooperation with the white minority regimes, focusing heavily on continued NATO aid to Portugal and the importation of Rhodesian chrome under the notorious Byrd Amendment. Lockwood also helped bridge the gap between the grassroots and policymakers. His close cooperation with congressmen like Gale McGee, the head of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa, was accompanied by strong ties built with grassroots organizations such as CCLAMG.[751] WOA provided a consistent pathway through which activists, their publications, and their ideas could gain a hearing on Capitol Hill. As a result of this work, a new flow of information critical of Portugal and the minority regimes of southern Africa began to have greater and greater influence on Congressional decision-making. In 1973, for instance, Congressman Charles Rangel would introduce a bill to halt exports of chemical herbicides to Portugal, specifically citing one of the LSM's interviews with an MPLA soldier as his inspiration.[752] It was in part through WOA – and before it ACOA and the churches – that legislators discovered in the early 1970s that a growing number of young people were taking an interest in southern Africa and particularly the Portuguese colonies. They looked to solidarity organizations and their plethora of publications for information on the revolutions and ways they could join the struggle. The extension of the Congressional-activist coalition to the grassroots began slowly in the early 1970s, but it picked up speed as popular action demonstrated the true breadth of solidarity sentiment.

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[751] Hanson-Kelly interview.
[752] "Rangel Bills May Halt Chemical War," *Afro-American*, 9 June 1973.

Solidarity in the Streets and at the Pumps: The Beginning of the Gulf Boycott

Solidarity with the revolutions manifested most widely in attacks on businesses operating in southern Africa. The promotion of conscientious investment had been the most public activity on behalf of southern Africa since 1965, when SDS, SAC, CORE, and ACOA initiated the protest of Chase Manhattan. The churches haltingly followed their youth, but major institutional divestment was slow, highlighted by actions from the Methodist Board of Missions in 1968 and the United Methodist Church the following year.[753] The effects were important within the churches, as it provoked some like the United Church of Christ to define policies aimed at promoting "Corporate social responsibility" in a number of areas, including racial and economic justice, peace, Third World development, environmental protection, and gender equality.[754] But the bank campaign had passed its zenith by 1970 when the alliance on southern Africa had truly begun to congeal. South Africa did not renew the loan in 1969 after conditions had greatly improved, providing a pyrrhic victory for the movement while robbing it of an effective rallying

[753] William Minter, "Action Against Apartheid," in Bruce Douglas, ed., *Reflections on Protest: Student Presence in Political Conflict* (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1968). A number of groups and publications associated with Christian churches sided with the NSCF, including the influential *Christianity and Crisis Magazine*. For the evolution of ecumenical leftists thinking in the periodical, see Mark Hulsether, *Building a Protestant Left: Christianity and Crisis Magazine, 1941*-1993 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1999). See George Dugan, "Church is Leaving Bank as Protest," *New York Times*, 10 February 1969.
[754] Briefing Paper, "Corporate Social Responsibility in a Christian Perspective," 13 April 1976, Box 14, Schomer Papers.

point.[755] More importantly, the Chase protest had spread slowly beyond New York and the enclaves where SAC alumni were working to build activism.[756]

The problem with the bank campaign was its timing as the first such action, but it failed to grab the popular imagination because it tried to build a movement in revolutionary times around a cause for which there was no revolution. Apartheid was widely reviled, but the South Africans had effectively exiled both the ANC and the PAC. With no active resistance in the country, anti-apartheid solidarity became a relic of the civil rights movement, which failed to capture the zeitgeist of the post-1968 United States. The Portuguese colonies and their dynamic liberation movements better fit the moment, but they lacked the symbol that dramatized U.S. involvement in the region. NATO complicity worked well for attracting the anti-war crowd, but activists wanted to place the Lusophone struggles near the level of Vietnam not as an addendum to it. The problem, as one ACOA staffer pondered in 1969, was finding "ways of 'Chase Manhattanizing' the economic and military institutions through which we work with Portugal."[757] The growing success of the liberation movements provided an opportunity to invest domestic activism with renewed

[755] Anti-apartheid groups rightly claimed some credit for the withdrawal, but South Africa had used the money to establish financial stability. Many institutions under pressure had sold stocks in banks for financial reasons, but a few – including Princeton University – explained that the institution would not do business with banks dealing directly with the South African government. Campaigners considered this a major victory, which it was – one of the first times a major non-religious institution had explained its divestment on the grounds of Southern Africa. Tim Smith, "Subject: South Africa and the Bank Campaign," nd [circa fall 1969], Southern Africa Committee, Collection of David Wiley and Christine Root, AAA.

[756] The first major protest in California, for instance, seems to have taken place in 1970. See "100 in Noisy UCL Protest, *Los Angeles Times*, 5 March 1970.

[757] Memo, ACOA Staff to Steering Committee, 6 June 1969, Box 92, ACOA Papers.

energy if only they could find something that directly connected the African struggles with domestic issues in an immediate and concrete way.

Gulf Oil provided the solution. The CONCP parties had long urged their supporters to protest the foreign investments in the Portuguese colonies, which they asserted directly funded the metropolitan war effort. During the 1960s, the largest payments were coming from the oil companies who descended on what one official report referred to as the "sleeping giant" of Africa.[758] Speculation occurred at various points in all three of the mainland colonies. The most successful and therefore most offensive company was Gulf Oil, which had first negotiated exploration for rights Angola and Mozambique in 1964. FRELIMO criticized Gulf for its role in assisting the metropolis to exploit Africa's natural resources. The company, the party argued, provided the expertise and capital in a situation "where the mother-country has no economic possibilities of its own."[759] In the social scientific theories of the CONCP movements, this investment made Angola, Mozambique, and other southern African states virtual colonies of the United States.[760] Gulf's payments to the Lisbon government for exploration and drilling rights in Angola indirectly funded the military ventures, since almost half of the annual Portuguese budget went to maintaining three wars by the early 1970s. Fortunately for the regime, Gulf discovered viable oil deposits near Cabinda off the coast of Angola and began operations in the mid-1960s. As military costs rose for Lisbon, so too did the payments for Angola's mineral

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[758] Bureau of Mines, *International Petroleum Annual 1968* (Washington: Department of the Interior, 1970), 4. The oil in Angola was not of the highest quality but had a low sulfur content, which made it attractive to countries worried about air pollution like the United States and Canada.
[759] "Imperialist Allies," MR 7 (June 1964).
[760] For one example, see "Mozambique: Colony of America," MR 10 (September 1964).

wealth, with the production of crude tripling between 1968 and 1969 alone.[761] The $61 million paid by Gulf to the state in 1972 amounted to almost sixty percent of military expenditures in Angola or just under a third of those in Mozambique.[762] For a country as poor as Portugal, these revenues were a major windfall.

In 1969, the decentralized network responded to the CONCP parties' calls for action.[763] ACOA had known about Gulf's activities but wondered if these payments to Portugal would be enough to incite public action. Gas was after all a necessity, and there were other targetable products.[764] Radical grassroots organizations had fewer doubts due to their ideological agreement with FRELIMO and MPLA that the company's presence represented a clear form of American economic imperialism in a way colonial coffee production, for example, did not. The CRV spearheaded the campaign, first identifying Gulf as a major backer of Portuguese colonialism in its study of Mozambique.[765] A few months later, Bill Minter and ACOA's Jennifer Davis published a carefully research investigation of American involvement in the Portuguese colonies for *Africa Today*, including a searing criticism of oil investments.[766] Finally n 1971, the CRV New York branch that included FRELIMO associate and future CCLAMG founder Nancy Freehafer

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761 Bureau of Mines, *International Petroleum Annual 1969* (Washington: Department of the Interior, 1971), 8.
762 ACOA Fact Sheet, "Why We Protest Gulf Oil in Angola," June 1973, AAA. See also Houser, 185.
763 FRELIMO complained "the policy of encouraging these companies is part of the Portuguese war against the people of Mozambique." "Caetano, Capitalism, Cahora-Bassa," *Mozambique Revolution* 40 (September 1969), 6.
764 Reflecting its non-establishment nature, ACOA flirted with the idea of "mount[ing] a public campaign plus resolutions in Congress to get the U.S. government, by Executive Act, to ban Angolan coffee." Letter, Gary Gappert to Diggs, 8 December 1969, Box 208, Diggs Papers, MSRC, HU.
765 CRV/NY, Mozambique Will be Free (New York: CRV, 1969), 23.
766 "Allies in Empire," Special Issue, *Africa Today* 17:4 (July-August 1970).

produced a detailed attack on Gulf's operations in Angola. Its analysis focused on Africa, but it argued the company "literally engulfed the globe" with an equally "long (oily) history" supporting reactionary regimes in South Africa, Bolivia, Iran, the Philippines, and Taiwan. Puns aside, the CRV was among the first to reveal the extent to which Gulf payments aided Lisbon's wars.[767] These numbers, along with the firm's close ties to the American military, made it a perfect symbol of domestic complicity in Portuguese exploitation and repression, which linked it to a number of wider New Left causes.

As the New York CRV finalized its research, it began to organize a protest at the 1970 Gulf stockholder's meeting in Pittsburgh. It joined with the SAC to make overtures to ACOA and the NCC, who offered their support to the young activists. In contrast to earlier bank divestment, the churches were now fully on board, approving plans for an extended campaign to be undertaken in coordination with other elements of the emerging solidarity movement.[768] ACOA felt the time was right for broader action.[769] The New York based organizations then reached out to the Gulf Action Committee, a group of Pittsburgh radicals opposing the corporation's activities abroad and hostility to unions at home.[770] It was this coalition that disrupted the Gulf meeting described at the beginning of the chapter. That the churches, ACOA, and radical students rallied around Gulf was a major step in the

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[767] CRV/NY, *Gulf Oil Corporation: A Report* (New York: CRV, 1970), 2.
[768] SAC member Tim smith first proposed the idea to the NCC. Minutes, Southern Africa Task Force, 19 January 1970; Minutes, Southern Africa Task Force, 23 March 1970, Box 23, RG 6, WCC Papers, PHS.
[769] Houser remained concerned about the readiness of the American population for a grassroots boycott, but he had become frustrated by years of "dialogue too often followed by inaction." Hopefully, the Gulf action could change the course. Letter, no author [Houser?] to Eric Peterson, 7 December 1970, Box 79, ACOA Papers.
[770] Hovey interview.

development of the solidarity movement. The bank campaign had focused narrowly on institutions directly lending to the apartheid state, but this was something new. Boycotting Gulf extended the critique to any corporation that aided colonialism and minority rule with proceeds generated in the territories, opening up a new and more expansive form of resistance and international pressure that would become one of the primary aspects of future organizing.[771] It would also develop methods for establishing a boycott among myriad constituencies through the utilization of the decentralized activist network.

In the months following the board meeting, all elements of the coalition worked to expand the movement. SAC, MACSA, CRV, and LSM promoted the Gulf boycott, linking it to Vietnam for the anti-war crowd.[772] ACOA concentrated on promoting campus actions, distributing a list of major university investors in Gulf and working with students to mount peaceful protests.[773] The NCC continued to engage with local Pittsburghers and prepared for an internal insurrection through a more aggressive use of its stocks. A number of Protestant churches publicly criticized Gulf, led by the United Church of Christ (UCC). In early 1971, the United Presbyterian Church introduced four resolutions to that year's Gulf proxy statement urging the company to study the Angola situation, increase the size of the board to improve democratic control of the corporation, and end its activities in all colonial areas. The church contacted 600 university stockholders, ten banks, and several mutual

[771] The NCC earlier made the distinction between direct assistance and "the problem of generally doing business" in southern Africa. Memo, Robert Bilheimer to Juel Nordby, 13 November 1968, Box 23, RG 6, NCC Papers, PHS.
[772] See MACSA, "Solidarity in Worldwide Struggle," nd [fall 1970?], AAA; Hanson-Kelly interview; Conference Report, Beyond Vietnam, 4 July 1971, Lynne Weikart Collection, MSU.
[773] Letter, Janet Hooper to friend, 26 February, 1971, Box 79, ACOA Papers.

funds with requests to support the proxy statement.[774] Both the NCC and ACOA also appealed to contacts in Congress who showed interest in the matter. In April 1971, Representative Jonathan Bingham (D-NY) invited his colleagues to join in signing a letter supporting the United Presbyterian Church's resolutions for Gulf. With Republican colleague from New York Ogden Reid, Bingham offered public bipartisan support to the churches and openly criticized the oil giant.[775] The next month, the Gulf issue became the center of Digg's House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee hearing on business in southern Africa, where the head of the Presbyterian task force endured a withering assault from Pittsburgh Republican Rep. James Fulton.[776] From the streets to the Capitol, Gulf's involvement in Angola inspired strong feelings and words.

No reaction was more dramatic or surprising than that of Gulf Oil. It attacked the first church that launched a boycott. While the NCC and the Presbyterians were strategizing in late 1970, the Ohio Conference of the UCC adopted a resolution criticizing Gulf for its cooperation with Portugal and urged constituent churches to cease using the company's products "until Gulf Oil discontinues the use of its African operations in ways that cause human suppression and suffering." It asked stockholders to retain their shares to maintain voting power but encouraged the return en masse of Gulf credit cards.[777] The move was

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[774] Minutes, Southern Africa Task Force, 6 November 1970, Box 23, RG 6, WCC Papers, PHS; Arthur H. Lubow, "Presbyterians Lead Proxy Fight Over Gulf Involvement in Angola," *Harvard Crimson*, 17 April 1971; Lubow "Ship Passes in Night: Harvard Votes Proxies with Gulf Management," *Harvard Crimson*, 24 April 1971. Wayne State, Charles Diggs' alma mater, was the only school to respond positively to any of the resolutions.

[775] Dear Colleague Letter from Jonathan B. Bingham, 12 April 1971, Box 127, Diggs Papers, MSRC, HU;

[776] Betty Medsger, "Get Us All into Heaven," *Washington Post*, 15 May 1971.

[777] Resolution, 1970 Annual Meeting of the Ohio Conference of the Church of Christ, in Righter, 6-7.

unprecedented and infuriated the Pittsburgh corporation. It issued a strongly worded letter and may have threatened to sue the church for defamation, garnering national headlines and revealing the seriousness with which Gulf viewed the boycott. Reporters had a field day, speculating that the courtroom drama would reveal the inner workings of the country's tenth largest company, while a Gulf victory would send bailiffs into "sanctuaries to seize the silver crosses . . . to be melted down and recast in the shape of little oil derricks."[778] Gulf denied threatening a suit, but it was the first time a major corporation had responded publicly to charges of international immorality by a religious organization.[779] Church members and fellow Protestants were a mixture of encouraged and furious, and the publicity fueled the expansion of the campaign.

The lawsuit also had the unintended side effect of inspiring the formation of the Gulf Boycott Coalition (GBC). It evolved from the Congregation of Reconciliation in Dayton, a non-denominational community associated with the UCC and dedicated to social action. In March, 1971, Pastor Richard Righter and congregant Pat Roach formed the Gulf-Angola Committee to aid the expansion of the movement nationwide. Though fearful of retribution from Gulf, the community justified its action with scripture and the right to self-determination advanced by the United Nations. The result was a project that the Congregation hoped would appeal to both religious and secular groups.[780] The fledgling

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[778] Nicholas von Hoffman, "Taxing Goliath," Washington Post, 7 September 1970.
[779] Ann-Mary Currier, "Churches Prompted to Restudy Their Plans for Social Activism," *Boston Globe*, 29 August 1970.
[780] Jeffrey K. Hadden and Charles F. Longino, Jr., *Gideon's Gange: A Case Study of Church Social Action* (Philadelphia: Pilgrim Press, 1974), 114-115. The Congregation included members who were not religious, but participated in the church due to its activism. Rev. Richard Righter, phone interview with author, 24 February 2015.

organization hosted a conference in July that provided a forum for organizations who had launched the protests to coordinate their efforts. Attendees included representatives from ACOA, the UCC, and unspecified participants from New York, Chicago, San Francisco, and Philadelphia (likely including the SAC, CRV, and LSM).[781] ACOA in particular was effusively supportive of the project, providing material to build the educational aspects of the newly rechristened GBC and lending staff member Paul Irish to act as spokesman for the group. The event closed with a Fourth of July procession through Dayton that ended at Kelly's Gulf Station, where Pat Roach raised a massive "Boycott Gulf" balloon amidst American flags and pennants demanding Angolan independence, much to the consternation of Mr. Kelly.[782]

The balloon that angered the Dayton storeowner signaled the ascent of a new era in the movement. The GBC had assembled a network that encompassed ten cities within a few weeks, mostly in the Midwest and Northeast. It urged allies to spread the word about the boycott, even as it sought to escalate its impact by moving from issues of personal and congregational decisions to official policy. The GBC's first major action was to urge that the city of Dayton not renew its contract with Gulf when the agreement expired at the end of the year. Worth more than $50,000, loss of the contract would not bankrupt Gulf, but it would dramatize the power of civic action on foreign issues. Months of protests, campaigning, and education followed, culminating in December when Dayton rejected

[781] See "Selected Bibliography," ND (likely summer 1971), in Righter, 13-14. See also, Hadden and Longino, 116. Eileen Hanson attended representing the CRV.
[782] GBC, Press Release, July 1971, in Righter, 12.

Gulf's low bid for gasoline in favor of Standard Oil, citing Angola as the reason for the decision. The GBC hailed the moment as its "first real victory."[783] For its part, Gulf dismissed the growing activism as the result of an overzealous Christian elite who, in the words of B.R. Dorsey, "tend to sit in parish headquarters and worry about world problems."[784] Yet the corporation's casual dismissal of its antagonists ignored both the grassroots foundations of the GBC and the high profiles of its growing list of collaborators.

With the GBC, the churches, and ACOA as central nodes, the boycott exploded. The GBC expanded on this support by presenting its criticism of Gulf in a language that appealed broadly to American activists tied to both the Old and New Left. Rev. Righter convinced close friends in the American for Democratic Action to provide a mailing list, and dozens of influential supporters lent their names to the movement.[785] Using headlines like "Southern Africa will not be the next Vietnam; it already is Vietnam," the GBC also expanded on existing rhetorical devices linking southern Africa to the anti-war movement.[786] It even pioneered new themes, taking advantage of the environmental movement stimulated by the 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill and growing anti-capitalist agitation as the United States entered a recession.[787] Union leaders also took notice, adopting the Gulf issue to appeal to youth and minorities who blanched at Nixon's policies and the rally-around-the-flag complacency of national bodies like the American Federation

[783] "Dayton Bars Gulf Oil Bid in Victory for Activists," Wall Street Journal, 9 December 1971.
[784] Marylin Bender, "Gulf's Chief Defender," New York Times, 7 November 1971.
[785] Righter interview. Among the influential liberals who joined the advisory board were John Kenneth Galbraith and civil rights lawyer Joseph Rauh, Jr.
[786] GBC, "Another Vietnam in Africa," undated (1972), AAA.
[787] CRV, "Gulf kills Fish, Birds, & Plants . . . ", (New York, April 1970), AAA.

of Labor.[788] The GBC newsletter offered strategies that individuals and local groups could adopt to take part in the movement without formally joining an organization. Reports of boycott actions flooded in recounting these small actions and suggesting additional ones. A United Farm Workers member sent receipts for gas bought at competing stations to Gulf headquarters, while 8th grade students In Philadelphia wrote term papers on the company's involvement in Angola.[789]

It was this potential for daily and weekly acts of solidarity that promoted real identification with the revolutions, humanizing their social struggles. Individuals not ensconced in the movement learned about the Lusophone parties and U.S. support for Portugal. Solidarity activists achieved this not just through the creation and distribution of literature, but by sponsoring travel for the movements themselves. Khan remained the most accessible, followed by Gil Fernandes. But the focus that the Gulf campaign placed on Angola provided a new opportunity for the MPLA to sell its brand in the United States. The party was enthusiastic about the new attention and applauded the boycott. When asked by a journalist what Americans could do to help, two leading officials responded emphatically: "Expose and demonstrate against Gulf Oil's investments in Angola."[790] The party struggled to send representatives overseas, but the coalition did its best to put a human face to the campaign. Abel Guimaraes, a student in Brooklyn and a member of the National

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[788] Jack Hart of the United Electrical Workers of America even addressed the National Anti-Imperialist Coalition in 1973, using Gulf as the centerpiece of his call to action. "U.. Should Stop Aiding African Slaughter," *Philadelphia Tribune*, 27 November 1973.

[789] "Recent Development in the Gulf Boycott Coalition, 1 June 1972, Box 80, ACOA Papers.

[790] James Cassell, "James Cassell . . and Africa," *Philadelphia Tribune*, 21 October 1972. The officials were Paul Jorge and Jacob Khamalata, who also discouraged tourism in Portugal and the importation of Angolan coffee.

Union of Angolan Students loosely associated with the MPLA, traveled widely with the campaign. He specifically rebuffed Gulf's claims that they were benefiting the country's local population.[791] ACOA even invited MPLA President Agostinho Neto on a multi-city speaking tour that would coincide with Gulf Oil activities.[792] He could not make the trip, but the invitation alone demonstrated how far ACOA had come in supporting the leftist liberation party.

The GBC and its allies had struck upon a strategy for success. Gulf's ubiquity brought the Portuguese revolutions into the lives of everyday people, and the quotidian choice of whether or not to buy its products offered "a practical action for the 'little' people who want to effect freedom" in Africa.[793] Revelations of corporate involvement provided an impetus for deeper reflection on American complicity with Portugal, which helped expand identification with the movements. In 1973, for example, the War Resisters League and the Vietnam Peace Parade Committee in New York City joined together to protest the Portuguese Consulate partially as a result of the boycott.[794] In 1974, Pat Roach boasted that the Coalition had active associates in more than fifty metropolitan areas in the United States made up of local GBC chapters, unions, student organizations, and others. These numbers did not include the irregular individual and group protests that filled the GBC newsletters,

[791] Letter, Richard Leonard to Charles Cook, 18 January 1973, Box 79, ACOA Papers. ACOA was his primary agent.
[792] Letter, no name [Houser?] to Agostinho Neto, 11 March 1971, Box 79, ACOA Papers.
[793] GBC, "Proposal for Funding, 1974), Box 80, ACOA Papers.
[794] Gulf Boycott Coalition News and Notes, September 1973, Box 2, Southern African Support Group, Vivian G. Harsh Collection, Chicago Public Library.

nor could it account for the thousands of unreported acts of resistance.[795] Indeed, GBC members were consistently surprised by how large the movement became. The 1972 Easter Conference in Lund introduced the cause internationally, from which it quickly expanded. A Toronto-based activist organizations with ties to FRELIMO and Flory's FIM launched their own campaign, CCLAMG and boycott proponents addressed rallies for the End the Alliance Campaign in the United Kingdom, and Sietse Bosgra negotiated with Gulf to ban imports from Angola to Holland.[796] Religious, radical, and simply concerned citizens found a rallying point for their internationalism in the symbol of Gulf.

It also attracted an important new constituency: African Americans. The church appeal to universities in 1971 had fallen flat, but it inspired action by a Harvard law alumnus who objected to his alma mater's investment in Gulf Oil, the largest of any academic institution. After spending time in Dar es Salaam, where he met personally with FRELIMO leaders, Randall Robinson returned to Boston to found the Pan-African Liberation Committee (PALC) with a number of law students and South African exile Chris Nteta. When the Harvard president balked at their request to divest the stocks, the PALC joined with the Harvard African American student association to occupy the university's main administration building for nearly a week, dramatizing the Gulf issue and

[795] Pat Roach, "Gulf Boycott Coalition Response to Gulf Building Bombing," 20 June 1974, Box 2, Southern Africa, Harsh Collection.
[796] "D.C. Conference raps So. Africa oppression," *Chicago Daily Defender*, 9 September 1972; Righter interview; Special Committee on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples of the United Nations, "Record of 845th meeting," 28 March 1972, Inv Nr: 23899, Ministerie van Buitlandse Zaken, Nationaal Archief van Nederland (The Hague, Netherlands).

receiving national attention.[797] Beginning in June 1972, the Boston-based group worked with a growing network of internationally minded community organizations to mobilize black public opinion against Gulf in over a dozen states, including seven of the most lucrative markets for the oil giant.[798] As Robinson explained to Congressman Diggs, "if in the key states we can win overwhelming Black support in addition to marginal support from whites, Gulf's profit margin can be substantially reduced."[799] Utilizing the company's poor record in hiring minorities, the PALC linked local black frustrations with the international freedom struggles much as the radical students had first done with unions. PALC called "on all Black people and others who believe in freedom to boycott the products of the Gulf Oil Company."[800] The activity would serve the twofold purpose of educating about the liberation movements, while providing sympathetic African Americans with a local symbol of collective racial oppression. It also sought to carve out a leadership role for black activists within a solidarity movement that had been lacking in diversity for much of the 1960s. Tapping into an emerging African American interest, Robinson's PALC had contacts in more than 20 states by the end of 1973, who helped

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[797] See for example, "Black at Harvard Protest Gulf Stock by Seizing Building," *New York Times*, 21 April 1972,

[798] PALC, "1971 National and State Gulf Product Distribution Breakdown," 8 June 1972, 1126832-000 --- 157-HQ-25073 --- Section 4. 6/8/72 - 11/21/72. African Liberation Support Committee. FBI Library. Archives Unbound.

[799] Robinson to Diggs, 9 August 1972, Private Papers of Brenda Randolph (formerly Robinson). Hereafter BRP.

[800] Randall Robinson, et. al, "Dear Friend," no date (1973?), AAA.

inspire coordinated protests across the country in the fall of that year.[801] The PALC and its local affiliates had expanded the boycott into a national, multiracial movement.

There was little real possibility that the protests would force Gulf out of Angola, but that had never been more than an ideal objective. Rather, purpose had been to expand the movement through concrete action and, as one ACOA staffer had explained in 1969, to undertake action that "makes the Portuguese worry, costs them time, money, and diplomatic manpower, and puts them for once on the defensive."[802] Gulf certainly felt such pressure, and it scrambled to assemble some good press to offset its stained reputation, particularly in the black community. It took out full-page advertisements in popular black publications that gave a more positive spin to its role in the community, while also increasing investments in minority training programs.[803] Gulf even proposed creating "betterment programs" in Angola that it could use to defray the domestic impact of protests.[804]

The boycott also raised the costs for new companies interested in the colonies, giving them pause whether the potential profit was worth the criticism they would face domestically. Tim Smith ably summarized the viewpoint when he explained that it was not yet feasible that the protests would force the oil giant out of Angola, but "it didn't seem

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[801] See chapter 5 for additional details on the emergence of a Black Power interest in Portuguese Africa and details or Robinson's organizing in the wake of 1972's African Liberation Day celebrations.
[802] Letter, Gary Gappert to Diggs, 8 December 1969, Box 208, Digs Papers, MSRC, HU.
[803] Gulf Advertisement, *Ebony* (Aug 1973), p128. See for example, "The OIC and Gulf," *Forward Times* (Houston), 5 May 1973.
[804] The program was proposed in response to Church protests that coincided and partially inspired the PALC protests. Harvard would use plans for these programs to help defend its refusal to divest. Telegram, Lisbon to Secstate, 10 November 1971, Box 2040, Political and Defense, Subject Numeric Files, 1970-1973, RG 59, NARA.

possible to stop the Vietnam War in 1965 either. We must begin to mount pressure and raise American consciousness on Gulf's support for the Portuguese. At the least this will cause other companies to assess investment or expansion in the colonies."[805] And such roadblocks were necessary as Portugal continued to look abroad to find new sources of income. Cabral had warned in 1970 that ESSO was considering drilling in the Bijagós Archipelago near Bissau, while other corporations had shown interest in exploring Angolan territory.[806] Portugal remained confident that Gulf would not leave Angola, but the Portuguese ambassador warned his colleagues in Lisbon that they should not "underestimate what the campaign can do."[807] The statement proved prophetic when Exxon abandoned proposed investments in Angola in 1973 after ACOA, the Unitarian Church, and a number of youth activists threatened to expand the oil boycott.[808] Gulf even pledged it would not invest in either Mozambique or South Africa, a business decision but one that must have been influenced by the threat of additional protests.[809] The boycott could not force Gulf's hand, but it helped deny Portugal additional funds to maintain its war efforts while building an important political awareness of the extensive existing official and corporate ties to the colonial regime.

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[805] Tim Smith, "Response to Memo by Dr. H. Schomer," no date [c. December 1972], bms 551/22, Schomer Papers, HDL.
[806] "A Discussion with Amílcar Cabral, PAIGC," *Southern Africa* 3 no. 3 (March 1970), 8.
[807] Telegram, Washington to Lisbon, 25 April 1972, Processo 922, PAA 288, Arquivo Historico Diplomatico (Lisbon, Portugal).
[808] "Firms Queried on Africa Deals," Afro-American, 27 January 1973; Letter, Houser to Friends, no date [c. December 1972], Box 79, ACOA Papers; "Oil company told to halt Angola plans," *The Baltimore Afro-American*, 30 December 1972.
[809] GBC, "Proposal for Funding, 1974), Box 80, ACOA Papers.

And Gulf was not the only business affected. Boycotts of Portuguese wine and other products flourished on college campuses, while the momentum created by the GBC and its allies inspired plans to replicate the Dutch coffee campaign.[810] Gulf activism was merely the most successful due to the consensus that formed around it, its symbolic value within the new internationalism, and the able leadership of groups like CRV and GBC. Importantly, the growth of the movement was more than just an amusing sideshow or a manifestation of popular frustration with rising gas prices. It was a sincere and widespread expression of solidarity with southern Africa liberation movements and a rejection of reactionary American foreign policy that continued to engage with colonialism. And it was poised to grow in both power and influence as the middle of the decade approached.

Conclusion

By the time coffee joined oil in stoking the ire of activists, the outlines of an American movement were becoming clear. Youth activism had taken the lead uniting a diversity of perspectives. A network that had first discovered the cause of African liberation through religious institutions had united and intermixed with radicals dedicated to reorienting American foreign policy away from its traditions of power projection and amoral economic expansion. These young people had helped drag to the left the institutions from which many of them had come and continued to rely upon for support, notably the churches and liberal advocacy groups like ACOA. This coalition had been fueled by the

[810] Robert Manning, "Toward a Coffee Boycott," *Alternative Features Service*, Vol. 2, Packet 73 (17 November 1972). Alexander Street Press Database; "D.C. Conference raps So. Africa oppression," *Chicago Daily Defender*, 9 September 1972.

political disruption of the Vietnam conflict and indeed mirrored the anti-war movement in its myriad components, but it illustrated a much different reality than have the more familiar stories of the heroic 1960s. Yeats' axiom that the center cannot hold had aptly described the massive, sometimes contradictory anti-war movement, but at the margins where less popular causes like southern Africa informed the growth of independent networks, a different reality emerged. Here, the CONCP parties' repeated urgings to unite in an effort to change official and corporate policy provided a unity that did not exist elsewhere. Individuals and groups disagreed on tactics and ideologies, but they understood the necessity of merging mass grassroots protests with political lobbying and mobilization. Far left radicals like those in the LSM may have envisioned a revolution in the future, but they appreciated the necessity of utilizing political power in the near term to aid the African freedom struggles. They were therefore willing to work with groups closer to the center that shared their end goals and valued their commitment.

The key to this unity was in fact the decentralized nature of the solidarity movement. It provided the necessary independence for individual components to retain their own political and ideological identities, while allowing them to work on specific projects with a rotating list of allied organizations. They were tied together through networks that began with the liberation movements, but eventually developed into extensive personal relationships and shared memberships. Though never exceeding a much more than a few hundred active members at its core, few of whom were employed full time in activist work, the network survived the vicissitudes of life, movement, and employment changes based on a dedication to common goals and a handful of static allies such as

FRELIMO's Khan, ACOA, and the NCC. Local and regional organizations appeared and disappeared based on a number of factors including interpersonal relationships, but the dispersal of one group often meant the creation of another or access to a new community of potential supporters – all connected to this informal network. As CRVer Mimi Edmunds recalled, "You stayed connected to the African solidarity groups. We were like homing pigeons. That's where we felt we could do the most good."[811] It was this dedication to action that allowed the core movement to survive and slowly expand to include allies – likely numbering by 1974 in the thousands – willing to boycott, protest, and write their congressmen on behalf of African freedom in Portuguese Africa and beyond.

It was the decentralized diversity of this solidarity network that allowed it to expand. Its components each appealed to different constituencies within the United States, who had come to question American foreign relations for different reasons and who often proposed different strategies. The kaleidoscopic situation in southern Africa provided lessons for all of its viewers, and the diversity of the solidarity movement allowed individual organizations to tap into these realities to expand the base of support. As CCLAMG provided an entry point for revolutionaries, so the NCC's appeal to left-center parishioners brought in people concerned about human rights, and ACOA's non-establishment credentials appealed to liberal progressives with access to power. The result was a single movement with many leaders, but leaders who were able to speak to each

[811] Edmunds interview.

other and mobilize support – often in fits and starts – from the streets of Washington state to the halls of power in Washington, D.C.

These various constituencies did have one point of unity beyond the liberation movements. Each had come to question the pattern of American policies overseas. Vietnam and the domestic turmoil it caused had shattered the liberal international consensus that had defined the post-McCarthy era, but what would replace it was not yet clear. What bound those in and sympathetic to the solidarity movement was what might be called a new left internationalism, based on sincere support for political and economic self-determination in the developing world. Its proponents sought to constrain American interventionism in the Third World and provide the support necessary to redress the long history of North-South inequality. It was a movement centered on Africa but adhering to an ideology that stretched further afield. As one church leader captured succinctly, this coalition of internationalists understood that Third World peoples wanted to "be truly free to pursue their own road to national development, unshackled by either rigged Western market exploitation or subversive Western political infiltration, communist or anti-communist."[812]

One component remained largely absent from the movement: African Americans. For better or worse, the country saw African freedom as a black issue. African Americans were essential components to the work of many organizations, evidenced by Robert Van Lierop, Prexy Nesbitt, Randall Robinson, and the invaluable role played by Charles Diggs

[812] Howard Schomer and A. Donn Kesselheim, "Is Third World Liberation Compatible with One World Culture?," 1970, Box 20, Schomer Papers, HDL.

in Washington. But there was not, for much of the early 1970s, a black mass movement that could grab popular attention and invest solidarity with the political potential wielded by the country's largest minority. But black internationalism percolated below the surface of liberal civil rights politics, emerging finally in the Black Power movement. If this cacophony of angry and frustrated voices could be mobilized alongside the solidarity movement, it would provide the political boost necessary to create the political pressure necessary to achieve change.

Chapter 5: "We Are an African People"

The Transformation of a Pan-African Solidarity

In May of 1972, over ten thousand African Americans gathered in Washington, D.C. Young and old, radical and moderate, they streamed through the capital streets demanding recognition for freedom fighters waging wars of independence in Africa. At the first African Liberation Day (ALD), black peoples in the Diaspora sought to change American foreign policy, which continued to support Portual and its minority neighbors. The crowd carried signs proclaiming solidarity with the liberation struggles and condemning the economic discrimination that kept blacks subservient at home as well as abroad. The activists made stops at the State Department and the embassies of South Africa and Portugal, where Congressman Charles Diggs, Angela Davis, and community leaders urged listeners to adopt the African revolutions as their own and boycott corporate partners like Gulf Oil that fed the coffers of colonial rule. The demonstration culminated on the National Mall – renamed Lumumba Square for the festivities – where some onlookers estimated that between 15,000 and 25,000 people joined organizer Owusu Sadaukai (Howard Fuller) in chants of "We are an African People."[813]

This demonstration in Washington was a symbol of a much larger movement a decade in the making. Transnational solidarity with the liberation movements had not come easily to African Americans, but a shift in domestic politics and the renewed emphasis on

[813] "African Liberation Day," *Say Brother* Episode 427 (22 May 1975), WGBH Archive (Boston, MA).

personal diplomacy by the Lusophone African parties had finally inspired success. Disillusioned both with the slow pace of civil rights in the mid-1960s and internal divisions, African American activists sought a more assertive common ground on which they could build a political and social movement that would unite the entirety of the black community. They found a solution in the ongoing revolutions occurring in Portuguese Africa.

The thousands who gathered for the first ALD attested to the nascent power of blacks to shape issues of foreign policy, but achieving this unity of purpose had a history distinct from the development of radical and religious solidarity explored in preceding chapters. Whereas groups like the American Committee on Africa (ACOA) had sought to transcend racial concerns in its support for Lusophone African independence, the mobilization of the black community depended on the integration of radical internationalism, black identity politics, and domestic reform. The tendency of Cold War American identity to denigrate the connection between these major poles of African American thought helped stymy the growth of solidarity, as did the CONCP parties own marginalization of race as a global currency. As a result, it was largely the responsibility of black Americans frustrated by the confining domesticity of the Civil Rights movement to create what historian Melani McAlister has called an "alternative moral geography" through the forging of new bonds with revolutionaries both from Africa and elsewhere.[814]

As interest in continental revolutions grew, the leaders of the PAIGC and FRELIMO recognized the importance of using identity politics to provide a natural avenue

[814] Melani McAlister, "One Black Allah: The Middle East in the Cultural Politics of African American Liberation, 1955-1970," *American Quarterly* 51:3 (1999), 650.

for building Western support for the idea of transnational liberation. They began to use race as a gateway for discussions of global exploitation, which they explained as a single component in a larger system of international imperialism that marginalized colored peoples for sociological and historical reasons. This socialist Third World - what many termed at the time Tricontinental – reading of global politics allowed African Americans to integrate the elusive elements of radicalism, racialism, and domestic political participation into a single internationalist ideology best exemplified by the mass demonstration of the ALD. While this Tricontinental ideology embraced the idea of a common struggle that united peoples from all the colonized regions, it remained Africa and the idea of a black Diaspora that could best mobilize the average person who more readily identified kinship positively in terms of race rather than shared exploitation. This Black Power identity provided an agent for introducing large swaths of African Americans to the socialist ideology at the heart of the Tricontinental idea, merging the radical and racial together in an uneasy truce that formed the foundation of much black international thought in this period.

Yet without fully resolving the tensions between these elements, such unity was short-lived. The growth of real bonds of solidarity pushed African Americans to engage directly with the philosophies and activities of leaders like Amílcar Cabral and FRELIMO. This activity helped to develop popular understanding of liberation ideology and the global critique of American imperialism, but it also demanded an ideological commitment that superficial anti-colonialism had not. As Portuguese African nationalists privileged a Marxist-inspired socialism over the entry point of racial solidarity, the growth of their

specific influence within the African American community helped undermine the unity provided by the subsuming of competing traditions of race and class under the Tricontinental umbrella. A real dialogue emerged between black Americans and the Portuguese Africans at the expense of domestic unity. Each of these feuding viewpoints used African revolutionaries to legitimize their perspectives, drawing particularly on the MPLA-UNITA competition to define their positions. The African American unanimity would prove fleeting, but the embrace of a leftist reading of racial issues in the United States provided an opening for black nationalist to organize across racial lines. In so doing, it laid the foundation for a much more effective model of black advocacy than could have been achieved in isolation.

The Radical Element Remains

The story of this solidarity organizing has largely escaped the attention of historians due to a narrative of Cold War repression against black internationalism. A focus on the major personalities of Paul Robeson, W.E.B. DuBois and their ultimately unsuccessful Council on African Affairs has implied that government harassment effectively undermined the black leftist critique of American domestic and international policy in the late 1950s.[815] Radicalism did not disappear from African American life with the political demise of these key figures, though it did recede from the national level. Local black groups

[815] See also, Penny Von Eschen, *Race Against Empire: Black Americans and Anti-Colonialism, 1937-1957* (Cornell University Press, 1997); Brenda Gayle Plummer, Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1935-1960 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996); James Meriwether, *Proudly We Can Be Africans: Black Americans and Africa, 1935-1961* (The University of North Carolina Press, 2001).

continued to feel alienated from the government and its Cold War liberal ideology, and they looked to the African continent for inspiration on how to express this frustration, especially in the wake of the Angolan insurrection of early 1961. The socialist anti-colonialism advanced by the CONCP parties appealed to African Americans in two overlapping but sometimes complicated ways: in terms of racial solidarity and leftist reform politics. The solidarity championed by the liberal, multiracial ACOA in the early 1960s and civil rights leaders of the American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa (ANLCA) simply did not connote the same kind of transnational restructuring of power relations – both economic and racial - desired by these marginalized ideologues. As a result, most solidarity organizations operated below the level of national attention in the 1960s, their ideas only emerging onto the national stage as new advocates of Black Power incorporated these critiques into their confrontational tactics and rhetoric toward the end of the decade. As the most visible movements operating on the continent, the leftist Portuguese African revolutions fed these subterranean criticisms of the Western capitalist system, even if the nationalists concentrated their diplomacy elsewhere.

The complicated and sometimes tense relationship between radical and race-based solidarity appeared most clearly during the early 1960s in the form of the Liberation Committee for Africa (LCA) and its publication, *The Liberator*. The New York City based organization had arisen as a response to the Sharpeville Massacre and the ongoing Congo crisis. Headed by architect-cum-activist Daniel Watts and white communist Lowell P. Beveridge, Jr., the LCA had at its core a leftist critique of the imperial system that centered on the capitalist exploitation of Africa and African peoples – connecting it directly with

the legacy of the Council on African Affairs.[816] As its first action, members participated in the "riot" at the United Nations following the announcement of Patrice Lumumba's death.[817] Historians have generally seen the LCA through the lens of this reaction to Lumumba, but the group was also actively involved in supporting the Portuguese liberation struggles, particularly Angola. The LCA and other Harlem organizations provided forums for revolutionaries to present their cases directly to the African American public, hosting live discussion with anti-colonial leaders where blacks learned about their anti-colonial ideologies and discovered ways to aid the movements. Though rare, these public appearances featured unfettered access to leaders such as Angola's Holden Roberto and the Mozambican Eduardo Mondlane, still at the UN in 1961 but soon to become president of FRELIMO.[818] Most importantly, the nature of the LCA as a radical grassroots organization based within the community endowed its speakers with a legitimacy among African Americans that they did not always have when mediated through the auspices of churches or the liberal ACOA.

Though it would remain relatively small, the LCA reached thousands through its influential newsletter, which developed into one of the leading radical magazines of the era. Watts launched *The Liberator* in March 1961, the same month that the armed conflict

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816 Beveridge had worked with the CAA while in College, was close with Alphaeus Hunton, and likely saw the LCA as an extension of this work. Lowell P. Beveridge, Jr. *Domestic Diversity and Other Subversive Activities* (Minneapolis: Mill City Press, 2009), 262-263.

817 See Meriwether, 233-236.

818 "Pulse of New York's Public Life," *New York Amsterdam News*, 2 March 1963. Again, Harlem was a hotbed for this kind of person-to-person contact. Cooks, for instance, hosted Holden Roberto in December of 1961. The difference however is that Cooks and his Pioneer Movement did not have the reach of The Liberator to publicize Roberto's views, nor did the nationalist organization engage in the leftist critiques championed by the CONCP. "Angola Rebel to Speak in Harlem Sunday," New York Amsterdam News

began in Angola. It sought to create a new popular leftist internationalism among the black community by attaching it to natural Pan-African sympathies. Proclaiming itself "the voice of the Afro-American protest movement in the United States and the liberation movement of Africa," the magazine acted as a bridge between nations. It became one of the first homes for radical intellectuals writing on Pan-African issues in the 1960s, while also acting as a megaphone for continental nationalists wanting to speak to the black community. Early issues featured letters directly from the Lusophone colonies and South Africa, refusing to shrink from nationalist discussions of armed insurrection.[819] The editorial tone was consciously aggressive, criticizing mainstream black presses for denigrating Portugal while failing to take up a more active support for the liberation struggles.[820] Yet most importantly, *The Liberator* introduced American audiences to Marxist inspired organizations such as the MPLA that had yet to gain a foothold in the United States, presenting it as an equal partner with the more celebrated anti-communism of Roberto.[821] In its attempts to both promote and defend the African revolutions, *The Liberator* was tying together events on the two continents and pushing at the boundaries of what constituted acceptable internationalism in the midst of the Cold War. It eschewed Cold War concerns to present what it believed was the authentic voice of Africa – the liberation parties.

The LCA became the first primarily African American organization to champion the armed revolutions of southern Africa in the 1960s, but it was far from the only one.

819 "A Letter from Angola," *The Liberator*, August 1961.
820 "Portugal's Defender: George Schuyer of the Pittsbrug [sic] Courier," *The Liberator*, August 1961.
821 See "Two Statements from Angola Explain Position of Major Organizations," *Liberator*, Vol II, 2 (February 1962), 2.

Rather, it represented the most organized element of a much deeper sentiment that existed on the fringes of black communities around the country. The rich ideological soil of Harlem allowed it and a number of other groups to flourish during this period, since the neighborhoods history of radicalism insulated the groups to a certain degree.[822] But from Chicago to the Deep South, African Americans used the events of 1960 and 1961 to help define a new and more aggressive style of self-determination that challenged the limitations of peaceful civil rights reform. Central to this new radicalism was the acceptance of armed revolution as a legitimate strategy for resisting exploitation and marginalization, in the African context if not yet in the United States. Unlike the LCA though, most voices backed these movements not for their politics but as part of a black international movement resisting white superiority.[823] Often such calls remained vague in their programs, but there was an underlying militancy in the pleas for unity along the color line. The civil rights movement did not capture the frustrations of people who were coming to accept that Africans were facing a global system of racial subjugation, which operated in Chicago and North Carolina as much as on the continent.[824] Angola emerged as an early symbol of this nascent transnational resistance, and it became a rallying cry for African Americans who sought to establish more aggressive and, in some cases, armed movements to claim equality

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[822] The most notable was Carlos Cook's Garvey-inspired African Nationalist Pioneer Movement. Nesbitt, 27-30.

[823] One Chicago resident wrote to the *Defender* in the wake of the Angolan crisis demanding that "all black men and women who have sprung from the loins of Africa should make common cause against the race and color line." Emmett J. Marshal, "For Africa," *Chicago Defender* (daily), 3 July 1961. See also Laurence Llewellyn, "Well-Traveled," *New York Amsterdam News*, 2 December 1961.

[824] The assertive head of the NAACP in Monroe, North Carolina, Robert F. Williams, became the most noteworthy figure of this grassroots Pan-Africanism in the early 1960s. He labeled his home city "the Angola of the Americas" as a symbol of his resistance to the violent white power structure. Robert Williams, "Let's Meet Violence with Violence," *Afro-American*, 3 February 1962.

of civil and human rights. With the expansion of its increasingly influential publication, the LCA became the voice of these scattered pockets of resistance around the country, helping to introduce leftist criticisms into national discussions of empire, black liberation, and American inequality.

The problem, however, was that the LCA was a strictly domestic organization. It lacked strong ties to the Portuguese and South African parties about which it wrote, preventing a true dialogue on the goals and tactics of global black liberation. The CONCP parties did not actively cultivate ties in the United States along racial lines during these early years and neither did Roberto, though leaders like Mondlane appreciated the leftist slant of the group. Lusophone nationalists used claims to socialism and multiracialism to gain support from governments concerned about growing racial tensions, which meant that the appeals to Pan-Africanism implicit in Watts' writings or explicitly a component of Harlem's Garveyites were not part of early diplomacy. Mondlane built relationships with many African Americans, but he hesitated to use overt references to Pan-Africanism.[825] As some Mozambican critics pointed out, when Mondlane visited New York, he did not stay in Harlem's Hotel Teresa as Fidel Castro had famously done, but rather in mid-town near the United Nations and his predominantly liberal contacts.[826] During this period, the trans-Atlantic bond remained a commitment to achieving equal rights on a domestic and global

[825] Many of Mondlane's contacts with African Americans came less through any direct ties to the community than through multiracial events centered on civil rights. For example, see Andrew Young, Interview with Academy of Achievement, 14 August 2013 (Washington, DC): http://www.achievement.org/autodoc/printmember/you0int-1

[826] Douglas L. Wheeler, "A Document for the History of African Nationalism: The Unemo 'White Paper' of 1968, a Student Reply to Eduardo Mondlane's 1967 Paper," *African Historical Studies*, 3:1 (1970), 175.

scale regardless of color. Even Roberto, the Bakongo nationalist vocally hostile to the *mestiços* leading the MPLA in Angola, did not use race as a bargaining chip in the United States. He, Mondlane, and Agostinho Neto of the MPLA were interested in changing official American policy, and they did not begin their search for support for solidarity at the fringes of society but among individuals who had access to the levers of power – most of whom were firmly ensconced in the liberal mainstream during this early period. When the liberation leaders worked with the LCA or the Garvey-inspired African Nationalist Pioneer Movement, it was due primarily to the efforts of the African American organizations who sought them out.[827]

The LCA's distance from the center of power did have one advantage, it provided the room necessary to offer a critical reading of American policy toward Portugal that aligned much more closely with the liberation groups than did the opinions of the civil rights leadership. Watts and Beveridge had been among the first to criticize the Kennedy administration from the left for its handling of Lisbon's imperial war in Angola. After the first ever vote against Portugal at the UN had brought Kennedy praise from many black moderates in early 1961, *The Liberator* dismissed it as posturing for "political capital." The measure was toothless. [828] African Americans needed to understand the realities of colonialism in Africa and fight for the real isolation of Portugal – military and economic – if American actions were to have any effect. The position flew in the face of black liberals

[827] The first record of any of the liberation leaders working with Harlem groups came after April of 1961, despite the fact that both Roberto and Mondlane had spent time in New York and had contacts with organizations like ACOA, the Urban League, and other more mainstream groups.
[828] L.P. Beveridge, "Angola: Portugal's Crime, U.S." Embarrassment," *Liberator*, (June 1961), 6.

who had traded relative silence on international affairs for civil rights success, but it drew praise from Eduardo Mondlane. At the first ANLCA in 1962 attended by Watts, the Mozambican praised the LCA as the only black organization to break with Cold War liberalism and agitate seriously for African freedom on a socialist model. The "little-known group," Mondlane explained during a speech, "is about [the] only American Negro group who have managed to combine any active interest in the American Negro struggle for equality with an intense interest in African freedom."[829] Yet Mondlane's admonishing praise achieved little besides gratifying Watts. The potential backlash of tying together the armed African struggles and peaceful domestic ones were simply too much for the civil rights leadership, who avoided serious discussion of the ongoing revolutionary wars on the continent and the role of American support for Portugal. Deeply disillusioned by his experience at the ANLCA, Watts began moving in more radical directions. The question would be whether this movement would go in a leftist or racialist direction.

By 1963, *The Liberator* and the LCA had established themselves at the forefront of radical Pan-Africanism, but it had perhaps come too late to establish the kind of solidarity between the continents that both the LCA and African revolutionaries had envisioned. There is no record of Mondlane contacting Watts after praising his organization at the ANLCA, and ties to the MPLA did not materialize as hoped. The emergence of the LCA in 1962 and 1963 also coincided with a difficult moment in the history of the revolutions, between Angolan defeat and the PAIGC's armed struggle. Moreover, Mondlane had

[829] Daniel H. Watts, "American Leadership Conference on Africa," Liberator, Vol III, 1 (January 1963), 14.

returned to Mozambique by this point. His visits to the United States became scarcer, and when he did arrive he consulted primarily with protestant student groups and ACOA, which had access to generous donors and a handful of government officials.[830] Devoid of any tutelage in leftist politics of the CONCP with whom they identified, Watts and *The Liberator* rejected the civil rights leadership in favor of a more racialist, Pan-African approach advanced by a new staff that included among others the strident critic of integration Harold Cruse. As it defined a more confrontational black led approach to the domestic struggle, it alienated white communists like Beveridge, who found himself increasingly isolated within *The Liberator* until he finally exited in 1965.[831] Radical pan-Africanism had won the day over the more inclusive leftist critique of the American system, but importantly this new definition of racial solidarity incorporated an attention to the problems of global capitalism that would help develop a new generation of blacks sympathetic to left ideas.

During this transition, *The Liberator* was pivotal in the establishment of a new nationalist form of black radical internationalism. Its early writings had done a great deal to promote a Marxist-influenced reading of the global system as essential to understanding American segregation and policy.[832] As Watts moved in more Pan-Africanist directions and Beveridge lost influence, however, articles began to closely equate control of capital

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[830] See chapter 2 for more on Mondlane's work with ACOA and his contacts with Bobby Kennedy.
[831] Christopher Tinson, "The Fight for Freedom Must be fought on All Fronts: The Liberator Magazine and Black Radicalism, 1960-1971," Dissertation submitted to the University of Massachusetts Amherst (May 2010), 122.
[832] See for instance, L.P. Beveridge, Jr. "Apartheid's Allies," *The Liberator*, Volume III, 12 (December 1963).

with white hands. Contributors like Cruse pushed for an assimilation of Marxist rhetoric within a new dominant Pan-African ideology that rejected integration in favor of nationalist concepts of black communal self-determination within the United States.[833] His movement worried about capital and exploitation of resources in the United States and Africa, but it made little room for white participation. Solidarity was defined in this instance primarily by race. But Cruse offered more of a challenge to existing liberal heterodoxy than a complete theory of action. Defining a movement along color lines did a great deal to identify enemies; it provided little assistance in forming a plan of action. In looking to Africa and the idea of revolution, he had not yet found a specific model on which to base the American rebellion. The search was on to define a movement that could fully incorporate race-first and leftist criticisms of the international system.

Cruse's search for a new form of internationally influenced protest reflected the desires of a generation that Black Power thinker Roland Snellings called "the Africanists." While participating in the civil rights movement, they had grown disaffected by the slow pace of change and its ability to address the economic crisis of the black community. Calling for complete systemic reform, they found themselves in closer alignment with the popular perception of African revolutionaries demanding wholesale change at a quicker pace.[834] Unfortunately, the period after 1962 lacked clear revolutionary leaders from the continent, since the parade of freedom fighters visiting the United Nations and New York

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[833] Cruse, "Rebellion or Revolution?" Part Two, The Liberator, Vol III, 11 (November 1963), 10. Cruse specifically identified the cultural front – the creation of films, music, literature, etc – as the weakest segment of America's industrial complex and therefore the first target for the African American revolution.
[834] Rolland Snellings, "The New Afro-American Writer," *The Liberator*, Volume III, 10 (October 1963), 10.

had slowed to a trickle in the wake of the Congo debacle and the Portuguese and South African crackdowns on nationalist activity. As a result, radical black youth lacked what one author called a "revolutionary ideology," leading to unfocused manifestations of anger as would occur during the Watts Riots of 1965. What was needed for this Africanist generation was "a revolutionary group, with real roots among the people, to explain to the people what they are fighting for and to organize that fight."[835] This was the missing component in the pursuit of equality and the development of meaningful solidarity with the continental liberation struggles. Africans were waging wars in the jungles of Angola and the streets of Los Angeles. They needed a common ideology and leadership to bridge the trans-Atlantic gap.

For a brief period, Malcolm X positioned himself to be the voice and organizer for this nascent movement. The charismatic speaker had not followed the path of Snellings' Africanists, since he was a vocal critic of the non-violence preached by Martin Luther King and other civil rights leaders. He had ascended the ranks of Elijah Muhammad's Nation of Islam preaching against cooperation with whites in power, urging self-defense, and using sometimes violent rhetoric that sold papers and appealed to those unwilling to abide by Gandhian tactics. Yet Malcolm X was little if not thoughtful, and he began to clash with the authoritarian Muhammad as he traveled the world and began to moderate his view of whites, incorporate more leftist perspectives, and embrace the core teachings of

[835] Richard Price and Bob Stewart, "Watts, L.A.; a First Hand Report Rebellion without Ideology," Liberator, Vol. V, 9 (September 1965). In the same issue, another article defended black rights to self-defense, arguing that in the 1960s "Africans through force of arms and mass actions were upsetting white colonial empires," providing some clarification for the black American question of "how best to survive." Ossie Sykes, "Self Defense A Right and a Necessity," Ibid.

mainstream Islam. In a way he was traveling the path opposite Watts and *The Liberator*. When he split with the Nation of Islam in 1963, Malcolm X did not shrink from the spotlight. Rather, he offered an alternative nationalism based on a Pan-African ideology that emphasized a leftist reading of the world situation, which he formalized in the creation of the Organization of Afro-American Unity.[836] He owed this transformation to his sojourn in Africa and the Middle East, where he made connections with socialist African revolutionaries –specifically those from Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) – who challenged Malcolm on the centrality of race in his traditional thinking. They, along with Arab and independent West African leaders, urged him to adopt a more nuanced, systematic approach to global race issues. Influenced by these individuals and contact with Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah, Malcolm transformed his once strident racial rhetoric toward a new anti-colonial, anti-capitalist critique of the international system.[837]

The results of this transformation in thinking were twofold. First, Malcolm wanted to reproduce the national unity among black Americans that had occurred in the creation of revolutionary fronts such as FRELIMO. He quieted his once strident criticism of moderate leaders like Martin Luther King and urged all blacks to come together. With unity, they could negotiate from a position of power. Second, his new view of the racial problem as an example of human rights struggle led him to look to the tactics of

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[836] Part of his differences with Elijah Muhammad had come from the prophet's lack of interest in Africa, which Malcolm had come to support at the beginning of the decade. After his split, he complained for instance that Muhammad had never said anything "pro-African." Perry, Bruce. Ed. Malcolm X: The Last Speeches (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1989), 139. See also Manning Marable, *Malcolm X: A Life of Reinvention* (New York: Viking, 2011), 270-272.

[837] Malcolm had been housed with the stateless revolutionary leaders while attending a conference in Cairo.

revolutionaries as models. He argued that African Americans needed to stop focusing on and appealing to the racist government of the United States. The situation of blacks in the United States was more like "South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Hungary, the Arab refugee problem . . . a world problem."[838] A comparison of these various pursuits of freedom illustrated to Malcolm that black people in the United States and on the continent had a "common exploiter" which aligned closely but not completely with the color line.[839] Anti-colonials would have to unite together on the world stage to oppose this global imperialism. Though Malcolm continued to refine his thinking, his internationalist critique of the U.S. state increasingly tied together disparate national ideologies into a single campaign. This could lay the foundation for an American solidarity that merged leftist strategies for interacting with the world system and the power of racial sympathies.

The realization of the global problem of inequality broke down the artificial barriers of the Cold War consensus even as it challenged the equally constraining limitations of strict black nationalism. The question Malcolm dealt with in the last months of his life was how to forge unity domestically and abroad. Having rejected religion, he was in search of what biographer Manning Marable has called a "secular basis for common ground." [840] Racial identification provided one obvious answer but so then did anti-capitalist solidarity against exploitation. The latter seemed to offer the clearest prospects for meaningful action. In his final speeches, Malcolm offered both as foundations for a new ideology. The

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[838] Malcolm X, *Say Brother*, Episode 257, WGBH Archive (Boston, MA).
[839] Malcolm X, *The Last Speeches*, 167. In relaying this point to his audiences, Malcolm regularly used the Portuguese colonies as an example do to their familiarity to African American communities.
[840] Marable, 303.

CONCP parties had staked claim to an inclusive leftist internationalism that had clearly appealed to Malcolm X during his time on the continent, but he had not yet made the full commitment. His assassination prevented him from reconciling these two distinct pathways toward solidarity, leaving a legacy of ambiguity that would continue to haunt relations with the continent. Events in Angola and elsewhere had inspired Malcolm and others to reassess their own beliefs, but it could not yet offer answers to how they could translate international trends to their domestic goals.

Globalizing Black Power

The early 1960s had demonstrated that radical African American critiques of the national system continued to draw upon revolutionary continental symbols and ideologies. The multiracial, Marxist inspired CONCP parties had failed to pursue these avenues of solidarity in favor of a broader appeal to Western societies. Over the following years, Snellings' "Africanist" generation would guide the Black Power movement, which Peniel Joseph has described as "trumpeting a new militant race consciousness that placed black identity as the soul of a new radicalism."[841] The heirs to the ideas explored by Watts, Cruse, and Malcolm X, they too would gravitate toward revolutionary parties after abandoning the pacifist resistance of King and the civil rights movement. Groups like the Black Panthers also attempted to merge traditional racial solidarity with class-based Marxist readings of the international system, though this sometimes proved as divisive internally

[841] Peniel Joseph, "Introduction: Toward a Historiogaphy of Black Power," in *The Black Power Movement: Rethinking the Civil Rights-Black Power Era,* ed, Peniel Joseph, (New York: Routledge, 2006), 3.

as it was unifying internationally. As their power and size grew, Black Power attracted the attention of the liberation movements, who felt obliged to reexamine their methods of developing ties to foreign populations as part of their larger push for Western support. The result was a new form of solidarity that finally mobilized the African American community in a way that both the liberation movements and their activist allies had long desired.

One of the keys to understanding this new solidarity was a shift in the thinking of the emerging young black leadership. Malcolm X had been one of the first national figures to articulate a vision of Africa from which black Americans could truly learn. Far too often since Du Bois' exile, the ANLCA model of patronizing aid had typified elite black views of the continent. Despite the presence of Mondlane and others, much of the early discussion of the civil rights leadership had been about what they could do for southern Africa as compared to what nationalists desired.[842] Attitudes ranged from respect to condescension, but the latter had grown as domestic success in gaining political rights had contrasted with difficulties in postcolonial Africa. Stokely Carmichael, the radical head of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) had been among the host of American leaders who had expressed skepticism of African leadership, supposedly dismissing Tanzanian leader Julius Nyerere as a "clown."[843] Yet Carmichael had chafed under the restrictive pacifism he had inherited and grew frustrated by the lack of change in economic conditions of blacks across the country, as had much of this "Africanist generation."

[842] See chapter 2.
[843] Peniel Joseph, *Stokely: A Life* (New York: Basic Books, 2014), 223.

Like Malcolm, he developed a deep respect for revolutionaries in Vietnam and the Middle East who were challenging the American strategic and capitalist system with force of arms, but this admiration did not automatically extend south of the Sahara – at least not until he visited the continent in 1967. In the Tanzanian capital, the civil rights organizer was hounded by rumors of his earlier comments, but he found an ally in Eduardo Mondlane. Seeing an opportunity, the FRELIMO president reached out to Carmichael, reassuring him in the words of biographer Joseph "of the political integrity of revolutionaries he had too casually dismissed."[844] This began a reassessment of continental leadership for Carmichael, who eventually counted among his mentors Pan-Africanist socialist triumvirate in Conakry that included Sékou Touré of Guinea, the exiled Kwame Nkrumah, and PAIGC head Amílcar Cabral. Carmichael would become a student of this generation of continental radicals, eventually changing his name to Kwame Ture in honor of the leaders who most directly contributed to his evolving philosophy.

Carmichael's transformation was representative of wider currents of Black Power ideology, which was following Malcolm X's embrace of revolutionary movements on the continent. As the only ongoing struggles, the Portuguese colonies rose to become some of the premier sources of study and inspiration. In the wake of Carmichael's call for a black centered revolutionary movement, a number of key leaders declared their support and admiration for the anti-imperialist campaigns. In 1967, SNCC Chairman Rap Brown said that "the struggle against racism, colonialism, and apartheid is an indivisible struggle" and

[844] Ibid.

identified Mozambique and Angola as prominent fronts in this battle.[845] Newark's black power sage Amiri Baraka looked to Mondlane's *The Struggle For Mozambique*, finished shortly before his assassination in 1969, along with the English translation of Cabral's "Theory as Weapon" to help build an understanding of the struggle under America's own iteration of colonialism. *The Black Panther* devoted regular attention to the various movements, reintroducing its 100,000 weekly readers to the revolutions that had been absent from mainstream papers since 1961.[846] Other groups also gravitated toward the revolutions, notably the Greensboro-based Pan-African collective known as the Students (later Youth) Organized for Black Unity (SOBU or YOBU). Their widely distributed newsletter included columns written by and with the African nationalists, reclaiming the legacy of *The Liberator* of the early 1960s. Often, these articles highlighted the American government's ongoing cooperation with Portuguese imperialism, connecting two pieces of the anti-imperial movement in a concrete way.[847] In collapsing the geographical, linguistic, and political differences between Africa and the United States, radical activists legitimized their own movements through celebration of continental achievement. Before the decade came to a close, Eldridge Cleaver of the Black Panthers could claim that "Definitely [the

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845 "A Message from Chairman H. Rap Brown."

846 Jeffrey O.G. Ogbar, *Black Power: Radical Politics and African American Identity* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 121. See for instance, "African Patriotic Armed Struggle Grows in Strength," *Black Panther*, 17 February 1969.

847 One such article ran under the title "U.S. Trains African Oppressors," *SOBU Newsletter*, 17 October 1970.

struggle against Portuguese colonialism] is a source of inspiration, and it has a direct influence on the determination of the people fighting the struggle [in the United States]."[848]

This newfound enthusiasm for Portuguese Africa was not exceptionally self-reflective in its initial stages, depending primarily on imagined ideas of racial kinship and a common enemy rather than any strong understanding of shared ideologies or even socio-political goals. Nonetheless, key to this growth in interest was a greater effort on behalf of the Portuguese African nationalists to use racial ties to expand their following. After both the PAIGC and FRELIMO had launched their revolutions in 1963 and 1964, respectively, each had placed renewed efforts on diplomacy. In order to support these armed struggles, the nationalist had looked to comrades in the developing world, specifically Algeria and Tanzania. Yet in order to "fight imperialism on all sides" as FRELIMO expressed in one article, the parties adopted a form of solidarity that stressed unity across Africa, Asia, and Latin America.[849] The CONCP members became leaders of the emerging Tricontinental movement, which united around shared socialist development strategies in a postcolonial context. Cabral became a leading philosopher in this arena, and his speech at the 1966 Havana conference became one of his first texts to be translated into English, beginning a period of widespread international interest in his writings.[850] This philosophy was

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[848] "Black Panther Discussion with African and Haitian Liberation Fighters," *Black Panther,* 23 August 1969.

[849] Uria Simango, "We are Determined to Break the Shackles of Modern Slavery," *Mozambique Revolution* 7 (June 1964).

[850] For a discussion of the essential elements of Tri-Continental ideology, see Forrest Colburn, *The Vogue of Revolution in Poor Countries* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 14. Cabral would become noteworthy enough that the Black Panther would reprint whole speeches over multiple issues in the same way they did for Che Guevara and Ho Chi Minh. See Amilcar Cabral, "The Power of Arms," *Black Panther*, 6 September 1969.

multiracial, but it appealed especially to American minorities who were expanding their definition of race to include all darker and oppressed peoples. Tricontinentalism provided a common ground that merged race consciousness and Marxist radicalism, providing a temporary solution to the vexing problem, especially in the case of solidarity with the CONCP parties that combined black African identity with active leftist revolutions.

Cabral's popularity provides an insight into the aspects of the revolutions that most appealed to African Americans. Though the West African and Mondlane both applied a Marxist-inspired reading of the international system, neither demanded a single unifying theory. Rather, Cabral in particular stressed the necessity of each people defining their strategies and philosophies to fit within unique national contexts. The most important thing was that actions benefit the community. As Cabral explained in an oft referenced explanation of the PAIGC's success, "Always bear in mind that the people are not fighting for ideas . . . They are fighting to win material benefits, to live better . . . to guarantee the future of their children."[851] To best improve the lives of individuals in any revolution, leaders must identity areas of popular need and the tactics most likely to affect change. Ideological correctness to both Cabral and Mondlane's FRELIMO was less essential than the measurable improvement of education, healthcare, business, and dozens of other areas that had been largely ignored by the Portuguese. Communal unity and struggle were the only universal aspects of their model, based on a general understanding and analysis of a capitalist world system.[852] This flexible leftist ideology and the texts that explained it,

[851] Amílcar Cabral, *The Revolution in Guinea* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), 86.
[852] Amílcar Cabral, *Unity and Struggle* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979), 45.

combined with similar writings on African socialism by Julius Nyerere, became the core of a new black corpus that helped to define the later stages of Black Power. Both the Panthers and SOBU incorporated these readings of the revolutionary world situation into their influential papers, quoting liberally from the Portuguese Africans, their benefactor Nyerere, and the American solidarity organizations such as the Liberation Support Movement (LSM).[853]

As groups like the Black Panthers and SOBU adopted and adapted the ideologies of the Portuguese African revolutions, Mondlane again took the lead in reaching out to young African Americans in the years before his death. Sharfudine Khan's arrival in 1967 as permanent representative of FRELIMO to the United Nations and unofficial ambassador to the American people brilliantly took advantage of this changing American context. Khan was a Muslim, and he previously represented the party in Cairo. He was positioned perfectly to appeal to young radicals along Tricontinental lines, and he did exactly that, becoming a confidant not only for multiracial groups like the Southern Africa Committee but African Americans interested in pursuing the Pan-African aspects of Black Power.[854] PAIGC's Gil Fernandes also acted as a kind of roving ambassador to the African American community. Like Khan, he was well positioned to bridge the cultural gap, having attended the historically black Lincoln University before completing his degree at New

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854 Robert Van Lierop, phone interview with author, 11 October 2014. Prexy Nesbitt, interview with William Minter, September 2004, No Easy Victories, http://www.noeasyvictories.org/interviews/int08_nesbitt.php

Hampshire.[855] Along with increased visits by Mondlane and Cabral, this new personal diplomacy to the grassroots of the black community helped feed the growing interest in the revolutions. As Black Power advocates adopted the cause of African liberation as their own, they became the logical constituency to lead the popular African American movement that the Portuguese had feared since the Kennedy era.

Yet commitment to the CONCP cause remained confined to an elite cadre of activists and a few grassroots organizers in 1969. Since the beginning of the decade, the individual parties had imagined American solidarity as a way of changing official American policy.[856] Mobilizing this kind of democratic pressure would require more than a few noteworthy advocates like Carmichael and the Black Panthers; it would require a mass movement. Publications like SOBU's recently renamed *African World* were beginning to disseminate these leftist internationalist ideas but it was a slow process. Prospects for a mass level of support remained scarce. Recently, Martha Biondi has written that the average person had trouble embracing Pan-Africanism in their daily lives during the 1960s. Though identification with Africa was on the upswing, the commitment needed to undertake activity in concrete ways was simply not present. YOBU member Mark Smith recalls that the average individual could not force such solidarity to "connect up, either an

[855] Gil Fernandes education is somewhat unclear, but he seems to have been attending Lincoln in the early 1960s around the time John Marcum operated the program there, and it would make sense for him to have improved his English proficiency before moving on to study at New Hampshire. He is mentioned as a member of the Lincoln tennis team in early 1962. "Lincoln Net Coach Sees Winning Year for Lions," New Journal and Guide, 14 April 1962. See also, Gil Fernandes, Interview with John Slade, *Say Brother* 220 (1 February 1972), WGBH Media Archive, Boston, MA.

[856] FRELIMO had urged sympathizers as early as 1964 to "channelize your support in order that your help can be concrete . . . in the sense that you can influence the attitudes of your government. "Complicity of Imperialists," *Mozambique Revolution* 4 (March 1964).

explanatory framework or an action path, with the conditions that people felt in their lives."[857] To help build a movement, the CONCP parties and their domestic supporters would have to overcome this widespread apathy and clarify the relationship between foreign and domestic revolutions. Racial and cultural ties would surely play a factor, but clearly these were not enough. The CONCP parties would have to work with blacks to finally unite African sympathies with a transnational ideology that could inform popular action.

The parties did this through various means familiar from its simultaneous work with New Left groups – personal diplomacy, cooperation with local groups, and the dissemination of revolutionary writing in national publications like *The African World* and *The Black Panther*. Yet exploring briefly one example in this construction of a movement reveals both the transnational nature of Portuguese African solidarity, the ideology it represented, and the vital translation process that transformed African anti-colonialism into an American concern. This was the production and distribution of the film *A Luta Continua*, made by none other than ACOA's ever pragmatic Robert Van Lierop. One of Snellings' "Africanists," the native New Yorker had worked with the NAACP and civil rights organizations before he too looked for more revolutionary ideologies.[858] Though moderate on racial issues as evidenced by his work with the ACOA board, he had been deeply influenced by Malcolm X's later philosophical wanderings.[859] Like many other

[857] Quoted in Martha Biondi*, The Black Revolution on Campus* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), 237.
[858] See chapter 4.
[859] Robert Van Lierop, Interview with William Minter, 16 April 2004, New York, NY, NoEasyVictories.org, www.noeasyvictories.org/interviews/int07_vanlierop.php.

successful, educated blacks of his generation, he had come to appreciate these teachings only after the assassination.[860] It had been partially as a result of this epiphany that Van Lierop had journeyed to Africa after graduating law school in 1967, where he began his collaboration with Mondlane and FRELIMO.[861] While a member of the ACOA board, Van Lierop had successfully organized the Pan-African Solidarity Committee (PASC) in 1969 to promote a celebration in New York honoring the slain FRELIMO leader and Malcolm X. Featuring Betty Shabbazz and a speech by Khan, the event sought to promote "international black political consciousness" through the celebration of an African Solidarity week.[862] Yet the problems of participation and commitment scuttled ongoing activities after the first celebration, ending Van Lierop's attempts to build a black movement from this initial event. [863] This was just one example of a wider phenomenon, in which black American organizers committed to a new, revolutionary Pan-Africanism struggled to build the serious campaigns from initial displays of solidarity in cities across the country.[864] To create a self-sustaining movement, the nationalists and their allies

[860] The importance of Malcolm X to this generation of African American leaders is difficult to quantify, as almost all who looked abroad mention some element of Malcolm X's teachings as influencing their thoughts. Gene Locke, interview, with author, 8 May 2013 (Houston, TX); Interview, Owusu Sadaukai, *Say Brother* Episode 317: Malcolm X, 20 February 1974, WGBH Archive.

[861] Van Lierop, Interview with Minter.

[862] Van Lierop used his relationship with ACOA to help establish the PASC, but he made a special point to keep ACOA involvement secondary so this could evolve into a consciously black movement associated but wholly independent from ACOA. "Pan African Solidarity Committee," 1970? And flyer, "These brothers died fighting the racist system," no date (early 1971), Pan African Solidarity Committee P.A.S. Comm, Box 3, Robert Van Lierop Papers, Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture, New York Public Library (hereafter, RVLP, NYPL).

[863] Robert Van Lierop, untitled Letter, 27 October 1970, P.A.S. Comm, Box 3, RVL, NYPL.

[864] As an example, in 1971 local celebrations proclaiming a World Day of Solidarity with the African Community highlighted the liberation struggles. Gene Locke Interview.

needed to inspire self-sustaining grassroots movements based on individual commitment to a shared ideology of struggle.

Van Lierop felt that a film could translate FRELIMO and CONCP ideology for a black American audience in a way that could build this kind of support. Mondlane and Khan had both discussed the idea with him in previous years, and they had success in working with activists in Europe on such projects already. Yet the local concerns of Europeans did not necessarily translate to the issues confronting the black American community nor the bonds that linked Britons and Dutch to the revolutions. Van Lierop set out to make a film that addresses issues of African American solidarity, assembling an all-black film crew that journeyed into liberated Mozambique with FRELIMO to document the armed struggle and the social reconstruction occurring behind the lines.[865]

Van Lierop released *A Luta Continua* (The Struggle Continues) in 1972. Named for a line Mondlane often used to close his letters, the film self-consciously teases out the universal implications of FRELIMO ideology and its relevance to the black community. Brevity and Van Lierop's sympathetic gloss minimize foibles, but all simplifications reflect FRELIMO preferences, hewing closely to the party's self-styled image as a social-minded revolutionary organization that prioritized the construction of an egalitarian state over violence. The film emphasizes three CONCP narratives. First, the global nature of the anti-imperial struggle, in which Mozambique was a victim of both formal imperialism and the economic exploitation of multinational corporations that treated Portugal in essence as a

[865] Van Lierop, interview with author.

"neo-colony" representing Euro-American economic and strategic interests. Second, Van Lierop emphasized the creation of what Mondlane referred to as the "new and popular social order," which established cooperative farms, schools, and health facilities in the liberated territories where Portugal had never done so despite half a century of direct rule.[866] In a film about a revolution, images of war constitute roughly an eighth of the overall running time: even footage of a training camp describes it primarily as "an educational institution, an agricultural institution, a health institution, and a social services institution" rather than a place of war.[867] Finally, the film borrowed from FRELIMO in defining real victory as the achievement of equality and social cohesion – regardless of race, class, or gender. The film detailed FRELIMO's ideal of democratic participation in the struggle, where women and men held equal positions of authority based less on rank than specific responsibilities. It ended with FRELIMO's call to Mozambicans to cast off traditional tribal and gender identities in order to be reborn as a single, egalitarian nation. Though idealized, the film dramatized the practice of socialist revolution that had long been presented as dry theory.

FRELIMO and Van Lierop believed that depicting the revolution as it was occurring (at least in the ideal) would translate the struggle in an understandable way that could overcome the skepticism and indifference of American audiences. They understood revolution as universal, which could be adapted to circumstances in the United States as it

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[866] Eduardo Mondlane, *The Struggle for Mozambique* (Westport: Zed Press, 1983), 123-124.
[867] Robert Van Lierop, dir. *A Luta Continua* (Tricontinental Film Center: 1972), 16mm. Copy obtained from Evangelical Lutheran Church in America Library, Chicago, Ill..

had been in Mozambique. *A Luta Continua* acted as a filmic guide for reinventing communities, with commentary demonstrating how the FRELIMO model compared to practices in the African American community. One scene describing the Mozambican model of education is illustrative. For FRELIMO, Van Lierop as narrator explains that "education is not a way to achieve upward mobility or isolate themselves as an intellectual elite nor is it a meaningless abstraction that leads to dependence on external economic conditions." Education lifts students out of ignorance in a way that undermines class divisions associated with capitalist exploitation:

> When school is out, the teachers do not go one way, into cars for a trip home to exclusive suburbs, while the students go another way deeper into a ghetto. Instead, they are all part of the same mass movement, and the teachers live, work, and struggle in the bush with all of the people.[868]

Here, Van Lierop offers the solution to the weakness of the black American community. Committed activists must sacrifice the trappings of the capitalist-imperialist system in favor of communal unity in order to sustain a meaningful social revolution. During a period when African American activists were gaining firsthand experience with the corrupting influence of power in places like Newark, this lesson had a major effect on the way they came to view both domestic unity and identification with African movements. As one activist remembered decades later, blacks could learn directly from the foreign movements about the "way things are put together" in practice and not just in theory.[869]

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[868] *A Luta Continua*
[869] Gene Locke Interview.

Upon its release in 1972, the film became the key text explaining FRELIMO and CONCP ideology to American audiences.[870] Activists and occasionally nationalists like Khan presented at showings, acting as the visual centerpiece of programs that offered viewers of all races a way to participate in the revolution, either by joining in activities or donating directly to FRELIMO.[871] A discussion guide distributed with the film reveals the general tenor of such events. It urged viewers to boycott southern African goods, conduct their own educational campaigns, and launch "mass political actions against identifiable imperialist targets (e.g. corporations with investments in southern Africa, communications outlets that have failed to report on the wars of national liberation)."[872] *A Luta Continua* came to represent the entirety of the CONCP struggle for socialist liberation, headlining events supporting the MPLA in Angola and the PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau as well as Mozambique. As such, the film symbolized the promise of all liberation struggles in southern Africa for thousands of blacks, challenging them to reconsider their own lives and the future of their communities in light of this universal model. Sylvia Hill, an educator who would become a noted anti-apartheid activists in the 1980s, remembered leaving a screening of the film and "for the first time having this sense that you can have a science

[870] The film was screened widely, to both black and white, youth and religious organizations. For more on the film and its impact, see R. Joseph Parrott, "'A Luta Continua': Radical Filmmaking, Pan-African Liberation, and Communal Empowerment," in *Race & Class*. 57:1 (July-September, 2015): 20-38.
[871] See Informational announcement, CCLAMG, "African Liberation Support Workshop," 1973?, CCLAMG Materials, Collins Papers, MSU and advertisement, "Benefit Performance," *Black New Ark*, 1 March 1973. For a rare recorded example of this interpretation, see *Say Brother* Episode 306, 15 November 1973, WGBH archive.
[872] Africa Information Service, "A Discussion Guide for *A Luta Continua*," AAA, http://africanactivist.msu.edu/document_metadata.php?objectid=32-130-22D

of change because you have to think methodologically about what you're doing. It's not just haphazard and just occurring willy-nilly all based on chance factors."[873]

The film was just part of a larger propaganda effort, which finally targeted African Americans. The nationalists dramatically increased their personal involvement with the community. In addition to the Khan and Gil Fernandes work with local groups and appearances on black programs, Amílcar Cabral – the most noteworthy face of the CONCP after Mondlane's death – made multiple trips to the United States where he spoke with Black Power leaders. In 1973, he even had a private meeting, where the strictly African American audience peppered him with questions about his revolution and how to translate it to the American context. Van Lierop's African Information Service, which he had founded with activist extraordinaire Prexy Nesbitt, published this exchange and collected speeches in a widely read volume, *Return to the Source*. While attendees and readers of the volume were by and large familiar with much of what Cabral said, one comment had special resonance. Speaking to more than 120 representatives from various black organizations, the diminutive Cabo Verdean urged the audience to move beyond mere racial affinity to political activity. "Naturally we like our brothers," Cabral commented to the crowd who used the sobriquet to refer to him, "but in our conception it is better to be a brother *and* a comrade. . . if we are brothers it is not our fault or our responsibility. But if we are comrades, it is a political engagement."[874] Here was the central goal of the

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[873] Sylvia Hill, interview with William Minter, Washington, D.C., 23 September 2003, NoEasyVictories.org, www.noeasyvictories.org/interviews/int11_hill.php

[874] African Information Service, ed, *Return to the Source: Selected Speeches of Amilcar Cabral* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973), 76.

Portuguese African parties' solidarity. They hoped to use race as an introduction to the black American community, but they hoped their allies would adopt or at least support their leftist political goals as a way of achieving independence.

This barrage of propaganda and personal diplomacy was paying dividends in the early 1970s. The revolutions ideology was clear. Beyond the publications of activist organizations, the CONCP parties had broken into the mainstream black press. They attracted comment from a diverse array of black leaders who began to quote Cabral in particular as they discussed ways to integrate the useful aspects of Black Power into a politically influential ideology.[875] "A luta continua" became a catchphrase to describe any ongoing struggle. Even *Ebony* joined the fray when it featured a glossy spread on the war behind the lines in Mozambique.[876] African Americans had finally discovered the Portuguese African revolutions, in large part because the nationalists had finally realized the potential of appealing to the grassroots of this community and utilizing racial connections to break through a veil of indifference. Black Power in its most radical and confrontational form may have been on the decline during this period, but the integrated leftist Pan-African ethos it inspired laid the foundation for a mass adoption of the Portuguese African cause by the black American community. All that remained was to turn this growing affinity into visible political action that could supplement, amplify, and perhaps lead the wider coalition of solidarity activists.

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[875] Regular Pan-African columns appeared in the *New York Amsterdam News*, the *Chicago Defender*, and *Baltimore Afro-American* and even George Schuyler's old paper, the *Pittsburgh Courier*, which by 1970 had thrown its editorial weight behind translating the revolutions to the domestic context.
[876] Bob Van Lierop, "The Quiet War in Mozambique," *Ebony* Vol. XXVIII, 4 (February 1973).

People in the Streets: The Rise and Fall of the African Liberation Support Committee

African Liberation Day (ALD) was the political manifestation of this expanding interest in African revolutions. A national project, it took advantage of the increasing unity between the heretofore antagonistic poles of Black Power and civil rights political activism, buoyed by the formalization of this alliance in the inclusive National Black Political Convention held in Gary, Indiana. Beginning in 1972, it united African Americans from across the political spectrum in support of the liberation struggles. At the same time, it used the most well-known ideologies of the time – those of Portuguese Africa – to help remake the way that African Americans understood the concrete connections between local and international action. The celebration of ALD and the African Liberation Support Committee (ALSC) that it spawned helped convince many African Americans that their full equality depended on the complete freedom on the African continent. Though eventually hamstrung by the re-emergence of the nationalist-Marxist divide, the momentum that grew behind African liberation solidarity would continue through the fall of the Portuguese empire in 1974 and into the next decade.

Praised by Komozi Woodard as "one of the most important forces for African liberation in African American history," few historians have fully appreciated the debt this movement owed to this emerging solidarity with Portuguese Africa.[877] It emerged at a time

[877] Komozi Woodard, *A Nation within a Nation: Amiri Baraka* (LeRoi Jones) and Black Power Politics (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 175.

when the decline of militant black power opened an avenue for cooperation between the more radical "Africanist" generation and more moderate blacks in positions of power, such as ACOA ally Congressman Charles Diggs. Through unity, it was hoped the black community could wield greater political power through the election of more confrontational black politicians and the use of communal monetary power. This took place at the local level through the organization of political vanguard groups like Amiri Baraka's Congress of Afrikan People (CAP), but larger national manifestations included the first National Black Political Convention held in Gary, Indiana in 1972. The goal of this new movement was to create a single Black Agenda for national politics, that could achieve real transformation in minority areas of the country by controlling the government structures. Foreign policy goals were part of this agenda, but mass protest on African subjects was not necessarily a clear implication of this new project. Rather, it grew from the realization encouraged by the CONCP parties that the struggles of African peoples were indelibly linked.

Like *A Luta Continua*, the ALSC was a product of the personal diplomacy of FRELIMO and its interactions with ALD founder Owusu Sadaukai (Howard Fuller). The head of Malcolm X Liberation University in Greensboro, North Carolina and closely associated with YOBU, Sadaukai championed the education of blacks in the skills necessary to reconstruct their communities into autonomous and assertive units. He became an important national authority on the role of black education and its role in contributing to the new Black Agenda. In the fall of 1971, he traveled to Tanzania in order to learn from the country's education system. What inspired him most in Dar es Salaam was not Julius

Nyerere's African model of governance, but the liberation project in Mozambique. He met extensively with the FRELIMO leadership, discussing their model of national reconstruction and how African Americans could support their struggle.[878] In these exchanges, the freedom fighters stressed the importance of explaining the revolution to the American people – especially blacks. With knowledge of the revolution and the American role in sustaining Portugal, activists would surely provide "strong moral support" and show the world "our concern through massive Black protest and demonstration against U.S. involvement in Southern Africa."[879]

Sadaukai returned to the United States with a clear mission. Using the broad network of that he had developed while founding the university, he helped assemble a coalition of black supporters that crossed class and ideological lines. Among the notables who agreed to assist in preparing the first ALD were Stokely Carmichael, Newark's Baraka and his nationwide CAP, Betty Shabazz, head of the Southern Christian Leadership Council Ralph Abernathy, Black Panthers Huey P. Newton and Angela Davis, *Black Scholar* editor Nathan Hare, Lucius Walker of the Interreligious Foundation for Community Organization, four congressmen including Diggs, and dozens of others.[880] Finally, this ad-hoc organization, brought together by the appeal of black liberation, achieved the communal unity that Malcolm X had desired and offered the political potential

[878] Howard Fuller, telephone interview with author, 5 July 2013; Nesbitt Interview with author. Sadaukai actually joined with Robert Van Lierop temporarily as he filmed for *A Luta Continua*.
[879] Open Letter, African Liberation day, 17 February 1972, ALSC, FBI, 0983437000 HQ15725073 Section 1, Archives Unbound. Also,
[880] Interview, Fuller with author; Letterhead, African Liberation Day Coordinating Committee, no date (early 1972), provided to author by Fuller.

that the liberation parties had long advocated. All that remained was defining the ideology that would guide this movement.

In these earliest stages, however, ideology took a backseat to building sympathy with the foreign revolutions. Occurring at the same time that news of FRLEIMO and the PAIGC were just entering the mainstream black press, the rally would simultaneously educate and politicize a large segment of the African American population. Organizers desired to show individual blacks that the distant struggles for economic and political equality were inherently linked. Physical protests at major governmental and corporate backers of Portugal and South Africa would help Americans connect forms of oppression at home and abroad.[881] African Liberation Day would break down the traditional barriers that separated African Americans from their compatriots abroad, overcoming gaps in communication and creating a shared identity in a revolutionary struggle. ALD was fighting against the "thinking patterns of the black community" that saw the world "only in terms of the local and the immediate, and only in terms of pieces of the whole."[882] Here then was the Africanist vision writ large. Advocating for liberation would help groups like FRELIMO and the PAIGC, but it also provided the foundation for concerted action by African Americans that would be the first step in launching a domestic revolution of unknown means and tactics.[883] *A Luta Continua* and similar writings were establishing an adaptable model for struggle and unity, now it was up to black Americans to define its

[881] Ibid. Quoting one delegate to the Gary Conference, Sadaukai explained that the goal of the ALD was to show that the "new negro" will "stand up for the right of his people – wherever they are."
[882] "Understand the Struggle," *African World*, 27 March 1972.
[883] The search for African American unity was half the goal of the ALD and ALSC. As Gene Locke remembered, "it was easier to adopt that name as a foundation for coalition." Gene Locke, interview.

contours in their national context and put the plan into action. Timed to follow just two months after the Gary convention, it would be a continuation of the struggle for unity and the formation of the Black Agenda. "The strengthening of Africa," Baraka explained in the first public announcement of the ALD, "is the strengthening of ourselves."[884]

Sadaukai and the committee chose visible cities for the rallies with large black populations in order to increase the chances that sizeable protests would draw official attention. Sites in 1972 included San Francisco, Toronto, and Antigua. The U.S. capital, however, would serve as the primary location for the ALD. As Baraka noted, Washington represented the ideal location for organizing since it contained "the government of our worst enemies, but paradoxically in a stronghold of black life."[885] Marches and rallies in front of embassies and the State Department would physically represent the demands for the United States to reconsider its policies supporting reactionary, oppressive foreign governments. At each location, noted speakers including politicians such as Charles Diggs would educate the attendees about the individual crimes of Portugal, South Africa, Rhodesia, and the United States against African peoples. Preparations and speeches included attention to the entire continent still under minority rule, but organizers singled out Portugal.[886] Activists praised the Lusophone revolutions as the vanguard of the "newest most effective stage in a line of historical resistance [to European rule]." [887] As the

[884] Amiri Baraka, "African Liberation Day," *Black News*, 1 May 1972.
[885] Ibid.
[886] Sadaukai explained before the event that "Portugal today is looked upon as one of the most diabolical among all enemies of Africa," with Pretoria "running a close second." Owusu Sadauki, "Inside Liberation Mozambique," *African World*, 4March 1972.
[887] See for an example, "Understand the Struggle," *African World*, 27 May 1972.

campaigns in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau gained ground, African Americans hoped that their support might provide the final element needed to tip the scales in their favor. As one anonymous fan of the ALD suggested, perhaps "support[ing] the liberation struggles on our own homeland" might "thrust the Freedom Fighters [of the Portuguese territories] over that crucial hump after which total defeat of colonialism through armed peoples struggle will have to be admitted."[888]

As the chosen day of May 27th approached, all signs pointed toward a truly impressive national gathering. Organizers expected a few thousand protesters, but the popularity of the liberation movements had grown over the past two years. The largest planned demonstration in Washington, D.C. attracted African Americans from as far away as Houston. In the culminating rally at the National Mall (renamed Lumumba Park for the occasion) Sadaukai spoke before an assembled crowd of roughly 25,000, declaring "We are an African people."[889] Organizers proclaimed it the "largest all-Black demonstration in Washington's history" and the largest nationally since Marcus Garvey.[890] Another 7,000-10,000 gathered in San Francisco, while smaller crowds of roughly 3,000 attended the rallies in Toronto and Antigua.[891] It was by far the largest manifestation of black internationalism during the Cold War. It was also likely the single largest show of solidarity

888 "A Goal Worth Reaching," *African World*, 22 January 1072.
889 "The African Liberator," 19 May 1972, ALSC, FBI, 1126832000 HQ15725073 Section 4, Archives Unbound. More generous estimates from Baraka put the number closer to 30,000. The ALSC later claimed 60,000.
890 "ALD March Orderly and Enthusiastic," *African World*, 10 June 1972. See also
891 "African Liberation Day Follow-up Measures," *Black New Ark*, 1 July 1972.

with the southern African revolutions to take place in a Western country during the 1970s. It was sure to attract political attention.

The Nixon administration – acquainted with mass dissidence due to its Vietnam policies –downplayed the events, but the demonstrations proved more disturbing to representatives of governments in southern Africa.[892] To these officials, the visible manifestation of black discontent with American policy in the region represented a new and potentially disturbing trend. Thinking back on the event in the 1990s, the Portuguese ambassador tried to claim that the protests did not even disrupt the daily services of the embassy, but the rogue black nationalists who attempted to bomb the San Francisco consulate just a few days after the marches challenged his bravado.[893] After the ALD, it appears Portuguese security agents began paying closer attention to African American activists. Diplomats at the South African embassy also took note of events. They had been observing the preparations for the campaign with unreserved skepticism and expressed surprise at the turnout in Washington. The ambassador noted the "special venom" that protesters reserved for the Portuguese, but continued to question the commitment of the black community to sustaining this activism – especially given the history of antecedents like the ANLCA. Officials in the embassy came to the conclusion that "there is not enough

[892] "Potential for Violence in the Major Cities During Summer 1973," 6 April 1973, 12-13, Ex HU 3-1, White House Central Files, Nixon Presidential Library (Yorba Linda, CA).

[893] The records of the Portuguese embassy from this period remain closed, so it is difficult to challenge Themido's rather cavalier dismissal of the ALD two decades later. Given the concern he showed for the Gulf Boycott at the time, it is likely he may have been more worried than his memoirs reveal. Themido, João Hall. *Dez Anos em Washington, 1971-1981* (Lisbon: Dom Quixote, 1995), 98.

evidence at this stage that southern Africa is a high priority in the black community."[894] The first African Liberation Day had been a success, but it had merely been the first salvo in an attempt to push change – both within the black community and in wider American society. It had made an impression, but more sustained effort was necessary to expand popular participation and convince onlookers that black identification with Lusophone and other nationalists was indeed a real phenomenon.

The movement proved more durable than its detractors predicted. Within months of the first ALD, the ad-hoc organizing committee had formalized into the ALSC, which established the celebration as an annual event. However, the year between the two rallies produced a change in the nature of the program away from racial identification as the primary unifying factor. This shift owed a great deal to the ideologies of the CONCP nationalists who had captured the imaginations of many black peoples. As interest grew in the movements, people sought more information about them. Publications catering to the black radical audience including *The Black Panther*, *The African World*, and Amiri Baraka's *Unity and Struggle* all reproduced key texts from Mondlane and Cabral in particular, which revealed to many for the first time the multiracial Marxism that stood at the core of the movements. Even more important was Cabral's visit in the fall of 1972 mentioned briefly above. It was at this point that Cabral urged Africans Americans to become both "brother *and* a comrade."[895] This statement, published within months and

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[894] Memo, Ambassador to Secretary, "Afrika Bevrydingsdag: Washington, D.C." 2 June 1972, 1/33/3, South African Foreign Policy Archives (Pretoria, South Africa). [Author's Translation].
[895] Amílcar Cabral, "Connecting the Struggles: an informal talk with black Americans," in African Information Service, 76.

widely read after Cabral's assassination in early 1973, moved the leftist reading of activism to the center of the ALSC agenda, shaping the way that the leadership conceptualized its future organizing. This shift was reinforced by the inherently leftist perspective of an expanding list of propaganda items like *A Luta Continua*, produced in consultation with the CONCP parties. With this continental intervention, the transnational leftist element that had been subsumed within the ALSC's iteration of Pan-African unity began to assert itself over the racial component, which would have profound effects on the organization and the unity of the black community.

As part of this embrace of the Marxist inspired economic critique of the international system, the ALSC joined with other radical forces in boycotting Gulf Oil. ACOA and the predominantly white Gulf Boycott Committee had struggled to integrate the black community into grassroots protests against Portugal's single largest corporate partner.[896] Now, the ALSC and its constituent parts committed to joining the national boycott, led by Randall Robinson and his PALC. Targeting Gulf not only threatened to damage the Portuguese war effort, but it would link the PALC's domestic criticisms of unequal hiring practices with the foreign exploitation of Africa.[897] Already working with the ALSC on its activities in Boston, Robinson and colleague Jim Winston successfully pushed for the inclusion of Gulf as an issue in the first ALD celebrations.[898] In June 1972, Robinson proposed a nationwide campaign that would mobilize black public opinion

[896] See chapter 4.
[897] Letter, Randall Robinson to Marshall Brown, 31 March 1971, Private Papers of Brenda Randolph (nee Robinson).
[898] Willard Johnson, phone interview with author, 22 August 2014; Jim Winston, phone interview with author, 20 May 2014.

against Gulf in over a dozen states, including seven of the most lucrative markets for the oil giant.[899] As Robinson explained to Congressman Diggs, a pivotal member of the ALSC coalition, "if in the key states we can win overwhelming Black support in addition to marginal support from whites, Gulf's profit margin can be substantially reduced." Robinson hoped this might lead to Gulf's exit from Angola, though the campaign's educational value far outstripped the small likelihood of such an event. The ALSC approved the plan.[900] Local chapters, many of which were associated with Baraka's CAP, coordinated the widespread effort. The activity would serve the twofold purpose of educating populations about the liberation movements, while also providing them with a local symbol of collective racial oppression on which sympathetic blacks could focus their energies. The campaign also linked the first ALD with plans for its second incarnation.

The results of the campaign were impressive and demonstrated the growth of popular feeling on the Portuguese African cause.[901] In the run-up to the second May celebrations, the PALC coordinated the launch of an informational campaign across 20 states. In April a "flood" of bumper stickers, posters, and foldouts appeared from Miami to Seattle.[902] In Florida alone, the Gulf Boycott coordinator distributed 2,000 posters in two

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[899] PALC, "1971 National and State Gulf Product Distribution Breakdown," 8 June 1972, 1126832-000 --- 157-HQ-25073 --- Section 4. 6/8/72 - 11/21/72. African Liberation Support Committee. FBI Library. Archives Unbound. Of the three states without populations over ten percent, California, Pennsylvania, and Ohio all had large black populations concentrated in urban areas from which much of Gulf's sales likely derived. Gulf's next ten most profitable states included ones with heavy black populations including South Carolina, Louisiana, Maryland, Tennessee, and Alabama.

[900] Robinson to Diggs, 9 August 1972, BRP; Letter, Robinson to Lucius Walker, 9 August 1972, BRP.

[901] Letter, Nteta, Robinson, and Winston to Brother/Sister, 27 April 1973. The Full page advertisement appeared in Jet in the May 31 issue. Ebony appeared in the fall.

[902] Letter, PALC to Brother/sister, 9 March 1973. BRP.

weeks across the state, with special emphasis on northern cities like Gainesville. Churches and community organizations opened their doors to anti-Gulf speeches, and local radio and TV stations allowed for a once-a-week news spot devoted to Gulf campaigning. In New York, the PALC representative covered subways with more than 2,500 posters and handed out informational booklets at the local celebration of African Liberation Day in 1973. Through Diggs, the PALC also assembled dozens of black celebrities and officials who would lend their names to the campaign.[903] The expansive list of the luminaries appeared on full page advertisements in *Jet* and *Ebony* declaring the Portuguese African struggle "is also our war," which produced a frantic response from Gulf in the black media.[904] The barrage helped lay the groundwork for a national picket later in September of 1973, which included more than 25 cities.[905]

By the end of the year, the PALC and its ALSC affiliates had played a pivotal role in establishing the Gulf boycott as a national movement. Gulf remained in Angola, but it began to worry about the impact of the protests on its bottom line. It took out full page advertisements in popular black publications that gave a more positive spin to its role in the community, while also increasing investments in minority training programs.[906] Gulf even proposed creating "betterment programs" in Angola that it could use to defray the

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[903] Various Questionnaires Responses, Labeled Packet #2, no date, BRP. Memo, PALC to State and Local Organizers, 15 May 1973, BRP.
[904] See PALC Advertisement, *Ebony* (Aug 1973), p11.
[905] Memo, PALC to State and Local Organizers, 27 July 1973, BRP.
[906] Gulf Advertisement, *Ebony* (Aug 1973), p128. See for example, "The OIC and Gulf," *Forward Times* (Houston), 5 May 1973.

domestic impact of protests.[907] Portugal remained confident that Gulf would not leave Angola, but the Portuguese ambassador warned his colleagues in Lisbon early that they should not "underestimate what the campaign can do."[908] A mass movement had developed that targeted the economic imperialism that continued to subjugate both southern Africans and blacks in the United States, and it was beginning to achieve results. Most importantly, it drew on a specific form of Marxist Pan-Africanism that included room for multiracial cooperation, evidenced by the PALC's cooperation in some cities with existing Gulf boycotts dominated by white activists. Though such interracial cooperation with groups like the Gulf Boycott Coalition seemed relatively minor to individuals like Robinson focused narrowly on achieving the goals of liberation, it hinted at a deeper shift in conversation away from strict racialism within the ALSC and its associated organizations.

Like the black Gulf campaign, the 1973 celebrations also reflected the growing CONCP influence. The major change was a shift from the mass rallies of the prior year in major cities to a series of smaller demonstrations scattered across the country. These local demonstrations highlighted shared elements of imperial exploitation and its impact on individual lives, attempting to achieve Cabral's dictum of directly relating revolution to quotidian experiences. Small rallies provided a venue in which local organizers could readily connect domestic symbols of oppression with similar situations overseas. In Newark, for example, the comparison became centralized around the Portuguese problem.

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[907] Lisbon to Secstate, 10 November 1971, Box 2040, Political and Defense, Subject Numeric Files, 1970-1973, RG 59, NARA.

[908] Telegram, Washington to Lisbon, 25 April 1972, Processo 922, PAA 288, Arquivo Historico Diplomatico (Lisbon, Portugal).

Marchers designed a route that included "stops at many symbols of oppression against black people," which included the Portuguese consulate and the Portuguese airline TAP. The result merged the problems and the solutions to African exploitation on the continent and in Newark into one interrelated whole.[909] At the same time, organizers hoped to gently expand the base of their revolution beyond the strict limits of Black Nationalism. Adopting the longwinded theme "There is no peace with honor – the war continues in Africa and against Black People in this country," the ALSC hoped to canalize popular radicalism focusing on Southeast Asia into the southern African cause. As Sadaukai explained in words reminiscent of radical white solidarity organizers at the time, "We feel very strongly that as the war 'winds down' in Vietnam it will be winding up in Africa."[910] These local demonstrations were less likely to affect national policy, but they exposed the uninitiated to the looming threat of U.S. adventurism beyond Saigon. They offered opportunities to identify local collaborators with minority rule like Gulf Oil and give a wider array of people a sense of participating in the revolution. The decentralized activities sought to create a seamless connection between international and domestic revolution, spurring people to assert power in their own communities as they acted in solidarity with Africans abroad.

These changes produced an African Liberation Day far different from the previous year. In May of 1973, roughly 30 cities across the United States, Canada, and the Caribbean held rallies. Attendance differed from one city to the next, but widespread participation

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[909] "Support World Afrikan Liberation," *Black New Ark*, 1 May 1973. More than 2000 people attended the rally. "1000s March in New Ark," 1 June 1973.
[910] Letter, Owusu Sadaukai to Lu Walker, 27 February 1973, Box 1, Southern Africa Collective Collection, NYPL.

demonstrated a surprising depth of feeling among African Americans. New Haven produced well over a hundred; Raleigh, North Carolina more than 1500; and the less than radical city of Knoxville 400. In Portland, Oregon, over a thousand attended, including more than a few white leftists, while another surprise turnout of nearly two thousand filled the streets of Columbia, South Carolina. In Houston, a few hundred marched outside of the Portuguese Consulate and in front of the Gulf Oil building, before attending a rally of more than one thousand. Harlem, San Francisco, and Washington all gathered roughly five thousand people for their rallies. Earlier festivities in Los Angeles raised $17,000 from 3,000 attendees. Only in a few cities like Boston and Rochester did turnouts produce discouraging results, with poor weather being blamed for attendance. The turnout for the piecemeal ALD proved far greater than many expected, given its diffuse nature.[911] Local committees raised more than $41,000 in aid for the liberation groups.[912] Activist publications claimed that more than 100,000 people marched in the various cities, but the number was probably closer to 40,000 in the United States.[913] This number was disappointing in some ways as the movement failed to expand much beyond its previous success in terms of numerical turnout, but it likely involved more people in the liberation cause than had the more centralized celebrations of the previous year. As one activist remembered, for every one person who attended the rallies, there were likely three or four

[911] For reports on the various programs in cities across the country and their attendance, see the reports filed from various FBI offices. ALSC, FBI, 1126832000 HQ15725073 Section 6, Archives Unbound.
[912] IFCO Project Analysis, "African Liberation Support Committee," 15 March 1974, African Liberation Day Coordinating Committee, IFCO Collection, Schomburg Center, New York Public Library.
[913] "Over 100,000 March on African Liberation Day," *Struggle* 1:5 (July 1973).

who participated at some level beforehand or after.[914] The general success of the second ALD pointed to an ongoing solidarity with African liberation struggles and a greater incorporation of the socialist ideology into African American activity.

In spanning the country, African Liberation Day also broke out of the niche of strictly racial interest. In locations such as Portland where leftists cooperated across the color line, whites participated in ALD activities, though not without some consternation at the national level.[915] Major media outlets paid greater attention to the marches, devoting space to the demonstrations and the transnational ideology they articulated. An article on the front page of the *Washington Post's* Metro section (above the fold no less) noted that the D.C. event was smaller compared to the prior year, but that it showed concretely "correlations between the history and problems of both [blacks here and Africans]."[916] The *New York Times* and smaller local papers provided similar coverage, noting in particular the ways that activists used the event to highlight local issues. In Manhattan, Borough President Percy Sutton declared the proposed site of an unpopular state office building in Harlem African Liberation Square, effectively delineating it as a battleground that fit with the local theme 'One struggle – many fronts."[917] In places where celebrations received no coverage outside the black community, organizers charged racism. In Philadelphia, a group of young activists lambasted the *Inquirer* and other local media for their lack of attention. "A press that can uncover the Pentagon papers," they stated tongue firmly in cheek, "cannot

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914 Thomas Blanton, telephone interview with author, 2 May 2013.
915 Discussions about the presence of whites at the national level reveal that this was a wider issue. The decision was eventually made to allow white participation but to keep the leadership wholly black.
916 Alice Bonner, "Rallies Support Africans," *Washington Post*, 27 May 1973.
917 "African Liberation Day Marked by a March and Rally in Harlem," *New York Times*, 27 May 1973.

claim to have been unable to uncover information on African Liberation Day."[918] The ALD may have been a black project, but its organizers aimed to gain the attention of all segments of the country.

The size and breadth of the celebrations also had a meaningful impact in Washington. There had been a sense since the first ALD that Africa could become a substantial issue in domestic politics if trends continued. In the wake of the previous year's success, Charles Diggs had organized a congressional delegation that traveled around the continent, discussing the growth of black interest in the liberation struggles and urging coordinated pressure on the United States by independent governments. At the same time, congressional initiatives spurred in part by the ALD celebrations worked – in the words of one of Digg's committee staff – "to push, to pull, to tug, to embarrass, and to cajole the government into more considerate action" in the region.[919] Some individuals within the State Department believed this burgeoning transnational coalition on Africa could have real consequences for American policy toward the minority regimes.[920] FRELIMO agreed. Sharfudine Khan used the ALD celebrations and their enthusiastic reception on the continent to needle American officials, who continued to avoid discussions of isolating

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[918] Lear Len, "Media Charged with Racism in African Liberation Day Treatment," *Philadelphia Tribune*, 5 June 1973.

[919] Goler T. Buthcer, et. al. "Congress and American Relations with South Africa*," Issue: A Quarterly Journal of Africanist Opinion* 3:4 (Winter 1973), 54.

[920] The Luanda consul general remarked that after Vietnam ended, a "large number of critics of that war will be in search of a cause and may well adopt southern Africa. This in turn could put additional domestic pressure on [the] U.S."Telegram, Luanda to Secstate, 30 June 1972, Box 2040, Political and Defense, Subject Numeric Files, 1970-1973, RG 59, National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, MD).

their Iberian partner.[921] One State Department report openly wondered if such a shift in policy might not be inevitable if the Congressional Black Caucus and its grassroots allies could replicate the sustained successes of similar activities in Europe, which had by that point swayed governments in the Netherlands and Sweden to provide support for liberation movements.[922]

It was this emerging grassroots-political alliance – made visible by the mass rallies of 1972 and 1973 – that caused the most concern across the Atlantic. Portugal feared that its increasingly good relations with the Nixon administration could succumb to a potentially hostile legislature, which threatened to become a reality as popular interest developed. Events like the ALD helped promote more active and confrontational strategies from elected officials, with Digg's Congressional Black Caucus demanding an end to all aid in Portugal as part of a black "Bill of Rights" formulated shortly after the first ALD in 1972. Though unsuccessful, the move both infuriated and worried Lisbon, leading the generally dismissive Portuguese ambassador to label it "the only initiative with a really onerous character."[923] More importantly, the combined efforts of the New Left and black activists had made Portuguese Africa more than just an issue of race. Just over a year later in the fall of 1973, Congressional pressure materialized in the form of an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act that would enshrine the arms embargo against Portugal as law,

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[921] Memcon, Sharfudine Khan with David Matthews, 22 June 1972, Box 2491, Political and Defense, Subject Numeric Files, 1970-1973, RG 59, NARA.
[922] Bureau of Intelligence and Research, "Portuguese Africa: Growing Western Support for Liberation Movements, 21 August 1972, Box 2040, Political and Defense, Subject Numeric Files, 1970-1973, RG 59, NARA.
[923] Telegram, Washington to Lisbon, 2 June 1972, Processo 922, PAA 288, Arquivo Historico Diplomatico (Lisbon, Portugal).

which was sponsored by a pair of white senators from states with politically active African American minorities – Democrats Ted Kennedy of Massachusetts and John V. Tunney of California.[924] Both had relationships with groups like the Washington Office on Africa, but it was the intersection of lobbying and visible protest that made the sympathetic politicians see the value in leading the opposition to Portugal and southern Africa more generally.[925] That Kennedy in particular would do so in the traditional hotbed of pro-Portuguese sentiment that was Massachusetts illustrated how effective the anti-colonial solidarity movement had become. At the end of the year, the legislation had passed both houses despite strenuous objections from the administration.[926] Reflecting on the changing attitude in Washington, the exasperated Portuguese foreign minister complained to Assistant Secretary of State David Newsom that "10,000 people marching in African Liberation Day should not form U.S policy."[927]

The importance of this grassroots-Congressional opposition became apparent when Secretary of State Henry Kissinger attempted to renegotiate Luso-American relations after

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[924] "Portugal Bid for U.S. Aid in Africa Reported," *Los Angeles Times*, 14 November 1973. Tunney and Kennedy were friends dating back to their days together at the University of Virginia Law School. Around this time Congressman sympathetic to southern Africa also began serious work to repeal the Byrd Amendment, which had allowed the import of Chrome from Rhodesia since 1971.

[925] Kennedy had shown sympathy to southern African causes for some years, but one staffer nonetheless referred to the first ALD as "one of the most outstanding, most well-organized, most exceptional demonstrations the city has ever seen," though he also noted additional demonstrations would be needed to press home popular response. Butcher et. al. "Congress and American Relations with Southern Africa," 58.

[926] Memorandum, Government of United States to Government of Portugal, no date [late 1973], in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-15 Part 2: Document on Western Europe, 1973-1976,* Kathleen B. Rasmussen ed. (Bureau of Public Affairs, State Department, 2014), online: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve15p2/d128

[927] Memcon, Rui Patricio and Luis Navega with David Newsom and Richard Post, 20 March 1973, Box 2555, Political and Defense, Subject Numeric Files, 1970-1973, RG 59, NARA. The vote under discussion had been praised by Diggs from his CoDel in Africa, calling it "a real breakthrough." Telegram, Dar es Salaam, 29 November 1972, Box 2558, Political and Defense, Subject Numeric Files, 1970-1973, RG 59, NARA.

Caetano regime allowed American jets to refuel in the Azores as they traveled to aid Israel during the Yom Kippur War in October 1973. The lone European nation to grant such rights to the United States, Portugal combined the event with another set of base negotiations to renew its demands for American arms to fight in Africa. While Kissinger was "prepared to explore with [Portugal] the possibility of providing weapons without any publicity," he found domestic and particularly Congressional disapproval a major obstacle.[928] Despite the fact that a number of congressman had expressed a willingness to reassess their approach to Portugal in light of the Yom Kippur aid, enough remained committed to colonial independence in the immediate aftermath of the Middle East crisis to hamstring the State Department. The administration prepared to send a handful of naval missile systems to Portugal, but it could not even obtain permission to provide unarmed C-130 transport planes for fear of running afoul of the Congress. Hesitant to approach the increasingly hostile legislative body, Kissinger was obliged to seek the cooperation of third parties such as Israel to even attempt to satisfy Lisbon's most measured demands.[929] The administration had been more willing to aid Portugal than at any point since Eisenhower held office, but the popular-congressional consensus in favor of independence constrained executive flexibility. Supplying arms to Portugal would have made little difference even if

[928] When discussing the matter with Kissinger, Foreign Minister Rui Patricio commented that he knew the secretary of state was "very much concerned about Congressional opinion and public opinion" concerning the request. Memcon, 17 December 1973 in FRUS *1969-1976, Volume E-15 Part 2,* online: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve15p2/d130

[929] See Memo, Leslie Yate to Bob Boetcher, "Discussion of U.S NATO Commanders on use of Azores during last year's Middle East War," 10 April 1974, Box 165, Diggs Papers; Memorandum, Director of Policy Planning Staff for Kissinger, 8 March 1974, FRUS *1969-1976, Volume E-15 Part 2,* online: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve15p2/d131

Kissinger had gotten his way, but the confrontation proved just how influential solidarity organizing had become since the beginning of the 1970s.

The End of the Estado Novo and African American Unity

Success at the national level could not resolve the ideological split that was developing within the ALSC. As leftist thought and its multiracial connotations grew, it clashed with parts of the united front that had embraced the organization on strict racial lines. Two issues presented themselves in 1973 that fanned tensions, inspiring a year of infighting that would eventually split the ALSC. The first was clearly the issue of race. Requests to allow additional non-white peoples such as Hispanics and Asian Americans to participate in the marches led to a national debate. Though more than a third of committee members objected, the ALSC voted to allow any non-white individuals to join the local celebrations, though it barred them from holding positions of authority.[930] The decisions angered many strict black nationalists, though supporters likely justified it on the foundations of an emerging emphasis on the inclusive socialist Tricontinentalism that informed African revolutionary thought. The decision was quietly monumental in its shift away from the primarily Pan-African identity on display in 1972. The shift to the left would reach a culmination at the first major ALSC meeting after the second ALD held in Frogmore, South Carolina. There, an expanded national committee voted to accept the participation of progressive whites as participants in future activities, though it still kept a

[930] FBI Memo, Chicago to Washington, 16 March 1973, ALSC, FBI, 1126832000 HQ15725073 Section 6, Archives Unbound.

distance from direct cooperation with any majority white groups.[931] The shift to the left angered many nationalists who considered race as the defining factor of solidarity over any other political ideology.

The second difference applied this growing split to the question of Angola, which proved even more divisive for the ALSC than it had been for the ACOA. Despite the place of Angola in such campaigns as the boycott of Gulf Oil, there was no consensus on the legitimacy of the three competing parties. Black activist publications often were opportunistic in their coverage, celebrating the achievements of any party that claimed a victory against the Portuguese. The non-ideological approach to Angola was the norm in the black community and had been since the days of the LCA.[932] But once the ALSC chose to distribute its newfound funds in Africa after the 1973, it faced a problem. All national committee members accepted PAIGC and FRELIMO as worthy recipients of aid, but Angola presented a problem.

With Roberto removed from the discussion due both to his image problems in the United States and the apparent weakness of the FNLA, the decision came down to two: either Agostinho Neto's MPLA or UNITA under the Mbundu nationalist and former Roberto protégé Jonas Savimbi. The MPLA positioned itself alongside its CONCP allies as the more politically progressive group, fighting not only imperialism but also the "tribalist trends and racist prejudices fostered by the colonialists."[933] Randall Robinson,

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[931] FBI Memo, Cincinnati to Washington, 2 July 1973, ALSC, FBI, 1126832000 HQ15725073 Section 9, Archives Unbound.
[932] See Say Brother, Episode 264: African Liberation Day, WGBH Archive.
[933] "Victory Is Certain in Angola – MPLA," *African World*, 19 February 1972.

Robert Van Lierop, and others who worked well with organizations such as ACOA and the GBC embraced the MPLA, partially for its ideological commitment and multi-racial goals and more often because it flowed naturally from their existing associations with fellow CONCP members FRELIMO and PAIGC. The MPLA was also the most openly left-leaning of the three revolutionary groups, proving attractive for many who adopted Marxist readings of the international situation. Nonetheless, even this caused consternation among Tricontinental advocates who believed the MPLA was closer to Moscow than Third World governments like communist China. Most problematically, the MPLA had been relatively inactive in promoting its cause in the United States even more so than in Europe, relying on groups like the LSM and students studying in the United State such as Abel Guimarães to champion its diplomatic goals.[934]

In contrast, UNITA actively cultivated foreign support, in part to offset its difficulties waging armed struggle in Angola. Savimbi presented himself as a Third World Marxist based on his early embrace of Maoist ideology, but he was also nothing if not an opportunist. Among African Americans in the 1970s, he appealed to race-first Black Power thinkers by emphasizing a restrictive Pan-Africanism as the centerpiece of his party's revolution.[935] Savimbi had first clashed with the MPLA in the 1960s because of its supposedly entitled, multiracial leadership, and his party returned to these sentiments a decade later. UNITA claimed that the racially and ideologically elitist MPLA could not

[934] Guimarães was one of the more active Angolans in the Gulf Boycott Campaign with speaking engagements sometimes arranged through ACOA.

[935] Savimbi had been resorting to this argument regularly since the early 1960s, but he rarely adopted this approach internationally.

relate to the average Angolan peasant, which the predominantly Ovimbundu party claimed in terms that mirrored Cabral's writing on the practical revolution. Jorge Sangumba, Savimbi's traveling ambassador who had attended Lincoln University in the early 1960s and later became UNITA's minister of foreign affairs, adopted this perspective even as he espoused a leftist critique of the international system that differed little from sentiments expressed by Agostinho Neto and other CONCP leaders.[936] He dismissed the MPLA as the party of Portuguese educated mestiços and foreign interests, reserving especially harsh criticism for Western supporters with limited ties to Angola. Basil Davidson became a popular target, for instance, since a number of publications such as the *Black Panther* had reprinted articles praising the MPLA. Sangumba dismissed such praise as the misinformed opinions of "white gurus [speaking] on black peoples struggles."[937] Savimbi stressed repeatedly that his party alone understood Angolan needs since he lived "where the fight is," contrasting his leadership with that of exiles Roberto and Neto.[938] Given that the two leading contenders for African American support leaned left and had loosely defined ideological structures, the differences between the two parties defined themselves in the American mind primarily along such ad hominem attacks. The racialized rhetoric helped UNITA find support among American black nationalists increasingly suspicious of serious

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[936] For information on Sangumba and the UNITA approach to mestiços, see Leon Dash, "Black Roots in Angola: In Search of a Classless Society," *Washington Post*, 26 December 1973.
[937] Letter, Jorge Sangumba to Mailk Chaka, 15 November, 1973, File: African Liberation Day Coordination Committee, Box 22, Interreligious Foundation for Community Organizing Papers, NYPL. UNITA also criticized the black African Neto for marrying a white Portuguese woman.
[938] Leon Dash, "Rebel Chief Lives 'Where the Fight Is,'" Washington Post, 25 December 1973; Bridgeland, 93.

Marxists willingness to work with multiracial groups at the edges of the solidarity movement.

Moreover, UNITA directly courted the ALSC along racial lines. After the initial success of the 1972 ALD, Savimbi astutely sent two representatives to help publicize his party. In addition to Sangumba, the former Swedish representative Stella Makunga spoke throughout the country around the time of ALD 1973. Another Maoist, Makunga also helped muddy the ideological waters by speaking about a favorite CONCP topic: the dual liberation of people and women through the act of revolution.[939] UNITA also arranged for an African American writer for the *Washington Post*, Leon Dash, to spend ten weeks in Angola, where he penned a series of sympathetic articles on Savimbi, party ideology (notably difficulties with mestiços), and efforts to build schools and clinics along the eastern border – replicating successful CONCP propaganda but with clear Black Power overtones.[940] By using similar rhetoric and ideas to the MPLA and the CONCP, differences for the two parties were again defined primarily along racial lines, as domestic MPLA proponents such as LSM and Abel Guimarães were predominantly white or associated with organizations like ACOA. As a result of Savimbi's successful maneuvering, the majority of the ALSC membership embraced UNITA in 1973, even sponsoring a fourteen city tour of the United States for Sangumba.[941] The ALSC eventually decided in a somewhat

[939] See Simon Anekwe, "May Proclaimed African Liberation Month," *New York Amsterdam News*, 19 May 1973; "'Africa is at War' Writer Tells Group," *New Pittsburgh Courier*, 9 June 1973.
[940] See Leon Dash, "Rebel Bands Roam at Will in Portuguese Territory," *Washington Post*, 23 December 1973; Dash,"Black Roots in Angola."
[941] ALSC, "Report on UNITA Tour," February 1 1974, ALSC, FBI, 1126832000 HQ15725073 Section 13, Archives Unbound.

contentious vote that UNITA was most actively advancing the struggle in Angola, naming it an aid recipient alongside CONCP parties PAIGC and FRELIMO.[942]

Funding Savimbi's party was a small victory for the black nationalists, but it was a pyrrhic one as the more doctrinaire leftist elements of the ALSC consolidated power that same summer. The internal debate over which party to support had highlighted the tensions that existed below the surface of the ALSC. Activists were forced to ask whether their critique of the international system was defined primarily along leftist lines or race concerns, pushing some of the most vocal activists into opposing camps. Moreover, the decision to support UNITA came as a number of MPLA sympathizers came to view Savimbi with suspicion. Noteworthy among this camp was Robert Van Lierop, whose African Information Service– according to Prexy Nesbit – "helped kick-start the process of rejecting Savimbi" after the Swedish Africa Groups had shared unflattering information on UNITA activities in Europe.[943] As a result, the leftists pushed to take the ALSC in a new and more radical direction. At the 1973 Frogmore meeting where the ALSC voted to accept white involvement, one of the leading socialists on the national committee, Dawolu Gene Locke, replaced Sadaukai as national chair. A native of Houston who had helped organize a regional precursor to the ALD, Locke was supported in his leadership bid by SOBU head Nelson Johnson and influential Chicago sociologist Abdul Alkalimat.

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[942] Memo, Lucius Walker to Owusu Sadauki, 18 April 1973, Folder: Requests to visit Mozambique, Box 3, Robert Van Lierop Papers, NYPL.

[943] Prexy Nesbitt, "[Organizing] Outrage into Action: A Brief Discussion of U.S. Anti-Apartheid and African Solidarity Work, Then and Now," unpublished paper, presented at The International Conference on a Decade of Freedom: Celebrating the Role of the International Anti-Apartheid Movement (Durban, South Africa: 13 October 2004).

Together, this group helped form a statement of Marxist-inspired principles that laid out what Johnson and Alkalimat later called the "theory of class struggle with a correct analysis of racial oppression."[944]

The statement would set the direction the ALSC for the coming year, helping to bring the internal debate to a final destructive end. The new, Marxist-inspired organizational goals emphasized resistance to a capital-driven imperialism and the role of class in shaping black politics, while opening doors for greater cooperation with whites who opposed political and economic exploitation. The leftists argued that only by embracing these tenets and empowering a multiracial working class could blacks find true unity and advance their cause. The ALSC would act as the center of a united front, which would enhance the African American "ability to carry the fight against racism and imperialism to different groups of people around different issues, yet maintain our course."[945] Here then was a decision to move the ALSC beyond just its racial core, making it a black led movement that could ideally act as the head of a wider coalition of peoples dedicated to changing conditions for "people of color" on all continents. The language used in these documents directly reflected the leftist influence of the African revolutionaries, specifically the writings of Cabral. More importantly for the wider solidarity network, it provided a legitimacy that could mobilize the black community and guide a multiracial movement committed to African issues.

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[944] Abdul Alkalimat and Nelson Johnson, "Toward the Ideological Unity of the African Liberation Support Committee: A Response of Criticisms of the ALSC Statement of Principles" (Greensboro, NC: ALSC International Steering Committee, 1974), 1.
[945] Ibid. 8-9.

The racial nationalists – or what Jonson and Alkalimat called the proponents of "pure race theory" – were deeply disturbed by the document and the rapid drift of the ALSC. They believed this apparent shift in direction demanded a response. Stokely Carmichael had long considered Sadaukai and his closest advisers political neophytes, and he became the unofficial leader of the anti-left opposition. For years, Carmichael had discussed the importance of understanding the "scientific socialism" taught by Malcolm X. His iteration of the ideology was critical of capitalism, but not necessarily because of its monopoly characteristics. Rather, capitalism ran counter to traditions of African "communalism." Under this ideology, racism did not evolve from capital's attempts to divide the working class but from the natural clashing of races and European attempts to subdue darker peoples. In this view of the world system, Carmichael proclaimed "Pan-Africanism is the highest form of Black Power."[946] This was an exclusionary vision of solidarity, which made room only for darker peoples who understood the specific experience of racial exploitation. It was a form of Tri-Continentalism, but one devoid of serious Marxist influence and deeply suspicious of non-black people. It coincided closely with the American perception of UNITA, which presented itself as a race-conscious nationalist party in the Maoist tradition if it followed any at all. Supporters of Carmichael such as the poet and ALSC member Haki Madhubuti said that blacks could not benefit from following the "white boy" theories of the increasingly Marxist ALSC leadership. Dismissing famed international communists Fidel Castro and Che Guevara, Madhubuti

946 "Carmichael returns from Africa sojourn," *Milwaukee Star*, 5 June 1971.

gave voice to the suspicions of many black nationalists that they were simply "another set of white boys that are just as racist as Thomas Jefferson, George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, John Kennedy, etc., each using their special system of control both steeped in and based on white supremacy."[947]

Other nationalists may have hesitated to lump Kennedy with Guevara, but many would have agreed that most socialists outside of Africa were nothing more than what one former ALSC member referred to as "red fascists."[948] Like the MPLA in Angola, Marxists could not understand the needs of blacks, and adoption of their tactics threatened to undermine the movement toward racial self-determination. These critics found ammunition for their fight against the leftists in the liberation leaders, who eschewed defining themselves as communists and regularly questioned Marxist preoccupation with the working class.[949] UNITA, which was self-consciously Third World in its socialist tendencies and hostile to the supposed theorizing of groups like the MPLA, became the symbol of this black African nationalism. To these activists, the ALSC's adoption of this Marxist ideology betrayed not only blacks in the United States but also Africans fighting for a continental form of communal socialism in Portuguese Africa and elsewhere.

Over the next year the socialist-nationalist divide would tear apart the ALSC. By the fall of 1973, ideological debates at the top of the organization had filtered to the local

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947 Haki Madhubuti, "Enemies: From the Left and the Right," in ALSC, FBI, 1126832000 HQ15725073 Section 13, Archives Unbound.

948 Omowale Luthuli, telephone interview with author, 27 April 2013.

949 See Africa Information Service, 88. Cabral said to a group of African Americans "To have ideology doesn't necessarily mean that you have to define whether you are a communist, socialist, or something like this. To have ideology is to know what you want in your own condition."

levels with disastrous results. In local meetings, nationalists and leftists confronted each other, often descending into violence. Prexy Nesbitt remembers hearing tales of gunfights breaking out over the question of support for the MPLA versus UNITA.[950] In less polarized communities, local chapters sided with one element or the other of the national leadership. Leftists backed the national structure, while nationalist chapters threatened to secede and on at least one occasion hosted independent celebrations in 1974.[951] As historian Manning Marable summarizes the situation, "old friends turned against one another; marriages were broken over which African liberation organization one chose to support."[952]

These divisions were further exacerbated by the achievement of one of the ALSC's primary goals. As domestic American debates over Angolan rivalries came to a head in 1974, Portugal suffered its own crisis after nearly a decade fighting a three front war. On April 25, a group of young military officers toppled the Caetano Regime in a bloodless coup. Exhausted by years of fighting and struggling under the weight of a weakened economy, the country welcomed what became known as the Carnation Revolution (for the Lisbon residents greeted rebel tanks with flowers). The sources of this revolution were centered in Africa, where the PAIGC and FRELIMO had stretched the Portuguese military to the breaking point while exhausting the treasury that Salazar had worked so assiduously to build. But international pressure on Portugal did contribute to the alacrity with which the population accepted the change of government. The use of antiquated weaponry –

[950] Luthuli Interview; Nesbitt Interview with Author.
[951] Memo, Cincinnati FBI to Director, 14 May 1974, in ALSC, FBI, 1126832000 HQ15725073 Section 14, Archives Unbound.
[952] Marable, Race Reform and Rebellion, 135.

necessitated by the limitation of arms imports – against increasingly advanced material provided to the PAIGC and FRELIMO by Eastern bloc countries damaged already flagging military morale. Domestically, the country was also suffering an economic downturn under the weight of mass mobilization, and industrialists became increasingly frustrated at the role the wars played in retarding foreign investment in Portugal and endangering the country's entrance into the European Economic Community.[953] It was this mixture of colonial, domestic, and international pressure that allowed the toppling of Europe's oldest fascist dictatorship with barely a shot fired.

Activists reacted to the events with a mixture of surprise, elation, and determination. Few however could have anticipated its timing, and some were actively engaged in solidarity work when they heard the news. Stephanie Urdang, the South African SAC member, was traveling with PAIGC cadres in Guinea-Bissau when the news came over the radio. Euphoria gave way to skeptical disbelief before the revolutionaries began the process of patiently waiting to see what plans the still forming Lisbon government had for the colonies.[954] A world away, Prexy Nesbitt found himself hosting South African activist Ruth First at Northwestern University when he first heard the news. He passed a note to the speaker, and "without skipping a beat" the anti-apartheid advocate began explaining what the events could mean for the wider struggle in southern Africa and the future of the continent.[955] Activist and revolutionaries alike both understood that the coup

[953] For a concise overview of the Carnation Revolution in English, see Kenneth Maxwell, *The Making of Portuguese Democracy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 27-29, 55-63.
[954] Stephanie Urdang, skype interview with author, 1 May 2014.
[955] Prexy Nesbitt, interview with author, 1 September 2012 (Chicago, IL).

was momentous, but it did not solve all problems. Independence was not guaranteed, nor was it clear who would inherit power in Angola if decolonization were to occur. As the following months saw the temporary victory of more radical elements within the Portuguese Armed Forces Movement (*Movimento das Forças Armadas*, or MFA), the constantly changing government in Lisbon inched closer to abandoning its claims to its former colonies. But time did little to solve the Angolan question.

As a result, the collapse of the Caetano regime became a source of cautious optimism for revolutionary parties and their foreign allies, but it only fueled divisions at the top levels of the ALSC. With Portugal likely to grant independence to the colonies, leftists and nationalist lost one of the key elements of unity. Within a month of the Carnation Revolution, the confrontation came to a head at the Howard University Conference held in anticipation of the annual ALD of 1974. Now debating not just who should receive funds but what party – and ideology – should lead new nations in Africa and the diaspora, tensions escalated to the point of rupture. YOBU had increasingly shifted to support a Marxist reading of the international situation, and it pushed an agenda at the conference that emphasized the organization of black workers as part of a transnational movement linking black peoples together against imperialism and exploitative capitalism. The organization's proposals were generally supported, most notably and surprisingly by Amira Baraka, the head of the influential nationwide CAP network. Baraka – who one observer noted had undergone a conversion under the influence of Cabral and his own frustrations with the black elected leadership in his home of Newark – argued for the need to recognize and cooperate with whites willing to support a broader revolution. The result

was a rejection of Carmichael's strict black nationalism, which the former SNCC leader and his followers at the conference refused to repudiate. Both sides used Cabral's writings and references to the ongoing African revolutions to defend their positions.[956]

The result of this ideological impasse was a split in the movement. The ALSC would continue, but it would represent the leftist elements of the former united organization alone. Opponents occasionally mounted their own demonstrations, sometimes in direct competition with the group as it became increasingly Marxist. In 1975, for instance, Carmichael would sponsor his own nationalist celebrations in Washington D.C., which directly competed with the left-leaning march organized by Baraka and his CAP. Yet despite these sectarian feuds, African Americans continued to celebrate African liberation day, though primarily at a local level.[957] Black activists had finally articulated a meaningful solidarity with revolutionary Africa but the consensus on just what this meant in the United States had disappeared. What remained in both these sides, however, was a commitment to understanding the United States and African Americans as part of a larger global struggle for freedom and community control, which included and in many ways was led by the Portuguese African liberation leaders.

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[956] Phil Hutchings, "Report on the ALSC National Conference, "*The Black Scholar*, July-August 1974, 18.
[957] Kwame Ture and his All African People's Revolutionary Party sponsored the nationalist celebration, attracting more than 10,000 people to Washington in 1977. Margaret Tarter, "The politics of African liberation organizations," *Bay State Banner* (Boston), 7 July 1977. See also Cedric Johnson, "From Popular Anti-Imperialism to Sectarianism: The African Liberation Support Committee and Black Power Radicals," *New Political Science* 15, no 4 (December 2003), 492-493.

Conclusion

Despite the splintering of the ALSC, there was by 1974 a new level of international awareness and involvement in the black community. This sentiment had never fully disappeared, but it was now mobilized and visible. Both leftists and racial nationalists pledged solidarity to the successful parties of southern Africa, though some disagreement remained over which parties were legitimate. The PAIGC and FRELIMO had become symbols of assertive political and economic self-determination, which appealed to African Americans demanding full equality in their own communities. Internationalists such as Daniel Watts of the LCA and Owusu Sadaukai linked the liberation cause with domestic frustrations, illustrating that even the Cold War conformity of the 1960s did not completely silence Pan-African solidarity. As Brenda Gayle Plummer has argued, these "African vistas . . . provided an alternative to white nationalism and its political agenda," as well as an alternative to a Civil Rights movement that was often bounded by this same national mythos.[958] The Black Power movement and the new attention of the African nationalist parties helped activists collapse the distance not only between Africa and the United States, but between foreign and domestic policy. It was from this new transnational perspective that they could break free from the confines of Cold War liberalism and offer more scathing critiques of the unequal American system while imagining grander ideas for liberation.

Organizing in the early 1970s created a new momentum for the support of African liberation, albeit one that had to overcome ongoing conflicts concerning authentic

[958] Brenda Gayle Plummer, *In Search of Power: African Americans in the Era of Decolonization, 1956*-1974 (New York: Cambridge, 2013), 344.

ideology. Malcolm X, the LCA, the ALSC, and myriad local organizations like the Randal Robinson's PALC forged a solidarity with the struggles in southern Africa that would lay the groundwork for future organizing. Distance, language, and culture had always separated African Americans from their co-racialists abroad. Pan-Africanism had been popular among intellectuals, but it had been difficult for such thinking to take root in the wider black community until the successful merging of national and radical leftist internationalism combined with the practical, flexible ideologies of the Portuguese African movements. In supporting the positive cause of liberation advanced by the most successful parties of the socialist CONCP, blacks in the United States discovered a new identity with which they could challenge the rigid conformity of a Cold War foreign policy based on reactionary anti-communism and unrestrained capitalism. These popular organizations crafted what scholar Komozi Woodard has referred to as a "fictive kinship" that collapsed the distance that had divided Africa and the Diaspora since World War II.[959] Unfortunately, the creation of this mass solidarity could not overcome the tension between leftist international critiques of the United States and race-first identity politics. As serious engagement with the ideas and tactics of the Lusophone parties expanded, so too did disagreements. The ideological divide would hamper the ability of the African American community to organize mass demonstrations on the scale of the first and second ALDs.

Yet the triumph of the leftist philosophy did have important ramifications for black participation in the wider movement, as it opened up avenues for cooperation with

[959] Komozi Woodard, "Amiri Baraka, the Congress of African People, and Black Power Politics from the 1961 United Nations Protests to the 1972 Gary convention," in Peniel Joseph, ed, *The Black Power Movement: Rethinking the Civil Rights-Black Power Era* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 62.

predominantly white groups whose embrace of an internationalist ethos shared the same goals of global social justice. This new model arrived at by the leadership of the ALSC and individuals like Randall Robinson stressed the need for black-led organizations that could work with ACOA, LSM, and the GBC. While many black communities had been understandably suspicious of the ACOA as unrepresentative of their interests, this new model allowed Black Power groups like YOBU, Baraka's CAP, and later Robinson's TransAfrica – which emerged from remnants of the ALSC in the Northeast – to maintain a focus on black priorities while gaining a seat at the proverbial activist leadership table. This model of independent black organizations working in cooperation with the internationalist, multiracial groups would provide the framework through which future solidarity organizing would take place. Black Americans had finally created and formalized a structure for expressing their popular will on American foreign matters, which linked grassroots interest to black political leadership and all areas in between. It also illustrates a continuity of African American internationalism stretching from the postwar period into the heights of anti-apartheid activism. Rather than a disrupted narrative of black engagement with global issues as claimed by Penny Von Eschen, these events hint at more of an ebb and flow of popular manifestations of a consistently radical, left reading of African American foreign policy operating consistently if not always visibly within the community. African Americans did not necessarily have to "reinvent the wheel" so much as reinterpret an existing radical, internationalist tradition to fit the new context of the post-

civil rights era.[960] The political power and visibility of this constant black internationalism depended largely on the ability of charismatic African nationalists to provide it with an identity and empower it in the face of the specific political problems of the day.

In this transitional moment after the collapse of the ALSC and before the formation of key organizations like TransAfrica toward the end of the decade, it remained to be seen how this new left-leaning black internationalism would play out in American politics. It was not clear if it could fully overcome the more exclusive Pan-African nationalism that threatened African American participation in the larger solidarity movement. Relationships with the GBC and ACOA were still largely interpersonal and developing. There were few formal communication networks, depending largely on individuals like Nesbitt and Van Lierop who had ties to both worlds, or Baraka who was just beginning to explore such relationships. Even among blacks, the collapse of the national structure of the ALSC robbed the burgeoning popular movement of its coordinators and leaders. The question of capabilities of this new black activist network and it relationship to the wider movement would be answered only when the Lusophone nationalists finally gained power, and the United States confronted the problem of socialist parties taking power in Portugal's former colonies.

[960] Von Eschen, 187.

Chapter 6: "Welcome Back"

The Activist Reaction to the Angolan Intervention of 1975

More than 200 people stood in sub-freezing temperatures on the steps of the national capitol in Washington. It was January 19th of 1976, and they had gathered to protest President Gerald's Ford's intervention in the former Portuguese colony of Angola. "Welcome back," veteran activist David Dellinger spoke into the microphone. Many of those in attendance knew each other well. Most had taken part in the Portuguese African solidarity movement at one point or another over the previous decade, though many had known each other as part of other movements as well – anti-war, civil rights, and anti-imperial. White, black, man and woman, they cheered as various presenters spoke scathingly of Ford's attempt to undermine the Soviet-backed government of the MPLA, which had already consolidated power in the capital of Luanda. Among the speakers besides Dellinger were Cora Weiss, Representative Bella Abzug, Howard University professor and member of the ALSC (African Liberation Support Committee) Ronald Walters, and Reverend W. Sterling Carey, the former head of the National Council of Churches. Under signs reading "Hands off Angola," the attendees demanded an end to the war developing in the far-off state, comparing it to the quagmire in Vietnam that the United States had escaped only a few years before. At the beginning of a year that would see the president, the House, and much of the Senate seeking re-election, Dellinger stated in no uncertain terms that the assembly that took place that cold January day in front of the capital

was "a warning."[961] Within a few weeks, this warning would be heeded by the House of Representatives when it approved a bill that would deny covert funding for Angola and remove the amount already spent there from the defense budget. The legislative intervention into the executive's prerogative in Africa was the culmination of the organizing conducted by the Portuguese African nationalists of the CONCP and their international allies. After more than fifteen years, the transnational coalition had finally legitimized socialist claims to self-determination in the context of American foreign policy.

This event and other popular manifestations against the intervention, like the organizing that preceded it, has received little scholarly attention. Indeed, such a combination of grassroots and congressional interest in combating aggressive American adventurism before the 1980s contradicts most movement historians, who have seen the period following the Vietnam War as one of general quiescence to a slow reassertion of the Cold War.[962] This was especially true on the Hill. Robert David Johnson has pointed out in his overview of Congressional activity during the Cold War that the liberal internationalism that helped force an end to the Vietnam War in 1973 was on the decline by the time Angola gained independence two years later. What scholars at the time referred to as a legislative "revolution" had greatly expanded the oversight abilities of the Congress and its power to influence foreign affairs, but it could not fully overturn the entrenched

[961] UPI, "200 Protests U.S. Role in Angola," *Washington Post*, 20 January 1976.
[962] See for instance, Melvin Small, *Antiwarriors: The Vietnam War and the Battle for America's Hearts and Minds* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002); Charles DeBenedetti and Charles Chatfield, *An American Ordeal: Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1990); Tom Wells, *The War Within: America's Battle Over Vietnam* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).

Cold War values of containment and anti-communism.[963] Movement allies like Congressman Charles Diggs, Senators John Tunney, and Ted Kennedy had joined with Dick Clark, Joe Biden, and a host of other young "radicals" swept into power by popular disillusion with the Vietnam, but they struggled to constrain military spending and calls for greater resistance to communism after their high-water mark of 1973. Many would be gone after only one term on Capitol Hill. By 1979, the Congress, led by a Democratic president who entered the Oval Office advocating human rights, would approve the supply of arms to Afghan rebels resisting a Soviet invasion in a region where the United States had few strategic interests and prior contacts.[964] The following decade would witness the rise of the Reagan Doctrine, which empowered anti-communists to attack sitting leftist governments and fed the coffers of reactionary regimes the world over.

Explaining what set Angola apart must account for the crowd that occupied the Capitol steps on that cold day in January. Bundled in caps, scarves, and heavy jackets, the few hundred protesters represented the latest manifestation of popular anger aimed at the long American indifference to Portuguese Africa traced in preceding chapters. After five years of rapid growth, the decentralized solidarity movement had helped isolate Portugal, but it had never achieved the transformation of official policy that had occurred in Europe.

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[963] Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband, *Foreign Policy by Congress* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 3. Though they focus primarily on presidential politics, see also Campbell Craig and Fred Logevall, *America's Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2009), chapter 8. Julian Zelizer depicts this period as the rise of the Republican right, depicting very briefly Angola as an unanticipated legacy of Vietnam that "fueled conservative demands for tougher anticommunist policies." See Zelizer, *Arsenal of Democracy* (New York: Basic Books, 2010), chapter 11.

[964] Robert David Johnson, *Congress and the Cold War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), Chapter 5-7.

In 1974, the expanding cooperation of religious, radical, and African American constituencies had promised greater political power, but the Carnation Revolution had removed the need for continued lobbying against Portugal. Now the activists and their socialist African allies had another chance. 1975-76 represented a period of transition, where both the American government and the world attempted to renegotiate relationships of power, cooperation, and intervention after the globally divisive conflict in Vietnam finally came to a close. The contested independence of Angola, the communist world's clear material support to a leftist-nationalist government in Luanda, and the quadrennial debate on national priorities created by a presidential election all converged to create a moment of fluidity in the Western alliance, where Cold War priorities could be discussed, debated, and perhaps altered. It is in such moments of punctuated equilibrium that sociologists Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink have identified advocacy networks greatest chances of policy success, so long as organizations exist with sufficient expertise, membership, and access to official institutions to shape the emerging political agenda.[965] The socialist nationalists of the CONCP and their network of allies in the United States and Europe had positioned themselves perfectly over the preceding decade to control events in this moment of transition.

The convergence of international and domestic factors meant that the protection of independent, socialist Angola would be the first moment when the popular-congressional linkages forged over the previous years would have a noticeable policy impact, well before

[965] Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikink, *Activists Beyond Borders* (Ithaca: Cornell, 1998), 119.

an expanded version of this coalition forced South African sanctions on a reluctant Ronald Reagan in the 1980s.[966] The commitment to anti-colonialism had transitioned for the majority of organizations over the previous five years into an internationalist ethos of global freedom and independent development, striking at the heart of Cold War American programs for the developing world. The constituent components of the Portuguese African solidarity movement had not abandoned the hard-won linkages to other groups, nor had they forgotten the lessons of the anti-colonial struggle. As Angola and the other Portuguese colonies finally prepared to declare their independence, American sympathizers rallied to aid in every way they could. Even more so than the financial aid mentioned in previous chapters, an MPLA-ruled Angola would be the measure of their accomplishments. After years of warning that Western intervention in Africa was inevitable, the solidarity network had been proven correct. It quickly prepared to reorient the movement toward guaranteeing Portuguese African self-determination against the meddling of their own government in Washington.

When Angola's independence attracted the attention of President Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, the critical leftist network went on the offensive. By uncovering the existence of covert assistance to Holden Roberto and defining early public opposition to it, the network of local activists and lobbyists controlled the discussion of

[966] Though a number of authors discuss organizing around Portuguese Africa, none link it to popular opposition to Angola in 1976 nor the role it would play in expanding American interest in Southern Africa. See Francis Njubi Nesbitt, *Race for Sanctions: African Americans Against Apartheid, 1946-1994* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004); Donald R. Culverson, *Contesting Apartheid: U.S. Activism, 1960-1967* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999; Hakan Thorn, *Anti-Apartheid and the Emergence of a Global Civil Society* (London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2009); see also Roger Fieldhouse, *Anti-Apartheid: A history of the movement in Britain, 1959-1994 – A study in pressure group politics* (London: Merlin Press, 2004).

Angola by framing it within the particular heuristic of Vietnam. Congressional internationalists seeking to challenge the Cold War narrative offered by the administration relied on these informed minorities, fed via the grassroots-to-legislative inroads made over the prior decade. Critical propaganda and activist connections to leftist African nationalists helped define congressional opinion against the covert intervention before Ford could even present his case. While the administration pledged not to send advisers or troops to Africa as the government had done a decade earlier in Southeast Asia, the comparison between the two conflicts articulated by the activist community won over the Congress as it had already large segments of the population. This link between grassroots organizing, lobbying, and the legislative politics – emerging during the waning years of the Vietnam era but facing its first test with Angola – would become the model for constraining reactionary executive policies for the remainder of the Cold War.

IA Feature and the New Internationalism of the United States

Angola reentered the world stage just over a year after the Portuguese Revolution toppled the imperial government. Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique had both gained independence under the leadership of the CONCP parties of the PAIGC and FRELIMO, respectively. Solidarity activists had welcomed the events in the summer of 1975, sending volunteers from Europe, Canada, and the United States to help provide expertise for the establishment of the new independent governments.[967] But the deep divisions between the

[967] Known as *cooperantes*, these western volunteers joined Eastern bloc citizens to help FRELIMO in particular establish many of its most important domestic institutions, including the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Information, and the National Institute of Cinema. Many of these volunteers would leave

three nationalist parties in Angola prevented any such smooth transition to peace. The MPLA confronted a combined front made up of the erstwhile enemies of the FNLA and UNITA. Though Holden Roberto and Jonas Savimbi had been antagonists since the Ovimbundu leader had abandoned the FNLA in the mid-1960s, they entered an uneasy truce in hopes of combining their meager forces in a confrontation with the still divided MPLA. As they had for the past decade, the new FNLA-UNITA coalition looked to the outside world for aid, but they now found increasingly important partners in the former allies of Portugal. This new arrangement of powers would force the Cold War back into the lives of Angolans, while giving the American movement a new reason for organizing. In the months leading up to independence, both sides withdrew to their regional strongholds in preparation for the fighting that would take place after the transfer of power. The MPLA looked to Cuba and the Soviet Union for assistance, while Roberto and Savimbi established alliances with Zaire and South Africa, respectively. The final piece in this puzzle was the small but vital aid provided by the United States to the nominally anti-communist forces that came to be known as IA Feature.

IA Feature had its origins in the early months of 1975. Kissinger remained as dismissive of the world beyond Europe as he had been after taking office in 1969.[968] Vietnam and the Middle East crisis had done little to shake this bias, especially as it pertained to Africa. In 1974, Kissinger and the State Department had been distracted by

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the country within a few years, but some would stay for decades and remain part of the government infrastructure today. They included a number of longtime activists mentioned in previous chapters including Bill Minter of MACSA, Ole Gjerstad of the LSM, Sam Barnes of the CRV, Polly Gaster of the CFMAG, and Margaret Dickinson of the same.

[968] See chapter 2 for discussion on Kissinger's views on the developing world in foreign policy.

events occurring in Portugal, which the administration feared could lead to a communist government in Europe.[969] Only after Lisbon moved toward the political center and independence for the colonies neared did the Ford administration turn its attention to the power struggle occurring in Angola. Washington's troublesome ally Mobutu Sese Seko brought the matter to the attention of Kissinger. The Zairean strongman won few popularity contests in Washington, but Kissinger wanted above all to maintain the precarious peace that he had finally instilled in the former Congo and appreciated his role as a dependable anti-communist on the continent. Mobutu worried that events in Angola were working against Roberto and the defeat of the FNLA at the hands of the Moscow-backed Luanda government could promote unrest along the borders of his massive state.[970] He urged Kissinger to recognize the importance of the competition brewing in Angola.

Kissinger had been loath to waste time on Africa for much of the tumultuous year of 1974, but he reacted quickly and assertively after he learned that the MPLA might take control with Soviet aid. He pushed the administration to expand its support for the FNLA and, to a lesser extent, UNITA. The "loss" of Angola could combine with the North Vietnamese victory in April to put the country on the defensive, at least in the realm of public and international opinion. Given Ford's upcoming presidential campaign and the challenge the inheritor of détente was receiving from the right of his own party, such a

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[969] In his memoir, Kissinger would explain his inattention to Angola due in part to its location within the "backwaters of foreign policy." Henry Kissinger, *The Years of Renewal* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1999), 799.

[970] CIA Information Cable, 9 June 1975, Document 107 in *Foreign Relation of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXVIII, Southern Africa*, Myra Burton, ed. (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2011). Hereafter FRUS 1969-1976 1969-1976.

perception of weakness was unacceptable to the president, who lent his support to his increasingly embattled secretary of state.[971] It was the domino effect all over again. With Ford's backing, Kissinger told a group of high-ranking officials in June, "We can't let the communists win there." The secretary of state was deeply concerned about what American inaction would mean for regional politics and African relations with the United States. An MPLA victory could alienate Zaire and upset the balance of power in the tenuously stable region.[972] It could also lead to a deeper global crisis of confidence in Washington's leadership against the Soviets and threaten the administration's continued tenure in the face of the rising conservative challenge in an election year.

By June, Kissinger and Ford had made the decision to send their new allies millions of dollars in financial support and, indirectly and later directly, weapons. Mobutu would provide arms to the anti-MPLA forces, with the United States resupplying the Zairean military. New M-16s flowed into Kinshasa, while older weapons were redirected into Angola. The United States provided some artillery and anti-tank weaponry and backed the recruitment of non-American mercenaries to help train the FNLA-UNITA troops.[973] Eventually, Zambia would provide arms to UNITA, as did Israel through purchases by South Africa. Portuguese officers provided additional training in Zaire.[974] The goal of this

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[971] For an overview of Ford's difficulties with conservatives and liberals alike, see Julian Zelizer, *Arsenal of Democracy* (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 256-264.

[972] Memorandum for Records, 5 June 1975, Document 106, FRUS 1969-1976 1969-1976.

[973] Telegram, Kinshasa to Secstate, 22 July 1975, Box 7, Presidential Country Files for Africa, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library (Ann Arbor, Michigan). Hereafter GRFL. See also Angola Section, FRUS 1969-1976.

[974] Memorandum for Record, 8 August 1975, Document 123, FRUS 1969-1976. Document 201; Memorandum of Record, 14 November 1975, Document 137 in FRUS 1969-1976.

massive influx of arms was not necessarily outright victory for the American allies, but to "balance off" the Soviet and eventually Cuban aid that was strengthening the MPLA.[975] The Ford-Kissinger administration hoped to maintain a status quo in Angola that would force the parties to share power or at least resolve their disputes without direct Soviet participation. Conscious of the deep divisions that remained within the United States after Vietnam and the pockets of strong feeling about Portuguese Africa, the White House felt that it was pursuing a constrained policy that avoided most political pitfalls and remained aligned with the larger strategy of détente. No American troops (outside a few CIA advisers and trainers secretly in Zaire) were committed to Angola, and expenditures were relatively modest. When CIA Director William Colby expressed concern that the Angola issue might cause a scandal with Congress or the American public if revealed, Ford responded dismissively: "We can't sit here and worry about six Committees [in the Congress] if we do what's right."[976] The bleed over between passive support to colonial Portugal and active support for domestic anti-communists that the solidarity movement had anticipated since the late 1960s had come to pass.

The administration, however, had not accounted for the anti-interventionist zeal of the internationalist minority on the Hill. The House had traditionally been the most active on African affairs under the influence of Charles Diggs and the Black Caucus, but a reorganization of Foreign Affairs subcommittees in mid-1975 and deep political divisions

[975] Telegram, Kinshasa to Secstate, 24 June 1975, Box 10, IFM (Institutional Meetings File), U.S. National Security Council, GRFL.
[976] Minutes of National Security Council Meeting, 27 June 1975, Document 113, FRUS 1969-1976.

within the body militated against serious action.[977] The Senate would have to take the lead in opposing the covert operation. Vietnam had pushed the Congress in more activist directions during the preceding decade as it had the American public. Many legislators had come to oppose the war if only to keep their jobs in the face of increasingly vocal challenges from their constituents. After Nixon withdrew troops in 1973 partially as a result of legislative attacks on military spending, congressional assertion on foreign affairs calmed. Yet there remained a core of critics committed to expanding legislative control over matters of international policy and military adventurism in particular. The most influential of these men like Stuart Symington (D-Missouri) had undergone a transformation from anti-communist crusaders to Cold War critics, spurred largely by what they considered overreach in Southeast Asia and a military-industrial complex run amok. They made common cause with a young generation of politicians who had defeated the old guard by opposing Vietnam and American adventurism. These new Senate classes included liberals like Joe Biden (D-Delaware), Floyd Haskell (D-Colorado – a former Republican), and John Culver (D-Iowa), who aligned with existing youthful Democrats such as ACOA allies Ted Kennedy and John Tunney. This coalition led the charge against Cold War politics as usual, opposing Vietnam, questioning major defense projects like the B-1 Bomber, and famously investigating the covert operations of the CIA with a committee led by the increasingly reluctant Frank Church (D-Idaho).

[977] Digg's Subcommittee on Africa would become the Subcommittee on Resources, Food, and Energy, though Diggs would remain chair but with a much broader range of issues to cover.

The internationalists converged around policy programs very close to those championed by the Portuguese African network. At the core of their beliefs was opposition to anti-communist adventurism, but they also represented an important break with the longer tradition of the great power politics personified by Henry Kissinger. The new generation of liberals in particular had stressed the reprogramming of military funds toward domestic programs on a Great Society Model, pushed for a more internationally engaged foreign policy centered on peaceful trade relationships and cooperative aid, urged greater engagement with the United Nations, and emphasized international leadership through moral means. The internationalist contingent also believed that these policies had to take direct account of the developing world. Many came to support the UN approved target of .7% of gross national product to be devoted to development assistance, which put them in line with the most ardent champions of decolonization in Sweden, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Importantly, such policies were not simply humanitarian but relied upon a starkly different calculation of American interests from the Eurocentric ideas of Kissinger. The always direct John Culver explained the logic in prophetic terms in the late 1970s: "the third-world problem [food, development, trade, the potential instability] in the year 2000 will be every bit as great a threat to our security as the U.S.-Soviet balance."[978]

For many of these congressmen, intervention was occurring in the wrong ways and in the wrong places. The United States needed to use its economic and political leadership to address not the form of government in the developing world but what positive effects

[978] Elizabeth Drew, *Senator* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978), 18.

those governments could have on their people. That was the way to expand American prestige. As historian Robert David Johnson explains, the internationalists shared a "vision of demilitarized foreign policy that stressed economic cooperation, cultural exchange, and ideological issues such as human rights and support for democracy."[979] This rejection of suffocating anti-communism made room for leftist regimes like the MPLA that reflected the legitimate desires – if not necessarily the democratically demonstrated will – of its home nation. What the internationalist ideology did not do, however, was grant great authority on its proponents, who remained largely excluded from political leadership and struggled to make headway in an institution still dominated by seniority.

Unfortunately for Kissinger and the administration, Angola's backwater status on the African continent placed it under the purview of one of the most committed and capable of these marginalized ideologues, Democratic Senator Dick Clark of Iowa. Clark was neither an expert on Africa nor an activist. The Iowa senator had been a history and political science professor before entering politics as an aide to then Congressman John Culver, helping guide the Democratic Party's resurgence in the socially conservative farming state. After walking 1,312 miles across Iowa during his first campaign in 1972, the personable Clark entered Washington firmly committed to liberal, anti-war causes.[980] He quickly joined the reformers pushing the Congressional revolution in foreign policy. Thoughtful, articulate and hardworking – described by one observer as "a spirited and determined

[979] Johnson, Congress and the Cold War, 186.
[980] Richard F. Fenno, Jr. *Senators on the Campaign Trail: The Politics of Representations* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996), 11-112.

academic type, with a puritanical streak" – Clark became one of the leading voices of the group.[981] Given their natural affinities, the Washington Office on Africa (WOA) identified him immediately as an ally and made contact with his staff.[982] Outspoken as he may have been, his opinions did not carry far for his first two years in the Senate, as he had little clout in policymaking circles. This changed slightly at the beginning of the 94th Congress (1975) when he received the chairmanship of the Africa subcommittee, the least politically desirable chair on the Foreign Relations Committee given to the least senior member (Clark ranked above only the equally green Joe Biden). Rejecting Biden's half-hearted request to cede the chair to him, Clark took his role seriously and began to educate himself on the continent.[983]

Central to this education was a series of hearings Clark held on southern Africa in the summer of 1975, taking advantage of one of the revolutionary changes that had occurred in Congress over the past five years. Vietnam had demonstrated that the executive branch had a virtual monopoly on information; Congress struggled to verify facts produced by the executive and therefore lack an informed independent perspective. As the dangers of this conundrum became more apparent in Southeast Asia, there emerged a simple solution that would fuel the revisionist internationalist revolution of the 1970s. New laws provided the authorization and funds to nearly double personal Congressional staffs, who

[981] Quoted in Robert David Johnson, "The Unintended Consequences of Congressional Reform: The Clark and Tunney Amendments and U.S. Policy toward Angola," *Diplomatic History* 27:2 (2013), 223.
[982] WOA, "What can we expect from the new Congress?" 22 November 1972, Box 6, Southern Africa Support Group, Vivian G. Harsh Collection, Chicago Public Library (Chicago, Ill.)
[983] Dick Clark, phone Interview with author, 25 September 2012.

now had the ability to pursue independent investigations into foreign policy issues.[984] Yet these congressmen and staffs still faced a daunting challenge of mastering a world of history and complicated foreign politics, so they had to rely on existing experts to shape their research. When it came to Africa, there were few more knowledgeable or convincing in their argumentation than the various members of the activist network that had formed around Portuguese Africa. From June through July, Clark and his staff would use a series of hearings to learn from some of the few experts on southern Africa outside the executive branch– the academics, activists, and church members who had forged alliances with the socialist nationalist movements of FRELIMO, the PAIGC, and the MPLA over the prior decade.[985]

While it is unclear how Clark assembled the list of nearly 30 witnesses, it is likely that either ACOA or WOA had a hand in the matter. In addition to WOA's early identification of the senator as an ally in 1973, the office had worked closely with his predecessor, Gale McGee, when he chaired the committee during the latter Nixon years. Clark remembered later that he "had a lot of close contact with [the two groups]." One of his key staffers, Marianne Spiegel, had earned a master's degree in African Studies and was likely familiar with ACOA through its extensive publications.[986] The leadership of both groups was also well represented at the hearings. WOA Director Ted Lockwood

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[984] Franck and Wisbaden, 228-229.

[985] Dick Clark, "Angola: A Story of My Personal Involvement," 8 April 1982, ox 143, Dick Clark Papers]. Though poorly attended – Biden was often the only other person in the room – the impact of these hearings on Clark and his staff was immeasurable.

[986] Dick Clark Interview. Admittedly, Clark could not remember when his association with them first began.

testified as did ACOA Deputy Director Jennifer Davis, with George Houser providing the closing commentary of the two month process. An academic at heart, Clark gave preference to professors over the grassroots organizers that Diggs had increasingly invited to Washington in previous years, but the majority of the witnesses had ties to ACOA, local movements like the Madison Area Committee on Southern Africa (MACSA), and close personal contact with the CONCP parties themselves.[987]

The hearings covered events in all the countries of southern Africa, but Angola stood out as one of the more pressing issues alongside the problem of apartheid in South Africa. As Kissinger and Ford were deciding on the levels of American involvement in the colony in the summer of 1975, Clark's experts were warning him of the dangers of American involvement. In one of the earliest testimonies, University of Minnesota professor, MACSA member, and close FRELIMO associate Allen Isaacman explained the long history of American support for the Portuguese wars, which surprised the neophyte Clark. The professor hinted that the Ford administration might be providing aid to nominally anti-communist groups in the region but did not provide much detail.[988] Angola experts Douglas Wheeler and Gerald Bender were more forceful than Isaacman. They made no claims to secret knowledge but sounded the alarm about potential action.[989] Bender was especially direct in his challenge, requesting that Congress use its oversight

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[987] Allen Isaacman was close to FRLEIMO and later taught in free Mozambique, while Angola expert John Marcum had entered Angola with George Houser in the early 1960s to provide medical aid to Holden Roberto. Willard Johnson of MIT lacked nationalist connections, but he had been active in the Boston ALSC and acted as a mentor to Randall Robinson and the PALC on various occasions.
[988] "U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa," Hearings before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, June-July, 1975, (Washington: 1976), 43.
[989] Ibid. 79.

powers "to insure that neither the, CIA, DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency] nor any other intelligence agency or private corporation is currently providing covert assistance to any of the Angolan parties."[990] Here for congressional consumption was the warning of a new Vietnam that activists had been sounding for nearly five years.

Arguably the most important individual who shaped Clark's thinking was John Marcum. Marcum had been an important member of ACOA while living on the East Coast in the 1960s, and he was generally acknowledged to be the authority on contemporary Angolan nationalism.[991] An erstwhile friend of FNLA head Holden Roberto, by 1975 he had come to question the Bakongo leader's ethnocentrism and suitability as a leader of a free Angola. In his testimony, he defended the MPLA against allegations that it was dangerous to American interests in the region. Marcum expressed concern about the governing potential of the alternatives. He also told Clark that the vague reports of American aid to Roberto and Savimbi circulating around the country rang true, since the FNLA had developed ties with the American government as far back as 1960. It had, after all, been Marcum who had worked with the Kennedy administration to administer the Lincoln exchange program during the same period. Marcum had mirrored ACOA in shifting his Angolan alliances over the past years, but he suspected that Washington continued to see Roberto as a capable and dependable anti-communist. Kissinger's recent warnings about spreading Marxist ideologies hinted at the deep suspicion of the MPLA

[990] Ibid, 103.
[991] For John Marcum's initial relationship with Roberto and activities at Lincoln and within ACOA, see chapters 1-2.

that had developed in the executive branch over the previous decade. Marcum explained to Clark that "Washington should, above all, avoid the trap of overreacting to hostile rhetoric and socialist advocacy and of identifying potential 'enemies.'"[992] His advice effectively recovered the anti-colonial movement's warnings of American meddling in the region and attached it specifically to the bellwether state of Angola.

Marcum's testimony had an impact on Clark and the way he understood the potential for disastrous intervention in Angola. As he opened his hearing featuring administration representatives, the senator quoted directly from Marcum's testimony: "The most important thing the American government can do in Angola is to refrain from projecting parochial or ideological intolerance into its perception of the situation there."[993] This statement set the tone of subsequent questioning, when both Clark and Biden peppered the witnesses with questions about arms dealings and the potential for anti-communist aid to specific Angolan parties. At all points, the State Department representatives denied favoritism or major assistance of any kind, explaining that the White House had backed Portuguese efforts to form a government of national unity through diplomatic channels.[994] Clark harbored suspicions, but the government roundly denied American involvement in the increasingly tense standoff brewing between the nationalist parties. The activist and academic communities continued to push the issue though. On the final day of the hearings, when asked by Clark for his recommendations concerning future American policy, Houser

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[992] Ibid. 93.
[993] Ibid. 235.
[994] After hearing a response to his question about support for one party from Assistant Secretary of State Nathaniel Davis, Biden remarked –with some level of skepticism – "Mr. Secretary, you are an amazing man . . . I think you are an amazing fellow to hope that much." Ibid.

urged the senator to conduct an "immediate investigation" into allegations that Zaire was providing heavy military material to the FNLA on behalf of the U.S. government.[995] Activists had long ago accepted the likelihood of Cold War intervention in southern Africa. They believed that the internationalist wing of the Congress had to step in and act as the arbiter of unchecked executive power in international relations. The activists had made important connections over the years, but they had finally bridged the gap for real policy change in the person of Dick Clark.

During the hearings Clark decided to conduct a more thorough investigation of the Angola situation. He began arranging a trip to Africa for the August break and requested to be briefed on CIA operations. As a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, he had the right under the Hughes-Ryan Act passed the year before to receive information on covert activities. The CIA had consulted with the Hill but had left Clark out of the closed door sessions. Kissinger has since claimed that IA Feature was never "all that covert" due to the 40 congressional briefings conducted by various departments. At the time, however, he admitted that many of the legislative consultations did not "amount to much more than [CIA Director] Colby talking to [Senate Foreign Relations Chair John] Sparkman and [ranking minority member Clifford] Case."[996] Both of these men sympathized with the constrained covert operation and did not voice objections to the program. In fact, Kissinger was upset when he discovered that the senior legislators had shared information with the

[995] Ibid. 500.

[996] Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 802. Telecon, Hyland and Kissinger, 23 December 1975, Kissinger Papers, Library of Congress. Frank Church claimed that not even he had been fully briefed until "after the fact." "Senates Aim: Get Us out of Angola," *New York Post*, 16 December 1975.

hostile senator from Iowa.[997] Shortly before his departure, Colby finally briefed Clark in person. According to CIA operative John Stockwell, the spymaster was disingenuous, explaining that the United States was only restocking Mobutu's weapons that he had provided to the combined FNLA and UNITA in their attempts to forestall an MPLA takeover before the elections. The administration had no specific program of aiding either the FNLA or UNITA. For his part, Clark felt like Colby had spoken in platitudes and cannot recall anything significant being discussed in the meeting.[998] Nonetheless, it represented the first time that the internationalist element in Congress had been directly told of any operation in Angola. It would be the first step in a six month long campaign that would bring covert activities to an end.

In mid-August, Clark left for Africa accompanied by Joe Biden, aide Mary Ann Spiegel, and Foreign Relations staffer Dick Moose. The trip would confirm the expert testimony from the summer and steel his resolve to take action. He arranged to visit a handful of countries, where he would consult with the competing Angolan nationalists, Mobutu, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, Julius Nyerere in Tanzania, and Mozambique's Samora Machel.[999] The administration attempted to conceal its activities, with the CIA even coaching Roberto and Savimbi on what to discuss with the congressional delegation.[1000] But Clark's extensive travel made this deception hard to maintain. No

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[997] Memorandum for the Record, 8 August 1975, Document 123 in FRUS 1969-1976.
[998] Stockwell, 227 -228; Dick Clark Interview.
[999] Ibid. Dick Moose was famously hostile to Kissinger, who commented "He's gone so far he doesn't even like me." Memorandum for the Record, 8 August 1975, Document 123 in FRUS 1969-1976.
[1000] The American embassy in Kinshasa requested guidance from Kissinger about how much it could reveal to the codel. Telegram, Kinshasa to Secstate, 13 August 1975, Box 7, Presidential Country Files for Africa, GRFL; Stockwell, 227 -228.

amount of vague responses or fudged numbers could conceal what the critical observer could see and hear in the chaotic pre-independence atmosphere. Upon landing in Angola to meet Savimbi, the Americans discovered a South African plane waiting on the tarmac, which aroused Clark's suspicions of the connections between the nationalist movement and its apartheid neighbor. In Luanda, the American consul general and a CIA agent advised him that "putting money into Roberto and Savimbi was a hell of a bad idea and wouldn't work."[1001] Clark returned to the United States even more skeptical of the venture. There was something afoot in central Africa, and he was determined to stop it.

Clark did not, however, know what the most effective form of action would be or how he would find sufficient support for his plans. Outside a few key allies like Culver and WOA collaborators Tunney and Kennedy, Clark found few willing to help him. He remembered later, "no other senator showed much interest" in Angola or the problem of the covert operations.[1002] In fact, a number were actively hostile to the neophyte senator's cause. At the same time that Clark flew to the continent, South Africa began an extensive campaign to build support in the Senate. Targeting conservative Republicans and southern Democrats, the Afrikaner government established relationships with some of the most powerful men in the upper chamber, including Senate Foreign Relations Chairman John Sparkman (D-Alabama) and Appropriations Committee head John McClellan (D-Arkansas). Throughout the fall, more than twenty senators would agree to approach the administration in support of a more positive response to Pretoria's interests, including its

[1001] Dick Clark Interview.
[1002] Ibid.

strong opposition to the MPLA.[1003] This bloc of anti-communist (and in some cases, segregationist) politicians was a challenging hurdle for Clark, especially as their influential committee positions gave them power over a large number of indifferent and undecided politicians seeking their largesse for projects in their home states. Clark knew that there was a large portion of the American public that would support his amendment and help nullify such calculations, but the Senate's rules constrained him from disclosing the facts. Fortunately, a deeply divided executive branch and the American press helped solve his conundrum.

In late September, *New York Times* correspondent and former Pentagon staffer Leslie Gelb wrote a front page piece about foreign intervention in Portugal and Angola, highlighting the role of Mobutu and providing background on Roberto's relationship to the United States.[1004] Gelb's article – more focused on Portugal than Angola – did not inspire popular outrage, but it provided an excuse for the internationalists on the Hill and their activist allies to begin making noise about the Ford intervention. It was especially timely given that Roberto had used his advantage in American-supplied heavy weapons to push back MPLA forces in the north of the country, threatening to overtake Luanda shortly before Gelb's article appeared in print. The MPLA had mounted a spirited defense and struck a blow to Roberto's forces, but the FNLA leader vowed that he would take the city in order to be the primary beneficiary of the Portuguese transfer of power. The arrival of

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[1003] Memo, J.H.A. Buekes to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 30 January 1976, USA Relations with SA, vol. 32, 1/33/3, South African Foreign Affairs Archives (Pretoria, South Africa).
[1004] Leslie H. Gelb, "U.S., Soviet, China Reported Aiding Portugal, Angola," *New York Times*, 25 September 1975.

Cuban instructors and Eastern bloc weapons helped alleviate the MPLA's relative military disadvantage even as it succeeded in its struggle against UNITA in the south, but it was unclear whether September's events would tip the scales in any one party's favor.[1005] As this information trickled through the media to the outside world, American activists focused less on the fighting and more on the reactionary intent of the American aid to Roberto through the dictatorial Zairean regime. Over the seven weeks preceding the independence ceremony on November 11, ACOA and WOA publicized Gelb's revelations and inspired additional articles.[1006]

When the Portuguese flag was finally lowered in Angola, the MPLA remained in control of Luanda but the fighting continued unabated, with foreign aid continuing to pour in from all sides. Shortly thereafter, Clark submitted a rider to the foreign aid bill that would ban additional involvement in the newly independent country without congressional approval. In addition to his colleagues sensitive to South African interests, the Iowan was opposed by such powerful men as Hubert Humphrey (D-Minnesota). The former vice-president feared appearing soft on communism and urged moderation. The mainstream press also provided a surprisingly muted response. A handful of black newspapers who had sided with the ALSC socialists offered scathing commentary fed by WOA information, but most like the influential *Chicago Defender* said little. The black newspapers had rallied around the freedom struggles, but they hesitated – as they always had – to make firm

[1005] Gleijeses, 165-272.
[1006] See for example, "Pamela J. Banks, "Angolan lib forces battle towards Nov 11 Independence," *Baltimore Afro-American*, 8 November 1975.

statements on the interparty rivalries. When reporters criticized Kissinger, they generally did so for the covert nature of operations rather than the rote assistance to anti-communists in a state where no clear American interests existed.[1007] With few willing to speak out against a president responding to direct Soviet intervention in far-off Africa, Clark still faced an uphill battle.

Vietnam loomed over the Angola debate, but not always in the way historians have suggested. Looking back from a contemporary vantage point, it seems logical that an activist Congress forged amidst the Southeast Asian war would overwhelmingly condemn foreign adventurism. Yet for much of 1975, Clark and his fellow advocates of a new foreign policy had been waging a losing campaign. In the Senate Defense Committee, Symington and Culver had scored few victories. Final votes on their bills to rein in the Cold War military-industrial complex failed by an average of nearly two dozen. Congress approved the expansion of military operations on the Indian Ocean Base of Diego Garcia and refused to end arms shipments to Turkey despite liberal protests over the country's activities in the disputed territory of Cyprus. Even the ardor against covert operations, so strong after the Chilean coup of 1973, had waned. An attempt by one House critic to publicize the CIA budget had been defeated by 120 votes that very summer.[1008] In the midst of his subcommittee hearings in June, Clark worried that the more constructive foreign policy he and his allies championed was in danger. They believed Vietnam repudiated the use of

[1007] Johnson, Unintended Consequences, 226. The *Washington Post* went on record supporting "modest open" assistance.
[1008] Johnson, Congress, 209-221.

force in foreign affairs, but the senator saw his opponents drawing on another lesson: "the administration, and . . . the majority in Congress, have somehow become so embarrassed or falsely humiliated by the experience of Southeast Asia, that they may in fact react the other way [toward the fetishization of force and an "abrasive" foreign policy]."[1009]

The revisionists in Congress struggled to make headway on Angola exactly because the lessons of Vietnam remained obscure to many policymakers. Hubert Humphrey, for example, had repudiated the strict mentality of the Cold Warrior, but his actions demonstrated that he did not wish to appear weak in the face of Soviet expansion.[1010] The revelation in November that Cuban troops were arriving in Angola, at the (apparent) behest of Moscow, offered a new and perplexing problem absent from Vietnam. Many legislators did not know how to react. Even the Congressional Black Caucus and Diggs did not publicly take a stance, since the Angola issue had proven so divisive in the black community over the last few years. The Detroit congressman explained to one black newsman that the Caucus had not yet made plans to take any action as late as early December, though members had clearly expressed interest in Angola and Diggs had begun investigating the situation at WOA's request.[1011] Vietnam did not necessarily impart a single lesson but many. One supported by Clark and internationalists viewed the war as a

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[1009] 121 Congressional Record, 94th Congress, 1st Session, pp16699 (3 June 1975).

[1010] Johnson, Unintended Consequences, 226.

[1011] John W. Lewis, Jr. "Say U.S. Involvement in Angola Could Lead to Another Vietnam," *Atlanta Daily World*, 4 December 1975. Memo, HSC to CCD, "Meeting with Ted Lockwood et al of the Washington Office on Africa, 1 October 1975, Box 300, Diggs Papers, Moorland-Spingarn Research Center, Howard University (Washington, D.C.) Hereafter MSRC. WOA reached out to Diggs at the beginning of October and encouraged him to look deeper into the Angola issue, specifically the shipment of arms through Zaire. Interestingly, they did not record any mention of Clark's research, either because they did not know due to secrecy rules or because they could not share the information.

repudiation of American interventionism, which opened the door for a constructive, multilateral internationalism based on human rights and ideological flexibility. Another more conservative camp believed that Vietnam had been mishandled. American troops should not have been on the ground in such a remote part of the world, but confronting clearly identifiable Soviet expansion remained necessary. The latter conclusion gave new life to the seemingly forgotten emphasis on aid – both covert and overt – to friendly anti-communist forces. Many in Congress sat undecided between these two poles, worried about which direction their constituents might lean. Angola presented the perfect opportunity for these two contrasting lessons of Vietnam to do battle for the heart of the legislature. Clark needed popular and Congressional outrage to match his own perspective if he was going to disrupt the administration's plan.

The Iowan found some help from the same groups who had first pointed him toward Angola. The activist network that had emerged from earlier solidarity organizing rallied behind the senator and his reading of the international situation. ACOA and WOA took the lead shaping Congressional discussions in these early stages. Both groups had invested heavily in the activist Vietnam analogy during the anti-colonial struggle, which presented covert assistance to reactionary regimes in Africa as the first step in the creation of a new anti-communist quagmire. The propaganda had created broad support for the CONCP parties just the year before in the form of a mass boycott of Gulf's operations in Angola, and they believed it would be able to sway the Congress now. Letters flowed to constituencies beginning in October, and WOA even arranged meetings for congressmen to speak with MPLA representatives during a brief visit to Washington that same

month.[1012] The activist groups hoped this might prepare American politicians to take a more pro-active stance when independence ushered in the seemingly inevitable jostling for power in Angola.

By far the most important event of the fall was the meeting convened by ACOA, WOA, and a number of grassroots organizations in Madison, Wisconsin. MACSA hosted what it billed as a "work session" to help coordinate solidarity activities in the United States and Canada in light of the looming threat in Angola. The conference gathered together forty solidarity organizations that represented practically a "who's who" of 1970s organizing – religious, radical, and African American. Attendees included a handful of chapters from Amiri Baraka's Congress of Afrikan People (CAP), the leftist branches of the ALSC from Atlanta and elsewhere, the Chicago Committee for the Liberation of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea (CCLAMG), the American Friends Service Committee, the Freedom Information Service from Mississippi, various church groups, and a number of other smaller organizations. Panels focused on bringing everyone up to speed on the latest developments in American policy toward southern Africa and providing a forum in which local organizations could discuss potential campaigns with representatives of the liberation groups. An entire day of workshops was dedicated to discussing the various tactics used by committees, with the hope of "exchang[ing] ideas for strengthening [local action]."[1013]

[1012] Untitled notes (Havana Meeting?), nd (May 1976?), Box 44, WOA Papers.
[1013] "National Working Conference to be Held in Madison," *MACSA News*, 52 (September 1975); "Ballot [for the selection of the steering committee of the coalition on the liberation of southern Africa]," Box: 1975 PED, American Friends Service Committee Archive (Philadelphia, PA). Hereafter AFSC Archive.

At the conference, the assembled minds made a number of decisions that would shape the movement to oppose Angolan intervention, as well as establishing a formal framework for cooperation on anti-apartheid issues. First, they agreed to focus their energies on resisting any American attempts to intervene in Angola and other newly freed states rather than on the topic of foreign intervention more generally, since the Lusophone movements had relied on socialist aid to sustain the military struggles for so long. Objecting now to such aid would be hypocritical and a betrayal of solidarity. Second, they agreed on a list of action priorities, which included the establishment of a "national campaign to stop U.S intervention in Angola, a 'Hot-Line' telephone news network," and continued action on the Union Carbide company that was importing Rhodesian steel. Finally, the working groups selected individual organizations to help coordinate activities on these topics. They tapped WOA to lead the lobbying for legislative opposition to Angola and ACOA to be the central distributor of news on solidarity actions.[1014]

These conclusions were not arrived at easily or unanimously due to deep ideological divides that continued to hamper complete unity, but they offered a starting point. The CAP chapters, for instance, refused to sign the final statement due to a disagreement over the exclusion of armed struggle as a necessity for liberation, while proposals to link southern African demands for equality with domestic class issues was narrowly defeated, to the frustration of the more radical MACSA and CCLAMG. Yet all parties agreed that cooperation would be necessary to achieve maximum victory for the

[1014] "Minutes of October 13 Plenary Session on National Coordination at Working Conference on southern Africa at Madison, Wisconsin," 13 October 1975, Ibid.

African revolutions, and most committed to working together even if a little less than half joined the formal framework.[1015] The result of the Madison conference was a first step in the formalization of the decentralized network of activists, who committed to action and began to build a structure to help coordinate local activities in order to achieve national results. This all came into existence nearly a month before the official independence of Angola, preparing the activists to shape the legislative agenda well before most congressmen had begun to pay serious attention to the issue.

Tasked with national coordination of local activism in Wisconsin, ACOA and WOA reached out to many former and current allies in hopes of drumming up support for the Clark amendment. More than 40 organizations responded, representing an array of religious and ideological viewpoints.[1016] Church organizations sent communiques to their congregations urging them to write their legislators, as did local radical committees working on southern Africa. These groups reproduced or drew on information sent from the national organizations, including WOA's eight reasons for opposing the intervention. The first of these widely reproduced arguments claimed that "Angola may prove as tragic and costly as in Indochina," while others targeted the CIA and defended the MPLA against charges of it becoming a "Soviet puppet."[1017] The office also appealed to its sometime allies with clout in Washington. It reached out in particular to unions, using comparisons

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[1015] Ibid.

[1016] Houser, No One, 291.

[1017] See Episcopal Churchmen for South Africa, "USA – South Africa Allies in Angola War," 29 November 1975; Bay Area Namibia Action Group, "Legislative Action Alert," ND [likely November or December 1975], Box 44, Washington Office on Africa Papers, Yale Divinity Library (New Haven, CT) [Hereafter WOA, YDL].

with Vietnam and the recent revelations of American covert actions in South America to cajole them toward support or at least acquiescence to the Clark amendment.[1018] Concerned activists also made direct contact with congressmen. Ted Lockwood made this point most dramatically in his November testimony to Digg's new committee shortly before Angola's independence in November. Expressing concern at growing evidence of American intervention against the MPLA and the muted response of leading foreign policy critics, the WOA director counseled

> U.S. intervention in Angola has already become as costly and as dangerous as its involvement in Chile only a few years ago. Surely the tragic lessons of Chile should teach us to oppose immediately and vehemently every sign of covert or overt intervention in the troubled political affairs of another country. We call on the United States government to end its intervention in Angola. We urge Congress to take every action in its power toward this end.[1019]

The activists hoped this early lobbying and constituent mail would prejudice Hill politicians against Ford's Angola policy before the administration could make its case.

Throughout late November and December, WOA' lobbying emphasized the damage such a poorly planned intervention could have on the wider region. WOA and ACOA were assisted in their efforts by news that South Africa had sent troops into Angola weeks before independence. The influx of communist instructors and eastern bloc weapons had greatly improved MPLA prospects in October, and its military forces retained control of the capitol as the Portuguese exit passed. South Africa had been providing arms to both the FNLA and UNITA since August, and the success of the communist backed government

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[1018] "Conversation with Lou Gerber," 10 December [1975], Box 44, WOA Papers, YDL.

[1019] Statement of Edgar Lockwood Before Subcommittee of International Food, Resources, and Energy of the House Committee on International Relations," 5 November 1975, AAA.

in Luanda deeply concerned officials in Pretoria. In mid-October, it sent troops over the border to fight with Angolan forces.[1020] It did so without consulting the United States in an attempt to prevent a rout of UNITA in the south.[1021] The MPLA military forces fell back in face of the invasion, but held onto Luanda and were reinforced in November by Cuban troops. Soon there were over 1,300 foreign soldiers in Angola, who helped turn the tide again the South Africans. Pretoria had kept its role in the fighting secret, but as the MPLA took the offensive on the battlefield and in the international media, it became harder to deny the participation of white troops from below the border. South Africa denied the allegations for the first weeks of December, but the capture of two soldiers by the Cubans on December 13 ended all speculation.[1022] The activists had the weapon they needed to link American policy with the reactionary white regimes. As revelations of the incursion became public in the first weeks of December, the National Security Council worried that they would "increase significantly the political price we will have to pay in Africa, the Third World, and with segments of the American public and Congress."[1023]

The council was right to be concerned, and the already mobilized African activist network pounced on the issue. George Houser penned the unofficial manifesto of this coalition in an op-ed for the *New York Times* in December that detailed the Vietnam analogy. "Communism and the War in Angola" cast the administration's reading of the

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[1020] Gleijeses, 294-305.
[1021] See Jamie Miller, "Yes, Minister: Reassessing South Africa's Intervention in the Angolan Civil War, 1975-1976," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 15:3 (Summer 2013).
[1022] Gleijeses, 308-326.
[1023] Memo, Hal Horan to Brent Scowcroft, 15 December 1975, Box 5, Presidential Country Files for Africa, GRFL.

situation as simplistic, asking why the United States had only rallied to the cause of self-determination when a foreign government was aiding a socialist liberation group. There had been no such intervention – political or otherwise – during the decade of anti-colonial struggle. Houser also highlighted the role of South Africa and its use of Angola as a smokescreen for reaffirming control of neighboring Namibia. As in Southeast Asia, regional competition between socialists and their enemies was pulling the United States into a predicament that had little importance to the broader geopolitics. "It would be a tragedy for the United States to repeat the errors of Vietnam," Houser concluded, "because it looks upon the Angolan conflict as an occasion for another anti-communist crusade."[1024]

As Clark and the activists raised the heat on the administration, ham-fisted handling of Congress further damaged the prospects for the covert operation. Nearly a month after Angola's independence, Ford and Kissinger continued to publicly deny the accusations.[1025] A number of senators had been briefed on the matter, but like Clark, they had been told by CIA and State Department officials that no American arms were entering Angola. Clark suspected that the Congress still did not know the whole story. He arranged for secret hearings to ascertain details of the program and allow the administration to presents its case. In early December, the Foreign Relations Committee invited CIA Deputy Director Bill Nelson and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Ed Mulcahy to testify. Arriving after Nelson had spoken, Mulcahy confidently stated that the United States

[1024] George Houser, "Communism and the War in Angola," *New York Times*, 14 December 1975.
[1025] Telcon, Barry Schweid with Henry Kissinger, 8 December 1975, Kissinger Telcons. When asked about possible covert operations in Angola, Kissinger told the AP reporter that "There is nothing."

was not supplying arms to any Angolan factions, not realizing that the CIA deputy had revealed the truth to the committee just minutes before. Confronted by the politicians, Mulcahy reversed course, but the damage had been done.[1026] Furious with the administration's attempts to conceal its activities from Congress, the Foreign Relations Committee recommended termination of future funds for Angola activities and sent the bill to the floor.

A secret Senate session began on the 17th to deliberate on the bill. Seeking to strengthen Clark's push against IA Feature, John Tunney of California upped the ante when submitted an amendment to the defense bill that would prohibit further aid to Angola and reduce the total allocation by $33 million, roughly what Congress believed was spent in Angola. The move was designed to shock; no amendment to a defense bill had left the Senate unaltered since the start of World War II. Tunney, however, felt the bill would work.[1027] The son of famed pugilist Gene Tunney, the combative Californian had championed non-intervention in Angola since 1973, when he had attempted to block aid to imperial Portugal.[1028] An old ally of WOA, he felt that congressional outrage and effective lobbying would win the day.[1029]

Ford and his congressional allies scrambled to mount a workable defense. A number of administration-inspired amendments flowed into the chamber aiming to derail the forthcoming vote or at least give the administration time to work out a defense over the

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[1026] Stockwell, 230; Dick Clark Interview.
[1027] Johnson Unintended Consequences, 227-228.
[1028] See chapter 4.
[1029] "Portugal Bid for U.S. Aid in Africa Reported," *Los Angeles Times*, 14 November 1973.

Christmas break.[1030] None succeeded. The White House next turned to a group of Republicans, who filibustered the bill on the 19th. The filibuster aimed to put pressure on the liberals to accept the compromise offered by Appropriations Committee Chairman John McClellan (D-Ark), who offered an additional $9 million to the administration in exchange for Congressional consultations before any more funding.[1031] Tunney, Clark, and their compatriots refused the offer, but the internationalists struggled to find the 60 votes to force cloture.[1032] Seeing the likelihood of eventual defeat, the White House backed away from stalling tactics, allowing the vote to happen. The maneuver sought to place the full onus of any Soviet gains in Angola on the Senate, which Ford hoped might give some undecided voters – and by extension the House – pause. The tactic did not work, and the chamber passed the Tunney Amendment by what two academics would soon refer to as the "startlingly decisive result" of 54 to 22.[1033] With no time for debate in the House, the defense bill would have to wait until next session.[1034] Clark's bill would linger until after the recess as well, overtaken by the more sensational defense rider.

The Senate vote had been a major victory for the youthful liberal contingent in Congress. Through brilliant use of the hearing system and assistance from the activist network, they had swayed their colleagues to oppose Ford's limited intervention. Many senators had come to accept Clark's framing of Angola as a new Vietnam. This included

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[1030] Dana Adams Schmidt, "Covert Actions Pits Congress Vs. Kissinger," Christian Science Monitor, 19 December 1975.
[1031] The additional funds were badly need, as money had run dangerously low. Memorandum for Record, 21 November 1975, Document 139 in FRUS 1969-1976.
[1032] Spencer Rich, "Angola Aid Plan Returned to Ford," *Washington Post*, 19 December 1975.
[1033] Franck and Weisband, 53.
[1034] Spencer Rich, "Senate Bars Angola Aid," *Washington Post*, 20 December 1975.

not only fellow Democrats, but Republicans as well. Senator Lowell Weicker (R-CT) lambasted Angola as "a mirror of our entry into Vietnam. . . we are being sucked into a growing involvement through old Cold War rationales . . . [while] ignoring the history of Africa."[1035] Even Humphrey felt obliged to rally around the internationalist flag as the vote forced him to take sides. After nearly a month of seeking to give the White House some way out of its corner, the senator from Minnesota fell into the ranks of the skeptics when confronted by the press. "This is exactly what happened in the Vietnam situation," he exclaimed, "involved a little bit at a time . . . without any oversight." Faced with a White House operating behind the backs of both Congress and the American people, he had no other option but to vote with the internationalists.[1036] The activist-academic-political network had won over the Senate, but a final battle remained in the House.

Popular Organizing, House Votes, and the End of Angolan Intervention

The U.S. Congress' lower body had proved an obstacle to the internationalist agenda of the Senate liberals in recent years, and it seemed in January 1976 that it might play spoiler again. When Colby had discussed the possibility of reprogramming funds toward Angola with the Appropriations Defense Subcommittee in December, he had been pleasantly surprised at the mild reactions of its members.[1037] The long break also allowed interventionists to coordinate their response in a way they had not been able to do in the

[1035] "Weicker Hits Policy in Angola," *Hartford Courant*, 18 December 1975 and WOA, "Previous Statements by Senators on Angola," nd [c. 1981], Box 15, WOA Paper, YDL.
[1036] Spencer Rich, "Senate Moves to Bar Aid," Washington Post, 18 December 1975.
[1037] Memorandum for Records, 11 December 1975, Document 147 in FRUS 1969-1976.

Senate. Ford quickly made a statement condemning the action in the upper house. Striking directly at the Vietnam comparison, the president protested that "Angola is not, never has been, and never will be" a question of deploying American troops. Instead, it was an attempt to oppose intervention by communist powers that had sent soldiers thousands of miles to support a leftist government. In failing to recognize the severity of the situation and the important role the US had to play, Ford and Kissinger feared that the Senate had undermined the administration's attempt to maintain the balance of power and the foundations of détente. "This abdication of responsibility," Ford cautioned Congress, "will have the gravest consequences for the long term position of the United States and for international order in general."[1038] Over the following month, Ford continued to attack Congress and its interference with his foreign policy prerogative. While few representatives were fans of IA Feature, a good many feared binding the hands of the administration.[1039] Ford's harangues only reinforced this opinion. With a sense of unease and a vocally critical president, a number of Hill members wondered, in the words of Senator Jacob Javits (R-NY), whether the House would be "in any mood to do anything about Angola."[1040]

[1038] "Senate Decision to Cut Off Additional Funds," 19 December 1975, National Security Adviser Presidential Country Files for Africa, Angola (1), GRFL.

[1039] "Congress Divided Over Angola Aid," Washington Post, 27 December 1975; after the Senate vote, a resolution expressing a non-binding sense of the House that the US should stay out of Angola received 140 signatures – a large number, but nowhere near a majority. Spencer Rich, "Senate Bars Angola Aid," *Washington Post*, 20 December 1975.

[1040] Congressional Record, Senate 94th Congress, First Session, 41619 (18 December 1975). Senate Foreign Relations Chair John Sparkman agreed with Javits, assuring his constituents that the House would strike down the Tunney amendment. "Sparkman Doubts Angola Aid Ban," *Washington Post*, 11 January 1976.

The activist network did not rest on its laurels over the break. It continued organizing in hopes of swaying the House as it had done the Senate. In this struggle, activists and lobbyists had an important partner in the lower house that had been absent from the Senate: African Americans. Beginning in the late 1960s, black lawmakers had worked with ACOA, WOA, and the ALSC to isolate the southern African regimes. They rallied once more around the MPLA cause, especially after South Africa entered the fray on the side of UNITA. Andrew Young (D-GA), who had become a vocal advocate of southern African liberation struggles after his work with the ALSC and the Gulf Boycott, openly wondered why the administration condemned Soviet and Cuban intervention with barely a word about the more troublesome meddling of the Afrikaner military.[1041] Other comments were less measured. From the Organization of African Unity Conference in Addis Ababa, Charles Diggs acerbically referred to the Angolan policy as "the biggest blunder in the history of [American] relations with Africa" and implied that Kissinger should resign over the matter. The congressman spent much of his trip to Ethiopia canvassing African leaders and American diplomatic officials on the Angola issue, gaining confidence in his existing desire to back the MPLA. He assembled a report for the Black Caucus that criticized both UNITA and the FNLA, but lambasted the U.S. government for retrogressive policies that demonstrated "a profound perceptual lag and apparent inability to adjust fully to the political and economic realities of the seventies."[1042] He also distilled

[1041] Mary McGrory, "The Lunacy of our role in Angola," *Boston Globe*, 20 December 1975.
[1042] The report quoted the Ethiopian chair of the conference, stating "the struggle for Angola is for the body and soul of Africa." Charles Diggs, "A Report from the OAU Meeting on Angola, Addis Ababa," 11 January 1976, Box 193, Diggs Papers, MSRC.

his eleven page report into a Dear Colleague letter.[1043] When the House reconvened in late January, Andy Young welcomed fellow congressmen with an information session featuring ACOA's Houser, WOA director Ted Lockwood, MACSA alum Dave Wiley, Ron Walters of the ALSC, and Courtland Cox representing the anti-CIA Center for National Security Studies.[1044] Here then was the perfect example of the multi-racial, anti-colonial coalition making the final step to become important sources of information for policymaking.

Popular black opinion also rallied to the cause. Activists previously involved in the anti-imperial struggle interpreted the American presence in Angola as a logical outgrowth of Portugal's fall, which had been a common refrain in the black community and the theme of the second African Liberation Day. Most importantly, the entrance of South Africa on the side of the UNITA-FNLA forces had finally resolved the divisive ideological issue that had crippled the ALSC and communal organizing in 1974. Whatever claims to Black Power legitimacy Savimbi and his representatives had claimed four years earlier dissolved when they accepted the assistance of the apartheid state. The MPLA was justified in claiming power in the face of these threats, no matter its ideology or its associations. Writing for the *Baltimore Afro-American* paper, George Daniels gave voice to this dominant opinion when he said that Angola had taken the country "a shade closer to seeing events in Africa for what they are . . . communism unwittingly has been [Africans'] greatest

[1043] David B. Ottoway, "Rep. Diggs Hits Ford on Angola," *Washington Post*, 12 January 1976.
[1044] Harrington, Young, Harking, et. al. to Colleague, 16 January 1976, Leon and Leppert Files, Box 1, Angola; Letter, Ted Lockwood, 15 January 1976, Box 44, WOA Paper, YDL.

ally rather than our enemy."[1045] With apartheid as its enemy, most Blacks pledged support to the MPLA and demanded an end to American meddling.[1046] Impromptu protests targeted the South African embassy and the White House around the New Year's holiday. The Afrikaner ambassador dismissed the dozens of protesters as a paltry number compared to the displays that had accompanied African Liberation Day, but they represented a return to the confrontational style of activism that had gone on hiatus after the Carnation Revolution.[1047] One group in Harlem even proposed the creation of a "volunteer Lumumba Freedom Fighter Brigade" to help defend the MPLA government from South Africa and the CIA.[1048] The community generally abandoned their ideological infighting in favor of a more internationalist, less dogmatic view of global politics. Their vocal condemnations did not escape the attention of either the White House or Capitol Hill.

The vocal black response represented a more general shift back toward popular organizing after the Senate vote. Activists hoped that such demonstrations would communicate to politicians precisely which Vietnam analogy its constituents accepted during the election year and apply pressure on them to vote against Ford's Angola policy. ACOA again led the way. The committee sponsored advertisements in major papers warning readers that "We are now at the crucial Gulf of Tonkin stage." Concerned citizens

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[1045] George M. Daniels, "Americans may be close to seeing African events as they are," *Baltimore Afro-American*, 24 January 1976.
[1046] African American opinions were strong enough to attract the attention of Walter Cronkite, who profiled the communal view of Angola in December. "Policy over Angola is Examined by CBS," *New York Times*, 17 December 1975.
[1047] Memo, J.H.A. Beukes to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 2 January 1976, US Relation with SA, vol 32, 1/33/3, South African Foreign Affairs Archives (Pretoria, South Africa).
[1048] "Fighter Brigade to Aid MPLA," *New York Amsterdam News*, 24 January 1976.

should organize, demonstrate, and, most importantly, write to Congress urging them to end military assistance.[1049] Activists had begun organizing their memberships in December, and by the New Year these efforts had begun to show.[1050] Demonstrations started small, with local coalitions of religious, civil rights, and anti-war groups having the most success. In one such rally at the end of December, the Fellowship of Reconciliation united with the American Friends Service Committee, representatives of *The Catholic Worker*, the Episcopal Peace Fellowship, and the War Resisters League to picket the U.S. and Soviet Missions to the United Nations.[1051] Rallies spread across the nation in January, broadcasting popular discontent with the intervention and surprisingly widespread support for the MPLA. Large solidarity gatherings took place in Chicago, Boston, Philadelphia, and Norfolk, while smaller pickets and marches occurred nationwide – including the WOA organized rally in Washington mentioned above.[1052] In one of the largest demonstrations, more than one thousand people marched through the streets of downtown New York in protest of the government's policy. Activists designed their efforts to simultaneously educate local populations on the issue and demonstrate to legislators how seriously their constituents opposed foreign intervention.[1053]

[1049] Advertisement, ACOA, "Angola . . . A New Vietnam?" *New York Times*, 18 January 1976.
[1050] Letter, Deborah Huntington to WOA, 7 January 1976; Report, Clergy and Laity Concern, January 1976 [early], Box 44, WOA Papers, YDL.
[1051] Announcement and handwritten note, "Protest at U.S. and Soviet Missions," 24 December 1975, Box 44, WOA Papers, YDL.
[1052] Prexy Nesbitt Interview; Angola Solidarity Coalition, "Angola Solidarity Rally," January 1976, AAA. Thomas L. Dabney, "Support for Angola Urged in Norfolk," Norfolk Journal and Guide, 10 January 1976. See also C. Gerald Fraser, "Small Groups of Blacks in U.S. Focusing on Angola," *New York Times*, 14 December 1975. Protests would continue throughout the month, with more than 400 showing up to an MPLA rally in Boston as late as February. "Faneuil Hall," *Harvard Crimson*, 9 February 1976.
[1053] "1,000 Here March Against U.S. Role in Angola," *New York Times*, 18 January 1976. One woman also dismissed them as communists, while another man waiting for his wife inside Macy's proclaimed he did

A growing number of solidarity groups also conducted less sensational informational campaigns, which rallied ordinary citizens against the policy. With relatively little data available about Angola before December, people looked to the activist groups for answers. In the Midwest, for example, CCLAMG spent the first third of the year speaking, publishing news articles, and holding fundraising events for the MPLA – showing *A Luta Continua* more than 50 times in 1976 as a way of dramatizing the constructive CONCP ideologies.[1054] Similar activities occurred in the Bay Area, New York, and Boston. These campaigns included the diversity of membership that had been the hallmark of the final years of the anti-Portuguese demonstrations, but the immediacy of the Vietnam comparison acted as a magnet for groups that had always been at the outskirts of solidarity organizing. The participation of established anti-war organizations such as Clergy and Laity Concerned, Americans for Democratic Action, and Women's Strike for Peace merged with existing activism from the pre-independence period to form a new and more visible popular front. Constituent letters flooded into Washington, trending strongly against intervention. The numbers of teach-ins and meetings did not approach the size of the Vietnam era, but a sense of popular outrage was palpable. South Africa, watching closely from the sidelines, noted the unprecedented pressure placed on the administration by not just the Congress, but "the media, religious organizations and radical

not give a damn about what happened in Angola. To many of the protesters, the man's gruff remark likely proved their point.

[1054] "Summary of CCLAMG's Work," ND [March or April 1977], Carole Collins Papers, Michigan State University Special Collections (East Lansing, MI).

activist groups."[1055] By the time the House prepared for its vote in late January, national polls showed more than 70 percent of Americans opposed involving themselves in foreign internal wars like the one raging in Angola.[1056]

This popular pressure along with ongoing lobbying swung the House firmly behind the Tunney and Clark amendments by the time it reconvened at the end of January.[1057] The floor debate represented the last chance for the White House to salvage its policy. From the White House, Ford warned that passage of the amendment "will send a message of irresolution . . . to United States allies and friends throughout the world." He appealed directly to Speaker Carl Albert to oppose the vote and possibly delay it. Nothing worked. Only a handful of conservative Republicans spoke in favor of the intervention.[1058] These rare statements paled in comparison to the strong sentiment against Angolan aid. Critics set the tone and rules of the argument, as almost all statements revolved around the comparisons between southern Africa and Vietnam. The two sides haggled over the accuracy of various aspects of the analogy, but its centrality to the debate demonstrated the victory of Clark's framing of the issue.

[1055] Memo, J.B. Shearar to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 4 March 1976, SA Public Relations Activities in the United States, Volume 5, 1/33/3/1, South African Foreign Affairs Archives (Pretoria, South Africa). Author's translation.

[1056] William Chapman, "Activists of the 60s Reappear, with Angola Aid as Target," *Washington Post*, 25 January 1976. Letter campaigns communicated this anger directly to Congress and the White House. See Campaign for a Democratic Foreign Policy and Center for National Security Studies, "CIA war in Angola," 5 January 1976, Box 5, Southern Africa Support Group, Harsh Collection; letters to President Ford, White House Central File, CO, Box 6, CO 7 Angola, GRFL

[1057] Robert P. Hey, "Congress May Ban Angola Aid," Christian Science Monitor, 6 January 1976. Quoted in Dana Adams Schmidt, "Congress Waits Impatiently to Press Angola Curbs," Christian Science Monitor, 23 January 1976.

[1058] Ford to Albert, 27 January 1976, Max Friedersdorf Files, Box 10, Angola.

Less debatable was where constituents stood just a few months away from going to the polls. Congressmen returned again and again to the unpopularity and wrongheaded nature of the White House's actions, quoting among others WOA documents on popular opinion.[1059] As John Burton of California stated, anyone willing to vote $50 million for the unpopular Angola adventure "should get ready to draw retirement."[1060] Appropriations Committee Chair George Mahon (D-TX) and other Cold Warriors maintained their opposition to the bill, but they recognized that passage was inevitable. "It is perfectly clear," Mahon stated resignedly, "that the sentiment in Congress and in the country is opposed to heavy involvement of the United States in Angola."[1061] The American commitment may have been small, but that was beside the point. The twin pressures of the Vietnam specter and domestic outrage pushed congressmen to overwhelmingly condemn the Ford-Kissinger policy in southern Africa. By a three-to-one majority, the House backed Tunney and forbade the Administration from granting any additional aid to the competing Angolan nationalists. The Clark amendment would become law a short time later.

After the House passed the Tunney Amendment, the administration faced a difficult decision. It would have to request direct assistance in order to continue its operations. In the weeks following the Senate defeat, this hope had kept the anti-communist coalition together.[1062] Ford's dilemma had a few solutions, none of which seemed likely to succeed

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[1059] CR – House, 94th Congress, Second Session 1040 (27 January 1976), 1045-1046, which specifically quotes from the Washington Office on Africa.
[1060] Ibid, 19.
[1061] George Mahon, "Statement on the Angola Amendment to the Defense Bill," 26 January 1976, Box 1, Loen and Leppert Files, GRFL.
[1062] Ford had also made preparations for other allies to back the anti-communists, including Saudi Arabia and Iran. Cuban exiles also made preparations to travel to Angola to fight Castro's forces, which the United

in light of the overwhelming vote in the lower house. The president retained the power to veto the legislation and force it back to the Congress, request additional military aid for Zaire, or seek the public approval of funds he had promised Mobutu. While the veto seemed an attractive option in a White House that wielded the weapon with great aplomb, the move would win few friends among those legislators already angry at the secrecy of the whole project. It would certainly not go over well with a hostile public, which was dangerous during the election year of 1976. The second option, providing additional military aid to Zaire with the implicit understanding it would go on to Angola, raised legal questions. The administration came to the conclusion that overt assistance would only be possible through new legislation authorizing it or an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act. The solution included a bill that tied continuing assistance to the pursuit of a negotiated settlement and a prohibition against the deployment of American personnel. The National Security Council thought it would be a difficult road, but they believed putting the "hard choice" directly to Congress may "bring us unexpected support, especially in the House."[1063]

Republicans and other Cold Warriors encouraged Ford to take the stand. Some legislators quietly supported the program, believing that Angola demanded a larger American commitment. They, however, feared a public backlash and remained away from the limelight. Many abstained or otherwise avoided a firm stand. There existed a possibility that Ford could find support in these corners if only he publicly committed himself to

States did not try to prevent. Informational Bulleting, Jon Howe to Vice President, 4 January 1976, Box 13, Series 19, Papers of Vice President Nelson A. Rockefeller, Rockefeller Archives (Sleepy Hollow, NY).

[1063] Memo, Granger and Janke to Scowcroft, "Overt Funding," 16 January 1976, Box 1, Presidential Country Files for Africa, GRFL.

opposing the Soviet-Cuban presence.[1064] Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) felt this way. He assured Ford that the votes existed to pass the funding if only he would submit the request directly to the Senate on its own merits. The problem, according to Goldwater, was not popular opinion or Congressional sentiment, but that a bunch of "sob sisters on Vietnam" had railroaded the legislation through the Senate before pro-intervention members were able to gather their forces. Goldwater assured the president in private that "if you veto it . . . I think we could support it . . . we got a lotta votes."[1065] Ford had already discarded the veto idea, but Goldwater's encouragement hinted at the possibility of an overt funding package finding a positive reception. Some press outlets agreed, estimating that a presidential request for Angolan funds stood at least a 50-50 chance.[1066]

The White House had an outside chance of winning the long war, but popular dissent continued to demonstrate just how politically dangerous this stance would be as campaigns for reelection began. Popular protests continued, with the majority continuing to call for official recognition of the MPLA. In Philadelphia, black activists with lingering memories of the Gulf Boycott marched on the headquarters of the oil giant, urging accommodation with the leftist government of Angola.[1067] In California, the former head of the Congress of Racial Equality and Elaine Brown formed The Black Coalition Against

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[1064] Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 832; See for instance David Binder, Congressmen tell of irritation over cover U.S. Angola Aid," *New York Times*, 13 December 1975.
[1065] "Transcript of Goldwater/Ford Conversation in Oval Office," undated (late January 1976), Howard H. Callaway Files, Box 1, Memoranda, GRFL.
[1066] Dana Adams Schmitt, "Kissinger Expected to seek over aid for Angola action," *Christian Science Monitor*, 29 January 1976.
[1067] Harry Amana, "Philadelphia Angola Backers to March on Gulf Oil Offices," *Philadelphia Tribune*, 7 February 1976.

U.S. Intervention in Angola, which targeted blacks working in favor of UNITA and others opposing MPLA interests.[1068] Letters of protest also continued to pour into Washington. Many that made it into the White House files came from religious organizations with connections to the anti-colonial and anti-war movements. In one example, the national board president of the Young Women's Christian Association wrote to Ford offering her advice. The letter, which made it to the desk of National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, cautioned the president from "increasing the potential for destruction" through further aid to warring parties, recommending instead a sole focus on diplomatic initiatives.[1069] Ford could complain about the decision of the Congress, but he realized that the votes represented the most vocal elements of the country. In an election year, ignoring these constituents could prove disastrous for his chances of returning to the Oval Office.

By February, the decision to accept Congress' decision had essentially been made. The administration doubted that Angola would be worth a second black-eye from Congress. Kissinger had been one of the first to resign himself to the facts, nearly accepting the inevitable defeat during the winter break. "Maybe we should let Angola go," the embattled secretary told Brent Scowcroft, "Maybe we should just not have started that operation." Scowcroft scoffed, "We should not have done what is right[?]" Kissinger answered with seeming resignation, "The defeat [Clark and the Congress] are inflicting on us is worse."[1070] Deeply frustrated with Congress and in need of reassurance, Kissinger

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[1068] Daryl Lembke, "Recruiting for Angola War Opposed," *Los Angeles Times*, 13 February 1976.
[1069] Letter, Elizabeth S. Genne to Ford, 26 January 1976, White House Central File, CO, Box 6, CO 7 Angola, GRFL.
[1070] Telcon, Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft, 6 January 1976, National Security Archive.

continued to agitate for Angola only because Ford offered his full support to his secretary.[1071] Ford insisted on the rightness of the policy, but the January vote had forced the president to confront the fact that the intervention would not succeed. The president's most forceful reaction was to lash out at Congress for having "lost its guts," effectively turning Angola into an election issue. [1072] Observing closely from the sidelines, the South Africans articulated what much of the country had already realized: "the administration is powerless to act . . . and the Russians and the Cubans, at least for the foreseeable future, have nothing stronger than words to worry about."[1073] In the battle between two views of what was the "right" course of action in Angola, the administration had lost to a determined Congressional cadre and a vocal popular minority. Ford would continue to see Angola as a Cold War crisis and threaten action, but he admitted behind closed doors that he would not submit a bill. Kissinger and Ford had lost. The activist network inspired over the years by the CONCP parties had finally achieved a major political victory in the United States and on the continent. The defeat in Washington sapped the will of the anti-communist coalition already on the defensive, and the MPLA was able to consolidate its power across much of country as aid to Roberto and Savimbi diminished. Though UNITA would continue to employ a guerilla resistance from the southern bush for nearly three decades,

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[1071] Telegram, Washington to FCO, 26 February 1976, FCO 082/641, Folder: Henry Kissinger, UKNA. Kissinger's depression was so deep that he talked about resigning. Telegram, Washington to FCO, 5 February 1976, Ibid.

[1072] "Sen. Weicker Defends Stand on Angola Aid," Hartford Courant, 12 February 1976. One critical reporter noted that Ford's statement had "The phrasing had the delicacy of Joe McCarthy's." Anthony Lewis, "The Politics of Patriotism," *New York Times*, 16 February 1976.

[1073] Memo, J.B. Shearar to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 3 March 1976, SA Public Relations Activities in the United States, Volume 5, 1/33/3/1, South African Foreign Affairs Archives.

the communist backed party had effectively established itself as the legitimate government of independent Angola.

Institutionalization of Internationalism and Reaction

The Angolan crisis of 1976 heralded a new era of American foreign policy, one in which a new, popular internationalism could confront the heretofore dominant Cold War tendencies of the government and win. This was not just a reaction to imperial overstretch as had occurred in Vietnam or to covert coups as had happened in Chile, but a proactive political opposition to Third World intervention in all forms. It sought to change the nature of American foreign policy as it happened. The punctuated Cold War equilibrium created by Vietnam and other events had found its first true test in Angola. As the largest colony of the last European empire, Angola was a symbol of a new era that challenged the traditional power politics of the superpower conflict. This new era would be created by decolonization and growing global concerns about Third World development, but it continued to clash with the traditional bipolar international system. In the midst of the debate over IA Feature, the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation published a report claiming that the "existing 'order' is coming apart, and rightly so." Unfortunately, the very name of this document, "What Now," testified to the still unidentified nature of this new, increasingly decentralized postcolonial era.[1074] New governments like that of the MPLA were making claims to legitimacy across the strict Manichean confines of the Cold War,

[1074] Dag Hammarskjold Foundation, *What Now: Another Development*, 5th Printing (Motala, Sweden: Motala Grafiska, 1982), 6.

with new constituencies like the American solidarity network promoting the interests of a leftist – and soon to be officially reorganized as a communist – party in the heart of the Western alliance. The cumulative effects of moments like the confrontation over Angola would help define the direction of this nascent era.

The internationalist victory had important implications for the administration and the long-term viability of Cold War foreign policy, but not all of them were obvious at the time. In the short term, the Angola debacle forced Ford and Kissinger to reassess their African policy. Angola had demonstrated the errors and costly political side-effects of continuing to work with recalcitrant regimes like South Africa. In the wake of its defeat in Angola, the United States desperately needed to polish its tarnished image. It began by relaxing its opposition to the MPLA. The secretary allowed the sale of a Boeing 737 to the government and did not protest when Gulf Oil made plans to resume its operations, with the government in Luanda benefitting from the revenue. Still, the White House refused to normalize relations and would occasionally oppose MPLA requests to join international agencies.[1075] The fiasco did force a more dramatic transformation of regional policy. It convinced Kissinger to abandon the U.S. tradition of quietly backing the minority regimes in favor of more direct involvement in negotiations favoring majority rule. The secretary applied his famous shuttle diplomacy to the problem of self-determination in the minority state of Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). This policy united the administration with many of its most vocal critics, including the activist network, Clark, Tunney, and the Congressional Black

[1075] "Report Prepared by the Working Group on Angola," 2 April 1976, Document 162 in FRUS 1969-1976.

Caucus.[1076] These strange bedfellows would have been nearly impossible to imagine just a few months before. The problems of self-determination, human rights, and majority rule that had been perpetually delayed by American governments now came front and center.

The MPLA had been largely passive in terms of its appeals to the activist network during the Angolan crisis, focused primarily on the military aspects of independence. The hallmark of the solidarity movement had always been the irregular involvement of nationalist representatives like Sharfudine Khan and Gil Fernandes, which left local action largely in the hands of Western allies. This especially had been the case in 1975, since all the CONCP parties had been focusing on the foundation of their new states. None had established permanent representations in the United States after the transfer of power, and only FRELIMO kept Khan at the United Nations. Yet events had demonstrated the power of the solidarity network, and the nationalists were eager to continue working with their old grassroots contacts despite the diplomatic opportunities offered by control of the state apparatus.

After the victory of the anti-interventionist coalition, the MPLA sought to formalize these popular ties as a way of advancing its international agenda. In February 1976, the party arranged for a support meeting in Havana, where it gathered nineteen organizations sympathetic to its cause in the United States, including ACOA, WOA, the CCLAMG, the American Friends Service Committee, the Coalition for a New Foreign Policy, the National Council of Churches, and the National Conference of Black

[1076] Memo, Les Janka to Brent Scowcroft, 18 May 1976, Box 4, NSC Press and Congressional Liaison Staff, National Security Adviser Files, GRFL.

Lawyers.[1077] For five days, three MPLA representatives fielded questions from the groups and laid out the goals of their newly established government in the familiar CONCP areas of agriculture, health, and education. The government would pursue a non-aligned policy, which provided room for American cooperation even as they continued to depend on Cuban and Soviet assistance.[1078] The party understood that they would continue to face resistance within the United States and some other Western nations, so it urged its allies to champion their cause as they focused on the development of the nation. The MPLA specifically requested assistance with promoting its image in America, nation-building support in the form of medical aid programs as had emerged from Europe, the arrangement of functionary visits to the United States, and –most importantly – political lobbying for official recognition of the MPLA government.[1079] Upon their return, these solidarity organizations would become the popular voice for the MPLA and worked closely with allies like Diggs and Clark to push legislation acknowledging Luanda's legitimacy, though this would again prove an uphill battle.[1080]

This meeting – in the capitol of a communist country which had only recently been fighting American backed forces – illustrated how far many of the groups had come in

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[1077] George M. Houser, "Report of the Havana Seminar," 25-29 February 1976, African Activist Archive, Michigan State University. The Congressional Black Caucus had been invited, but declined to attend based largely on ongoing discussions about how African American legislators should treat Cuba.
[1078] James E. Bristol, "Report on Seminar on Angola," February 1976, AAA.
[1079] Marjorie Boehm, "Report of Angolan Seminar held in Havana," March 1976, AAA.
[1080] See for instance, "Group urges recognition of Angola," *Baltimore Afro-American*, 6 March 1976. The MPLA would officially adopt Marxist-Leninism in 1977, adding *Partido do Trabalho* (woeker's party) at the end of its name. Diggs also specifically referred to the success the MPLA had in Europe, where a number of governments that had long been working with the party recognized it in the wake of American defeat. Charles Diggs, "Angola: Why Washington should Recognize Luanda," 24 March 1973, Box 300, Diggs Papers, MSRC, HU.

rejecting Cold War ideological divisions. The activists, including traditional centrists like ACOA and the National Council of Churches, had adopted a new internationalism that emphasized North-South issues over East-West rivalries. This broad front had begun during the Vietnam era, but the battle for Portuguese Africa and Angola expanded, clarified, and confirmed it. It would remain a loose network dedicated to the pursuit of a more progressive foreign policy for the next decade, including but not limited to Africa.[1081] Activists, lobbying agencies, and congressmen would consistently look back to Angola as a model for future action against American intervention targeting Latin America and Asia as well.[1082] The strong linkage between anti-UNITA, anti-apartheid and anti-Contra campaigning in the 1980s illustrates the long-term impact of the coalition forged in solidarity with struggles of the Portuguese colonies and confirmed in the activism of 1976.[1083]

It is the timing of such transnational initiatives that is especially important for understanding the impact of the Portuguese African solidarity movement. Historians looking at American policy in southern Africa have long seen the Soweto uprisings that began in mid-June as a pivotal moment that helped inspire widespread resistance to

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[1081] Some of these groups that would later play an important role in mobilizing anti-apartheid demonstrations began their operations in 1976, due to Angola and before the Soweto Uprising in June, notably the American Friends Service Committee.

[1082] The influential, church-funded Washington Office on Latin America drew directly on the experiences of WOA, with whom they shared an office in the 1970s. Joe Eldridge, phone interview with author, 19 May 2014. Dick Clark became the head of the Aspen Institute, which sought to unite activists, academics, and politicians around issues involving the developing world. The anti-Contra rider of the 1980s even referred back to Dick Clark's famous amendment.

[1083] See Roger Peace, *A Call to Conscience: The Anti-Contra War Campaign* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2012). According to Dick Clark, the anti-Contra rider drew almost word for word on his 1976 legislation.

apartheid, but Angola galvanized existing networks and heralded emergence of a new, more critical voice on American involvement in the developing world and Africa in particular. It provided momentum for a segment of American society to push policy in the direction of sincere self-determination, based less on style of governance than perceived popular will. As one WOA staff member noted at the time with reference to American policy, "After Angola, the [liberation of South Africa] entered a new phase w/ new possibilities."[1084] At the grassroots level, organizations refocused their work on the minority regimes and greatly expanded their campaigns on behalf of the liberation movements. As the American Friends Service committee reflected days before Soweto, activists had to seize the opportunity to reach new audiences after Angola forced southern Africa "into a spotlight for American attention" and revealed the extent to which "church, academic, black, and peace activists" had already begun organizing.[1085]

Politically, the defeat of IA Feature confirmed and reified the emerging internationalist coalition that directly questioned the traditional tenets of the Cold War. In their statement on U.S. policy drafted in April, the Black Caucus revealed the impact of the popular-congressional struggle over the former colony:

> The U.S. debacle in Angola exposed the bankruptcy of U.S. policy toward Africa – a policy permeated with racism and conceived as a by-product of U.S. relations with its European allies and as a minor addendum to U.S. Soviet policy. . . The African momentum toward liberation in southern Africa from minority rule and full liberation in Black Africa from the shackles of neo-colonialism leaves the United States no choice [but to adjust US policy]. Past and present policy for supporting white rule in Africa has placed the United States in an untenable position.

[1084] Undated notes, [c. 1976], Folder 8, Box 44, WOA Papers, YDL.

[1085] Memo, David Sogge to Earle Edwards, 7 June 1976, Box PED Program Resources Southern Africa Speakers Services 1976, AFSC.

> Internationally, the United States can only lose if it fails to get on the side of freedom in Africa. Domestically, such a policy cannot be sustained.[1086]

Africa became for many in 1976 *the* cause for the new internationalism supported by legislators, liberals, and grassroots activists. As the Black Caucus summarized succinctly, "U.S. African relations present a critical test to the U.S. to demonstrate its capacity to adapt to the challenges of global interdependence, and the demands for economic equity."[1087] Activists responded to this challenge with renewed vigor, and legislators showed their assertiveness would not end with Vietnam. In the period of political reorientation of 1975-76, a broad bloc of centrists and leftists had united together behind the goal of supporting meaningful economic and political self-determination in the developing world unconstrained by anti-communism or the Cold War.

The political reorientation that coincided with the collapse of IA Feature did not, however, create a consensus to replace the Cold War liberalism that had begun to splinter. Angola had a much different effect within the ranks of anti-communists. A segment of the population had been deeply disturbed by Soviet and Cuban actions. It came to believe that Angola, in the words of columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, symbolized the "U.S. inability to respond to Soviet challenges because of the ravages of Vietnam and ten years of internal political upheaval."[1088] These opinions had been silenced by the chorus of activist voices mobilized by ACOA, the Congressional Black Caucus, and myriad other

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[1086] Draft, "The Caucus of Black Democrats U.S. Policy Toward Africa," 12 April 1976, Box 300, Diggs Papers, MSRC, HU.
[1087] Draft, "The Caucus of Black Democrats U.S. Policy Toward Africa," 28 April 1976, Ibid.
[1088] Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Angola's Deeper Threat," Austin American Statesman, 22 December 1975.

groups in early 1976, but they re-emerged after the victory in the House. Some moderate members of Congress felt that Clark and his allies had crossed a line, even as they acceded to constituent calls to vote against the administration. House International Relations Committee member Lee Hamilton (D-IN) saw Angola as the latest in a series of "well-meaning congressional initiatives" that had unintended consequences for American foreign interests. [1089] These members felt that Congress was overextended. The body had declared itself arbiter of foreign affairs, a role for which its deliberative nature was poorly suited. Many critics came to believe that the legislature had been overtaken by an activist minority reflecting the beliefs of a relatively thin slice of the American population. The divisive nature of Vietnam had empowered this vocal minority over Nixon's still "silent majority" in the 1970s, but with Angola the momentum seemed to have reached its zenith. The presence of Soviet and Cuban forces in a foreign country was something new entirely.[1090] Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld thought that Angola would have a cathartic effect, releasing the Vietnam guilt and inspiring a new concern about Soviet expansion: "you'll see the mood in this country shift; you'll see people become concerned about defense."[1091]

And shift it did. Angola became the rallying cry for a new generation of Cold Warriors. Ronald Reagan used the topic as a bludgeon on the primary campaign trail in

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[1089] Dana Adams Schmidt, "Congress Waits Impatiently to Press Angola Curbs," Christian Science Monitor, 23 January 1976.

[1090] The apparent defeat at the hands of Cuban forces was especially worrying, since this had direct implications for Latin America. Writing to the president, Kissinger argued that "Angola, for Latin America, is more important thn Vietnam . . . we tried to do something about it and failed, by our own internal division, to stop Cuba." Report, Kissinger to President, 19 February 1976, Box 13, Series 19, Papers of Nelson A. Rockefeller, Rockefeller Archive.

[1091] "Rumsfeld says Congress won't repeat Angola action," Boston Globe, 15 February 1976.

1976, as did a number of congressional candidates over the next three years. Just months after pushing through his defense rider, John Tunney lost his seat to the conservative president of San Francisco State University, S.I. Hayakawa, who branded the incumbent an isolationist.[1092] Dick Clark would not escape a close race in 1978 with an opponent that referred to the "radical" legislator as "the senator from Africa."[1093] The shift in electoral politics also had a grassroots component. Taking a page from the Vietnam protest handbook, young conservatives began to build networks that championed just the kind of covert operations that the internationalists had opposed. Often, they would do so by mobilizing public and congressional opinion to force executive action.[1094] These emboldened conservative critics pointed to Soviet involvement elsewhere in Africa as the ramifications of Angolan retreat. The country needed a new form of containment. By the time Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan in 1979, politicians from both parties saw a disturbing trend and backed Democratic President Jimmy Carter's covert funding to the Mujahedeen. Six years later, the Congress would overturn the Clark amendment after numerous attempts, freeing the way for the Reagan Doctrine to provide arms to Jonas Savimbi's UNITA, which had retreated into the bush after its ignominious defeat in 1976.

[1092] Larry Stammer and Ellen Hume, "Tunney, Hayakawa Debate Foreign Policy," *Los Angeles Times*, 28 October 1976. Hayakawa actually argued for sending troops to Africa. Amazingly, he won.

[1093] Dick Clark Interview. Bill Richardson with Michael Ruby, *Between Two Worlds: The Making of an American Life* (New York: Plume 2007), chapter 4. Richardson traveled to Africa with Clark in late 1976 as a staffer on the Foreign Relations Committee.

[1094] Eventually, these popular organizations would give birth to some of today's most strident conservative voices, including Grover Norquist. Nina J. Easton, Gang of Five (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000), Chapter 7.

Conclusion

Angola was a pivotal moment in the history of U.S. foreign affairs toward the developing world. It helped institutionalize and disseminate a common internationalist critique of American interventionism. In contrast to Vietnam and Chile, an assertive activist network had helped Congress pro-actively constrain executive power. It articulated a clear analogy to Indochina that militated against covert operations and embraced a more cooperative approach to the developing world. At the same time, it bred a sincere distress among Americans still dedicated to fighting the Cold War, fellow citizens who felt that the limitations of the Southeast Asian hangover had been defined in the bush around Luanda. In answer to the question of "What Now?" Angola hinted that the future would hold few answers. Rather, it introduced and formalized a number of competing ideas that drew less on a common view of world order than competing transnational ideologies competing against each other in the context of a series of domestic political debates.

There was no consensus on the future of American policy, but there did exist agreement on the role of popular democracy in shaping foreign affairs. As historian Van Gosse has argued, Vietnam created a political earthquake opposed to the basic tenets of the Cold War and launched a new era of grassroots engagement with the government. The multi-tiered activism that emerged in the 1970s around Indochina and the revolutions in Portuguese Africa did not disappear – not after the fall of Saigon nor the Lisbon regime – but "rather, it melded into the fabric of our political institutions and habits, and by doing

so, changed them profoundly."[1095] The institutionalization of this decentralized movement relied on the efforts of key activists, lobbyists, and legislators in applying its lessons to ongoing problems of American policy, notably in the region of southern Africa. The leftist-centrist coalition that formed around Lusophone liberation and concrete activities such as the Gulf Boycott demonstrated its longevity with Angola in 1976, while also spurring the creation of a similarly powerful grassroots conservatism. This domestic conflict over ideas, values, and the proper form of international policy would in many ways replace the monolithic Cold War that was slowly unravelling at the international level. As the shibboleths of this deeply divided new era, the former colonies of Portuguese Africa – Angola and Mozambique – would remain at the heart of this transnational ideological debate until the end of the superpower conflict.

[1095] Van Gosse, "Unpacking the Vietnam Syndrome," in *The World the Sixties Made,* Gosse and Richard Moser, eds. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2008), 111.

Conclusion

The surprising defeat of Gerald Ford's limited intervention in Angola against a Soviet-Cuban backed MPLA government hinted at a new era of American foreign policy, one that could no longer be justified primarily in terms of anti-communism and narrow national interests. As Thomas Borstelmann has recently argued in his expansive look at the 1970s, the "anti-colonial, pro-human rights environment of American politics in the mid-1970s" hamstrung Ford and hinted at a new status quo.[1096] Yet in attributing the Clark and Tunney amendments solely to popular frustration with foreign adventurism and a new attunement to human rights – often broadly captured in references to a "Vietnam Syndrome" – historians have missed the concrete ways in which transnational solidarity networks directly influenced official policy.[1097] Congress' ability to quickly mobilize against the president owed much to the maturation of a motivated left-leaning transnational advocacy lobby backed by a decentralized grassroots movement. Opponents of American policy in Vietnam and Chile suffered from an insufficiently critical and organized public, but this was not the case after nearly a decade of organizing on behalf of Portuguese Africa. Transnational activists had refined their ability to frame foreign issues and mobilize popular-political support in ways that could constrain an executive branch that continued to lean toward intervention in situations where a pro-Western stability seemed threatened. Angola offered the first demonstration that such an approach could be successful outside the unique circumstances of the late Vietnam War, and it established guidelines for action

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[1096] Thomas Borstelmann, *The 1970s: A New Global History from Civil Rights to Economic Inequality* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 190.

[1097] See for instance Tom Wells, *The War Within: America's Battle Over Vietnam* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 850; Christian G. Appy, *American Reckoning: The Vietnam War and Our National Identity* (New York: Penguin, 2015), chapter 10.

that would inform coming domestic debates on South Africa, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Mozambique, and elsewhere.

That a show of popular-political solidarity with a socialist party in Angola was possible owed much to the specific circumstances created by events in the 1960s. The Vietnam War shattered the illusions of the just, democratic, and egalitarian societies that Western states had sold to the world. Long histories of the intervention in the Third World demonstrated that far from idealistic, Western policy was continuously based on cold calculations of economic and political power. The treatment of Portuguese Africa in the 1960s dramatized to many international observers that this reality stretched beyond Southeast Asia. Despite the seeming inevitability of decolonization, the United States and its European allies continued to cling to the familiar in an attempt to manage the East-West conflict at the expense of popular aspirations in the global South. Long-term prospects for continued Northern hegemony were prioritized over the immediate demands of African peoples. This narrative was not unfamiliar, but in the globalized postwar world, nationalists had the ability to move around state borders. Information and travel networks allowed them to cultivate alliances with civil society groups through personal diplomacy, confirming an openness in the international system that empowered stateless movements.

The formation of these networks were pivotal in the creation of a transnational civil society that, while not truly global, connected Africa, Europe, and the United States. From the 1950s through the 1970s, the contentious debate over the rights – civil, political, economic, and human – of African peoples and their descendants defined the contours of this space. It was the dialectic between the continents that helped fuel the growth of the New Left internationalism, but it also contributed to the creation of a reactionary internationalism opposed to systemic reform and often clothed in rhetoric of anti-communism. As a result, battles over the legitimacy of the Cold War that emerged in the

1960s incorporated considerations of race and the continued preponderance of the global North. The tensions between these competing worldviews demanded the creation of an activist solidarity movement in the West in order to combat a conservative internationalism that identified the stability offered by colonialism and white rule as an essential element of Western security. That Euro-Americans began to question this state of affairs, domestically at the behest of civil rights movement and internationally with the encouragement of Third World revolutionaries, had deep effects on the way large swaths of society understood international relations.

In the United States, these transnational advocacy networks competed most aggressively in the Congress. Even with relatively sympathetic presidents in office, the executive branch had shown a clear deference to European interests as part of its strategy for managing the superpower conflict. Beginning in the late 1960s, though, a new generation of Cold War cynics on the Hill did battle with hawks for majority votes on increasingly contentious matters of national security.[1098] Victory for one side or the other depended less on the general environment and more on the ability of leftist grassroots-political advocacy networks to build coalitions against traditions of Cold War interventionism. Anti-Vietnam dissents had opened a space for such criticism, but reaction against the war had not necessarily offered an alternative policy nor an effective model for organizing around more marginal causes. The New Left internationalism that lay behind the defeat of the Angolan intervention of 1975 addressed both these issues. Grassroots-political coalitions, committed to more cooperative relationships with the nations of the global South, organized against foreign adventurism by framing policy options and

[1098] Politicians were encouraged in this new stance by the influx of young, occasionally radicalized staffers who had been active in political movements. Though most were likely intimately familiar with Vietnam, some like ALSC activists Randall Robinson and Gene Locke brought to the Hill a special interest in African issues.

providing alternative information, gaining real power without needing to mobilize hundreds of thousands for mass protests. This state of affairs encouraged activists and reformist policymakers, even as it troubled transnational anti-communists who worried about the decline of Western power.

The deep divisions that informed American policy are apparent in the debates that occurred during the presidential administration of Jimmy Carter. Like Kennedy, Carter was more ideologically flexible and less cynical in his view of the Third World than were his immediate predecessors, but he was still a Cold Warrior. His emphasis on diplomacy and human rights was as much a way of combatting the Soviet Union on moral terms as it was pursued for its own justness.[1099] This internal tension seeped into political debates in Washington, much as it had done for Kennedy sixteen years prior. In Carter's White House, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski continued to champion an anti-communist worldview that clashed with that of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, the former diplomat under Lyndon Johnson who had adopted a more internationalist, human rights-centered approach to international affairs. One of the areas where these two perspectives conflicted most consistently was in southern Africa, particularly in Angola where the United States had yet to normalize diplomatic relations. Where the Cold Warrior Brzezinski saw an upstart communist state inviting Soviet and Cuban presences into the heart of Africa, Vance and United Nations Ambassador Andrew Young worried that an obsession with communist influence in the region would distract the United States from its central goal – the pursuit of a just resolution to the nagging problems of self-determination that would better guarantee long-term stability.[1100] As it had under Kennedy, Brzezinski's support for

[1099] For example, one memo on broad policy toward Africa understood the negotiations regarding Zimbabwe and Namibia as worthwhile for "improve[ing] America's image throughout the continent" and "denying an opportunity for Soviet intervention." Memo, "Sub-Saharan Africa," NLC-128-7-3-1-8, RAC, Jimmy Carter Library (Atlanta, GA). Hereafter, JCL.
[1100] Memo, US UN to Secstate, 27 April 1978, NLC-24-110-2-3-7, RAC, JCL.

a greater interventionism slowly won out as the pugilistic national security advisor outlasted both Young and Vance. He succeeded in delaying the recognition of the Angolan government, while laying the groundwork for future aid to Jonas Savimbi's UNITA in its ongoing guerrilla war against the MPLA.

Yet in contrast to Kennedy, the debate in the Carter White House occurred under sustained pressure from outside forces. Angola had become a Cold War flashpoint filled with Soviet weapons and Cuban advisers, but in the new context of the late 1970s there was no clear mandate for American action. Vance and Young had an extensive list of allies who supported a more positive, less reactionary engagement with the communist-leaning government of Angola and the region more generally. Beyond the vague spirit of human rights present in American discourse or the diffuse "Vietnam syndrome" much discussed by historians, a concrete coalition of internationalist activists and reformist politicians continuously called for Carter to recognize the MPLA and engage sincerely with questions of African self-determination. This coalition was led in the Congress by the Black Congressional Caucus, but also included myriad grassroots organizations, ACOA, WOA, and – after 1977 – the African American lobbying group TransAfrica under the leadership of Randall Robinson.[1101] Influenced and encouraged by these groups, a small core of congressman regularly urged the president, in the words of Paul Tsongas (D-MA), to downplay Cold War considerations in favor of a policy defined by "our own values and the aspirations of black Africans."[1102] The Cuban presence and the increase in Soviet attention to the continent would embolden hawkish politicians as the 1970s progressed, but, for much of the decade, Congressional opinion had a chilling effect on Brzezinski's

[1101] See for example, Memo, North-South to David Aaron, 23 June 1980, NLC-10R-30-1-4-3, RAC, JCL; Press Release, 14 August 1979, Box 13, Chronological Files, White House Press Office, Presidential Papers, JCL.
[1102] Letter, Tsongas to the president, 22 June 1978, Box 218, Office of Congressional Liaison Beckel, Presidential Papers, JCL.

ambitions to fund UNITA and reignite the Cold War in Africa.[1103] This state of affairs owed much to a network of internationalists dedicated to challenging the historic inequities and changing traditions of American policy.

Here in a nutshell was the new state of American and – to some extent – Western engagement with the global South after the Vietnam War. The anti-communist consensus that had motivated American policy and pushed it toward intervention in the Third World for much of the 1950s and 1960s had disappeared. It had received a heavy blow from the conflict in Southeast Asia, but movements against similar activities in places like Angola had confirmed its demise. No new consensus had taken its place. Rather, there existed inherently conflicting visions of Western engagement with the wider world, defined most clearly in the conflict between traditional anti-communism and a New Left internationalism dedicated to true self-determination as well as greater cooperation between North and South. These two ideologies would clash in the White House, the halls of Congress, in the competing pitches of lobbyists around Washington, and in the streets of the United States and Western Europe. While both sides would adopt novel rhetoric that paid lip-service to the challenge of protecting individual human rights, at stake was another equally fundamental right: whether states and peoples in the Africa, Asia, and Latin America would define their own futures in the midst of superpower conflict.

As it had been for over a decade, Portuguese Africa – and its symbolic center in Angola – remained a contested piece in this puzzle. As the Carter administration considered the possibility of normalizing relations with Angola when Cuban troops still patrolled the country, it faced a situation where domestic constituencies were likely to condemn it for

[1103] Memo, Cyrus Vance to the president, 27 December 1977, NLC 128-13-3-17-4, RAC, JCL. Brzezinksi in particular was bullish on an "interventionist policy" in Africa he believed the Congress would support, but others within the administration remained cautious given the Kissinger experience. Memo, Tom Thornton to Brzezinksi, 10 April 1978, NLC-24-97-9-11-7, RAC, JCL. The Congress would successful defend the Clark Amendment from administration attempts to overturn it well into the 1980s.

any action. Either the president would suffer the wrath of an anti-Cold War left with vocal elements in the Congress, or it would be "rake[ed] over the coals" by anti-communist organizations such as the AFL-CIO and their Washington allies "for 'betraying' a pro-Western African leader [Savimbi]."[1104] The nation and the Congress were deeply divided between a core of hawkish Cold Warriors and a newly empowered network of New Left internationalists, with both sides winning and losing converts based on the vicissitudes of national and international politics.[1105] What was unique to this post-Vietnam context was that there existed a consistent network of activist groups willing to work with politicians against American intervention abroad as political fortunes waxed and waned. The network provided information on events and movements in Africa and elsewhere. It helped congressmen frame an alternative to the Cold War narrative of the Third World that regularly emanated from the White House with increasing frequency as the 1980s dawned. At the heart of this network of committed activists and progressive politicians was an assertive anti-imperialism, which viewed reactionary Western policies as anathema to the legitimate needs of the peoples of the global South.

Portuguese African nationalists had been pivotal in encouraging the adoption of this expansive anti-imperialism as part of the New Left internationalism, which encompassed critiques of existing racial, geographic, economic, and even gender relations. In all cases, this ideology identified self-determination as a necessary goal, giving marginalized communities greater ability to determine their own futures whether as independent nations or within existing states. The fact that a generation of young people adopted this outlook helped sway more centrist organizations, which had greater access to the policymakers that wielded political power. The key in creating this movement was a

[1104] Memo, Zbigniew Brzezinski to the president, 29 October 1979, NLC 126-19-29-1-9, RAC, JCL.
[1105] Weekly Report, North-South to Brzezinski, 10 January 1980, NLC-24-110-8-11-2, RAC, JCL.

merging of radical leftism and liberal humanitarianism, which had also proved pivotal to the successful diplomacy of the CONCP parties. The left of center groups that adopted this Third World perspective believed countries of the global South deserved the right to define their own economic and, indeed, political systems so long as they seemed to represent the interests of the local people. There is little doubt that the Marxist leaders of North Vietnam and China had helped popularize such ideas, but a widespread embrace by centrist groups owed much to the attractive and less controversial anti-colonial struggles happening outside international hot spots. The socialist parties of the CONCP were important agents in selling this ideology, having an especially strong impact among liberals wary of communism and religious communities with historic ties to Africa. Lusophone solidarity helped institutionalize radical challenges to U.S. foreign policy and society in ways that directly affected the tenor of Western politics. According to the prominent Canadian anti-apartheid activist John Saul, Westerners "learned about the necessary expansiveness of the concept of 'liberation' from the southern African movements themselves, notably from FRELIMO in Mozambique."[1106] The less iconoclastic anti-imperialism promoted by CONCP parties such as FRELIMO and PAIGC had a lasting impact on Western perceptions of the global South and policy toward it.

In disseminating this ideology, the solidarity movement that developed around Portuguese African liberation produced a network of organizations dedicated to empowering reformist, leftist approaches toward the global South. Transnational advocacy networks had existed in the Western world for decades, but they had generally accepted the limitations defined by the liberal anti-communism of the Cold War. Only after adopting more assertive and experimental Third World leftist ideologies did a critical mass of

[1106] John S. Saul, "Two fronts of Anti-apartheid Struggle: South Africa and Canada," *Transformation: Critical Perspective on Southern Africa*, 74 (2010), 145.

activists begin promoting a sincere Euro-American acceptance of political, economic, and social self-determination for postcolonial states. Groups such as the African American-led ALSC and British CFMAG created a grassroots campaigns that demonstrated to Western governments a mass solidarity with revolutionaries in southern Africa, while the Dutch AC and WOA forged permanent contacts with government agencies and politicians. This radicalized generation helped compel existing institutions such as ACOA and the various church organizations to more directly cooperate with leftist parties long suspect in the context of Cold War anti-communism. The result was the merging of radical leftism and liberal humanitarianism that created a broad coalition that could more effectively challenge widely held beliefs in rigid anti-communism. Histories narrowly focused on the anti-war movement have underappreciated the role anti-colonial causes played in uniting these diverse constituencies, but in some ways so have better contextualized studies of human rights activism. The Lusophone challenge to Western foreign affairs drew on the ideological openings created by the Vietnam War, but it extended and formalized them in regard to Euro-American policy toward other postcolonial territories rarely at the center of international news cycles.

As with the anti-war movement, dramatic demonstrations gave way to more patient organizing and lobbying after the dual victory over Portuguese colonialism and American intervention. This shift helped institutionalize negative appraisals of Euro-American foreign policy while simultaneously shifting focus away from Portuguese Africa to encompass regional and global perspectives. This transition happened fluidly because Lusophone solidarity had openly recruited anti-war and anti-apartheid activists through appeals to a broad anti-imperialism. Thus, a more general opposition to minority rule in southern Africa and Western economic exploitation seemed natural after the collapse of the Lisbon regime. In addition to groups like ACOA, LSM, and WOA who had always had

such regional approaches as part of their missions, groups emphasizing Lusophone solidarity used Western attention to Africa in 1976 to expand their advocacy against Rhodesia and South Africa. Notable examples include the transition of the Dutch AC and CCLAMG to the Komitee Zuidelijk Afrika and the Chicago Committee for African Liberation, respectively. Activist groups that had gained prominence during the 1970s continued their missions after 1976, providing an experienced and well-connected leadership ready to support the liberation struggles of Zimbabweans, Namibians, and South Africans in future years.

Relationships forged during this period would also continue to shape radical-religious engagement with foreign policy. Groups organized in the late 1970s and early 1980s drew on a generation of activists who had first discovered Africa through the Lusophone struggles. In Massachusetts, the Boston Coalition for the Liberation of Southern Africa – which helped promote the first successful statewide government divestment bill aimed at apartheid – emerged from the Gulf Boycott Coalition and its members' reaction to news of the Soweto Uprisings in 1976.[1107] The next year, a collection of African American leaders linked to African Liberation Day established TransAfrica to provide a black voice in U.S. foreign relations. Its longtime leader was the seasoned activist Randall Robinson, who had begun working in Washington after making connections with Congressman Diggs as part of the Pan-African Liberation Committee.[1108] These are but two noteworthy examples of a process that occurred throughout the United States, in which activists who had first embraced anti-imperial ideologies as part of their solidarity with

[1107] Richard Clapp, interview with author, 28 May 2015; Richard Clapp, "A Brief History of the Boston Coalition for the Liberation of Southern Africa," 2004, African Activist Archive.
[1108] Randall Robinson, *Defending the Spirit: A Black Life in America* (New York: Dutton, 1998), part three.

Lusophone liberation refocused their efforts to different causes.[1109] Rather than receding to the background, these organizations and individuals used existing strategies, tactics, and relationships to agitate more effectively for constructive engagement in Africa and beyond.

The retention of this network and many of its most important organizations ensured the continued expansion of political power of the New Left Internationalism. As political scientist Bert Klandermans notes, "Organizations and networks among individuals play an important role in the transition from latent to manifest political potential."[1110] By forging ties between activists and gaining access to the political process in the late 1960s and 1970s, the Lusophone solidarity movement expanded beyond the social mobilization of the earliest anti-apartheid organizing to affect policy – albeit at the margins. The introduction of congressional constraints on the reactionary anti-communism regularly adopted by the executive branch had become a component of politics in the early 1970s and demonstrated its full power in undermining the Angolan intervention of 1976. In other parts of the Western alliance – in Sweden and the Netherlands –even more noticeable policy shifts had occurred. Activists now provided policymakers with information on events in southern Africa prejudiced in the favor of socialist nationalists, effectively combating the official modes of communication dominated by the minority governments of the region that had long set the frameworks for Western decision makers. In so doing, they extended the Third World challenge to the Cold War beyond Southeast Asia to include Africa and, by extension, other parts of the global South not previously central to Western strategy. Activists demonstrated the political potential of a New Left internationalism to policymakers through both popular mobilization and effective informational framing,

[1109] Other groups included the evolution of Southern Africa News from the Mozambique Project and the Zimbabwe Group's origins in the Norfolk, VA protest of the Portuguese at the Azalea Festival.
[1110] Bert Klandermans, "The Formation and Mobilization of Consensus," in Klandedrmans, et. al., *International Social Movement Research: A Research Annual*. Vol I (Greenwich: JAI Press, 1988), 180.

convincing many to adopt this approach not only as an effective form of global justice but as a way to please a wide swath of constituents.

The lasting success of the Lusophone solidarity movement is perhaps best seen in the revival of global anti-apartheid activism, which reached new heights in the 1980s. Certainly, there was not an unbroken line between the Portuguese African struggles and later activism, with everything from the cycle of university enrollment to ANC setbacks affecting the movement. Yet there existed a number of continuities that showed the important role renewed attention to southern Africa in the early 1970s played in promoting and expanding anti-apartheid activism. Examples range from the founding of TransAfrica to the British protest against Barclay's loans to South Africa, which was a direct continuation of the Dambusters campaign against Cahora Bassa. Even where breaks occurred, organizers in the late 1970s and 1980s could look back on earlier successes to legitimize and encourage action. Thus when university students began demanding institutional divestment from South Africa in places such as Harvard, they consciously drew linkages to the earlier Gulf boycott.[1111] While strategies and networks aided the expansion of activism, perhaps the Portuguese African solidarity movement's greatest contribution was proof that change was possible in southern Africa, and that Westerners could play an active role. Portugal's collapse after more than a decade of determined resistance renewed the momentum of decolonization and self-determination after it had seemingly ground to a halt in the 1960s. According to British activist Tony Gifford, these events demonstrated that "These regimes are not eternal. They can be brought down. They can fade. They can fall. And I think that probably encouraged a lot of people."[1112]

[1111] See for example "Change Investment Policy," *Harvard Crimson*, 19 November 1977; Jesse M. Fried, "A Long and Winding Road," *Harvard Crimson*, 15 September 1983.
[1112] Tony Gifford, phone interview with author, 1 August 2013.

This longer, broader history shows that the seemingly unique global anti-apartheid movement was in many ways an extension, expansion, and perfection of older trends of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism that had taken root in the Western system during the 1960s and 1970s. While Sifiso Mxolisi Ndlovu and others have credited the ANC with building support for regional allies such as FRELIMO and the MPLA, in many ways the opposite is true.[1113] During the period when the ANC struggled to sell its vision of a free South Africa to the wider world, the environment that would allow later activism to flourish took shape.[1114] The CONCP depiction of an egalitarian social revolution justified Western support for leftist parties as an extension of the general challenge to the anti-communist consensus. Networks of activists and policymakers formed around southern Africa, while the inclusive internationalism of the CONCP parties inspired Euro-Americans to imagine their own domestic liberations in terms comparable to African struggles happening an ocean away. When anti-apartheid activists went looking for people to support protests and divestment campaigns in later years, they found, according to Joseph Jordan, "a receptive audience among people whose consciousness had been raised during the campaigns of the 1970s."[1115] They also found existing pathways for bringing popular concerns about Western foreign policy to the men and women who could help remake it. This new consciousness and political access routes owed a debt to a generation of activists who had united around the global struggles of the CONCP.

While Lusophone solidarity organizing had its most direct effects on the success of anti-apartheid activism, its contributions to the formation of a wider New Left

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[1113] Sifiso Mxolisi Ndlovu, "The ANC and the World," in *The Road to Democracy in South Africa*, ed. SADET, volume I (Pretoria: UNISA Press, 2010), 505.
[1114] Christabel Gurney, "The 1970s: The Anti-Apartheid Difficult Decade," *Journal of South Africa Studies* 35:2 (June 2009).
[1115] Joseph Jordan, "The 1970s" in *No Easy Victories*, ed. William Minter, et.al. (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2008), 123.

internationalism should not be ignored. More than simply demonstrating the effectiveness of popular organizing against traditional Euro-American policy in Africa, the joint victory over imperialism and Western interventionism in the former Portuguese colonies legitimized a wider critique of the Cold War. Particularly in the United States, Portuguese Africa became part of an international trinity symbolizing popular resistance to a status quo foreign policy that also included Vietnam and Chile. If the war in Southeast Asia had opened many eyes to the inequality of the existing system and Chile had partially demonstrated its global character, than the defeat of the Angola intervention in 1975 had proven to Western activists that proactive action could end such policies. The complex, decentralized grassroots-congressional networks that animated Lusophone solidarity thus became models for future organizing.

The wider anti-imperial influence of Portuguese African solidarity was especially apparent in the growth of the Latin American lobby, which would challenge Carter and later Ronald Reagan in their cooperation with anti-communist dictatorships and support for rightist guerilla movements. One of the most important institutions in this struggle, the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), modeled itself directly on WOA during a period when it was combatting the Luso-American alliance and the Angolan intervention. After its foundation in 1974, WOLA learned from its African counterpart – according to founder John Sinclair – "that such an office could be effective."[1116] Operating out of the same United Methodist Building and sharing compatible politics, longtime WOLA director Joseph Eldridge remembered observing and learning from WOA's work in the 1970s – notably reproducing the challenging balance of relations between politicians and grassroots activist groups. While the two groups would work in largely parallel geographic areas in

[1116] Coletta A. Youngers, *The Washington Office on Latin America: Thirty Years of Advocacy for Human Rights, Democracy, and Social Justice* (Washington: Washington Office on Latin America, 2006), 12.

the 1980s, they both promoted the personal diplomacy of Third World actors, worked with similar individuals on the Hill, and adopted common rhetoric of resistance to an imperial presidency. There also remained a joint commitment to a common anti-imperial ideology. Individuals working on Latin America would join anti-apartheid protests, while WOA strengthened its condemnation of official support to UNITA by linking it to similar aid programs in Latin America.[1117] The informal, interpersonal networks that existed between groups such as WOA, ACOA, WOLA, the Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy, TransAfrica, and other groups helped coordinate information and political connections aimed at limiting the power of the executive branch to intervene in the global South.[1118] Like the Lusophone solidarity movement that played a pivotal role in cementing the New Left internationalism of the 1970s, these movements of the 1980s gained strength from cooperation that occurred across geographic and ideological boundaries in pursuit of common foreign policy goals.

This coordination owed a debt to the fact that lobbying groups concerned with specific regions or nations understood their primary causes as examples of wider foreign policy problems, and therefore advocated that policymakers adopt broader global critiques of American policy. As WOLA's Joe Eldridge recalled, "we were all part of the progressive foreign policy movement, trying to influence official policy."[1119] Politicians closely associated with individual causes like apartheid or human rights in Latin America often

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[1117] Joseph Eldridge, telephone interview with author, 19 May 2014; see for example of WOA connections, Christine Root, draft article for Guardian, 16 March 1981, Folder 109, Box 15, Washington Office on Africa Papers, Yale Divinity School Library (New Haven, CT).

[1118] For instance, all the above mentioned groups (or prominent members of them) were part of the Covert Operations Task Force along with the Maryknoll Fathers, the Unitarian Universalist Association, the Chile Legislative Center, and a half dozen additional groups. Covert Operations Task Force Phone Tree, no date [1980/1?], Folder 109, Box 15, WOA Papers, YDL.

[1119] Eldridge interview.

lent their voices and leadership to colleagues working on these other, analogous issues.[1120] The limited formalization of this alliance network made it difficult to recreate the mass protests of the Vietnam era, but after Angola this model seemed less necessary.[1121] Rather, parallel networks of Third World actors, grassroots activists, left-leaning lobbyists, and sympathetic politicians provided Cold War detractors with access to policymakers. Ad hoc exchanges between these geographically defined activist networks helped create common languages of dissent, while individual victories in African policy provided encouragement for others working on similar issues in Latin America and elsewhere – and vice versa. The result was a sustained challenge to the grand vision of Cold War containment that had long animated American and wider Western policy. This new state of affairs would define the contentious domestic politics of the final fifteen years of the Cold War.

The complex, decentralized nature of this New Left internationalist movement has long obscured its growth and impact. The prominence of individual manifestations such as the Vietnam protests of the 1960s and anti-apartheid movement of the 1980s have drawn attention away from the consistent organizing, lobbying, and network building that linked traditions of anti-colonialism with later human rights-centered internationalism. Western solidarity with Portuguese African liberation provides a case study of transnational advocacy at the margins of international news, while also capturing a moment of transition in the way Euro-Americans engaged with foreign policy. In the wake of the catharsis of Vietnam, transnational anti-imperial networks provided pathways for stateless nationalists

[1120] For example, Houston Congressman Mickey Leland (D-TX), known as a strong anti-apartheid voice, took the lead criticizing Ronald Reagan's policy in El Salvador in 1981 – which many at the time rightly understood as directly related to the White House's desire to support Jonas Savimbi as a component of the Reagan Doctrine.

[1121] Importantly, when mass protests did occur, it was sometimes difficult for organizers to limit their scope to only Latin American or Africa. In 1987, for example, popular demands forced the New Mobe to expand a plan anti-contra campaign to include South Africa, resulting in the National Mobilization for Justice and Peace in Central America and Southern Africa. Roger Peace, *A Call to Conscious: the Anti-Contra War Campaign* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2012), 211.

from the global South to appeal to an array of Western constituencies. The result was what ACOA head George Houser called a "basis of unity" for "bring[ing] together liberal and militant, black and white on a minimum program supporting the liberation struggle in Africa."[1122] This broad New Left coalition found in the Portuguese colonies proof of concept, demonstrating the political power inherent in cooperation across partisan and racial lines. In the wake of a decade of social upheaval that would remain unmatched, the Portuguese African liberation struggles had established a replicable model for the unification of a transnational civil society opposed to the Cold War. Though never large enough to replace the anti-communist consensus that had preceded it, this internationalism based on concepts of global social, economic, and racial justice would help define leftist politics and foreign policy activism for decades to come.

[1122] Though referring to ACOA's own role as a clearinghouse, Houser captured one of the main goals of the CONCP revolutionaries and the reason they worked closely with his organization. Memo, Houser to Executive Board, April 1970, Reel III, Microfilm Records of the American Committee on Africa, Part I: ACOA Executive Committee minutes and National Office memoranda, 1952-1975.

Acronym Glossary

AAM - Anti-Apartheid Movement

AC – *Angola Comité*

ACOA – American Committee on Africa

AFL–CIO – American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations

AFSC – American Friends Service Committee

AH – Albert Heijn, Dutch national supermarket chain

ALD – African Liberation Day

ALSC – African Liberation Support Committee

ANC - African National Congress

ANLCA – American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa

ASEA – Swedish hydroelectric engineering firm

CAP – Congress of Afrikan People

CCLAMG – Chicago Committee for the Liberation of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea

CFMAG – Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola, and Guine

CIA – Central Intelligence Agency

CONCP – *Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas* (Conference of Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies)

CORE – Congress of Racial Equality

CRV - Committee of Returned Volunteers

CWS – Church World Services

CZA – *Comité Zuid-Afrika*

FIM – Frontier Internship in Mission

FLN –*Front de Libération Nationale* (Algerian National Liberation Front)

FNLA – *Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola* (National Liberation Front of Angola)

FOR – Fellowship of Reconciliation

FRELIMO – *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (Mozambique Liberation Front)

GBC - Gulf Boycott Coalition

GE – General Electric

GRAE – *Govêrno Revolucionário de Angola no Exílio* (Angolan Revolutionary Government in Exile)

LCA – Liberation Committee for Africa

LSM – Liberation Support Movement

MACSA – Madison Area Committee on Southern Africa

MCF – Movement for Colonial Freedom

MFA –*Movimento das Forças Armadas* (Portuguese Armed Forces Movement)

MP – member of [British] Parliament

MPLA – *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola)

NAACP – National Association for the Advancement of Colored People

OMA – *Organização da Mulher de Angola* (Organization of Angolan Women)

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCC – National Council of Churches

New Mobe – New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam

NSCF - National Student Christian Federation

NSSM – National Security Study Memorandum

NWRC – New World Resource Center

OAU – Organization of African Unity

OMA – *Organização da Mulher de Angola* (Angolan Women's Organization)

PACFA – Portuguese-American Committee on Foreign Affairs

PAIGC – *Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde* (African Independence Party for Guinea and Cabo Verde)

PALC – Pan-African Liberation Committee

PASC – Pan-African Solidarity Committee

PCP – Portuguese Communist Party

PIDE – *Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado* (International and State Defense Police [of Portugal])

PvdA – *Partij van de Arbeid* (Dutch Labour Party)

SAC – Southern Africa Committee

SARA – *Serviço de Assistência aos Refugiados de Angola* (The Angolan Refugee Assistance Service)

SC – Security Council (United Nations)

SDS – Students for a Democratic Society

SIDA – Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency

SNCC – Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee

SOBU – Students Organized for Black Unity

UCC – United Church of Christ

UCM – University Christian Movement,

UDENAMO – *União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique* (National Democratic Union of Mozambique)

UDI – Southern Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence

UN – United Nations

UNITA – *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* (The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)

UPA –*União dos Povos de Angola* (Union of Angolan Peoples)

WCC – World Council of Churches

WOA - Washington Office on Africa

YOBU – Youth Organized for Black Unity

ZAMCO –consortium that coordinated transnational contractors who began construction of the Cahora Bassa Dam across the Zambezi River in Mozambique

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Barbara Brown

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Dick Clark

Kathleen Cleaver (New Haven, CT)

Anne Crane

Marylee Crofts

Frouke and Jan Draisma (Deventer, Netherlands)

Margaret Dickinson

Mimi Edmunds

Joseph Eldridge

Howard Fuller

Polly Gaster

Anthony Gifford

Ole Gjerstad

Christabel Gurney

Eileen Hanson-Kelly

George Houser

Bertil Högberg (Uppsala, Sweden)

Gail Hovey

Caroline Hunter

Willard Johnson

Richard Knight

Soren Lindh

Margaret Ling

Gene Locke (Houston, TX)

Omowale Luthuli

John Marcum

Robert Maurer

William Minter

Prexy Nesbitt (Chicago, IL)

Brenda Randolph (Silver Spring, MD)

Richard Righter

Lars Rudebeck (Uppsala, Sweden)

Danny Schechter (New York, NY)

Tim Smith

David Sogge

Rick Sterling

Stephanie Urdang

Bob Van der Winden (Amsterdam, Netherlands)

Dick Urban Vestbro (Uppsala, Sweden)

Cora and Peter Weiss (New York, NY)

David Wiley

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